NIE 11-4-54: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003500030009-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 11, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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X56 e
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 Amt 1954
--- - LED FOR: Mr. Man LVang (OM)
Col l W. H. fennig USA (a-2)
Cap 'B. E. Wi g . Q (ONI)
Coloml W S. Boydt MAP, (AFOMM)
Captain ReV Mal, UST (40)
SUBJECT ffm n-4,54: Sit Capabilities Probable
Cot es of Action thmugh 2 .d 1959
1. -The attached reviced Co .u&d are forum4ded for
your review.
2. It is requested that your ntative mgt with
us at 10:00 WWedne a 18 Au t9 In Room 246 South Duiift ,
to dins these Counluai and the tables and chart w in
Yaw draft of 9 July.
PAM A. SCE
Act1W irtazit Director
Nation. Eatimtea
Distribution, mu
_ DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
O DECLASSIFIED
TS S
GED TO
:
CLASS. CHAN
I ~ 11 `
NEXT REVIEW DATE;
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE. M REVIEWER: ?1 5
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CENTRAL I9TELLIGZNCI AGZ1CX
Av&mat 1954
Swum C " L LE CGURM
N AM= X .1.959
a i d-1959.
W 1i that the .ty and a t7 t
reem 1 "t-s ast2mate by
i o S e o my take y1ftes * Im the Suul
e' t 1atI r itio of Its
a-'ems ourceed In galalug t solmu Pewwo We
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def. ravel ed 'its the emflms t
the echelons of tba. Co hht Pty, and mild'
Eet 1md to civil sa a d .stu-mes of =Jor io e o
20 Altbough the bum ng In the authority
the Soviet
n t i oa t h e totautaxim
tU Its c extra awar t tio, thwe bee s
%gemat offs by the isgim to
a bums of t devised
by mlIa to c tol t Soviet tiro YJM u ,
MW MAIM bas Vramieed the 1e :mat t~air scale
02 1UVISS tQWtkw VIVA I.md s
Lty f
Zlw? ldI. ett ae, o s to Implamm, t
theme premleas. A 8 j' effert Is being to imermae'
I .t i , and to arpad the supply of
e ' lZm1med
the t - elm p3dly demlop.lBg Vy , mw bw
I t c u t back 00 at t deb' o Mmmthale
It 11 Prdiably Islad to a e at
C itf
s s et antiea d g the
pm,lod a' eatirmte, end MW ll1 f t bow,, 1 .
to z a hence to e aftmazathealft of the o
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30 TiMme in a that t a e of mu
p ew has a the c tw. re1ati
betwou NO U3= aSd Its ate status In Maste= ? m
bellow tit SMIet M ty the Satoults regime
will Vemalm l d the Pax1ad of tbio effblmte.
c ant Mim is owe a a to to
t3 W.M. It senses
sib3y e f a ti wbI& the
i ty fw
MI&t d1mppvme but
Ifideh it Muld find 4SPfie t to ate,. K v the =in
Gutlnee of ftmmiat policy in As% am eb s3.y jointly
dom. ip X30 the S tat Voice ass
t ap - to be i its
ffb&tWQ v i t r o t he S i hip. 3 ? . n Bartlaular Commd
. ?m& seem to bave an i ei 3 in
C tpolein XWth K o Tft believe t t.
de - at. e e Batton betwma the t.,
a Si aeMai i c ate or R,t . 3. iu s
a . f s is relntia p. 3I be
the Eivioive f - e t this Ceti=
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mte of Zroifth, of the met eemmu has dwUmd
the past five yewa from the vax7, high =to. of the to
pmtww ede W e eatt to t h a t durlmg the 'b t s Soviet
awe zseeaeml ( ) will :Lwxawe by cant 6 or 7 pweent,
and In 1956@1959 by abaut 5 o 6 Vement, pw yew. .ie be
XWCA
with the long-range to of 3 yenta with the UUS
z atv st J k Pwc@st f the med. 1948!-1933- T9 GIP Should se durIM the t .e eat` to at its
aversaa of 3 Pwewtt Bovie t at
the and at t edbeebott 4- vo eopazed with
am-third about 19530
6 matte'. in the Soviet manetW
1953 iftewd eat 14 percent d to defuse, 28 Fement
tom , and 56 per6wtto ewsuspueno Cowast o e
PMEOM l eate -that far, at I mat the, x-t two s defame wJU
be allotted a e14. s and i at , shwe of
788 slp With a i 1 abet the so= or s
sl ,, InUtC
of a the ellme of pmviow'years
I
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w - MW
abeolut ' , we **ti rite that the s t at expsMiture on deefease,
is etsad at cowtlaulM the rapid, Imeavase that preveiled in 1950.
1952 will emain about the sass through s ld?1956, while ex-
pessdituze ca is%estmat and a iea will Inerewn. '
thief ampbuds in Swiiet economic policy will about certainly
cantinas to be on further dasaelo nt of heavy isduatry.
70 We belie the ehsoatess am batter than ovsa that the
I lft will eontiseis its mememic policies ail these lines
t4woug%oft the period of this estimtt 0 If it does so, then In
absolute terse eonsusa ioa in the ysr 1959 will be about 43 per-
eeat VN&Ur that la 1953 (about 30 p ent Pvatw Por capita)
and total lavestamt about 59 percent meter, with defame
ituzes remaining mebood or sli ly i>l s"ed0 It will
always be peo"b] s, hvseever, teas the &amla to make seibsteatial
ebaft" is its a atiti on Volleys favoring am Sector or US
eo r at the expense of etchers. TM Xr a could, for e1wp1a,
vary s steatielly inerease its l , hares fa defer
while stin certinaing to sehitve an absolute eased. is rises in
tom ii on, though this increase weuU under sash eireu sees
be subs ially less than that astii etaed above.
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10
ebl ? makwas at the Sit eeenwW as a who3a
beda the sffisth v2dek is .'Li
i lea a cam' with the =ft of aadvame la othw see,
of the ec . S 3: o . tta1 ti has remlved
at a fGe3.' the peww le l,, *.hav& t t eR :is p.
abc 7 rent
b1y a zed that eo: tis of the swims 3ag in
mgricvltwe would e 1t It fio t to Beat the f,
reqdZemats of the a ns u , > t
mal s of Stet fwal~p av in whiff aWleulture plajs
Vale 0 To rewdy -the eituaen
with gGaU 3nvoly a 50 rcem
i ase P-WIMItmal production GVW the period 3.950-1955'.
We belles Wit. tie ale .n not be net, and that the se
of -^ 11m Is unMely to zbQ14 3 Pemmt s
MakL-C a total. ab 15 te 20 o f the eatire
.VarLed 1950-109. Even this mWflelent to
aeh o a to i la the pm capita -aval.3abIlIty of
f fo and textilesO
96 We do met 11 v thWILL be am IMPWtsat
lasting ' Se' et tzaft with b31 ies ding
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? Qs
the Zind of this estimte. The Bloc is net depeadmt up= -
E1ecz n for we* then a 11 er at c ties and
eervi s, and its poliey of a ky will tend to
LOW e ien of trade based an ardinary eaeneide eensidc tie .
Yaweavers, the Blew would emeeuzUw considerable difficulties in
fib non-Cst =Wkets for suasttially Wised aumants
of its usnl emits. Nevertheless, even a ll increase in the
vole of trade which cartaft non st countries mw ewry
on with the Bloc could have an appreciable ecena;te effect In
the c es and possibly a awe significant psychological effect.
lO. We believe that, generally s , the size of Soviet
armd f ns-icebeing, and the mamt of ennuml Soviet defense
e eaditures, will immain a o tely constant during the period
o f this estimte, though t h e Kremllm of course Inmease
or demise bad at. any tix it saw fit. 2fellemin are the met
i e. tort develagmmtz which we believe will occur in Soviet armd
h during the period of tide esta te:
a. A zrmt lwmase is mudmrs of nueleaar weap , and
is ramses or yields derived f thew pons.
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! do into '1 Soviet ? P a of a jet
t T 39
-- vias a 1.,410/2,72D -
e t =dIUG/mm9Q of about 1,57O/3, anti
zdlee w i t h &'10,,000 pwxA bemb Imd. We lle
t t the Viet Air Forge a1 bam.abcat
20 o f these eivemn in i i i Up and
win have by d&1959
?
0 1& Gf a jet hmm7 b late the t
Air P 1957* Ife belio . t le bada6r VIII
a 29.350/4, e t ndlum/mMp ate' ab Ln
2P6Oq/5'P3Dq a ica1 a. a,mi r 10,,OGO pound
b e a t lead, and that the U S S R will v abeut.
of tee r m i? d-1957 and about 250
by aid-1959.
do toy o ,zn tk f to m iavo t et
A ,Force. we ew that a few ai 'het Mr-
craft have already entered epwatlawl t''a &Rd
that them will be oft .200 by- ate-1.955, I.,000
by odd-1957: and 29: b 2d-1959. These elmmifts,
tvaetber with IW*ved a'i e at g 'e lys
as ~t~
guMed a Ja llemg will ma 9$ 1.
i (A bilit es, eqmelailly
temurds t end or Us, Ieri tkia, Gaat ti e
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s. A great is are In the amabar CC Soviet long-
reage sabaasiaes. We believe that these boats
we now bail ag at a rate at 46 per ar, aid
that this rate will alert a s is i ceatiam
through 1956 and parvbably throughout the period
of this estii te. This would give the USSR 379
long- raag- onbsarimos by add-1959
U. A Soviet preg a- of we search and deve mt is guided
missiles is kno m to exist, but vs usable to assess the
priority of this progwan as eawpure& with other vsap ,
or the priorities aceerded the v ous guided missile extegmies
vtithia the . It Is veil within Soviet mobilities to
develop ummme types of missiles vithim the Varied of this
exti ts. per ei lev ve believe that by 1955 the Ui eeuld
have a sn -te-surface ball.istie guided missile with a vangs
of 500 aautieaal atlas, warhead of 3a000 pains, and a CRIB' of
2 to 3 mautiesai wiles; by 1957 the rare idght be 900 nautical
miles, ' with the CRP 3 to 4 aaa teal. miles. fir, it is
iagQossible to estimate with eoafidea ce that the R will in fact
develop these atissiles, or produce them In opereti l q ties.
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w
22o Darrift the pwled of this sst1mte the eapeabiities
of and DIM armed fo*e viii ftWM" a 024 bectim
a.9 the speQal devealaymite noted abem, but a1* tbmk* p e waive
a Wontiarstion @aad sta limtieu of vaapoW and equipment, porartia-
QnMllp tbom iaampc tiaaz o1 actre"a SWWLaace and c .g
Um W% ineveasiasg combat icieaaay of t3 MOODGM Satellite
e g a d c k s U n s e CommIst f e m m e ; ; s 1 saw UWmwwAxt of
the Blew, 1o istical positions iaaludimig facilities and possibly
stake of *Ossutial ? ma-tavielo
Pt&ab]A Claws of Action
1 & 0 The Soviet Uadars jambably assess t t stznte c
aaituat iee, s t as feUms o the balawe of &3.ltearg Poww
is the varld. is saga h that ?ap aaMt ea swim veuld iwelve
Ymy bassvy risks to the C sat sphoi ed possibly to thaw Soviet
cysten itselto Oz the thaw baand, aaaa a-C ist p mw is a
ing wait wit 6*ai s1 fay the preeeeeaat advamed mitioas
iaa spa aaad Asia sere ass sae o Vb"mro the po5peetz
probably sum SeM that the Ineumm of Bloc sanitary eapabilitles,
tomatkor with politi . defeeticaao o disunity of the aam-
C st side, will gpaad d y shift the Wam of pow in fa
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the Soviet 3100. t , the R a a , agauft
i to 2 problms w , while t y to mto , a weakwas
r l a mt of e. at even the mealoet
of tLLs f i a e, t d
risk, fie C&U :CM at iom
a ? ISOLMIS the eftWOMIaUm of St PmW 2m
the EMOPOM Satellites and Qta, the fmther bldldup, of eew ?
pmw Is theme a .. rles amd t as A sbp tc
the 1y te' ec s POUZU&I the est., a t -
e etlem
of, certain
ease is the Bioe a r, ie 3,y
~ o We not lievo that the almmdomd Its
si et alms., o tit it . sa ct qty fc
tkA.Imea of C t o t i whos tin em be do
alr ? t a of l t eke t r, end, t n
a2d eca,lealml , f a s t Imawrfttloas t b s s
e t$ , t it vbatevw ii' e s
a. 5 t i i ati , ~ , eat sE# s~
hem ` ias in the
t dit at 3. f a ste
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a ieuit
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GemwWs and isolating the US its allies in Zmvpe end Asia.-
Per the time beings at least, the &emUa seem to feel that these
esbjoetives are best sermd by as appessame of r so bleses? and
tiara in foreign relatione, a frequent reiteration of t
possibility of "peaceful e s r" batmen the C silt and
no-C at maids, and an attest to dindaish the sense -at
imminent peril whiff served to create and maintain the 'Tam
all. We cannot estate bow long "there tactics may persist;
we believe -they will be modUled whemver the Xftslin feels that
awe aggressive and tkreatemlM conduct will bring Increased returns.
Soviet .leaders probably believe that by alternately easing
using Interzatlemal tension they can move the chaand
nces
for further st strategic advances without substantial risk
of dal war.
15. Daring the period or this estieete we believe that the
lfa will try to avoid cis of action involving anbstsatlal
wish of general war. However, the or one of the Bloc eo ies
migkt tabs action creating a situation in which the US or its
allies, rather than yield ant position, would decide to
take comer ion i lving gain risk of gemoral with the
Q We believe, moreover., that the w l i n would net be deterred
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v 1W
by the uisk of ral mw fx takiaeg eoemtsrwtion a last a
Wasters sedan ukieh it cea .tdcd as iniserrt threat to Savi
sesanrity. Thus ge l van a W Recur during the posted of this
est1te as the CUMZ of a series Of aetieas and cOW*,W&tiese,
initiated by ei r sid*, vhieh set r sift ss sal3y IntoWed
to 2uA to goeleal vw,
16. brae beisag made by the US= in ? the dov+ei
Of nosler warms and the is Sit a ility to
deliver Us= veagoara, a ag the wW3A per situattes its
reropealts0 Shiest leaders clot certainly believe that
as SO T"& asalsor capabilities inn se, the aversion of the us
and its allied to gemml v will ce agly macs ,
and that the MmaUn will thserofeae have ,,teen fmadeaei of action
to pwcroste its objectives vithcut rvaeniig saabstasatial risk of
steal Saar. As the ^ted of this eestiaate jw sses, US allies
bees= psi fearful of Soviet nuclear capabilities
and cesrespsndiagly loss willing to sup tt the US in resisting
Chat tats. Is W case, the will probably be
i> aaiug]y ready to apply h vier g sse ees the am-Ceag midst
world apes any signs of sjer ' d18MMIon or mss =mg the
US and its allies. Nevearthalrass, ve believe that the Krealia will,
be eartvemly mlwvteat to ps ipitate a Est in v1dek the USSR
vsuld be subjected to nuclear attack.
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27* believe that Southeast M1 abaost a offers,
?21 the CMEMILett view, the t "!'? bla qOwtualtIes fe ex-
PMUM In the War future. ? Ceatlaugnst eat eesoes in
Indoehim or the ee lidtIM of VMMMt et 9"M the"
vcu]d o pm up onlwVd eib tiees fees a e - ss:Lve pokey
Su the W M- We believe tit t ?s dilti them VVIM
be a mmr of st ? e 'foi'tg to evbvert :Q b
e ea iri tin arm by politi l iltrmtio and aevwt, support
of goat itw titer, but prabably aft by the c ftt of
ideffitifieblae combat sates of 'iet er Mimes CommIst'Mmd
fames. %to g;e