PRESIDENT WAS TOLD ARMS WERE KEY TO IRAN'S HELP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100023-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: November 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100023-8
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WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1986
President Was Told Arms
Were Key to Iran's Help
Families' Pressure Overcame .lides' trarnings
By-Walter Pincus?
AshIngtnh Post Simi Writer
President Reagan ordered secret arms
shipments to Iran last spring alter being
told that it was the only way to get Teh-
ran's help in freeing five U.S. hostages then
held in Lebanon by pro-Iranian terrorists,
informed sources said yesterday.
In making his decision, the president dis-
regarded warnings from Secretary of State
George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger that such action
would undermine his public counterterror-
ism policies, according to the sources, who
provided many details of the covert oper-
ation that Reagan described sketchily in his
televised speech last night.
Even Reagan's envoy in the Iranian ne-
gotiations, former national security adviser
Robert C. McFarlane, objected to the arms
shipments, according to one source familiar
with his views. Other officials, however,
said McFarlane supported the idea.
Although Reagan had agreed in January
that the United States would shun arms-for-
hostages bargaining, the president was "un-
happy" with that position, largely because
he was under pressure from the hostages'
families to take action, sources said.
Reagan repeatedly asked Shultz, Wein-
berger and others during the spring wheth-
er they were "sure we can't ship arms,"
sources said. He eventually reversed his
January decision, and two Americans were
freed after arms shipments were received
by Tehran. Earlier, in September 1985, the
Rev. Benjamin Weir's release had come af-
ter a U.S.-approved Israeli shipment of
arms to Iran.
As the furor over the covert operation in-
tensified this week, the White House has
sought to portray Reagan's authorization of
arms to Iran as principally an effort to win
the good will of factions in Tehran that
might become important in a government
succeeding Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Despite 18 months of continuing disap-
pointment at what they consider Iranian du-
plicity in promising more than was deliv-
ered?as followed McFarlane's mistaken
expectation that all hostages would be freed
before he arrived in Tehran on a se-
cret mission last May?some White
House officials say they hope Teh-
ran will help free some of the re-
maining American hostages be-
lieved held in Lebanon. While the
pro-Iranian Islamic Jihad group con-
trols some of the hostages, admin-
istration officials acknowledge they
are not certain who kidnaped three
other Americans within the past
two months or how they will be
freed.
The secret diplomatic gambit
with Iran had. its origins nearly 18
months ago during the June 1985
hijacking to Beirut of TWA flight
847, according to current and for-
mer U.S. officials, congressional
sources and knowledgeable Israelis.
After the White House realized
that only the intervention of Iranian
officials led to the freeing of some
of the hijacking hostages, McFar-
lane explored the possibility of new
channels to Tehran through Iranian
exiles and U.S. allies.
This secret diplomacy began
about the time Reagan gave a July
8, 1985, speech to the American
Bar Association in Washington's
Constitution Hall. In it, he de-
nounced Iran's alleged support of
terrorism and called Khomeini's re-
gime part of a "new international
version of Murder Incorporated." ?
At that time, the director general
of the Israeli foreign ministry, Da-
vid Kimche, and some Israeli arms
dealers suggested to McFarlane
that the Reagan administration
could "show good faith" to Iran by
approving shipments of arms and
military spare parts to that country.
The shipments, they suggested,
could help the United States rees-
tablish Iranian contacts and expe-
dite the hostages' release, sources
said.
Reagan and his top aides found
the idea intriguing, despite the ad-
ministration's well-publicized neu-
trality in the six-year war between
Iran and Iraq, its policy of not pay-
ing ransom for political hostages
and its global efforts to embargo
arms to Iran. One issue the admin-
istration never was willing to con-
sider was the demand of the pro-
Iranian group holding the Ameri-
cans that 17 terrorists in Kuwaiti
prisons be freed.
For the first contacts with Teh-
ran, the Israelis used a former
agent of their secret service who
had acted as Jerusalem's air attache
in Tehran during the last 12 years
of the shah's rule. They also em-
ployed an exiled Iranian business-
man who is a friend of Iran's prime
minister, Mir Hussein Moussavi.
The first plane load of U.S.-built
military equipment was shipped in
early September by the Israelis,
with U.S. officials aware of but not
interfering with the plan. The plane
flew from Israel to Iran via Portu-
gal, but the Iranians said they could
not deliver hostages and instead
sent a $10 million check through
the Iranian businessman to pay for
the material. The Israelis, accord-
ing to Newsweek magazine, re-
turned the check and demanded re-
lease of hostages. The Iranians re-
sponded that they needed additional
arms, and a second plane load was
dispatched.
On Saturday, Sept. 14, the sec-
ond plane left Iran; Weir was re-
leased that day. The White House,
according to sources, had expected
release of all five Americans be-
lieved held in .Lebanon by the pro-
Iranian Islamic Jihad. A sixth hos-
tage, U.S. diplomat William Buck-
ley, had been killed earlier, accord-
ing to Islamic Jihad statements.
In hopes that others would be
freed, the president waited until
Thursday, Sept. 18, to announce
Weir's release.
In one of many unexplained ep-
isodes involving the hostages, Mar-
ion G. (Pat) Robertson, in a televi-
sion interview with Reagan on his
Christian Broadcasting Network
the next day, Sept. 19, told the
president: "Word reached us that a
member of the White House staff
was dispatched on Sunday [the day
after Weir's release], I believe, to
Iran to seek the release of the re-
maining [hostages]."
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100023-8
Reagan replied that "I can't really
talk about what we are doing." His
aides at that time refused to con-
firm or deny Robertson's assertion.
One official familiar with the Weir
release said yesterday he had not
heard of anyone going to Tehran-at
that time. White House spokesmen
refused to discuss the matter.
In the wake of Weir's return,
Reagan called Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Shimon Peres to thank him for
Israeli cooperation, according to Is-
raeli and U.S. sources.
_ In succeeding months, the Israeli
arms dealers suggested another try
at freeing the hostages. In Decem-.
her 1985 and January, 1986, an in-
teragency review of U.S. policies
toward Iran was conducted because
McFarlane believed that Iran, stra-
tegically located near the Persian.
Gulf, was threatened by Soviet ex-
pansionism and perhaps ready to tilt
back toward the West.
Although McFarlane had left the
government for personal reasons on
Dec. 4, he continued to participate
in the discussions on Iran. At one
point he met in London with the Is-
raeli arms dealers and reported to
the White House that if there were
to be future arms shipments, they
should not go through that channel.
About that time, Peres, also told
Washington that the continued use
of Israeli arms dealers would be too
dangerous.
At a January meeting in the
White House, the president and his
top advisers decided that it was im-
portant to make contacts in Tehran.
Supporting this decision was a be-
lief that Tehran was increasingly
fearful of Moscow and needed spe-
cial U.S. equipment to keep its
U.S.-made aircraft particularly
the F14 Tomcat?and sophisticated
air defense systems working.
It was then that Reagan approved
a secret plan to explore contacts
with Iran but agreed to cut off dis-
cussion of an arms deal.
By April, however, Reagan had
changed his mind and ordered an
arms channel to be opened. One
source said new "feelers" had been
put out by Tehran; others said Rea-
.gan had been influenced by his con-
cern for the hostages and the public
pressures created by their families.
Reagan was also said to hope that
the United States could eventually
reestablish electronic "eavesdrop-
ping posts" in Iran to listen to So-
viet missile facilities. Those posts
were lost after the Iranian revolu-
tion in 1978.
Reagan called Peres and asked
that a new channel be opened for
further arms shipments. Peres of-
fered the use of an aide familiar
'with Israeli antiterrorism contacts.
Reagan also reportedly offered to
establish a system under which Is-
rael would be resupplied with mil-
itary items sent to Iran. Items sent
to Iran that Israel did not possess?
including F14 parts?would be
shipped to Israel as part of its mil-
itary aid program and then turned
over to Iran.
Although the shipments were rel-
atively small, the items were con-
sidered critical to Iran. Although
the military supplies have repeat-
edly been called "defensive" by ad-
ministration spokesmen, one knowl-
edgeable official said they included
sonic offensive munitions.
In approving arms shipments,
Reagan also ordered that, with the
exception of .Shultz and Weinber-
ger, officials of the State and De-
fense departments be kept unaware
of the program. Furthermore, the
Central Intelligence Agency was to
be bypassed in order to keep Con-
gress in the dark.
In May, McFarlane was told by
his successor, Vice Adm. John M.
Poindexter, that contacts since his
departure from the White House
had paved the way for a trip to Teh-
ran and face-to-face talks with top
officials of the Khomeini regime.
McFarlane traveled to Tehran
with Lt. Col. Oliver North of the
National Security Council staff, who
had supervised the resumed arms
shipments for the White House.
They flew in a cargo plane carrying
military spare parts, although one
source said McFarlane was not
aware, prior to that time, of Rea-
gan's resumption of arms ship-
ments.
McFarlane mistakenly thought
that all the U.S. hostages would he
freed before his plane landed. He
thought talks would be totally fo-
cused on such political goals as end-
ing Iran's support for terrorism,
searching for a way to conclude the
gulf war and discussing resumption
of relations.
Instead, he found the Iranians
wanted to discuss terms for releas-
ing the hostages, including not only
arms but U.S. help in getting the
terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait
freed.
Two weeks later, Reagan said, in
response from an appeal from a hos-
tage family, that an avenue for get-
ting all five released "didn't work
out," causing him "great disappoint-
ment."
Additional secret shipments Were
sent in July. Late that month the
Rev. Lawrence Martin Jenco was
released. In late October, another
shipment was sent, and on Nov. 2,
David Jacobsen was released. The
secret diplomacy became public last
week, however, when as part of the
political infighting in Tehran, an
Iranian official leaked a version of
the McFarlane visit to a Lebanese
magazine.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100023-8