THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 20, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
LECTURE AT MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY
STARKVILLE, MISSISSIPPI
20 APRIL 1988
THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND
ITS ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY
MOVIES, TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS,
HEADLINES GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY
FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY "EXPERTS" WHO
EITHER HAVE NEVER SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OR HAVE
SERVED AND STILL NOT UNDERSTOOD ITS ROLE. THE CIA, THE ONLY
STATUTORY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, IS SAID TO BE AN
"INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT" YET IT IS THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST
EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED, AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THE CIA IS SOMETIMES ABLE TO
REFUTE PUBLICLY ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM, USUALLY IT MUST
REMAIN SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES
OF THE CIA AND VERY LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING OF ITS
FUNCTIONS OR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. I WOULD LIKE TO
DISCUSS THESE TONIGHT.
LET ME DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE THREE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE -- OF CIA -- AS SET FORTH IN THE 1947
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND EVOLVED IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS.
1
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
? , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
COLLECTION
THE FIRST IS THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE WORLDWIDE. US
INTELLIGENCE GATHERS ITS INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF
SOURCES. THE TYPES OF SOURCES WE DRAW UPON ARE WELL KNOWN.
OUR INFORMATION COMES FROM SATELLITES, FROM NEWSPAPERS,
PERIODICALS, RADIO AND TELEVISION WORLDWIDE, FROM DIPLOMATS AND
MILITARY ATTACHES OVERSEAS, AND, OF COURSE, FROM SECRET
AGENTS. ALL OF THIS INFORMATION, BILLIONS. OF BITS AND PIECES
OF DATA ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE
UNITED STATES, FLOWS TO WASHINGTON WHERE IT GOES TO THE
ANALYSTS. MUCH OF OUR MOST VALUABLE INFORMATION COMES FROM THE
VOLUNTARY, OVERT COOPERATION OF BUSINESSMEN, ACADEMICIANS AND
OTHERS WHO ARE WILLING TO SHARE WITH US INFORMATION THEY
ACQUIRE WHEN TRAVELING OVERSEAS. OUR DEPENDENCE ON DIFFERENT
SOURCES OF INFORMATION VARIES FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE. ON SOME,
SUCH AS SOVIET WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, WE DEPEND HEAVILY ON
SATELLITES AND SPIES. ON OTHERS, SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, WE DEPEND HEAVILY ON OPEN LITERATURE AND
EMBASSY REPORTING. BUT, IN ALL CASES, WHAT CLEARLY
DISTINGUISHES INFORMATION AS SUITABLE FOR INTELLIGENCE
EXPLOITATION IS ITS RELEVANCE TO US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
AND INTERESTS.
2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
fr
ANALYSIS
THE SECOND FUNCTION -- THE CORRELATION, EVALUATION AND
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE, OR ANALYSIS, IS THE ONLY
FUNCTION OF CIA SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE 1947 NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT. INDEED, CIA'S CREATION DERIVED FROM
DETERMINATION TO PREVENT ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR: TO ENSURE THAT
ALL AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE WOULD BE COLLATED AND EVALUATED IN
ONE PLACE AND PROVIDED TO THOSE WHO NEED IT.
AS INFORMATION FLOWS TO WASHINGTON, ANALYSTS WITH EXPERTISE
IN SCORES OF DISCIPLINES COLLATE AND TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF IT.
THE CIA THEN REPORTS ITS FINDINGS TO POLICY OFFICIALS AND TO
THE MILITARY SERVICES. IT IS THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF THE
CIA'S COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THE AGENCY'S FOCUS ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
ADVANTAGE OF ITS HAVING KNOWLEDGE BEFORE ANYONE ELSE THAT MAKE
THE CIA'S INTELLIGENCE VALUABLE TO THE POLICYMAKER.
FURTHERMORE, THE CIA OFTEN MAKES A CONTRIBUTION SIMPLY BY
ORGANIZING FACTS IN A CLEAR AND CONCISE WAY, BY PROVIDING THE
SAME FACTS TO A RANGE OF DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS, BY
IDENTIFYING THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS -- AND BY TRYING TO ANSWER
THEM.
THIS INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN
SEVERAL WAYS. FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY?TO?DAY EVENTS AND
3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS
DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY. EARLY EACH MORNING A
WRITTEN BRIEFING IS DELIVERED TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE
PRESIDENT. AS DIRECTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN 1981, OFFICERS
OF THE CIA'S ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE ALSO FAN OUT ACROSS
WASHINGTON EACH MORNING TO SHARE COPIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
BRIEFING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND
DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
_ -
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. DURING CRISES, SITUATION REPORTS ARE
PROVIDED EVERY FEW HOURS.
SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS, BY
DESCRIBING BOTH CURRENT EVENTS AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES OR
PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES. NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB?CABINET
MEETINGS BEGIN WITH A BRIEFING BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE OR A SUBORDINATE EXPERT.
THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. AN ESTIMATE PROVIDES A
FACTUAL REVIEW OF A SUBJECT AND FORECASTS FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.
IN RECENT YEARS A HIGH PREMIUM HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE
PRESENTATION OF DIVERSE POINTS OF VIEW AND ALTERNATIVE
SCENARIOS -- THE DIFFERENT WAYS EVENTS MAY PLAY OUT, AND WITH
WHAT LIKELY CONSEQUENCES. BUT, ALWAYS, A "BEST ESTIMATE? IS
OFFERED; THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OWES THE POLICYMAKER THAT.
14
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
THESE ESTIMATES -- MORE THAN A HUNDRED WERE DONE LAST YEAR
-- ARE PREPARED BY ANALYSTS FROM DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE SENIOR SUBSTANTIVE EXPERT
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO AND COORDINATE
WHAT IS WRITTEN IN NATIONAL ESTIMATES. THE BEST KNOWN OF THESE'
ARE THE ANNUAL ESTIMATES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY FORCES.
FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY
INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. THE CIA'S ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH PAPERS
ARE THE PRODUCTS OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING
-- FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES, EPIDEMIOLOGY TO
SPACE, WATER AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY,
MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, SOVIET
LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO COMMODITY SUPPLIES, AND
MANY, MANY MORE.
COVERT ACTION
THE THIRD FUNCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE -- OF CIA -- IS
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COVERT ACTION. COVERT ACTION IS AN
INSTRUMENT FOR PROTECTING OR ADVANCING AMERICAN NATIONAL
5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
SECURITY INTERESTS IN THOSE CASES WHEN IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT BE HIDDEN OR AT LEAST NOT OFFICIALLY
ACKNOWLEDGED. THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT THING TO UNDERSTAND
ABOUT COVERT ACTION IS THAT IT DOES NOT REPRESENT SOME SORT OF
INDEPENDENT CIA FOREIGN POLICY. THE DECISION TO USE COVERT
ACTION IS A POLICY DECISION MADE BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL -- THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARIES OF
STATE AND DEFENSE. AND IT IS CIA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT
SUCH DECISIONS.
UNDER THE LAW, THE PRESIDENT MUST SIGN A DOCUMENT KNOWN AS
A "FINDING" TO AUTHORIZE SUCH COVERT ACTIONS. THESE FINDINGS
ARE SHARED WITH THE TWO INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES AND
THE FUNDS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ARE APPROVED BY CONGRESS,
THERE HAVE BEEN THREE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PROCESS OVER THE PAST
DECADE OR SO, ALL RELATING TO IRAN.
YOU CAN READ DOZENS OF BOOKS ABOUT PAST COVERT ACTIONS --
MOST OF THEM CRITICAL, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW
OBSERVATIONS. ONLY ABOUT 3% OF CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN
COVERT ACTION. ABOUT 5% OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS
DEVOTED TO COVERT ACTION. WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE ONLY
COVERT ACTIONS YOU TEND TO HEAR ABOUT ARE THOSE THAT FAILED.
IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, IN MY JUDGMENT, THIS HAS BEEN BECAUSE
THE COVERT ACTION WAS DECIDED UPON BY POLICYMAKERS AS A LAST
DITCH EFFORT TO INFLUENCE EVENTS WHERE ALL OVERT MEANS
PREVIOUSLY HAD FAILED. AS A COROLLARY, COVERT ACTIONS TEND TO
6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
FAIL IF THEY ARE DONE IN ISOLATION FROM THE USE OF OTHER, OVERT
INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY, OR IF THE COVERT ACTION IS UNDERTAKEN AS
A SUBSTITUTE FOR OR IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR POLICY. CONTRARY
TO POPULAR IMPRESSIONS, THE CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN BROADLY SUPPORTIVE OF COVERT ACTION. WITH
A VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- MOST OBVIOUSLY IN CENTRAL AMERICA --
THERE HAS BEEN BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR OR AT LEAST
TOLERANCE OF MOST OF THE COVERT ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY
PRESIDENTS CARTERAND REAGAN -- MOST OF WHICH HAVE NEVER BECOME
KNOWN PUBLICLY. IN MY VIEW, CIA SHOULD NOT BE AN ADVOCATE OF
COVERT ACTION BUT RATHER AN IMPLEMENTING INSTRUMENT. THE
DECISION TO USE COVERT ACTION IS A POLICY DECISION. IT IS THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR MANAGERS IN CIA, AS WELL AS THE
EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES, TO ENSURE
THAT SUCH ACTIONS DO NOT TAKE ON A LIFE OF THEIR OWN AND
PROCEED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT REGARD TO CHANGING
CIRCUMSTANCES OR POLICIES, RELEVANCE, OR EFFECTIVENESS.
FINALLY, IT IS CIA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BE SCRUPULOUS IN KEEPING
OUR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES PROPERLY INFORMED ABOUT COVERT
ACTION. IF THERE IS TO BE CONTROVERSY, IT SHOULD BE ABOUT THE
POLICY, NOT HOW WE HAVE CARRIED OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
COMMITTEES.
CONGRESS
THERE IS A FOURTH FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE THAT IS
RELATIVELY NEW AND THAT IS ITS RELATIONSHIP TO AND SUPPORT OF
7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
THE CONGRESS. SINCE THE MID-1970S, VIRTUALLY ALL CIA
ASSESSMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER PRINCIPAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, HAVE GONE TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE APPROPRIATIONS,
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ARM SERVICES COMMITTEES. EIGHT
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES GET THE CIA'S DAILY NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE REPORT. IN 1986 THE CIA ALONE SENT SOME 5,000
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF
BRIEFINGS. OFTEN THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES ARE AS WELL, IF NOT BETTER, INFORMED ABOUT
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT
THAN CONCERNED POLICYMAKERS. MOREOVER, THIS INTELLIGENCE IS
OFTEN USED TO CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE
EXECUTIVE AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS
WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION. BY THE SAME TOKEN, I REGARD THE
DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS AS AN
IMPORTANT ADDED PROTECTION FOR THE OBJECTIVITY AND INTEGRITY OF
OUR ASSESSMENTS.
MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE CHANGE IN RECENT YEARS
IN THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY CITE WATERGATE AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY
CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR: THE
OBTAINING, BY CONGRESS IN THE MID 1970S, OF ACCESS TO
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
THIS SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND THE POLICY AGENCIES.
POLICYMAKERS' SUSPIGIONS THAT THE CIA USES INTELLIGENCE TO
SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES ARE OFTEN BARELY
CONCEALED. AND MORE THAN A FEW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE WILLING
TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY THEIR OWN SELECTIVE USE OF
INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS A
STRENGTHENING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND A
GREATER HEIGHTENING OF THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST-Or
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
I MIGHT ADD THAT THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS ALSO HAS GIVEN
CONGRESS -- ESPECIALLY THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES -- FAR
GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF AND INFLUENCE OVER THE WAY CIA AND OTHER
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SPEND THEIR MONEY THAN ANYONE IN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH WOULD DREAM OF EXERCISING. CONGRESS HAS BEEN
IMMENSELY SUPPORTIVE AND STEADFAST OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS IN
PROVIDING THE RESOURCES TO REBUILD AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. BUT
I SUSPECT IT CAUSES POLICYMAKERS CONSIDERABLE HEARTBURN TO KNOW
THAT CONGRESS MAY ACTUALLY HAVE MORE INFLUENCE TODAY OVER
INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES THAN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THE INTELLIGENCE?POLICYMAKER TANGLE
EACH OF THE FOUR FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE THAT I HAVE
DESCRIBED -- COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, COVERT ACTION, AND THE
9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS -- AFFECTS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CIA AND THE POLICYMAKER. SHERMAN KENT, A PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
AT YALE WHO BECAME A SENIOR ANALYST IN THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES AND WAS LATER DIRECTOR OF CIA'S OFFICE OF NATIONAL
ESTIMATES, WROTE IN 1949: "THERE IS NO PHASE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PROPER
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE
ITS PRODUCT. ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ONE WOULD
EXPECT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AUTOMATICALLY, DOES NOT DO THIS.'
THE FACT IS THAT OVER THE YEARS THE POLICYMAKER AND THE
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY (AND WITH FRIGHTENINGLY
FEW EXCEPTIONS) COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT OF THE REALITIES
AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHERS WORLDS -- PROCESS, TECHNIQUE,
FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN DESCRIBE IN EXCRUCIATING
DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD
SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED
BY PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS OF
INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE "SWELLS WHEN THEY COMPARE THE
SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN THE COLLECTION
OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST
THE CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY
DECISIONS ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."
INDEED, MY DESCRIPTION AT THE OUTSET OF MY REMARKS OF THE
FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT ADDRESS CENTRAL QUESTIONS
SUCH AS WHETHER CERTAIN USERS OF INTELLIGENCE SEEK, NOT DATA OR
UNDERSTANDING, BUT SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE, WHETHER
10
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
THEY SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO INFLUENCE
PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICY: WHETHER THEY DISINGENUOUSLY LABEL
INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO. SOFT, TOO HARD, OR "COOKED";
WHETHER SOME INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE ADDRESSING PERSONAL
AGENDAS OR BIASES. IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
UNHAPPINESS OF POLICYMAKERS WITH INTELLIGENCE THAT CHALLENGES
THE ADEQUACY OF POLICIES OR ACCURACY OF POLICYMAKER
--
PRONOUNCEMENTS. IT DOES NOT REVEAL THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR WHO IS HELD AT T00
GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT, OR OF ONE WHO IS TOO
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. IT DOES NOT TREAT POLICYMAKERS'
FRUSTRATIONS WITH INADEQUATE, AMBIGUOUS OR LATE INTELLIGENCE;
WITH CONSTANTLY CHANGING EVALUATIONS, WITH ANALYSIS THAT IS
JUST PLAIN WRONG, OR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL
FOOTBALL IN STRUGGLES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. AND, FINALLY, MY
DESCRIPTION DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE PREOCCUPATION OF
POLICYMAKERS WITH CURRENT REPORTING AS OPPOSED TO LONGER RANGE
ISSUES, OR THE ABDICATION OF POLICYMAKERS FROM THEIR
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE RESPONSIBILITIES.
EVEN WITH THIS LITANY OF PROBLEMS, THE DIALOGUE AND
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICYMAKERS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IS,
ON THE WHOLE, A VITAL AND HEALTHY ONE; THE INHERENT STRESSES
ARE MANAGED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND TO GOOD PURPOSE. AND, IN THIS
RELATIONSHIP, THE OBJECTIVITY AND INTEGRITY OF ASSESSMENTS HAVE
BEEN PROTECTED. ON SUBJECTS SUCH AS VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS
11
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
OF SOVIET POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, IRAN AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AS WELL AS ON
A NUMBER OF OTHER EVERTS AND ISSUES, THE CIA'S ANALYSTS HAVE
DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT HAVE DASHED COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND
EFFORTS OF POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES THE CIA ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN
WRONG, MORE OFTEN THEY HAVE BEEN RIGHT; BUT ON PROBLEMS BOTH
LARGE AND SMALL THE AGENCY HAS NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING ITS
HONEST VIEW.
THE FUTURE
I HAVE FOCUSED MY REMARKS ON TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, CIA, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CIA,
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS. BEFORE CLOSING, I WOULD
LIKE TO MENTION SEVERAL TRENDS THAT DOMINATE OUR WORK NOW AND
ALMOST CERTAINLY IN THE FUTURE:
AS WE CONTEMPLATE THE STRATEGIC-RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
SOVIET UNION, A DOMINATING REALITY IS THAT THE MARGIN
FOR ERROR OF US INTELLIGENCE STEADILY IS BECOMING
NARROWER. THE COSTS OF MISESTIMATING OR OF
MISCALCULATING WILL BE HIGH. THIS IS AT A TIME WHEN
SOVIET WEAPONS ARE PRODUCED WITH GREATER SECRECY,
HIGHER TECHNOLOGY AND MORE EFFORT TO MISLEAD US THAN
EVER BEFORE, AND WHEN THE DEMANDS ON US FOR MONITORING
COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL ARE BECOMING ALWAYS MORE
COMPLEX AND DETAILED.
17
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
INTELLIGENCE FOR SOME YEARS NOW HAS BEEN MARKED BY A
GROWING DIVERSITY OF THE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IT IS
EXPECTED TO ADDRESS. TODAY, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA
TOGETHER PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR NO MORE THAN HALF OF OUR
OVERALL WORK. THE DIVERSITY OF ISSUES THAT WE COVER --
WHICH I DESCRIBED EARLY IN MY REMARKS -- IS EXPANDING
EVERY DAY.
THE GROWING DIVERSITY OF ISSUES HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY
GROWING NUMBER AND DIVERSITY OF THE USERS OF
INTELLIGENCE. WE NOW SUPPLY INTELLIGENCE TO NEARLY
EVERY DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL
AS TO THE CONGRESS. AND WE ARE UNDER INCREASING
PRESSURE TO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC.
INTELLIGENCE INCREASINGLY IS BECOMING CENTRAL IN POLICY
DELIBERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CAPACITY OF US
INTELLIGENCE TO MONITOR OR VERIFY SOVIET COMPLIANCE
WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS INCREASINGLY IS DRIVING
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AGREEMENTS THAT CANNOT BE
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES PROBABLY
CANNOT BE RATIFIED. SIMILARLY, IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTERTERRORISM AND A RANGE OF OTHER
ISSUES, INTELLIGENCE IS PROVIDING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
AS WELL AS TACTICAL INFORMATION.
13
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
FINALLY, INCREASINGLY, INTELLIGENCE IS THE ONLY PART OF
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THAT IS LOOKING AHEAD -- WHAT I
CALL "SCOUTING THE FUTURE". WEARE INCREASINGLY ALONE
IN IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES THIS COUNTRY
WILL ENCOUNTER OVERSEAS FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW OR
EVEN WELL INTO THE 21ST CENTURY.
CONCLUSION
THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND
TIMELINESS OF INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE TO POLICYMAKERS -- A
STORY THAT WITH RARE ANECDOTAL EXCEPTIONS CANNOT BE PUBLICLY
DESCRIBED, IN CONTRAST TO THE PUBLICITY SURROUNDING
CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS, PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE CIA AND THE
CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE CANNOT HOPE TO COUNTER THE
AVALANCHE OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST US IN THE DAILY NEWS.
SOMETIMES IT SEEMS THAT EVERY ACCUSED MURDERER AND DRUG DEALER
IN THE COUNTRY CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR US. THE
ALLEGATIONS ALWAYS SEEM TO MAKE PAGE 1; THE REFUTATIONS OR
FACTS, IF THEY APPEAR AT ALL, ARE IN THE BACK PAGES. THE
MYSTIQUE AND MYTHOLOGY OF CIA -- AND OUR SILENCE WHEN ATTACKED
-- MAKE US A DANDY TARGET. ACCORDINGLY, I WOULD URGE YOU TO BE
SKEPTICAL READERS OF INTELLIGENCE STORIES -- GOOD OR BAD.
THE FACT IS, CIA CANNOT ADVERTISE BETTER COLLECTION OR
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. CIA OFFICERS UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL
14
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3
*feve -
"
? 1-
REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMERICANS KNOW THAT THE
CIA'S PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF
INFORMATION. THIS IS THE CIA:S PRINCIPAL ROLE IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY
AND THE CONGRESS DEPEND UPON THE CIA, TASK IT AND LOOK TO IT
MORE EACH DAY. THE CIA ATTRACTS AMERICA'S MOST CAPABLE YOUNG
PEOPLE, WHO FIND THEIR WORK WITH THE AGENCY TO BE AN
- .
EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE AND CONSISTENTLY
FASCINATING CAREER. AS JOHN RANELAGH OBSERVES IN HIS RECENTLY
PUBLISHED HISTORY OF THE CIA, "IN ITS MOMENTS OF ACHIEVEMENT AS
WELL AS CONDEMNATION, THE AGENCY WAS A REMINDER THAT IT WAS A
FAITHFUL INSTRUMENT OF THE MOST DECENT AND PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST
OF THE GREAT POWERS, AND CERTAINLY THE ONE THAT EVEN IN ITS
DARKEST PASSAGES PRACTICED MOST CONSISTENTLY THE VIRTUE OF
HOPE."
THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE IN THE WORLD. FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LAW, IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOM AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES
AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN
DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. INTELLIGENCE IS AMERICA'S FIRST
LINE OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS, AND, AT TIMES, ITS HIDDEN
HAND. AND, JUST POSSIBLY, AMERICA IS AT PEACE TONIGHT BECAUSE
AROUND THE WORLD, FROM SHADOWY STREETS TO THE DEPTHS OF SPACE,
AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE ON GUARD -- KEEPING THE
WATCH.
15
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410007-3