PROBABLE EFFECTS OF INCREASING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES UPON THE POLICIES OF US ALLIES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004700010001-0
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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

4 "I CI
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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
4ikkee
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE EFFECTS OF INCREASING NUCLEAR
CAPABILITIES UPON THE POLICIES OF US ALLIES
41a,
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DOCI,_;MFINT NO.
i
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NO CHANGE-7 IN CLASS. t ,....-...
NIE 100-54 2ECLASSIRED ...,
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
Approved 20 April 1954 NEXT REVIEW DATE:
Published 26 April 1954 AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ? '-_,S_26:LL RE VIEWER:
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 20 April 1954. The FBI abstained, the sub-
ject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and
the Atomic Energy Commission.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
''',*1411421111Ff.
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OPMIONisT 1
PROBABLE EFFECTS OF INCREASING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
UPON THE POLICIES OF US ALLIES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable effect upon the policies of the principal US allies of a
general conviction that the US and the USSR each had acquired nuclear capabilities
more than sufficient to cripple the other.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. Nuclear weapons will not have been used in war since 1945.
2. No international agreement will have been made restricting or outlawing the
use of nuclear weapons in war.
NOTE
This estimate applies primarily to the
Western European allies of the US,
? though most of it holds true also for
Japan, Turkey, and other allied coun-
tries. So numerous are the factors that
would govern the policy of each allied
government under the conditions of the
problem, however, that no attempt can
usefully be made at present to estimate
these policies for individual countries.
This estimate is therefore stated in gen-
eral terms. As the potentialities and im-
plications of nuclear weapons become
better understood in various countries, it
may be possible to formulate more spe-
cific estimates.
CONCLUSIONS
1. A great and recognized growth in nu-
clear capabilities will obviously intensify
the anxiety of peoples and governments
to avoid war. No government will will-
ingly run risks of war unless interests
are at stake which it considers vital, and
the threat of nuclear weapons will almost
certainly tend ,to narrow the range of in-
terests that any government will consider
vital.
2. Under such circumstances, the diffi-
culties presently felt in maintaining an
effective Western coalition under US
leadership may be increased, but we do
not believe that the alliance will neces-
sarily show significant weakness, at least
as long as there does not seem to be a
greatly increased likelihood of general
war. The US allies will probably seek to
obtain greater influence over US policy
sjawiesupfflai.
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in order to ensure a cautious and non-
provocative attitude toward the Commu-
nist states.
3. The alliance could receive a severe test,
however, in connection with local aggres-
sion committed or supported by the So-
viet Bloc. Fear already exists that strong
reaction to such aggression might lead to
general war. Fears of general war will
-be intensified when both great power
blocs are believed to possess large nuclear
capabilities. US allies would therefore be
even more insistent than at present that
every effort be made to limit the scope
and area of local conflicts and to deal
with local aggression without resorting
to acts which might expand the conflict
into general war. US allies generally
would also be more unwilling than at
present to participate in repelling local
Communist aggression.
4. In the event of international crisis in-
volving grave danger of general war, we
believe that the allies would almost cer-
tainly support the US as long as they be-
lieved that firm maintenance of the
alliance would probably avert war.
5. We cannot estimate the probable
courses of action of US allies if an in-
ternational crisis should develop to the
point where general war seemed to them
virtually certain and no longer to be
2
averted by firm maintenance of the
alliance. There is inadequate evidence
or precedent on which to calculate the re-
action of governments and peoples who
consider themselves to be facing immi-
nent threat of attack with nuclear weap-
ons. Among the factors influencing the
courses of action of each nation, we be-
lieve that the following would be of most
importance: (a) the estimate that the
government and people would make of
their chances of survival in the event of
participation in general war; (b) the al-
ternatives which would appear available
at the time; (c) the political and social
stability of the state, and the morale of
its population; (d) the importance, to the
state, of the issues at stake in the crisis;
(e) the strength and cohesion of the alli-
ance at the beginning of the crisis, and
the degree of integration of its armed
forces; and (f) the judgment which
people and government had made of the
wisdom and skill with which US policy
had been conducted.
6. We believe that most allied govern-
ments, if confronted with certain nation-
al destruction as the sole alternative to
an accommodation with the USSR, would
choose the latter. We believe it unlikely,
though possible, that the major allies of
the US would become convinced that the
alternatives facing them were so limited
and so clear-cut as the two described.
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
7. The tests of nuclear weapons recently car-
ried out by the US and the USSR, and the
publicity attending these tests, has produced
a notable increase in public anxiety concern-
ing these weapons. The considerable inten-
sity of feeling on the subject presently observ-
able in the UK, Japan, and elsewhere will
probably diminish. Nevertheless, as time
goes on, and particularly as Soviet nuclear
capabilities increase, a greater realization of
the potentialities of these weapons will de-
velop. Such realization will be based in part
on misinformation; in part on the gradual
dissemination of knowledge about nuclear
weapons by Western governments and re-
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sponsible publicists.- Soviet propaganda may
contribute to the process. There will proba-
bly be many and varying interpretations
placed upon the potentialities and limitations
of the nuclear factor in modern warfare ? cor-
rect and incorrect, reassuring and hysterical,
hopeful and despairing. In any event, in-
creasing awareness of the potentialities and
implications of nuclear weapons will even-
tually exert a profound influence upon public
and governmental opinion throughout the
world. Fear of war, and anxiety to avoid war,
will increase.
8. This intensified anxiety to avoid war may
in turn affect the policies of governments. To
be sure, the present policies of governments
were not made in ignorance of the existence
of nuclear weapons, or without attention to
their significance and probable future devel-
opment. The present policies of the allies of
the US are therefore at least a partial guide
to their probable future courses of action.
Nevertheless, it is possible that popular pres-
sures, even popular hysteria, arising out of an
increasing realization of the destructiveness of
nuclear weapons, might force changes in pol-
icy against the desires of governments. More-
over, some governments may under certain
circumstances feel compelled to reappraise
their policies in the light of their own increas-
ing understanding of the implications of
nuclear weapons. The likelihood of such
changes of policy, and their probable nature,
are examined in the following paragraphs.
II. PROBABLE EFFECTS DURING A PERIOD
OF COLD WAR
9. The Western alliance system was estab-
lished in a period of high international ten-
sion. It had as its primary purpose the pre-
vention of _ war, while at the same time
providing its members with protection against
the danger of Communist expansion. It was
based on the proposition that the Kremlin
would be unlikely to launch general war, or to
take actions which it considered to involve
grave risks of general war, as long as the
political and military power of the Soviet Bloc
was at least approximately balanced, in an
over-all fashion, by the power of an opposing
coalition.
3
10. We see no reason to believe that this prop-
osition will necessarily become less convincing
to allied peoples and governments as the nu-
clear capabilities of the USSR increase. In-
deed it may appear to have even more force
than before, at least as long as there does not
seem to be a greatly increased likelihood of
general war. The prevention of war will be-
come more desirable than ever. Moreover,
most allied governments will continue to
realize that membership in the alliance as-
sures them of US interest in their general
welfare and prosperity, and gives them a much
greater voice in world affairs than they could
have in isolation.
11. We therefore believe it probable that the
Western alliance will endure despite the new
element introduced into the w,orld situation by
the further development of nuclear weapons.
The allies will almost certainly demand that
US armed forces remain in Western Europe
and in some parts of the Far East as evidence
of continuing US determination to protect its
allies, and of the strength and integrity of the
alliance. With the exception of the UK and
perhaps a few other countries, the allies will
probably not acquire the capability to produce
nuclear weapons. However, they will proba-
bly continue to play their role in the coalition
by maintaining substantial military establish-
ments, and will press for US aid for this pur-
pose. US allies with no capability of produc-
ing nuclear weapons will probably eventually
request the US to supply them with these
weapons for use by their own armed forces or
to make these weapons available for use under
the control of NATO. Allies who have or in-
tend to acquire a capability to produce these
weapons will press the US for an exchange
of information and a more complete integra-
tion of nuclear development and production
within the alliance.
12. Nevertheless, as the increasingly disas-
trous consequences of war become more gen-
erally recognized, the allies will even more
closely scrutinize the alliance to ensure that
it in fact serves to prevent war. This may on
many occasions make it more difficult for the
US to exert vigorous leadership:
a. The allies will almost certainly seek to
obtain greater influence over US policy toward
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sogniMil
the USSR and Communist China, in order to
ensure a cautious and non-provocative atti-
tude toward the Communist states.
b. The allies will become more fearful that
in pursuing its national interests or in re-
sponse to domestic pressures the US may
adopt courses of action involving, in the allies'
opinion, undue risks of war. Each ally will
try to ensure that no appreciable risk of war
is run except to protect interests which it
considers vital to its own national survival.
C. Increasing nuclear capabilities will place
the USSR in a stronger position to exert pres-
sures upon most non-Communist govern-
ments.
13. The alliance could receive a severe test in
connection with local aggression committed or
supported by the Soviet Bloc. Fear already
exists that strong reaction to such aggression
might lead to general war. Fears of general
war will be intensified when both great power
blocs are believed to possess large nuclear
capabilities. US allies would, therefore, be
even more insistent than at present that every
effort be made to limit the scope and area
of local conflicts and to deal with local aggres-
sion without resorting to acts which might
expand the conflict into general war. US
allies generally would also be more unwilling
than at present to participate in repelling
local Communist aggression.
14. On the other hand, the allies of the US
will be sensitive to any indication that the US
is unwilling, in the face of Soviet nuclear
capabilities, to resort to war in their defense.
If at some time in the future they should
become convinced that the principal deterrent
to Soviet attack upon them had been removed
by such a change in US policy, at least some
allies would, in the face of Soviet pressure,
abandon the alliance and seek an accommo-
dation with the USSR.
15. The great and probably increasing aver-
sion to the use of nuclear weapons may also
create difficulties for US policy. There is at
present a fairly widespread hope that nuclear
weapons will never actually be used again in
war. This hope may vanish, but there is
likely to be a strong desire among US allies to
4
maintain, as long as possible, whatever moral
and political inhibitions may exist against the
use of these weapons. Except when their own
most vital interests are at stake, US allies will
probably seek to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons in local conflicts.
16. It is almost certain that as Soviet nuclear
capabilities increase and as the implications
of this increase are better realized, popular
pressures will grow for some kind of agree-
ment restricting or outlawing the use of nu-
clear weapons. For example, there might be
strong public demand for a pact with. the
USSR in which both sides undertook at least
not to use such weapons against large centers
of population. Such a demand might rest on
ill-considered or militarily irrational founda-
tions, and most governments would probably
be wary of the adverse effect such an agree-
ment might have on the deterrent power of
Western nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless,
especially if the USSR should display an
apparently genuine interest in such a pro-
posal, popular pressures might become so
great as to compel the US and its allies either
to accept such an agreement or to risk under-
mining popular support for the Western stand
against the Soviet Bloc.
III. PROBABLE EFFECTS IN THE EVENT OF
GREATLY INCREASED THREAT OF
GENERAL WAR
17. Soviet nuclear capabilities may eventually
present the Free World with a problem unique
in history. Peoples and governments have
often in the past had to face the threat of
heavy devastation, prolonged enemy occupa-
tion, massacre of parts of the population, and
even destruction of the social order and the
political and economic system. But no peo-
ple or government has ever had to face the
imminent likelihood of such enormous de-
struction of life and property as nuclear weap-
ons can inflict in a brief period of time. Thus,
the situation facing allied peoples and govern-
ments in the event of imminent threat of
general war involving nuclear weapons will be
one of a new order, and the pressures will be
greater than those produced at any time in
history.
4,2004AVie
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4Serrt"' 5
18. Some of the peoples of countries allied to
the US at present entertain the hope that if
war occurs between the US and the USSR they
may not themselves be attacked with nuclear
weapons. We do not believe that this hope
for immunity from nuclear attack will long
survive, at least in Western Europe and Japan,
but even if it does not entirely disappear it is
unlikely to remain strong. We believe that
almost without exception the allies will come
to accept the idea that general war would in
all probability include the risk of destruction
of many of the cities and people of their own
countries and would perhaps strike a mortal
blow at their civilization.
19. Under these conditions, in a period of
grave international crisis governments allied
to the US would consider the following possi-
bilities:
a. That the best interests of their countries
could be served if the US could be persuaded
to yield to Soviet demands or pressures, and
that this persuasion could be accomplished by
threatening to renounce their treaty commit-
ments and to desert the alliance.
b. That in a prolonged crisis the attractions
of neutrality might increase so greatly and
popular pressure in their own countries might
grow so as to force them to withdraw from
the alliance and adopt a neutral position.
c. That, even if neutrality were not feasible,
acceptance of Soviet occupation or Communist
control would be preferable to undergoing the
devastation likely to result from nuclear war-
fare.
It is also possible that the Kremlin might, at
a time of grave international crisis, use the
threat of nuclear devastation in an attempt
to persuade the governments of at least some
countries to forsake their alliance with the
US in return for a Soviet pledge to respect
their neutrality. The difficulties and risks in-
volved in such an attempt would be consid-
erable.
20. On the other hand, allied governments
would also have to consider:
a. That unity and firmness might still offer
a reasonable chance of preventing the ulti-
mate outbreak of war without surrendering
vital national interests.
b. That it might be difficult or impossible
for them to enjoy the rewards of neutrality,
since they might be overrun and occupied or
brought under effective control by the USSR,
even if they sought to remain neutral. Or
the US in the course of actions designed to
ensure its own survival, to weaken the USSR,
and to attain victory might feel compelled to
use nuclear weapons against targets in the
territory of its former allies.
c. That even though abandonment of the
alliance were to prevent war, at least for the
time being, the break-up of the alliance and
the consequent loss of US support might con-
demn them eventually to Soviet domination.
21. It is possible that governments would have
no real choice between alternatives in a swiftly
?developing crisis leading to war. It seems
probable, however, that most govrnrnents
would have some chance to control their
courses of action, especially if the Kremlin
succeeded in managing the crisis in such a
way as to give opportunity for some allies to
desert the alliance. In such an event the
course of action of each allied government
would be determined by many factors, of
which the following seem to us most im-
portant:
a. The chances of national survival. Each
nation would evaluate its air defenses, its cap-
ability of resisting invasion, the likelihood of
early and adequate assistance from its allies,
the condition of popular morale, and other
factors bearing on an estimate of the probable
consequences of entering general war.
b. The political and social stability of the
state. Some countries, such as the UK, have
a much higher level of political and social
stability than others and a correspondingly
greater ability to undergo periods of crisis and
war. The governments of these countries can
generally count on popular support in time
of grave danger. In some of the less stable
countries, such as France and Italy, Commu-
nists and their allies have great political
strength, and would probably be able to con-
fuse if not to control governmental decisions
in times of crisis.
c. The issues at stake. No country would
willingly risk nuclear war unless issues were
at stake which it considered vital to its exist-
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40ippiti*Fita,
ence. The threat of nuclear weapons, how-
ever, will almost certainly tend to narrow the
range of interests that any country facing war
will consider vital.
d. The condition of the alliance at the time
of crisis. If the Western alliance had come
through a long period of cold war as an in-
tegrated and effective coalition, and, above
all, if the intermeshing of political, economic,
and military relationships had become highly
developed, each member government might
discover at the moment of crisis that a large
part of the crucial decisions had in effect al-
ready been made. Under such circumstances
any government might find it difficult,
though not necessarily impossible, to aban-
don its commitments, recall its forces, and
reverse the whole trend of its foreign policy.
e. The conduct of US policy. The allies
would be reluctant to support the US through
a grave crisis if they considered that US policy
had been rash and provocative. The stand-
ards by which the allies would judge US con-
duct are not easy to define, but it is plain
that the existence of the nuclear threat will
cause the allies to scrutinize US actions far
more critically than they might otherwise
have done.
f. The concentration of decision-making.
If the crisis should develop with great swift-
ness, it might make public debate upon policy
almost impossible. In such a case, decision-
making would tend to be concentrated in
fewer hands than normally, and a few domi-
nant powers in the alliance might make de-
cisions which for all practical purposes would
commit their lesser allies.
22. We believe that in the event of interna-
tional crisis involving grave danger of gen-
eral war, the allies of the US would almost
certainly support the US as long as they be-
lieved that firm maintenance of the alliance
would probably avert war.
23. We cannot estimate the probable courses
of action of US allies if an international crisis
should develop to the point where general
war seemed to them virtually certain and no
longer to be averted by firm maintenance of
the alliance. There is inadequate evidence or
precedent on which to calculate the reaction
of 'governments and peoples who consider
themselves to be facing imminent threat of
attack with nuclear weapons. We believe that
the main factors determining their courses
of action at such a time would be those dis-
cussed above, but we cannot foresee how
such factors would operate at some future
period when general war may appear to have
become almost inevitable.
24. We believe that most allied governments,
if confronted with certain national destruc-
tion as the sole alternative to an accommo-
dation with the USSR, would choose the latter.
We believe it unlikely, though possible, that
the major allies of the US would become con-
vinced that the alternatives facing them were
so limited and so clear-cut as the two de-
scribed.
S?iNfaaratT
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