NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00390R000200130004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 22, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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OS' REGISTRY:
TO:
YE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
1 DCI
ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL
X
2 DDCI
X
3 EXDIR
4 D/ICS
X
X
5 DDI X
gpso.DA
7 DDO
X
8 DDS&T X
9 Chm/NIC
10 GC
1 1
X
IG
12 Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
22
SUSPENSE
Nmwks To # 13: Please have clearaixe on
the FACT SHEET passed to Mr. John Lewis,
NSC Staff and dissemination to Con2ressinnmi
Committees ASAP. (Advisdd that
will release during press conf- -I .?
:
3637 (1?4"
Date
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
Date
27 Jan 88
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)
1. Da/DDA
leftist
C-Z?
Date
Ay
4
2. ADDA
3. DDA
.
4, DDA/Registry -
S.
File
Note and Return
Approval
For Clearance
Per Conversation '
As Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
IAction
Circulate
For Your information'
See Me
Comment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justify
REMARKS
D/OCA has action.
cc: D/OS for info.
Note:
Document received afternoon of 26 Jan 88.
Ae?r?f-e
STAT
STAT
STAT
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrencels, disposalsTAT
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
Room No.--Bldg.
Phone No.
011402 OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-711)
*U.8.01.0:1988-0.491-247/20047 prescribed by GSA
DIOR (41 CFR)101-11.208
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SYSTEM II
90944
THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL "
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF: MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE'TOTHE UNITED NATIONS
OF
D 7'
..2.1.._VI
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
,
CHIEF OF STAFF TO PRESIDENTTHE
ASSISfATTOTHEPRE$ipOrrFoRpoLICY DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEF80 STAFFClitiRmA,TICLEARREGuLATORY4OMMWSION
ADMA0i)R.P4R,, mumn( FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT A
DIRECTOR, AVMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ADMINIRATOR,GENE4LsERVIcEsADMSTRATION
DIRECT='' - '
OFFICE 0
"
, .14OF AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
-4 TECHNOLOGY
ADMINIStalo , NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY 'BOARD
CHAIRMAN4PRESIDENT'S.IgMEKE OVERSIGHT BOARD
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION OVERSIGHT OFFICE
DIRECTOR:, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE
National Operations Security ro/cam
SUBJECT:
The President has app
Decision Directive (N
the at
stabli
curity
perations
7.51A
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SecuritysProgram (OPSEC)A;? his unclaspi ied NSbD calls for each
Executive department anctiagOncy substiltialfy involved in or
supporting national seciiri4r mission with clAssiified or
sensitive activities to establish al4r41 04EC4rogram. While
the NSDD cannot be circulated, a FaCethtet,.dOntaining identical
information shouldApe,givehlthe widest distribution possible
within your agency/department . The:DC,should'provide copies t
the appropriate committees of Congress.',
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachments
NSDD
Fact Sheet
olin . Pow 1
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
STAT
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a.
THE1WHITE HOUSE
WAS
January
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 298:'
OBJECTIVE
NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM
SYSTEM II
90944
Security programs and procedures already exist to protect clas-
sified matters. However, information generally available to the
public as well as certain detectable activities reveal the
existence of, and sometimes details about, classified or
sensitive information or undertakings. Such indicators may
assist those seeking to neutralize or exploit U.S. Government
actions in the area of national security. Application of the
operations security (OPSEC),process promotes operational effec-
tiveness by helping prevent the inadverA40MSNqpromise of
sensitive or classified U.S. Government-7activitxgs, capabilities,
or intentions.
OPSEC PROCESS
The operations securityrd ess involves five epti identifica-
tion of.tical information, analy,'
,,,,,,,,, f thre s, analysis of
vulnerabilities,c assessment risks appl atidn of appro-
priate countermeasures.UT*proces s w ari.examination
of the totality of an 4i4ty to d loitable but
capabili
unclassified evidence ofici4 sified a be acquired in
light of the knowncollection
ential adver-
saries. Such evidence 'tiglrgily derives fro enly available
data. Certain indicators may be pieced together or interpreted
to discern critical information. Indicators most often stem from
the routine administrative, physical, or technical actions taken
to prepare for or execute a plan or activity. Once identified,
they are analyzed against the threat to determine the extent to
which they may reveal critical information. Commanders and
managers then use these threat and vulnecapi,l'ty analyses in
risk assessments to assist4in the selectIn -,adoption of
ep?e
countermeasures.
OPSEC thus is a system
Government and its sic
adversaries informa(
identifying, contr&
evidence of the plann n
activities.
nd prove ess ty which the U.S.
4.44 contra can er1 to potential
t capabilities ntions by
protecting. gene 1 nclassified
execu f sens Government
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APPLICATION
Indicators and vulnerabilities are best identified through
detailed OPSEC planning before activities start .They may also
be identified duringor,after the conduct of routine functional
activities by analy;inghowfunctions are actually performed and
the procedures used: :Planning and analysis proceed from the
adversary's perspective. TO assist,in!OPSEC planning and
analysis, OPSEC planning guidance must bedevelOpeilhointly by
those most familiar with the operational aspects ofa particular
activity together with "their supporting intelligence elements.
OPSEC planning guidance..4shadad take accountef-those aspects of
an activity that should be protected in light of U.S. and
adversary goals, estimated key adversaryestions probable
adversary knowledge, desirable and harmful adversary apprecia-
tions, and pertinent intelligence threats.OPSEC planning
guidance should also outline OPSEC measures to complement
physical, information, personnel, signals, computer, communica-
tions, and electronic security measures. OPSEC measures may
include, but are not limited to, counter.ageTy, cover, conceal-
ment, and deception.
In the OPSEC process, it is. limportail 4117iUng Ish between
analysis of threat ao vulnerabilityA_ n4,the)pnethand, and
gt
implementation, on the other. Recorilitiong on use of
OPSEC measures are: s joint operationi ligence
analyses, but ultifi ions on implement4tion? re made by
commanders, supervisors progra#1044gers WO dOitermine the
aspects of a program or activity tOibe.tiprotectkii. The decision-
maker with ultimate responsibility for *s_sj.peacg:9;inplishment and
resource management must ha- e complete authority 1for determining
where and how OPSEC will applied.
POLICY
A National Operations Security Program is hereby established.
Each Executive department and agency assigned or supporting
national security missions with classified or sensitive activi-
ties shall establish a formal OPSEC program with the following
common features:
Specific assignment 0 responsib ''f6tySEC direction
and implementation
Specific requirpribnts o plan fdYd im ent OPSEC in
anticipation o1ar, wnere appfopri te, g department or
agency activiM
Direction to use
identifying vulne
measures.
A
analytx echniq
ties a tselec
assist in
priate OPSEC
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Enactment of measures to ensure that all personnel, commen-
sur&te with their positions and security clearances, are
aware of hostile intelligence threats and understand the
OPSEC process.
Annual review and evaluation of OPSEC procedures so as to
assist the improvement of OPSEC pi:ograms.
Provision for interagency support and cooperation with
respect to OPSEC programs.
Agencies with minimal activities that could affect national
security need not establish a formal OPSEC Program; however, they
must cooperate with other departments and agencies to minimize
damage to national security when OPSEC problems arise.
ACTION
Heads of Executive departments and agencies assigned or support-
ing national security missions.
Heads of Executive departments or
missions shall:
agenClet with national security
Establish organj:zatiOhal OPSEC
_
Issue, as apptoppiate4 OPSEC policiesl
planning guidanCe41 and
Designate department and agce.ncy:
odedures, and
lannett for OPSEC.
Further, they shall adii,ise the Nati?,a1 Sectirity4Council (NSC) on
OPSEC measures required, of 3other Exe'04ive departments and
agencies in order to athaaVe and maintalhzliegetive operations or
activities. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
advise the NSC of the impact of nonmilitary U.S. policies on the
effectiveness of OPSEC measures taken by the Armed Forces, and
recommend to the NSC policies to minimize any adverse effects.
Chairman, Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I).
Consistent with previous DI.rectives, thek A,G74, has responsibility
for national OPSEC policy'lormulatiowiesontipn of interagency
differences, guidance *-4tional-laiel OpUC training, technical
OPSEC support, and adWcei*o departments and
agencies. The Natiphil Orations Ac4Tity A,t1v4ory Committee
(NOAC), as part o,f4iledSIGil structUte'and fnhc4oning under the
aegis of the Intet4ge4 y Group for Counteeri4atur (Policy).
will:
Advise the SIG-I str ,ture on, eagpres fd* re, ucing OPSEC
vulnerabilities 4Wd aopose corrective lmeasures,
,
g wi qA
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As cequested, consultwith, and prOvide advice and recom-
mendations to, theVarious departments and :agencies concern-
in OPSEC vulnerabilities and corrective measures;
On an ad hoc basis, chair meetings of representatives of two
,
or more Executive departments or agencies having competing
interests or responsibilities with OPSEC implications that
may affect national security interests. Analyze the issues
and prepare advisory memoranda and recommendations for the
competing agencies:. In the event NOACfails to resolve
differences, it shall' submit the issue, together with its
recommendation, to the SIG-I for resolution, which may
recommend a meeting 'of- the Policy Review'Group (PRG) to
consider the issue;
Bring to the attention of the SIG-I unsolved OPSEC vulner-
abilities and deficiencies that may arise within designated
programs and activities of the Executive branch; and
Specify national-level requirements for intelligence and
counterintelligence OPSEC support tp,-.-ow, SIG-I.
Director, National Securit# Agency.
The Director, Nation04: Security AgelloyAls ftignated Executive
Agent for interagentif pps44 trainingln t4Vs Opacity, he has
responsibility t4Ps4t Executive departffelig 44 agencies, as
needed, to establitfitoPSECAprograms;,1pvelopandovide inter-
agency OPSEC training an4Vg##blish and i#aintain an
Interagency OPSEC Sup0OrtjOtaff (IOSS)il,whoseilmem+ship shall
include, at a minimuma representa1iv'etofqt4g DeRartment of
Defense, the Department oflEnergy,the CeAral Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Inves-agaion, *the General
Services AdministraticinThe IOSS
Carry out interagency, national-level, OPSEC training for
executives, program and project managers, and OPSEC
specialists;
Act as consultant to Executive departments and agencies in
connection with the establishment of OPSEC programs and
OPSEC surveys and analyses; and.
Provide an OPSEC teOlipicalstafffor?the SIG-I.
, ,
A
Nothing in this directive:
Is intended o, infringe the a
ties of the 6iOtorOf on
intelligence soura:es 14nd meth6r
the Intelligence ("lamdnity as Isp
No. 12333; or
uthoritles and responsibili-
A
telligojlcel0 protect
nor thOle .61 any member of
?iedi E'ecutive Order
Aq
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Implies an authority,-,0 the part grG7I Interagency
Grotlp for Countermeasures (Policy) or the NbAC to examine
th'e facilities or-sciperations of 'any ExeCtitiv6 department or
agency without the approval of the :head oi such Executive
department or .agency.
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