NASSAR AND THE CONSERVATIVE ARAB MONARCHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 12, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 March 1958
MEMORANDUM FCR THE DCI
SUBJECT: Nasser and the Conservative Arab Monarchs
1. Nasser has seized the opportunities provided him to launch a
violent propaganda offensive against both the Iraq.Jordan Federation and
King Saud. We do not believe that, in this, he is acting on a definite
plan br the immediate overthrow of King Hussein or King Saud/ although
that is certainly his ultimate intention. Rather, we believe that he
is acting opportunistically to advance his long-range objectives -. the
elimination of foreign influence and 'the establishment of his own hege.
many over a united Arab area -. expecting that eventually internal develop.
ments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia will accomplish his purposes. The
existing level of Arab excitement is such, however, that the situation
may develop more rapidly than Nasser intends.
2. Nasserts attack on Saud: The exposure of SaAdls plot with
Sarraj and the propaganda barrage aimed at Saud from Cairo and Damnscus
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will probably not) of themselves, bring about Saudis downfall, but his
prestige and authority in the royal family and among his advisers and chief
henchmen have probably been damaged. Saudis position in his own house
has already been weakened by his inability to achieve progress on the matters
of Buraimi and the Gulf of Aqaba, and by the deteriorating economic situa.
tion in Saudi Arabia.
3. A continued Egyptian-Syrian propaganda campaign designed to
challenge Saudis claims to area influence and leadership and to label
him as a collaborater with the "inperialists" is likely to be highly
effective among radical Arab nationalists even in Saudi Arabia. Nasser
could use his substantial personal influence to turn many important Saudis
against their King. Nasser may at present be testing his strength against
Saud only to determine whether to seek to displace him now or later. We
believe it ualkely) however, that the situation has yet developed to the
point at which Nasser can organize an effective palace coup against Saud.
He will probably work further to undermine Saudis position and prestige
until a group favorable to Nasser and capable of wresting power from Saud
does emerge.
4. For his part, Saud is highly unlikely to try to ftght Nasser in the
open. He is much more likely to try to appease Nasser and pay his respects
to the idea of Arab brotherhood and unity. Such a course, however, is un-
likely to gain him relief from United Arab Republic (UA-1) pressures. If presen-
trends continue and Nasser is not sidetracked by interlIal diffi3ulties in the
UARI we believe that Saud's position may become critical within the next year.
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5. The attack on the Arab Federation: After Soma initial display
of enthusiasm, the leaders of the Arab Federation have allowed it to lose
momentum. The delay of Iraq and Jordan in recognizing the UAR and some
slighting remarks about the UAR by Iraqi-Jordanian officials gave Nasser
the occasion for his propaganda attacks on the federation. In a propaganda
contest on any level, the Federation is almost certain to be bested by
the UAR due to the widespread appeal of Nasser's brand of nationalism.
6. Nasser has as yet made no direct move against Jordanl the Federa?
tionts weaker element. However, he has been encouraging the establishment
in Gaza of a government purporting to represent all Palestinian Arabs.
This would have a profoundly disturbing effect on Jordan's West Bank and
would probably provoke disorders which King Hussein's government wollia
have difficulty in putting down.
7. We believe that Nasser could eliminate Hussein and bring about
the formation of a government in Jordan which would join the UAR. He is
probably inhibited, from dming so, however, by the possibility of inter.
vention by Israel, Iraq, or even the US. Nasser probably believes there
is a better than even chance that Israel would attack him if he ousted
Hussein and established his own government in Jordan. He might be willing
to accept this risk, feeling that Israel would appear to be the aggressor
and that he could count on UN and Soviet support similar to that in the
'case of the Sinai invasion in 1956. On balance, however, we believe that
the danger of Israeli attack will cause Nasser to exercise restraint.
. 1 .
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Moreover, the formation of the Iraq.Jordan federation has increased the
likelihood of Iraqi intervention.
8. Longer.rane developments: The strength of the radical UAR is
almost certain to wax and that of the conservative Arab federation to
wane, unless important additions to the Iraq-Jordan Federation's strength
and spirit are made. Nasser will move toward the absorption of both Jordan
and Saudi Arabia in the UAR as the developing situation permits. He will
probably continue to seek to influence developments in Jordan and Saudi
Arabia by propaganda and diplomatic means so as to bring about what appears
to be a voluntary rejection of their conservative leaders and voluntary
adherence to the Syro.Egyptian union. Nasser's accomplishment of this
purpose will be facilitated by widespread popular support throughout the
Arab kindgoms for his leadership and objectives. He will probably be
reluctant to accept the risks involved in initiating the use of armed force.
FOR THE DOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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