PROPOSED ESTIMATE ON THE SITUATION IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002500020016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: September 23, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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Nry
INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 September 1952
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 273
SUBJECT: Pt-opened Estimate an the Situation in Burma
10 In the first Burmese national election, completed in early
19520 the socialist dominated Antic.Fascist People's Freedom League
Won control of the Government by a substantial majority. Since
the election political stability has increased in Burma, and the
influence of the Communist.sponsored Burmese Workers' and Peasants'
Party has diminished. Of pertieulir importance in achieving increased
stability. have been the appointment of leading socialist Ba Swe
to replace the ineffectual U Win as Defense Minister, and the
cooperation shown by Commander-in-Chief Be Win, whose opportunism
formerly had been considered a major threat to the achievement
of permanent political Stability in Barna.
2. A decided ihift'in Buria'l foreign policy has also taken
place, and in deeds if not in .word, Burma is more and more aliza-
ing itself with the Went. Despite the accession of doctrinaire
socialists to high government positions, the Burma:Ws:though still
proclaiming strict neutrality, have accepted US aid under ,MSA and
TCA, are now seeking military aid from the US, and in general have
been less inclined to bend over backwards to avoid antagonising
Communist China.
3. Militarily the position Of ill insurgent groups has de-
clined during 1952. Anticipated ail to Communist Insurgents from
Communist China has failed to materializes and the Communiste no,
longer are capable of establishing a firm hold over subitantia1.
areas of the country: The Karend too have boon weakened, as -
Indicated by their inereasedLefforts fore settlement with the'
government. In. face of suits, roierses0 the Cdamuniets have:
(a) increased attempts to form a "united frest" of all insurgent.
groups, but with only minor and local success; (b) aimed propaganda
against the presence of Chinese Nationalist troope in upper Burma,
hoping that an aroused public would force the goyarnment to take
DOL,GMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. t
p< DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REV1EVV DATE-
AUTH: HR 70-2
-
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?10
?MEM-
action against those troops, and so relieve pressure on the
Communists; and (c) adopted a "nes line" of compromise, hoping
to gain by infiltration what they have failed to gain by inflame..
tion, The government, however, has continued its vigorous efforts
against the Burmese Communists.
I. In the light of the above developments, which are consider-
ably more favorable than those projected in MIE-36 and NIEN-36,14
the Far East staff had decided to recommend a new estimate of the
situation in Burma. At the same time the AR/ME ressived a request
from the Director, OIL, requesting a revision of MIE-36 on an
urgent basis. OIL desires that the. estimate (a) include the element
of Chinese Communist intentions, (b) look ahead at least a year,
and (c) take into acocunt the political and military trends in
Burma since the publication of NIE-36 and NIS-34/1.
5. The staff believes that a new Burma estimate will be most
useful if its scope approximates that of NIL-36 rather than NZE-36/10
Moreover, it considers that the title of NIS-36: "Prospects for
Survival of a Non-Communist Regime in Burma", is no longer appropriate.
We therefore suggest that the attached terms of reference be con-
sidered, for an estimate having "routine" priority.
Mote: Pares l-3 above prepared
by
8E01=
ABECT E. SMITH
Chief, Estimates Staff
STAT
STAT
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Nor 161,
SECURITY INFORMATION
23 September 1952
SUBJECT DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: N1E.16/2: PROBABLE DEVELOP?
MENTS IN BURMA THROUGH 1953 (ror consideration by
tho Board)
? TIM PROBLEM
To estimate probable deve1opments to Burma through 1953, and
Communist intentions and capabilitieg with respect to Burma during
that period.
QUESTICMS BEARING ea THE PROBLEM
I, STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA
A. What is the current situation in Burma and what trends
mAy be expected through, 1953 vith respect to the following:
1, The compoeitione efficiency/0 coheeiveneeep and morale
of the government and the popular support enjoyed by
tbe govenaMent;
2. The economic situation in Burma as it affects national
moraleo domestic and foreign pe1iciee9 and military ,
Q r police eapabilities;
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161,
36 The sive, equipment, training, reliability, and effect-
ienass of military and police forces;
4. Government policies toward the Karen*, the Burmese
Communists, the up troops MR Burma, and other ddent
groups;
56 Geverimmart policies toward the West and the Communist
bloc.
II* WASILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF BURMESE INSURGENTS
Av That ii the *arrant situation in Burma inci what trends
may In expected through 1953 with respect to the following;
le Capabilities a various insurgent forces;
2, Coordinated ahti-gtiernment motion by insurgent forces -
extant and effectiveness;
36 'Capabilities at insurgents to reosive and utilise
material and technical aesistance from the Chinese
Communists.
S6 Ehat is the present nature and level of Chinese Communist
assistance to the insurgents?
cz,
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C
-SECRET?
CHINESE COMEUNIST CAPABILITIES
A. What trends my be expected in the capabilities of the
Chinese Communists to provide material and technical
assistance to the Surmese insurgents?
B. Ihattrands may be expected through 2953 in Chinese Communist
eapabilities to. conduct military operations in Berm assuming
the foIlewing conditions:
1. A continuatiop of commitments elsewhere at present
levelal
2. Intensified operations in Korea;
30 Mew commitment* injudooninsp
XV. INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD BURMA
A, What courses of action have the Communists followed with
respect to Barna over the past year?
B. What indications of the probable strategy and tactics of
the Burmese ammoniate in the immediate fUture are available?
C. What indications of the probable :strategy and tactics of
the USSR and Communist China in Burma in the immediate
future are available?
? 3 ?
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