THE ITALIAN PRE-ELECTORAL POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 4, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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NEXT OLViEW DATZ:
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DAT : REVIEWER: 018645
STAT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM FCR THE DIRECTOR
4 April 1958
SUBJECT: The Italian Pre-Electoral Political Situation
1. Summary; No major change is likely in the proportion of the
popular vote which the various parties will obtain in the Italian
elections, but minor changes could have a profound effect upon the
kind of government which will emerge. The operation of the new elec-
toral law, which treats the large parties less favorably and the
smaller parties more favorably than in 1953, would produce changes
in the disposition of party strength in the new chamber even if no
changes in percentages of popular vote occurred. Thus, in, order to
retain its present strength in the Chamber the Christian Democrat
Party must receive more popular votes than 1953. The best for which
the CD's can hope appears to be a majority formed with either the
Saragat Socialists or the Liberals. The worst forseeable outcome
would be the failure of the CD's, Liberals, Republicans, and Saragat
Socialists collectively to obtain a majority -- and it would probably
take only a slight decline in their collective popular vote to produce
such a result. It will obviously be difficult, in the best of
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circumstances, to constitute a stable and reliable parliamentary majority
for any government. Should it Prove impossible to do so, Italian govern-
ments in the future would be even less effective than in the past; this
in turn would probably increase the popular appeal of extremist groups
on the right and left.
2. Pre-electoral condition of the parties. The Christian Demo-
cratic Party (CD) is entering the elections under the usual handicaps
of a party which has held power for a long time. The present minority
CD government is not popular, and the party has been embarrassed by
both the clerical and anti-clerical reactions to the conviction of a
Roman Catholic bishop. Although some of the furore over this affair
has abated, the party will probably lose some Catholic votes because of
it; on the other hand, the government's moderate and sensible policy
of non-intervention in the judicial process may encourage some anti-
clericals to feel that the party is worthy of their support.
3. A more serious problem for the CD's is that, under the existing
electoral law, the party will not be treated as favorably as in 1953,
The parliamentary results will be more closely proportional than those
under the preceding law. Thus, the CD's will probably have to increase
their
their share of the total vote by about 2 to 3i- per cent in order to retain/
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present position in the chaMber.* If these gains are made at the expense
of the CD's former coalition partnerst the prospects for forming a demo.
cratic parliamentary majority will be reduced,
4. The prospects that the COS can gain at the expense of the
Communists are not good. Recent advances in Soviet prestige and continuing
popular frustration with the existing political situation have new largely
offset the party losses which resulted from Khrushchevts revelations at
the 20th Party Congress and from the Hungarian affair. The PCI seem
well prepared for the coming elections; its campaign apparently will
concentrate on issues such as peace, independence, security, and un.
employment. The chances for successful exploitation of these issues
are better now than would have been the case as late as six months ago.
The results in 1953 were as follows:
Percent of Popular
Vote
Percent of Seats
in Chamber
_
Communists
22.7
24.2
. Nenni Socialists
12.7
12.7
Saragat Socialists
4.5
3.2
Republicans
1.6
.8
Christian Democrats
10.7
44.9
Liberals
3.0
2.5
Monarchists
6.9
6.8
Neo?Fascists ?
5.9
4.9
Others
1.9
....
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Sigtiea.
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In addition, the party retains a broad organizational base and still
abundant financial resources. Because it is a large party) the PCI
-- like the CD will need to win more votes than it did in 1953 to
retain its position. While the Communists will probably gain some
votes in the South, where they have been organizing vigorously, they
will also lose some votes, particularly of those who remain disaffected
over the events of 1956. We think they will lose a few seats, but
these losses probably will not produce much gain for the center. They
are more likely to benefit the Nenni Socialists or the extreme right.
5. The parliamentary positions of both Socialist parties may be
improved. Despite the failure of the merger negotiations, the maneuver-
ing involved did separate the two parties somewhat from their political
allies i.e., the Nonni Socialists from the Communists and the Saragat
Socialists form the Christian Democrats. This greater degree of inde.
pendence might make these parties more attractive to leftist voters who
are unwilling to vote Communist. In both Socialist parties there will be
considerable in-fighting between pro-merger and anti-merger groups for
favored positions on the two parties' respective electoral lists. How
the factions fare in these intra-party fights may have considerable
effect upon their vote in particular areas and upon their willingness
after the elections to enter into parliamentary or governmental collarbora.
tion with each other or with other party groups in the chamber.
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v.*
6. Although the minor center parties, the Republicans (PRI) and
the Liberals (PLI) stand to benefit from the electoral law, the trend over
the past decade has consistently been against them; since 1948 the strength
of both parties has been halved. -Moreover, because both parties until
recently have been closely associated with the CD, each has had difficulty
in establishing an independent identity in the eyes of the electorate.
The Liberals seem likely to suffer' Some losses to the extreme right in the
South, but may make gains in the North at the expense of the CD, and thus
they have a chance to retain their 13 seats in the chamber.
7. Recent efforts to form a "great right" of monarchists (PNM and
PMP) and Fascists (MSI) have foundered on personal rivalries and political
differences. The principal Obstacle to unity is the determination of
Achille Laura, Secretary of the PMP, to be the recognized champion of the
right. In view of the size of Laurots personal fortune and the success
of his campaign methods in the regional elections in Saudinia there is
reason to believe that he will make further gains this spring toward
realizing his ambitions, principally at the expense of the PNNI and the
MSI. Thus, the aggregate strength of the right would remain about the
same.
8. The cabinetmaking problem. In view of the foregoing, a major
political realignment appears out of the question. Any shifts in voting
strength are likely to be minor; i.e., they will probably not involve
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more than one or two percentage points in the total vote. Yet, these
minor shifts, largely unpredictable- on the basis of exisiting information,
could make a considerable difference in the Construction of post-election
governments. Since it appears that the CDIOrwill not even cone close to
winning an absolute majority,, the three major possibilities are: (a) a
situation similar to that noWexisting, When the votes of all the
democratic parties are required to Constitute a working majority, (b) a
sufficient CD parliamentary gain to permit the formation of a majority
with only one of the other democratic parties, and (c) a failure by the
democratic parties cotbined to gain a parliamentary majority.
9. Even if the four center parties together should win enough seats
to enable them to farm an effective working majority, the establishment of
a quadri-partite coalition would be more difficult than it was in 1953.
Doth the Saragat Socialists and Liberals are fed up with being in the
same government. Saragat has said so rather forcefully. Alghough he
probably would reconsider his position if this were necessary in order
to permit a government to be formed, the left wing of his party would
probably create serious difficulties for him. Perhaps the Democratic
Socialists and Liberals could again learn to live together, but the
resulting coalition would be unstable and probably short.lived.
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j
10. A result permitting the CD's to form a government with either
the PSDI or the PLI is the most favorable for which the CD's can hope.
For this result to obtain, the CD's would formally have to increase their
share of the total vote by about six percent. Such a situation would
be a considerable improvement over the past five years. Yet, it would
not be without its problems, too. A CD choice of a coalition leftward
would produce dissenaion on the CD right, and vice versa. Probably
the CD party would hold together under such conditions, but it could
not always accede to the wishes of its coalition partners. Hence such
governments likewise would be unstable and probably also essentially
immobile.
11. The most disturbing outcome for Italian democracy would be
the failure of the democratic parties collectively to obtain a majority.
It would probably take only a slight decline in their aggregate popular
vote to produce such a result.* Under such circumstances a CD coalition
with one of the more extreme parties of right or left would become the
subject of considerable political maneuvering. For example, Lauro of
the Popular Monarchists would probably make a strong bid for a coalition
with the CD, and he would probably win some support for this among right-
If the four parties won exactly the same aggregate percentage as
in 1953, they might or might not be able to constitute a majority.
The parliamentary results would be extremely close.
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wing CD1s. On the other side Nenni might see in this situation the
opportunity to deal himself into: the government by splitting finally
with the Communists and with the pro-Communists in his own party and
by merging with the Saragei Socialists., ,Such maneuvering on the right
and left would put a severe strain upot, the CD leadership and upon the
unity and discipline in the CD party._
12. It is obvious from the above that Italian politicians will
have great difficulties in constituting a stable and reliable parlia-
mentary majority, even under the best of circumstances. If the worst
of circumstances should materialize -- as may well happen -- it may be
impossible to form any government with a working parliamentary majority*
In this event, Italian governments will be even less effective than in
the past, and this in turn will probably increase the popular appeal
of extremist groups on the right and left.
FCR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
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=MT
SHERMAN RENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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