COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 25, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy _)Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-_RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
1,17,1
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
DCISEC-CSS-M99
25 March 1977
COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SECURITY COMMITTEE
? Minutes of Meeting
. Held at CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia
25 March 1977
L, The ninety-ninth meeting of. the Computer Security
Subcommittee of the Director of Central Intelligence Security
Committee was held between 0930 and 1300 hours .on 25 March 1977
in Room 7F21, CIA Headquarters Building. In attendance were:
Mr. Thomas Wasczykowski, FBI Member
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Robert Kyanko, Treasury/USSS Member
George Herrmann, State Member
Robert Cameron, Navy Member
James Studer, Army Member
(-apt. Ronald Pherigo, Air Force Member
miss Concetta Conigliaro, State Alternate
?
25X1
25X1
25X1'
25X1
25X1
Mr. Eugene Epperly, Office of Secretary Defense
(Comptroller), Observer
LCDR Dean H. Beyer, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Observer
CON F .E.77N Ti A i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
? kArati
2.- The.security level of the meeting was TOP SECRET SI.
3. The Issues of Draft DCID 1/16: The members of the
Subcommittee have not met as a formal body since late August 1976.
However, a nucleus of the membership have been diligently
meeting and working as an ad hoc group in an attempt to refine
and improve upon the 16 March 1976 draft version of. DCID 1/16.
During this period, two versions of DCID 1/16 have emerged; the
first is a January 1977 version and the other is a February
1977 version. The January 1977 version defines Classified
? Foreign Intelligence as "specially caveated...information (1) on
the capability, intentions, and activities of foreign powers,
organizations, or their agents; (2) concerning activities
conducted to protect the United States and United States citizens
from foreign espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination or
terrorism; and (3) concerning methods of Collecting foreign
intelligence, sources of foreign intelligence' (whether human,
technical, or other), and methods and techniques of analysis
that is designated by an Intelligente Community organization
of the United States Government (as set forth in E. 0, 11905)
as requiring:a specific degree of protectionainst unauthorized
disclosure, modification or destruction for,aasons of national
security." Also in this version is the Expanded Compartmented.
Mode. This mode states that "Individual NFIB members, on a case
by case basis, may authorize designated remote terminals and
peripheral devices secured to the SECRET level, and/or personnel
cleared for SECRET material access to an ADP system operating
in the Compartmented Mode. The above provision'shall,-a'pply
only after the NFIB member has made a determination that to
operate an ADP system in the Compartmnted Mode without this
option would significantly impair the-mission execution capability
of a NFIB agency or .department. The NFIB member, before approving
an operation in this mode, will ensure that other security
capabilities within the system have been strengthened, e.g.,'
increased physical protection and increased hardware/software
controls. As a minimum; the NFIB member will ensure that
a Remote Terminal Security Officer (RTS0) cleared for access
to the highest level of information being processed by the
,system, is present, during all periods of operations, in those
facilities where SECRET cleared personnel access the ADP system's
resources through remote terminals and/or other peripheral
devices." These two issues continue to be the sources of
controversy among the members of the SubcoMmittee. The Chairman
of the Security Committee requested that a vote be taken in
the Agency's and Department's of the Subcommittee membership on
2
CO.NinDt4NTIAL.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
AL
the January 1977 version. The vote was accomplished and the
resultS revealed that six (6) members disapproved of the
aforementioned two issues being in the draft DCID 1/16. The
remaining four (4) members approved Of the January 1977 version
in principal, with some editing to be accomplished. The Chairman
of the Subcommittee presented these vote sheets with their comments
to the Chairman; Security Committee, at his request. The Security
Committee Chairman reviewed this vote action and requested a
re-write of the draft DCID 1/16 to reflect the majority opinion.
Thus, the February.1977 version was written. This version was
prepared by NSA and CIA at the request of the subcommittee
Chairman. It deletes the Classified Foreign Intelligence definition
and substitutes, "The term "foreign intelligence" as used in this
directive is set forth in E. 0. 11905 and is so designated."
It further deletes the Expanded Compartmented Mode entirely. It
adds "No exception can be granted which would allow personnel
cleared less than Top. Secret 1 to request access to an ADP
system or network, which contained Sensitive Compartmented
Information. The footnote 1 after Top Secretequires the
clearance be granted based On the requiremental DCID 1/14.
The February-1977 version was given to the Chairman, Security
Committee who in turn handed out copies to the membership of
the Security Committee. A meeting of the Security Committee
was held at which many subcommittee members were present. ,
Controversial discussion ensued at this meeting on the afore-
mentioned issues. This resulted in the Chairman, Security'
Committee requesting the Subcommittee to meet for the-purpose
of preparing footnotes by the disagreeing members on the February
1977 version.. The due date for the footnoting was fixed for
15 April 1977. Thus, the 25 March 1977 meeting was convened.
The four dissenting members, Air Force, Army, Navy, and DIA
presented case studies to illustrate their problems should the
February 1977 draft be adopted. Again, controversial disscussion
ensued on these issues. The. NSA member suggested that an attempt
be made to resolve these issues by meeting with the Air Force
?
-and any other members interested are welcome to attend. The
Air force member Stated that he believed the issues could not be
resolved at the subcommittee level and declined th NSA suggestion.
The DIA member pointed out that the requirements of DCID 1/14
for a background investigation should not be applied to TOP .
SECRET collateral clearances. He indicated that DIA's interpre-
tation of classified foreign intelligence as stated in E011905
should not apply to unclassified material or foreign counterintel-
ligence.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5
The membership discussed the automated systems that were
?presented as examples. The NSA member pointed out that these
systems Were of the tactical variety and their accessability
Was clearly defined on a functional basis during design:
General purpose systems allowing numerous kinds of Activities.
and accessabilities present a .risk that is not acceptable. The
NSA member, stated that general purpose processing is the basic
concern of DCID 1/16. She felt that if and when the February
1977 draft is published, the subcommittee should address chang4s
in the Dcip 1/16 by defining computer operations on 4 functional
basis. She believes this 'mould require a year of effort by the
subcommittee.
? The meeting adjourned with no resolutions. The Chairman
announced that this effort on DCID 1/16 would resume on 1 April
1977 at0930 hours.
5. Other Business - No new business was presented.
25X1,
Executive Secretary
Computer Security Subcommittee
4
CONFIDENTIAL ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/10: CIA-RDP89B01354R000400510016-5