PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
c.
-eceptelartviz?
r?
r
June 16, 1966
6,tv
NENORANDUN FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
RICHARD MEYER
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development
RONALD J. POST
Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat
U.S. Information Agency
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Plan for Central America (U)
The NSC Staff approves the Public Diplomacy Plan submitted by the
Department of State on this subject. We note that there has been
considerable progress in the realization of our public diplomacy
goals concerning Central America among turopean audiences. We
must, however, continue to emphasize our comprehensive policy
towards Central America at the same time that we focus on the
specific question of Nicaragua. (C)
There is a need to maintain this as a high priority of our
missions Europe and Latin America. The opposition is engaged in
an intensive propaganda effort to sustain their point of view in
these areas, and our activity must be at. a high level to gain
support for our policies. In addition to the continued provision
of important materials to the field missions, we must keep up a
flow of speakers to the target areas. We must also seek to
utilize, as much as pcssible, Central American spokesmen to speak
on their own behalf in Latin America and Europe. Posts in Europe
and Latin America should find ways to encourage locals to travel
to Central America to gain on-the-ground knowledge of what is
happening. (C)
-Gotwipeullidr
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
TIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
11
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
2
The limited reorganisation of the SLPD function should in no way
suggest any dimunition of effort. IC)
The IISC requests a status report of activities undertaken to
implement the action plan by August 31, 1986. MI
Sodas/ S. McDani41 1
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
iTI !I
_L,;.on AL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
cONFIDENTIAL,
May 23. 1986
mimommum TO VADN JOHN N. POINDEXTER
THE UNITS SOUSE
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Plan for Explaining 0.5. Central
American Policy in Europe and Latin America
The Department submits herewith a public liplomacy plan
for explaining U.S. Central American policy to Latin Americans
and Europeans. Parts of the plan focus on explaining those
same policies to international political organizations such as
the Socialist International, the International Democrat Union,
and the Christian Democrats.
"ilatrho
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
P.Jblic Diplomacy Plan
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
CONFIDENTIAL
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN
POR EXPLAINING U.S. CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY
IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
BACKGROUND
Tbe Sandinistas came to power in July 1979 in a coalition with
genuine democrats. However, within weeks the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) began a pattern of actions
reflecting a betrayal of the revolution: internal repression
of genuine lemocrats and of non-communist institutions such as
religious organizations: aggression against fellow Latin
American countries through armed subversion: ties with
terrorist organizations in Latin America, the Middle East, and
Europe: and 3 military buildup supported by the Soviet bloc and
Cuba. That pattern continues today.
Under President Reagan, a balanced U.S. policy has been
followed in Central America. It contains four mutually
reinforcing elements:
1. Encouragement of democracy:
2. Economic aid to improve living conditions;
3. Active diplomacy for realistic political solutions;
4. Security assistance to give the people of Central
America the means to defend themselves against
expanded Soviet-loc/CubanMicaraguan subversion or
armed aggression.
Much progress has been made in four of the five Central
American countries since 1981: Costa Rica, Honduras,
El Salvador, and Guatemala ace democratic and ace steadily
strengthening their democratic institutions. The U.S. Congress
has year by year provided support for the President's policy
tncough increasing appropriations for economic and security
assistance (total amounts by fiscal year 1933--$$13 million;
1334?$939 million: 1335--$951 million: 199S--$1,014 million).
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADA
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
- g -
110ALS
-- To convince audiences in Central and South America
(particularly the Contadora and Contadora Support Group
countries) and in Europe that U.S. policy toward Central
America is balanced, workable, and the best alternative
possible.
41111,??
To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the
Nicaraguan democratic resistance has a cohesive and
credible political program and that it is a viable,
democratic force worthy of the support of the U.S. and
other democratic nations.
-- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe
that the Sandinistas support international terrorism and
that Sandinista external subversion threatens the nascent
democracies in neighboring countries.
-- To demonstrate that the Sandinistas consciously and
systematically violate human rights.
- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the
United States seeks only that the Sandinistas deliver on
their promises of 1979 to the Organization of American
States: that we believe that the best way to do this is
for the Sandinistas to engage in dialogue with the
opposition: that the Contadora process, if it can meet our
three cevirements that it be comprehensive, simvltaneous,
and verifiable, is an alternative we can support.
-- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe
now Sandinista ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union adversi?ly
affect U.S. and their own national security interests.
-- To persuade the internationals (Socialist International,
Christian Democrats, International Democrat Union, etc.)
to speak out on their concern for civil and human rights
In Nicaragua, Sandinista intervention in neighboring
countries, and Sandinista ties with international
terror its: and to encourage the internationals to oppose
aid to the Sandinistas for the same reasons.
- 73 c-)J1t.?r Saniinista li3inform3tion 3ctivities with f3r:ts.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
e?si
0
.t
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
_ 3 _
ADDITIONAL GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA
To convince the countries of Central America that the
United States shares their political and economic goals
and can be counted upon to stick with then for the long
haul (the U.S. is a reliable ally).
To persuade Central American government, political,
church, and labor leaders to be more active in telling the
Central American story in 'grope. South America, Mexico,
and the Caribbean.
ADDITIONAL GOAL IN EUROPE
NO eat
To convince European publics that the U.S. is responding
in a constructive manner to the desires of Central
American nations for political and economic reform.
THEMES
???? ?EID
Stress positive aspects (economic development, promotion
of democracy, security) of U.S. policy in Central America.
Set record straight on U.S. policy toward negotiations
with Nicaragua and on Contadora, including Nicaraguan
refusal to negotiate a comprehensive agreement and U.S.
aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.
Emphasize demacratic background and objectives of the
Nicaraguan resistance, while reiterating totalitarian
nature of the Sandinista regime. Point out militaristic
and undemocratic Sandinista educational system; exploit
existence of neighborhood committees and internal
repression. Remind audiences of Sandinista efforts to
crush internal opponents, especially the Catholic Church,
political parties, and labor unions not controlled by the
government. Focus on new Nicaraguan constitution when it
is unveiled by the Sandinistas and on totally controlled
process in which constitution will be subjected to "public
discussion.'
-- Reemphasize progress and successes in El Salvador, while
publicizing the destructive and totalitarian nature of the
Salvadoran guerrillas.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
1114" f Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
4?, ???
M111.
Explain that the United States supports those people and
governments who are furthering the democratic process--in
Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador--and
seeking to foster reconciliation and the democratic
process in Nicaragua.
Remind audiences of Sandinista and Salvadoran guerrilla
ties with terrorists in Latin America (example, M-19 in
Colombia) and elsewhere (including Middle East), arms and
drug runners, and of their Soviet?Cuban ties. Mention
Sandinista practice of giving Nicaraguan passports to
terrorists.
Continue to present U.S. position on, and rationale for,
withdrawal from Nicaraguan case before the International
Court of Justice. Note: The ICJ decision on the merits
of the Nicaraguan case, expected in May, will spark
Nicaraguan attempts to garner support for calls for the
U.S. to comply with the Court's rulings, likely including
a Nicaraguan approach to the UN Security Council for
enforcement of the ICJ's ruling under Article 94(2) of the
UN Charter.
ADDITIONAL THEME IN CENTRAL AMERICA
?Mi
Europeans do n3t have a clear understanding of progress
toward denacracy in Central America, nor do they
understand the threat to democracy posed by the
Sandinistas. The united States government cannot alone
convey that story to Europeans. The Central Americans
should take on a share of that task.
AUDIENCES
Political and government leaders in Latin America and
Europe
Media in Latin America and Europe
The Internationals
Religious leaders
Academics
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
-
Note: The following three audiences have ready access to the
American news media and to U.S. public opinion data. This will
affect their willingness to accept materials and information
aimed directly at them.
European and Latin American delegations to the United
Nations
Latin American and European diplomatic missions in
Washington, D.C.
Latin American and European journalists in the United
States
ACTIONS
Make increased use of WORLDNET as an interactive medium
for explaining u.S. policy in Central America (among
officials to be sought as spokesmen on Central America are
Vice President Bush, Ambassador Walters, Assistant
Secretary Abrams, and Ambassador Habib).
-- Speech by President Reagan describing his positive vision
for Central Americans. This should note our greatly
increased economic assistance, including scholarship
programs, and our identification with the hopes of the
people of the region for a better life. The speech should
also note that the door is open for Nicaraguans to share
In this prospect--if their Sandinista leaders will allow
them the freedom to pursue it. This speech should be a
major event delivered on some appropriate occasion,
preferably during the June 10-11 visit of the four Central
American democratic presidents. Other possibilities might
be to have the President speak to the 04S or during either
the President Sanguinetti or President Azcona visits.
A senior Administration official, perhaps Secretary
Shultz, should publicly unveil the second annual report on
the implementation of the Kissinger Commission for Jackson
Plan) findings. This can be an opportunity to demonstrate
that we recognize the North-South dimensions of the
problem, and to stress the affirmative part of our
strategy.
- Fr S.bcialist International in Lima, June 20-23, State
dill instruct emSassies in the countries represented to
7.1ake demarches to party leaders. USIS Lima will try to
place material on Central America in the Peruvian media at
that time, and will also distrioute ARA/LPD pamphlets
presenting U.S. views on Central America.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
?;j.
?
? .1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
-- USIA will saintain a steady flow of AMPARTS to Europe and
Latin America to speak about Central America. These will
be arranged according to the needs identified by posts in
their country plans.
-- In addition to continuous reporting by its own media, USIA
will distribute abroad incteased numbers of copies of
studies produced by ARA/LPD. USIA will encourage its
posts in Europe to translate more ARA/LPD documents into
local languages.
-- DOD will continue its series of research/study seminars in
Latin America on the Strategic Challenges to Regional
Security.
-- DOD and USIA will distribute the 80-piece slide
presentation 'The Challenge and Response' to posts in
Europe and Latin America. USIA will consider translating
the show into local languages.
-- put ARA/LPD sponsored 'Was Display ? exhibit at key points
in U.S. and overseas.
ARA/LPD will work closely with IO/UNP to prepare U.S.
statements and rights of reply in multilateral fora to
counter Sandinista disinformation.
ARA/LPD and USIA will be prepared to exploit any
Nicaraguan intransigence at the Esquipulas, Guatemala.
summit (May 24-26), and at the June 6 Contadora meeting
(possible Contadora conclusion), and at Contadora
negotiating sessions leading up to June 6. ARA/LPD and
USIA will also prepare to support positions taken by the
Central American democracies.
ACTIONS (Latin America)
During President Duarte's travel to Costa Rica, Peru.
Uruguay, and Brazil. May 9-22, USIS posts at each stop
promoted media coverage: USIA media covered in depth.
At the Costa Rican Inaugural, May 8, the U.S. delegation
took the opp.urtunity to meet with ContadDra and Contadora
support country leaders to lemonstrate U.S. support for
their goals.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
During visit of Uruguayan President Sanguinitti to
Washington in June. Administration leaders will underscore
U.S. support for democracy and economic progress.
emphasizing a positive vision, rather than reiterating
well-known American opposition to oppression. USIA media
will cover in full and also assist Uruguayan media
traveling with the president.
USIA will provide full media coverage and assistance to
the working visit of 'conduces President Ascona to
Washington May 26-2g. Appropriate ;votes by Means will
be played into Europe and Latin America.
ARA/LPD will prepare a cable to Embassies in Central
America instructing them to discuss with government
officials, political, church, and labor leaders the need
to tell the Central American story in Europe. A special
effort will be made to persuade President Duarte to begin
a public affairs effort in Europe.
DOD Policy Support Staff prepared special briefing and
display materi3ls on Central America for use at the
meeting with air force chiefs of staff from 20 Latin
American and Caribbean countries May 5-9. Similar
materials and briefings will be given to air force
intelligence chiefs from 20 Latin American and Caribbean
countries when they meet at Homestead AFB, Florida, in
August 1986.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
." Reply to note of 07iO3/116 12:15
MOTE FROM: Walter Raymond
Subject: OTTO REICH
After much discussion, *Bob Kagan, who was Elliot Abrams'
Special Assistant, was named as Otto's replacement. Xagan's
office was folded under ARA for command and control but
continues to have a reporting responsibility to the IPC and
the SPG as part of my effort to give it an interagency
mandate. It remains to be seen if this will weaken the
effort. One key will be the need for people to be assigned
from an interagency pool.
Meanwhile, I continue to chair weekly meetings to sustain
the public diplomacy effort. They are attended by Ragan,
Speakes rep, Buchanan rep, DOD, CIA, USIA and MSC LA
officer. When there is a Sitrm mtg of the Centam
coordinating group for Rill strategy we get a feed from that
group). Our brief is much broader. We seek to lay out and
implement broader international strategies, particularly in
LA and EUR. We approved a new strategy paper on 16 June
which was sent out over Rod McDaniel's signature. This
basically calls for a sustained effort to garner support for
our overall Centam policy, increase understanding of the
issues and, in the specific case of Mica, concentrate on
gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and white hats on UNO.
We have requested a community report on the level of
activity sustained under the latest NSC PD tasking by 31
Aug.
The group has produced an outstanding collection of
materials to suuport our policy. It is also light years
ahead of where it was three years ago, but much work needs
to be done. At our most recent weekly Centam mtg the
following items were covered:
--Senate strategy: Focus on key Senators who can be
brought over to increase victory margin and show momentum.
--Maximize exposure for Bishop Bismarck Carvallo and La
Prensa to highlight Nic internal crackdown. Lousy coverage
to date in foreign press and not much better in US.
--Play on key themes in Europe which will strengthen
our case:
c Popularize Centam support for UNO. Note USIA
poll which showed popular support for armed opposition to
Nics in Honduras and Costa Rica.
o We are on the winning side. The House vote can
help convince the Europeans that we will see this
through.. .we are not going to be blown away by the Hill. It
is always politically easier to support a winner.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
t Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9
1
--Arms Display--use on Hill or at UN. This does not
mean to say everything is perfect, but there is a process
under way and world opinion, often fluctuating because of
many reasons includng the East-West Relationship, has been
gradually moving. We have to sustain it.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000200330003-9