CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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Lir DEA.#11,..C.1 1
2 May 1951
Copy No. CJ-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
3. Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector (page 4).
5, Communist China's railroad to Indochina reported completed (page 5).
6. Petroleum being shipped to Communist China from Indonesia (page 5).
NEAR EAST
8. UN Secretary-General Lie cautions Israel on its international
polities (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
11. Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement (page 9).
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FAR EAST
3. Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector:
CINCFE Telecom A CINCFE telecon of 1 May reported that
1 May 51 five enemy tanks attacked six miles northeast
SECRET of Seoul and that UN aircraft observed seven-
teen more in enemy rear areas.
Comment: Although there have been almost
continuous air sightings of' enemy armor since January, scarcely any
ground contacts have been reported during this period. This tank con-
tact is reported in the sector occupied by the Chinese Communist 3rd
Army Group, previously reported as having received armored support
in Manchuria. Two major .North Korean armored units are also known
to be located in western North Korea.
KO'
An 11 April Far East Command analysis of
enemy tank sightings revealed 82 sightings in western Korea south of
Pyongyang for the period from 16 March, to 10 April. In the light of
previous experience indicating that air sightings fail to account for more
than 50 percent of actual armored strength, this same analysis estimated
that the enemy may have at least 150 to 175 tanks for future employment
along the more favorable west coast road net.
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5. Communist China's railroad to Indochina re
orted comtleted:
US Cons Gen Hong Kong An untested source has informed the US Consul
30 Apr 51 General in Hong Kong that the railroad from
CONFIDENTIAL .Laipin (in Kwangsi province) to the Indochina
border at Chermankuan has been completed by
using rails taken from a section of another line in Kweichow province.
The source alleges that the line from' Nanning to the Indochina border
is the same narrow gauge that is used in Indochina railroads.
Comment: This line was previously reported
scheduled for completion by the end of April.
6. Petroleum being shi
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01141A 41
ed to Communist China from Indonesia: ,;, k
1)1?v
US Cons Gen Hong Kong The US Consul General in Hong Kong reports
5 Apr 51 that the tightening of Singapore's export regu-
CONFIDENTIAL lationsjyJed to an organized movement of
goods from Singapore to Indonesia for trans-
shipment to Hong Kong, Macao, or directly to Communist China. The
Consul General states that, although the trade is not large as yet, opera-
tions may become larger in scale. He mentions in particular the move-
ment of petroleum products via this route, and says that mounting evi-
dence indicates that considerable finance As available to make bossible
a steady flow of petroleum to Macao from Indonesia.
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Comment: US officials in Singapore and Hong
Kong have been reporting information (which they evaluate as probably
true) concerning the planned delivery of a large quantity of motor gaso-
line or crude oil to Macao, possibly from Indo esia.)
NEAR EAST
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8. UN Secretarv-peneral Lie cautions Israel on its international policies:
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US Emb Tel Aviv According to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv,
30 Apr 51 UN Secretary-General Lie has discussed with
SECRET Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett the present
unsatisfactory situation in the Middle East
Referring to the dangers arising from Israel's hatred of the Arab States
and to the lack of progress in improving that situation, Lie advised the
Israeli Foreign Minister (1) to follow a milder policy in international
relations, (2) to abide by the UN decisions, and (3) while retaining a
necessary independence, to avoid any course that would lessen Israel's
friendship with the US. Lie stressed the importance to Israel of Ameri-
can goodwill, citing the Rule- controversy -- particularly the retaliatory
bombing -- as an example of unwise policies which might jeopardize US
goodwill.
Comment: Domestic considerations within
Israel -- such as the strong Israeli nationalism, the influence upon Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion of General Yaclin, Arrhy Chief of Staff, and the
problems involved in a general election this summer -- have made it
difficult for the government to pursue a moderate foreign policy, par-
ticularly in regard to Israel's relations with the Arab States. Lie's
advice, however, may have some effect in improving Israel's attitude
toward the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the various Mixed
Armistice Commissions.
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WESTERN EUROPE,
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11. Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement:
US Emb Madrid The US Embassy in Madrid reports that, despite
29 Apr 51 previous denials, the secretary of the non-Corn-
SECRET munist opposition Comite Interior de Coordina-
don (CIC) now admits that his organization was
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? ? ? ?
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behind the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. The CIC is planning a further
series of non-violent strikes culminating in a general sit-down strike
in Madrid during the month of May synchronized with the issuance of a
Monarchist manifesto calling on Franco to turn over the government to
the Pretender Don Juan.
Comment:
the CIC, a coalition of clandestine Monarchist, Socialist and Anarchist
organizations within Spain, does not appear justified in claiming credit
for instigating or directing the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. Monarch-
ists within the CIC, who sense the latent possibilities of the strike move-
ment, apparently are anxious to use it as a lever for the immediate
ouster of Franco and the restoration of the monarchy under Don J'uan.
On the other hand, the non-Monarchist elements of the CIC, who have
a more intimate grasp of the aspirations of Spanish workers, counsel
caution, since they feel that any undue haste might well jeopardize
their cause by affording Franco a pretext for a new series of repressive
measures that could break the back of the non-violent strike movement
before it gains momentum.
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