THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 14, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
STAT
STAT
9 September 1988
NOTE TO: Robert Blackwell, NIO/USSR
Dous MacEachin, D/SOVA/DDI
DDI/SOVA
DDI/SOVA
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
I have been asked to deliver a 14 October breakfast address
on developments in the Soviet Union to the Colloquium on
Science, Arms Control and National Security sponsored by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. I am
afraid this means I must prevail on your good offices once
again for an update of "The Soviet Speech".
Naturally, any suggestions or proposed changes will be
welcome but, in particular, I would be interested in some
additional language on the following:
-- I would like to say something about the Soviets' fear
to take risks on unemployment, inflation, price reform,
etc.
Also, what can we say about the Soviet budget deficit
and printing money that you have written about. I
would like to include something about the 60-70 billion
ruble deficit (at least that is what I remember from
the SOVA paper) and that this represents more than
twice the percentage of GNP as the US deficit. Can I
do that unclassified and, if so, how should I say it?
I appreciate your patience in doing this again. If, beyond
specific comments, corrections, or additions, you have any
broader points where with the passage of time the speech is
becoming outdated, please let me know those also.
I would appreciate having your comments by the time I
return from my Middle East trip on 29 September.
Robert M. Gates
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOGUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR MODERNIZATION
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST
POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO
TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A
STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES
SHIFTS CONSTANTLY. WHILE HIS REFORM PROGRAM WAS APPROVED
ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, WHEN
GORBACHEV WENT ON VACATION IN AUGUST, CONSERVATIVES LED BY
LIGACHEV AGAIN VOCALLY CRITIZED ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM.
MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THERE WERE NO SENIOR
PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE CONFERENCE OR IN ITS WAKE. IT IS
CLEAR THAT, FOR THE LONG TERM, THERE WILL BE CONTINUING BATTLES
OVER PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND WHO HOLDS POLITICAL
POWER. EVEN GORBACHEV ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST DECADES.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE --
AND ESPECIALLY FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER.
OPPOSITION FROM THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS
IS A CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE
ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES
TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY
RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE COUNT SOME 600
POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM
RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST
DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE JANUARY.)
THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT
THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE
SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS
OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE
ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT --
A WEAK NEED TO BE SURE IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE
TACITLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
OPPOSITION, AND HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO BYPASS THE
PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO
TAKE THAT POSITION HIMSELF, AND THEN TO FORCE THROUGH HIS
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A
TIMETABLE TO DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND
THEREBY SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE
DAY TO DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY. IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS
DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE
LATE 1920S AND 1930S. THE SOLE DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS
ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT
THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE CAN SO RADICALLY
ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE AND WHETHER THE
PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO WEAKENED AND EVEN
DISMANTLED.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR
SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW
ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED
THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET
UNION. IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO DESCRIBE THE SOVIET ECONOMIC
CONDITION AS DISASTROUS. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE DIMENSIONS
OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO CORRECT THESE
PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE.
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING.
BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO
MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED
BY 1991 AS INTENDED, THE REFORMS WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY,
AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS
DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ABOUT .5% IN 1987, DOWN FROM
ALMOST 4% IN 1986, AND WILL BE ABOUT 2.25% THIS YEAR.
HE WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH TO MEET PLAN TARGETS.
-- GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING
PRODUCTION.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT?DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
'DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE.
A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE
RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF
THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS
FROM THE WEST.
TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT -- TRUCKS FIRST, CARS
LATER. THE RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO
ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET
ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS
GENERALLY AWFUL HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE
CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD WAS SET IN 1954; AND FOOD PRICES
OVERALL IN 1962. STATE SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT
IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO
GIVE THEM GRAIN. (AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE KNOW ANY PRICE
REFORM CAN ONLY HURT THEM.)
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS
REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND
RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS. INDEED,
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONSUMER HAVE WORSENED
STEADILY DURING GORBACHEV'S TENURE. AND HE OFFERS
LITTLE HOPE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FOR YEARS.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM REMAINS TO BE FOUGHT AND WON. THE
GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING.
POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL?DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT AN IMPORTANT
MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF HIS VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT
THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF
THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL.
THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO
CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM.
THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. BUT, THE PARTY
CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA.
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL?EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD?FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST HAPPEN AT SOME POINT. THIS
IS EVIDENT IN THE RECENT PASSAGE OF NEW LAWS THAT AGAIN
CLAMP DOWN ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND PROTEST.
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC
HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY CHANGED
IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON
HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION
IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS
OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR
HOSTILITY IS LIKELY TO GROW AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A
WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS
SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE
BUREAUCRACY. ONCE AGAIN, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR
CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN-- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS
INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT
REALLY IS.
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR?REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND,
ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP
AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET
STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF
CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO
THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY
ARE ILL?EQUIPPED. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE IN THE EARLY
1970S CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN
DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOWED MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED
RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND
OPENED TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. UNDER THE GUISE OF
ARCANE MILITARY DOCTRINAL ISSUES SUCH AS "REASONABLE
SUFFICIENCY" AND "DEFENSIVE DEFENSE," WE ARE SEEING A DEBATE
OVER THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES DEDICATED TO THE MILITARY. BY AND
LARGE IT IS A DEBATE PITTING CIVILIANS AGAINST THE MILITARY,
WITH THE FORMER ARGUING THAT SOVIET SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED AT
A LOWER LEVEL OF EXPENDITURE AND LOWER FORCE LEVELS AND THE
MILITARY DISAGREEING. DESPITE THIS DEBATE, AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF FUTURE LEVELING OFF OR PERHAPS EVEN DECLINE IN SOVIET
MILITARY SPENDING, AT THIS POINT WE, SEE NO SLACKENING OF SOVIET
WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC
WEAPONS SUCH AS LASERS AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES
APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL
BE REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE
MID-1990S, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR
ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST
US WEAPONS ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR
CAPABILITIES FOR WAR?FIGHTING. AS OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES
AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED MORE THAN A BILLION
DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN
1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN
ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT
TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR -- TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE,
CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH
YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS
SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS. THE FOREMOST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE
DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE CAN AND SHOULD
EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING
UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY
TEST ALLIANCE COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA
AND JAPAN SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL
OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN
THEM AND THE US. AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
114
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF
ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO
STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT
ECONOMIC. HE DOES SEEK TO AVOID NEW, UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT
DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT REQUIRE. THESE WOULD PROBABLY
BE SUBSTANTIAL IN THE 1990S AND COULD WREAK HAVOC ON HIS
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AGENDA. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL
SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET. FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR
RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES AND
THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR
PRODUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE
MID-1990S. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS COULD GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC
BENEFIT AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE
FUTURE.
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS I NOTED EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING
DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN
MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET
ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW
OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN
INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE
PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC
ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE?BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START WOULD ALSO
OBVIOUSLY LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY
BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM?LINE
POSITIONS WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE
STRATEGIC POSTURE.
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OR POLITICAL LIFE OF
THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV
ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE.
HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND
CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE
CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE
HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS TO RESTORE IN THE USSR A SYSTEM
IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED
THUS OPENING THE WAY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND
THEREBY TO MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE
PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY.
GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION"
SOVIET?STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM
MARXISM?LENINISM AND ITS ESSENTIALLY TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE.
HIS ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC UNION AND OTHER SUCH
EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE POINT. THE DICTATORSHIP
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN AGAIN WHETHER GORBACHEV HAS SET IN
MOTION FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT REPRESENT A TURN FROM
TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF OVERTURNING THE STATUS
QUO IN THE WEST TO MORE PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE QUESTION OF
GORBACHEV'S LONGER RANGE INTENTIONS DOMINATES THE DEBATE IN THE
WEST, AND, INTERESTLY, APPEARS ALSO TO BE A SUBJECT OF DEBATE
IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN AN
EXCHANGE IN THE SOVIET PRESS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO
ADDRESSING THIS VERY ISSUE. THE APPARENT LEADER OF THE
CONSERVATIVES, LIGACHEV, HAS WRITTEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION
CANNOT ABANDON A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON CLASS INTEREST -- THAT
IS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME, KHOVLEV AND FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, HAVE ARGUED THAT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THE
SOVIET UNION CAN NO LONGER PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON
THIS PREMISE BUT MUST ADOPT A MORE STABILIZING ROLE.
19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
THERE IS A CHANCE -- A VERY SMALL ONE IN MY VIEW -- THAT
GORBACHEV IS SETTING LOOSE FORCES THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE PARTY
WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR INTENTIONS
AND EXPECTATIONS, ULTIMATELY MAY BRING A FUNDAMENTAL AND
WELCOME TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT HOME AND ABROAD.
AS WE HOPE THAT THIS REMOTE POSSIBILITY SOMEDAY COMES TO PASS,
I WOULD ADVISE, IN OLIVER CROMWELL'S FAMOUS WORDS, THAT WE
"TRUST IN GOD, BUT KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY."
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING
OTHERWISE.
IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS
WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR
FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS VERY
LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME
OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID,
WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET
SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON?INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A
SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY
EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND
DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE
BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE
SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME
SOVIET?WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD
PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS
BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING
PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE
SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE
TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE
CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS,
FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET
GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, ?OR EVEN EXPANDED
BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
21
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS CLEAR: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. SEEING THIS REALITY
CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE
AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150013-3