CSD'S SIX PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A000600200006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 18, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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csD/xPlc-5~-63
18 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, NPIC
SUBJECT CSD's Six Problems
1. Fors+ard~ed hereirith are CSD's six candidates for discussion
at the proposed) Seminar. In priority order they are:
Photo Intelligence Data Base
NPIC Reference Services
Representation on Operations Board
Future Groxth of NPIC
Area Specialists
NPIC Photo Interpretation Reports
2. The above priority listing is in order of direct concern
to CSD. Fra~m an overall NPIC point of view, however, I suspect
Item 6 and Item 5 take precedence over the other Pour.
Chief, Collateral Support Division,
NPIC
Attachments: (6)
NPIC/CSD (8 Mar 63)
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e~~t,~i"!~ 1
Attachment 1 to
can/NPIC-5#-63
8 March 1963
Photo Intelligence Data Base
To insure the continued creation of an up-to-date machine language data
base f ar~ machine storage and retrieval in response to future requirements for
photo intelligence information and for identification of pertinent photographic
coverage.
Aasuamtion:
It is desirable to maintain as comprehensive a machine controlled data
base ea is possible with out significantly interrupting the production of sub-
stantive intelligence.
1. To date, the MCI (and to a less
t
er ex
ent the OAKs, IPIRs, SITSUMs
and detailed reports) has provided a detailed machine language index to the
information derived from selected photography and to the film containing
this information.
2. NPIC production of MCI's is lagging seriously. Whenever backlogs
exist, there is considerable pressure to inactivate and delete targets in the
Target Brief file.
3? Other photo interpretation ou s such as SAC which has completed
MCI's on ell but two missions)
paring immediate type reports from material not f are pre-
ul],y exploited by NPIC.
Discussion:
A. Inclusion of Non-NPIC Produced Intelli nce in the Data Base
1. Most photo interpretation reports are reviewed, summarized and cited
in the Target Briefs if they add substantively to the Brief and are consistent
with previously available information.
are sometimes referred to by NPIC photo inte~y +f Vll~ 1Al-~`~ priers. They
because they are not cited in the Briefs~theyareeofteneover~oo ed~r Asbat,
results NPIC has reported out some installations as new or newly identified
when in fact they have been reported out by other agencies.
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information. ' review the film and validate the
3? Conversely, the non-NPIC immediate reports have carried scmie infor-
IDstion which has not been accepted or verified by NPIC. CSD reviews these
reports for neW or si~ificant information on missiles, at~c ener
and long-range bomber bases. The new information is called to the ~tention~
of the Assistant for Operations and~or the substantive photo-interpreters
either verbally or by memorandum.
~+? There exists no mechanism at the
new information which we feel should be disseminated tofthevintelli~ this
c~mUnitY and included in the Target Briefs. Analysts in CIA, DIA andcthe
Services rely on NPIC Por official missile site counts.
20 percent of the missile sites reported by others have beentre,jected byeNPIC.
We feel such important information should not be inserted into the data base
without verification.
Recommendations:
1. Where conflicts in interpretation and~or new information are con-
tained in non-NPIC reports NPIC should
photo ante on and an,}r other information from non-NPIC
NPIC informationtshould beeinsertedainethe dataibaset with previously reported
3? CSD should explore with SAC and others the possibility of exchanging
MCI's in machine language form.
B.
Film References on Inactive Tar eta
1.
Targets are deleted from the Target Brief file because:
a)
b)
They cannot be identified, i.e., do not exist.
Photography indicates that the target is insignificant.
2?
Targets are inactivated because:
b) they are of sufficient i
the tar t , will identify, locate and readout
$e , perhaps as A nAS.'1,. ~a,.-i~a, _
ante s ze and complexity that the photo
rpreter, in scanning the film
told by the target brie PA thn ~+?;11''';1ea installations unless he is
intelli - - ""`" " y " 1G ~10~ but of no current
Bence interest (e.g., abandoned or inactive airfields).
2? All validated informati
e) They are not of sufficient importance (in the ,joint view of
the MCI coordinator, CSD and the Assistant for Operations) to warrant
inclusion in the MCI report: ~,,,+
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3? The probability that tar
for intelligence is remote; the g^eta which are deleted wi
inactivated will become i Probability that tar ~- become important
mPortant in the future is mugc$s which have been
~? We have two gz'eater.
installation: methods of identifying film pertinent to a
given
a) Via plots. A cumbersome t
leads a researcher to the a ~'conawning operation that
There are on1,y broad indicationsimofatcl u~coveraPeoi-o ra
photographic g PAY concerned,
is accurate. Quality, nor assurance that the to g ' no indications oP
mPlate representation
b) Via target briefs. The target briefs cite the exact frame
and coordinates of photography covered
These references are machine retrievable~.d its ante
rpretability.
5? In reviewing Film fo '
inactive targets. With a raft MCI the photo ante
minimum of additional t rPreter peruses the
reference could be recorded for inclusion in the targethbrief but not
MCI. This would insure Pass and frame
the target. machine identification of photo the
~'aP~Y Pertinent to
Recommendations;
Pass and frame references of inactive targets be recorded for incl
in the data base.
usion
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s~c~Er
Attachment 2 to
CSD/~96 ~3
To what extent will NPIC provide photographic intelligence reference
service to other photo interpretation shops outside NPIC and intelligence
production agencies.
Facts:
1? The Primary function of CSD is to provide collateral support to NPIC
photo interpretation activities and, to the extent feasible, to the depart-
mental activities within NPIC.
2. NSCID 8 pars 2f states, "The NPIC shall maintain on a selective
basis a consolidated central file of photographic data as a service of common
concern. It shall make arrangements for the exchange of photographs and
photographic data with other photographic collections in the Intelligence
community, and shall make appropriate recommendation to facilitate the coor-
dinated developrment of compatible codes, indexes, and mechanized systems for
the efficient recovery, selection and collation of available photographic data."
3. NPIC~CSD has developed a large file of Target Briefs which intelli-
gence agencies and the DOD ~Partments and Commands have requested.
~. NPIC~CSD provides an automated phot9~intelligence report storage
and retrieval service.
Discussion:
1. The CIA "All-Source Center", the DIA Production Center, and other
DOD photo interpretation shops have a need for and are establishing services
similar to those being provided by CSD.
2. CSD has established a data base to service internal requirements
which could satisfy many external requests for published P.I. information.
On an ad hoc basis we already use the data base to satisfy DIA and CIA requests.
3? To accept and attempt to satisfy all external requirements will re-
quire an expansion of CSD personnel and equipment. The increments needed,
however, would be far smaller than the ones which would be required by CIA
and DIA to establish and maintain their own data bases.
~+. We believe that NSCID 8 authorizes NPIC to
vices to the intelligence community and that a centralizedesez`viceewouldebe
more economical--g~ernment wide--than separate services.
,,. .(,.;.iY ~
+~~~~T ~ down;radina~famatft
t'~^~+ B and
d=slilcatlon
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5? The extent to which NPIC is willing to su
published reports,~gnetic tapes of immediate readouts anditarget briefs
hard coPY target briefs, and answers to search requests must soon beere of
Recommendations: solved.
1. NPTC provide photographic intelligence reference services to other
USIB members as a service of common concern.
2. That NPIC prepare a statement of the services to be offered and
obtain the concurrence of OCR as executive agent for the CIA "
Center" and of DIA.
All-Source
3? Having obtained these concurrences, NPTC~CSD then e
and machine capabilities as necessary to meet external demands for these
services. xpand its staff
S~C1 ET
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Attachment 3 to
can/x~'C-54=63
8 March 1963
Representation on Operations Board
To provide closer coordination, cooperation, and integration of effort
between the support divisions within NPIC and the national photo ante
tion effort.
rpreta-
Facts:
1? The Operations Board is charged with the approval and scheduling
of national photo interpretation projects.
2? The members of this Board are the Assistant for Operations, the SIO's
of the PI detachments.
Discussion:
1. The Operations Officer keeps the support divisions (CSD, p~ pD
and TID) informed of the deliberations of the
deliberations, however, coammit the su Operations Board. The Board's
without consideration of their internal oschedulingnand worktload8eadlines
photo interpretation projects scheduled by the 0 Conversely,
cannot be ncecsplished until certain prelim~inarys~p8ohave beenfcompleted
by the supporting divisions.
3? Because of the close interrelationships, it is believed there would
be considerable advantage to having supporting divisions represented directly
on the Operations Board.
Rec~endation:
That the membership of the Operations Board be expanded to include
representatives of supporting divisions within NPIC.
s~cc~r
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
doa~a;railing and
daelaaaifiatlaa
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Attachment ~+ to
~D/~C-5#=63
Ftixture Growth of NPIC
To estimate the level and nature of NPIC activity one, two and five
years hence to provide ~ basis for the logical organization, stuffing,
training and equipping of the Collateral Support Division.
Discussion:
1. We have only the vaguest concept of the growth pattern anticipated
for NPIC during the next few years. Only last weeks quite b ha
I learned that proposed Y ppenstance,
payloads this summer would incl~ide twice and possibly
four times the amount of film previously carried. Yet extensive RBeD efforts
have been underway for some time and considerable long-range planning has
been done.
2. We have been given a vague estimate of the T~0 increase we ma ex
in FY-6~+. Presumably this estimate is based on the anticipated increase inpect
PI strength which in turn must have some relationship to anticipated receipts
of film. We have no projections beyond FY-64 and no projections of the
balance between iuunediate and detailed reporting.
3? The necessity for close coordination of future plans for growth and
development of assigned responsibilities between NPIC Divisions and Staffs
is greater than ever before.
~+. Some more definite guidelines extending over the next five
would provide a better criteria for planning the development of the Division,
the formulation of data management system, and the installation of equipment.
~ ~-" artcmaitcl
~~9F; d:a'a~raang and
~y;;,,,~,q: r~ 1 ~ +' d`tas~tlicatton
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Attachment 5 to
cSD/NPrc-5~+-63
8 1Karch 1963
and briefings. military field c~aands welecm-e NPIC su
PPort
7? With the exception of work done by the U. S.
done in preparing photo ra
g phic studies of re Ate, little has been
gions or countries.
$? NPIC is frequently called upon to brief chiefs of state
9? Crisis arise ra id s?
area specialists. P 13' allowing little or no t
ime for training of
10. NPIC has sent some men to the field for
were poorly equipped with area knowledge. immediate reporting that
11. The administi'etion, the Director C
great reliance on the acc ~ ~ and Mrector D
uracy of innaediate reporting, ' ~ have placed
~? NPIC 3ITSUMs, IPTRs and MCI's could be.oY
! _ caaN ~
~~:' ^~ , ~- Isla: iron autamatlo
a;; - ? ~? T ~ 1,V downrs9ing and
`' "' f t~ ? i declassi(icatiaa
Problem:
specielists,~C develop co],.lateral support and photo interpretation
area
Facts:
1' NPICusing the term broad
~C) has experts on Soviet ~' encoartpassing all
airfields guided missiles Personnel who work at
a moment's notice installations ' atomic energy BW/CW
etc., and can provide these analyetstonnics,
2? NPIC cannot boast of having a si
an expert (one with up-to-the minute info~e analyst who ma
the world ( rmation) on the trouble s?nsidered
North yietnamg?' Middle East, Indonesia, Tibet, China
North Koreapots of
Laos and
3? Foreign Governments in
U. S. Forces, e,g,~ Lebanon? Periods of crisis have re
to do special studies for fielNd c ?n such occasions us~lquested and recei~te~d
finders. ~-y is called upon
4? U. S. forces are near "points of contacts" with a
several areas of the world.
ggressor forces in
that we'veB~h wars" and revolutions have broken out in areas of th
known little about, e.g?~ Indonesia, Tibet.
e world
6.
Area ecielists
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Discussion:
~_
1. It is assumed that photography will continue to be used to determine
indications of hostilities, confirm order of battle, verify intelligence
reports, confirm indications oP bloc penetration, watch for the introduction
of missiles or nuclear weapons into a heretofore non-missile or non-nuclear
areas, etc. It is also assumed that with the lessons learned Prom the Cuban
crisis, greater reliance will be placed on photography to determine the above
discussed items in other areas of the world.
2. Rhe exploitation of "tactical" photography within the Center leaves
much to be desired. "Exploitation" usual],y means the production of the IPIR,
the MCI and a Pew random reports. For example, the total output Proan 29 missions
on Indonesia was 16 field reports, 10 MCI's and 3 detailed and 3 informal
reports. The intelligence community is considering flying some of these
potential trouble spots again and is approaching the problem as though no
photography existed.
3? The problem of area specialists was recognized by this Division
several years ago and the creation of the Noa-Soviet Section of the Research
Branch was the result. There has been some area specialization by analysts
in Geo-Military Branch of PID and editors have been employed in a regional
or area basis.
4. Although it might be argued that we had no need for area specialists
in the past, that a shortage of personnel existed, etc., future aeedB p8at
to the existence of knowledgeable area collateral specialists and photo inter-
preters. This camobination will lead to better iffinediate reporting and better
overall knowledge of the trouble spots of the world.
Recammtendations
1. Zhat the problem be recognized and that a selected cadre be trained.
2. That specialists be trained for China, S.E. Asia, India-Tibet, Latin
America, and North Korea.
3? 7~at these specialists be assigned the responsibilities for the
iamiediate readout of photography in their respective areas.
~+. That when these analysts are not engaged in immediate readouts or
answering requirements they prepare area or country photographic surveys.
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Attachment 6 to
CSD/NFI~~54_(3
8 March 1963
NPIC Photo Interpretation Reports
To improve the effectiveness and timeliness of NPIC reporting of the
results of photographic interpretation.
A. First and Second Phase Reports
Discussion:
1. ?he OAKs, IPIRs, SITSUMs, and MCI's have become sterile, stereotyped
publications that make deadly dull reading. They need more sex appeal, both
in content and presentation.
2. The reports state when there is no change from previous photo
interpretation. When there is a change, however, the reports do not identify
the change. The on7,y way a reader knows what is new or what is changed is
to compare the new readout with previous reports, item by item.
Rec~nendations
1. Change the criteria for reporting readouts to require identification
of changes from previously known photographic information.
2. Include a brief summary of the significant findings and highlights
at the beginning of IPIRs, SITSUMs and MCI's similar to that now included
in the OAK.
3? Include annotated photography of significant developments.
B. Detailed Reports
Discussion:
1. Detailed reports have a tendency to become bogged down due to the
pressure of current reporting requirements and frequently do not meet
publication deadlines. Consequently, we have been forced to rely upon "pre-
releases," with the result that when detailed reports are finally published,
more often than not they are history.
2. Many reports are issued as cables and memoranda which never come
out as an official publication. Unless they are published, it is very diffi-
cult to insure the wide dissemination deserved, and valuable information is
denied major segments of the intelligence community. Furthermore, the infor-
mation contained in cables and memoranda rarely gets into storage and retrieval
systems; consequently, it is lost to all but the immediate recipient.
CRJJP ~~?
Excloda9 tram automatic
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' 3. In an effort to put out cables in hard copy form, we have recently
published some one-paragraph 5-10 line reports which have been the ob,~ect of
ridicule. These reports leave many questions unanswered and force interested
users to refer to the photography or possibly submit a detailed photo inter-
pretation requirement.
Recoma-endations:
1. Every effort should be made to streamline the production of detailed
interpretation reports so that they may be published within deadlines.
2. We should reinstitute the PI Brief or Alert publication which would
be used for quick answers, and to confirm cables, but which would include
suitable annotated photograph,}. or graphics.
C? ~~F'I Notes"
Discussion:
1. There is a definite need for an informal publication which would pro-
vide the PI analysts within NPIC with a simple means of publishing the many
new bits and pieces of intelligence uncovered as a b
work. Several other DD~I offices have such semi-officiarloduct of their daily
Permit publication of individual analysts' b Publications which
These publications carry a suitable caveat andpareuissueddwith an~n~offitheofes.
substantive and editorial review. They include graphics.
Recommendation:
Within NPIC, "PI Notes" prepared voluntarily by individual analysts could
be submitted weekly to a Review Board. The Board would a
which are of intelligence value and a PProve those items
would be published with a minimum of fu~rtherubstantively sound. Approved items
processing.
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