CONSEQUENCES OF A SOVIET BLOCKADE OF VIENNA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003200100002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONSEQUENCES OF A SOVIET BLOCKADE. OF VIENNA-.
ORE
33-48 11109
411
d
SUMMARY
The western orientation of the present Government of ?Au,stria is
disadvantageous to the USSR which 'seeks to isolate Austria froth the-politidal.
_
and economic influence of the west and eventually to gain complete .control Of
the country. The Austrian Governtent, regardless of its desire, cannot pursue
a strong anti--Soviet policy as long as it eastern provinces _are soviet occupied.
An attempt to force the western powers .from Vienna by a blockade
similar to that around the western sectors of Berlin would result in a partition
of Austria, a withdrawal of the Austrian Government 'from :Vienna to2 some point
in the western zones, and probably in a withdrawal of the US UK, and France
, .
from Vienna. These developments Would cause the western powers to lose some
prestige in western Europe outside of Audt.rie...
oviet gains would be limited
largely to a temporarily enhanced prestige in the Satellite areas. Economically
the USSR would be the loser in Austria, and western loss of prestige could be
offset by increased arms commitments to western Europe and a strong western
stand" in the western zones of Austria. In addition the forced evacuation of
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the western Sectors of Vienna would enhance the danger, of war to the extent that
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it would widen the US-USSR rift and lead the kremlin to intensify its prespure
against the US in other parts of the world.
On balance, therefore, it is believed that the USSR 18 unlikely to
impose a blockade of Vienna or force a .partition of Austria in the near future,
and will prefer for the near future to maintain the present status of Austria
as the last important point of contact between the Soviet Union and the west.
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CONSEQUENCES OF A SCATIET B ?GIME OF VIENNA
1. Evaluation of the resent Soviet osition in Austria
ORE ?33-48 .
The western orientation of ,the present Austrian regime is," disadvantage
to the USSR. . The USSR therefore seeks to isolate Austria from western political
and economic influence and Ultimately may attempt to gain complete control over '
the country with a view to integrating Anetrie,inte the eastern bloc.
Soviet tactics in Europe are designed to effect a MAXIMUM Consolidation
o1 controls in eastern Europe and, mithin limited Soviet capabilities to. create
unrest and dislocation in western Europe. The political and economic repercussions
of the Berlin impasse have not served to advance Soviet objectives either locally
or in western Europe .generally. It is by no mans certain that the USSR will take
action in Austria which would result in a blockade of Vienna and a partition of
Austria. Such action would improve the Soviet political -position in eastern
Austria but would be harmful to Soviet economic interests. Furthermore, a soviet
decision to take measures leading to, a blockade of Vienna would be based primarily
upon a Soviet estimate of US readiness to resist any further Soviet pressure in
Europe.
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In the event that the USSR should- decide that the US is susceptible to
additional pressure, Soviet tactics in Austria might include a blockade of Vienna
and/or an assumption of complete -economic : and administrative control of the
,eastern zone.
The two moves may be dope concurrently or may be separate' tactics
occurring., n either 'order:
Conclusions
On balance, it is believed unlikely that the USSR. wi impose a 'blockade
on Vienna in the near future, - or that the USSR will force a partition of Austria.
While the existence of a pro-western Austrian Government, functionirgin Vienna,
is an obvious source of annoyance to the KreMlin, this government -does' not an
cannot pursue. strong anti-Soviet poiicis,so long as. the eastern: provinces .are
under Soviet occupation,. and so long a
,
Soviet:capabilities
no Austrian treaty ha.'s been. signed.
for ousting the western powers from. Vienna by blockade are
far greater than in Berlin, such action would
interests
A Soviet blockade of Vienna would inevitably cause a partition of Austria '
similar to that which presently divides Germany. The USSR may be led to such
not effectively promote Soviet.
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SECRET
action, either on its own initiative, in the belief that it would strengthen
the Soviet position in eastern Europe, or as a reaction to policies pursued by
the US, UK and France in their zones of occupation and in their relations with
the Austrian Government. It is believed, however, that given the present con-
dition of strained East-West relations, the Kremlin will prefer to maintain the
present status of Austria as the last important point of contact between the USSR
and the West.
_AGIT
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Discussion
Assumption 1: The USSR will impose a blockade of Vienna and fGrce'
the Western poWers to -evacuate the city:-
AsSumptionll: The western potirs will continue to occupy their present
pressure
zones in western Austria.
However forced, the evacuation of Vienna would belaretreat before Soviet
and a blockade of the city would be one of the most aggressive acts
yet comitted by the USSR against the 'Iest .Vienna is the seat of a legal,
popularly -elected government for Austria. The MOst.serious.international effect
. . ? , - ,
? of a Soviet blockade Of Vienna and the subsequent withdrawal o'Western _Occupation
forces from that city would be to enhance the danger of war to the extent that
such forced evacuation would Widen the US-USSR Furtherl'the evacuation of
the city as a result of a 6oviet blockade might encourage the USSR to intensify
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pressure elsewhere and thereby further increase the hazard of war.
The effect on US prestige and position in Europe would be adverse. The
abandonment of the pro-western political entity of Austria would tend to yeaken
the resistance of inhabitants of westernDirope to Soviet pressure.'
o offset
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the loss in US prestige, aceempanied by a definite split of Europe inte two arMed
camps, greater US arms aid would-be required for Western European countries.
Withdrawal fromVierms.W.oul&mean also a serious reduction in value of an important
collection center for intelligence on both the satellite states and on the USSR.
CanCUrrently, Soviet prestige would be increased in the satellite countries.
enhanced 'prestige would tend temporarily to reduce resistance to soviet rule in
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those nations.
In Austria, political complications would develop. The possibility of
concluding a four-power treaty would vanish,
Division of the country would result
from Soviet pressure. The present Governmentivould,reMain pro-Western and Would
not subject itself to Soviet dictation,rehoosing rather to Move to the western, ,
zone, where it would claimjuriediction,over all AUstria. Ihe.USSR'Would assume
complete administrative control of the eastern, zone, thus dePriving the legally
constituted Austrian Government ofitaautherity in that area, and would: force
a puppet regime on. eastern Austria; which mould be linked by the'dSSRHto-the
eastern bloc.; The majority ofthe people in the eastern zone would not voluntarily
support a Sovietereated.government, hence the Soviet occupation authorities:
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would be compelled to resort to political repression.
Despite western power withdrawal. from Vi9nna, Austrians in the three
western zones would continue to support western policies. The Austrian people
would probabli understand the logistic impracticability of the occupation forces'
remaining in Vienna under-a land blockade. In Austria, at least the US could
,mitigate any substantial adverse reaction to such a withdrawal by demonstrating
firm opposition to Soviet aggression in weetern Austria. The-western powers
could present the case to the UN, emphasizing the illegality of soviet actions
pertaining to Au-stria. Increased economic and military aid, needed by weSterri
Austria, could be supplied.
The Austrian Government functioning in the western zones, would be
under pressure from the western provinces to adopt more Conservative agrarian
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and clerical policies. The political complexion of western Austria could cause
a shift in Socialist-People's Party representatioh. Both the pressure of the
predominantly People's Party. sentiment in the west as well as the traditionally
strong provincial feelings there would force an increase in conservative member-
ship and a? corresponding decrease in Socialist representation in Parliament.
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, The change in representation mould vitiate the Austrian Government's claim to
be .a legally elected regime for all of Austria.
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In the event of,a partition of Austria, the peculiarities of the Austrian
economy would force each of the two parts to 'gear its economy with that of outside
neighboring areas. Western Austria would require additional imports;of.food,
while exporting raw materials and semi-finished materials, such as pig iron, steel,
nitrogenous fertilizer, timber and magnesite. Eastern Austria mould require'
imports of raw or semi-finished materials (notably crude or semi-finished steel,
rolled steel, and primary ores) from the satellite countries to process in its
_finishing plants; food potential would be adequate. Both areas would require
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extensive imports of hard coal, but_the weitern zoneswould have hydroelectric
power well above domestic needs. Austrian electric power generating capacity is
largely located in'hewestern zones from which 'come almost-all ofthe domestic ,
t
hydroelectric and tAr.
ofAhe.thermalPOWer; the-eastern zone has inadequate
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generating capacity' to meet its own needs, and, at present, approximately two-
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thirds of the consumption of the Vienna area comes from the western zones.
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? 'abty of eastern Austria to coordinate it economy with the economies of those
states. The USSR would acquire, for the most partl-industries producing mechanical
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Austrian oil, on the other hand is exclusively in the eastern zone; loss of this
product to-the east, however, would not affect the,econamy of western Austria
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because,it already receives less than minimum allocations from the Soviet author-
ities now operating the wells.
Separation of eastern Austria from western Austria would, temporarily
at least, be an economic disadvantage for the USSR. Supplies for eastern Austrian
finishing plants, primarily 'high grade metal, would' present the Soviet Union with
many of the same difficulties 'it is encountering in eastern Germany. Of less
importance; the partition of Austria would cause the direct loss of ERP benefits
to the eastern zone. In addition, partitionmould cause the loss of indirect
edonomic benefits which have.accrued'to the USSR including not only .a portion
of Austrian production, but also considerable east-west trade benefits and
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smuggled goods frOm Western Germany . Many strategic items, needed ky the USSR,
have been obtained through Austria. Any long-term advantages which the USSR
would achieve from exclusive control of eastern zone industries would be partially
dependent lipOn the degree of economic recovery in the satellite- countries and the
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and electrical products.
The nature of western Ahstriaz. economy would permit it to be coordinated
with that of the West more readily than the eastern zone economy could be integrated
with that of the satellite bloc. With the important e,xceptions of food and coal,
western Austrian raw materials and its capital ,equipment would constitute a 'sizeable
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addition to the western European
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