COMMENT ON A STATE DEPARTMENT PAPER ENTITLED, EFFECTS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT ..., AND DATED 8 AUGUST 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000100010002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 9, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/18: CIA-RDP84-00499R000100010002-3
Now
9 August 1962
ORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Comment on a State Department Paper entitled.
Effects of the Existence of the Castro Goverament? ? ? ?
and dated S August 1962
REFER CE: Agenda for the 10 August meeting of the
Special Group, Item Z
1. Our participation in the preparation of the subject
toted only of providing a contribution to 1?Ir. Florw tch
copy of which is attached hereto.
2. The subject paper is a murky composition Wbile we
have no quarrel with its details, we consider it potentially mis-
leading in that it conveys the impression that, as regards Latin
America, the existence of the Castro regime is a diminishing
threat. We agree that in Latin America Castro's stock has
fallen sharply during the past roar. but believe it imperative
to note that the continuing existence of the Castro regime poses
a continuing threat likely to become more serious in the future.
3. The danger in Latin America is not so much a
function of Castro's capabilities and intentions as of the rising
indigenous demand for radical social change. If the Alliance
for Progress should fail to satisfy this demand, the continued
existence of the Castro regime ceuld, two or three years hence,
pose a more serious throat than ever before. Fleas? i.e the
third paragreph of our contribution.
4. We consider that State's discussion relating to the
USSR may also produce a misleading impression. Cuba does,
Indeed, confront the USSR with serious problems, but the
USSR has good reason to be pleased with the net advantage
gained there.
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SEMI
*Mir'
S. we doubt that the USSR has ever expected to exercise
In Cuba the degree of control which It exercises in the European
satellite states. In the tscalas2te affair it lost the prospect of
an increased degree of influvatce, but it lost nothing that had al-
ready been established. By its adept adjustment to Castro's
assorticaof prhnacy. it has preserved its position in Cuba.
which is reinsured by Castro's growing dependence on Bloc aid
and support.
4. These comments have been corgsmunicated to
Mr. nurwitch, who agrees with them, saying in self-defense
oily that his consideration was strictly limited to the past
year."
ABBOT SlAiTH
Acting Chairman.
Board of National rettrnates
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Ts.:,t-lutikt.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 August 1962
R MR, HURWITCH
ta of the Existence of the Castro Regime on
uation in Latin America, and on the USSR,
the ?apt Year,
1. A year ago, disillusionment regarding the Cuban Revolution was
widespread in Latin America. Important elements of public ?pilaw
ion originally sympathetic toward Castro intellectuals, organised
labor, and the more moderate advocates of social reform -. were repelled
by the manifestly dictatorial character of the Castro regime and its
regimentation of Cuban life, Tince then Latin American opinion has been
fhrther alienated by Castro's public avowal of communism, which made.
possible the actions taken at Punta del Este to ostracize the Cuban regime,
The manifest and acknowledged fallurea of theregime in the field of
economic and social development have also diminished the appeal of
Castroism,
At present, gympatily. and support for Castro in Latin America is
chiefly to the organized Communist parties and such radical
onary groups, as the MIR in Venezuela. Dren the professional
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ALI
Communis have been disturbed by developments in Cuba? particularly
the te affair and the consequent subordination of gold" Communiets
to Caetr&e upstart revolutionary leadership. The Uruguayan Communists
were y shocked by Bias Rocals declarationyat a 26 July observance
in Montevideo, that the Cuban experience showed that a non-Communist
(lob., Fidel Castrol) could lead the Revolution.
Nevertheless the existence of a well-organized subversive
apparatus centerd in Cuba and able to exploit the growing demand for
radical social reform in Latin America continues to pose a serious
threat. During the past year several hundred Latin American youths
have received revolutionary instruction in Cuba for application in their
boas, countries. if the Alliance for Progress should prove ineffectual
as a means of Obtaining social reform and economic betterment
in pace with rising popular demand, the appeal of the revolutionary
example of Cuba will increase, particularly among the dispoeseesed masses,
as. In the Brazilian Northeast and the Peruvian Sierra. In this connection,
the calante affair mill encourage noteXemmunist revolutionaries to believe
that Soviet support can be obtained without submission to le Ceanmnist
50jt control
Cuba's alignment with the US; R provides MOSCOW with a base for
politie I and subversive operations within the Western Hemisphere such
as it has never had before, During the past year, however, the USSR
has encountered difficult problems in its relations with the Castro reg e,
SECRET
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"In
5, rhe USf'M has never exarcieed direct control over Castro and
his cohorts-, cannot threaten the regime militarily, and, as Castro
knows, could ill afford to abandon its committment to support the Cuban
Revolution, Thus, the central problem is, and is likely to remain, the
Soviets' inability to impose their will an Cuba, as they have, for
example* on the Satellite states of Eastern Europe, Castro has1 in
effect, elected himself to membership in and leadership over the Cuban
COmmuniet Party, and has forced Moscow to acquiesce in his actions.
The Soviets have had to accept Castres claims concerning the building
of Cuban ?socialism* and to endorse his moves against the "old",
Moscow-oriented PSP Communists Despite considerable dissatisfaction
with the Mimes management of the economy, the Soviets have also
had to liberalize the terms and boost the amounts involved in their aid
program to Cuba. Farther, Castro's efforts to assert leadership over
he "inevitable* revolution in Latin America may also run counter-to
Soviet designs, since this is a role which Moscow normally seeks to
erve for itself,
6,0 Finally, the Soviets are concerned lest Castro's policies ebbroll
em in a direct military confrontation with the US. Thus they have care-
fully avoided a categorical commitment to protect and defend the Castro
regime in all contiAgencies and have not provided military aid to Odba of
a character which would enable the regime to undertake major independent
military operations overveas.
FOR HF BOARD OF NATIONAL7I-TIMATE,S2
ABBOT SKTH
Acting Chairman
SECRET
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