GUATEMALA: PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Guatemala: Progress
on Human Rights
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NI I IA 86-10001
GUATEMALA: PROGRESS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Information available as of 6 January 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Assessment.
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SUMMARY
Guatemala has made significant progress in improving its human
rights record under the Rios Montt and Mejia military governments.
The systematic and government-supported violation of human rights
that characterized earlier military regimes has been greatly reduced,
and offenders occasionally have been punished or removed from office.
As a result, the number of politically motivated noncombat deaths has
declined from some 2,200 in 1982 to an estimated 280 in 1985,
In the last three years, the govern-
ment also has implemented several programs designed to undercut the
insurgency, reintegrate former insurgents and guerrilla sympathizers
into society, and win greater popular support. These include civic action
programs and "model-town" developments. Guatemalan efforts have
won little recognition from the numerous human rights groups that
claim the military, as a matter of policy, continues to repress human
rights.
Despite the improvements so far, human rights violations continue,
and impediments to further progress remain. Guatemala remains a
violent society where it is often impossible to determine responsibility
for the inordinately high numbers of deaths and disappearances. The
lack of an independent judiciary, particularly the immunity of the
military to prosecution for abuses, remains a serious hindrance to
continued improvements. Abuses in the field in the counterinsurgency
effort probably are the most frequent human rights violations and will
remain difficult to control. Although we have no evidence of secret
detention centers, an undetermined number of people probably are still
being illegally detained.
President Cerezo's government is likely to continue to make
gradual progress in improving Guatemala's human rights performance.
Although we believe the new civilian regime is committed to maintain-
ing and furthering reforms, it must move cautiously in dealing with
what the armed forces considers its prerogatives. For. example, we do
not believe the President will attempt to prosecute military or security
officials for past offenses, but has indicated that he would support
prosecution of any future violations by security forces. The military
most likely will argue that it can police its own house but may tolerate
the prosecution of members of the police or intelligence services.
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DISCUSSION
Background
1. For almost all of the past three decades, Guate-
malan governments have relied on violence and re-
pression to maintain order and suppress dissent.
Official and officially condoned violence reached
unprecedented levels during the 1978-82 period, when
the military government of President Romeo Lucas
Garcia embarked on a systematic campaign to elimi-
nate all persons considered to be involved with the left
during the previous 30 years
in early 1982, about 400 people were
killed monthly in noncombat politically related vio-
lence, several thousand disappeared, and thousands
fled the country. Virtually all segments of society
participated in and were victimized by the violence,
with three out of every four politically related deaths
attributable to government security services and
rightwing death squads.
2. The Army officers who toppled Lucas in March
1982 set out to seize the initiative from the country's
leftist insurgents, improve Guatemala's human rights
record, and draw previously excluded peasants, Indi-
ans, and urban workers into the political system.
Retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, the new head of state,
initiated a series of policies designed to defeat the
insurgents, break the cycle of violence and repression,
and lay the groundwork for the return to civilian rule.
His successor, Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores,
continued to press ahead with the counterinsurgency
strategy, presiding over the continued reduction of the
insurgency to some 1,500 full-time combatants-from
an estimated high of 3,000 in 1982-as well as Guate-
mala's first free and fair election in some 19 years.
Human Rights Improvements
3. Partly in an effort to secure badly needed US
economic and military assistance cut off in 1977, the
Rios Montt and Mejia regimes have taken several steps
designed to improve Guatemala's human rights record.
Under Rios Montt, the Army began to indoctrinate
troops and field commanders on the need to respect
human rights during military operations and clamped
down on the involvement of policemen in quasi-
official, rightwing death squads. Mejia continued this
policy and moved to curb the power of the Presiden-
tial Intelligence Service, AGSAEMP, implicated in
numerous kidnapings and assassinations of government
opponents. In the past two years, some 400 policemen
have been indicted for various crimes, and more than
300 Treasury Police members have been dismissed for
corruption and other abuses,
three Civil Defense Force (CDF) members and a
military commissioner recently were sentenced to
prison for murdering a villager. In 1985, Mejia re-
moved the Chief of National Police who previously
had been implicated in a murder-for-hire operation.
4. In part as a consequence of these policies, the
number of politically motivated noncombat deaths has
declined. estimates that the number has
fallen from a high of 2,240 in 1982 to 525 in 1984 to
an estimated total of 280 in 1985. At the same time,
the number of kidnapings and disappearances in 1985
was the lowest this decade, down to about 200 from
350 in 1981 and 425 in 1984.
pany larger Army sweep operations.
5. In the last several years, the government also has
implemented a multifaceted counterinsurgency strate-
gy that includes innovative political, military, and
psychological measures designed to gain the confi-
dence of the peasant and Indian populations, particu-
larly in the contested western highlands. Small aggres-
sive patrols are used to increase the Army's presence in
remote areas and more effectively counter the insur-
gents. These also have had the effect of giving the local
populace a greater sense of government protection and
limiting the indiscriminate actions that often accom-
6. CDF units also have been organized to give
villagers a stake in their own defense and provide
intelligence and early warning function for the armed
forces. Some 900,000 now belong to these militia-type
organizations that have become an important psycho-
logical weapon against the insurgents. In addition,
military civic action programs-including projects to
provide food, health care, and equipment to build
houses, roads, and other infrastructures-have im-
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Figure 1
Guatemala: Noncombat Deaths
No data
available
February
to
August
~Iflflllllll.llll. i ~~li lII I ~I II
Rios Morltt era Constituent
Lucas Mejia Assembly
ousted takes elections
over
1981 1982
Includes "executions" of policemen, miIitars conimission e rs and Civil Defense Force meinhers, as hell is
x trajudicial killings of civilians.
proved the Army's relations with the peasant and
Indian populations and undercut popular support for
the guerrillas
7. The government also has initiated a program that
offers protection to villagers who, under previous
regimes, might have been executed or had their homes
burned for alleged cooperation with the rebels. The
military has devised a "model-town" program, called
"Poles of Development," designed to better protect
and control the rural population and encourage more
of the estimated 45,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexi-
co to return home. An estimated 3,000 refugees, many
viewed by the government as guerrilla sympathizers,
reportedly were repatriated last year. The plan calls
for the reconstruction and the resettlement on or near
their original sites of some 49 villages destroyed by
battles with the insurgents. To date, two dozen villages
have been completed and inhabited.
8. The Guatemalan Government does not keep a
national record, but hundreds and possibly thousands
of insurgents and supporters have taken advantage of
the government's amnesty program begun in 1982 by
Rios Montt and extended until January 1986 by Meiia.
Although armed guerrillas who are captured are usual-
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Figure 2
Guatemala: Kidnapings and Disappearances
No dataV
available
for
February
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
J 1 Al A V1 J J A S O N D J I M A .M J J A S O N I) J I M A M J J A S O N I) J I Ni A Vl J J A S O N I) J I AI A 'l J J A ' O N
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Lucas
ousted
ly killed unless they can provide intelligence or are
willing to cooperate in psychological operations against
the insurgents, treatment of insurgent supporters has
moderated. In many cases, those who can prove that
they were noncombatants and gave only material
support are interrogated and then used as Army guides
or sent to "model villages" for resettlement.
9. There is no evidence that people who take
advantage of the amnesty program are later systemati-
cally killed for past activities. There have been cases,
however, where former guerrillas who returned home
later were killed by villagers who blamed them for
Mejia
takes
over
Constituent
Assembly
elections
10. In our judgment, Mejia's restoration of many
civil liberties suspended or ignored by earlier regimes
in an effort to root out subversion and corruption also
has improved the government's human rights perfor-
mance. In particular, Mejia abolished the controversial
special secret tribunals-set up outside normal judicial
channels by Rios Montt in 1982-that were designed
to protect judges who were prosecuting captured
insurgents and other government opponents. These
had become vehicles for justifying human rights
abuses. In mid-1984, Mejia pardoned scores of prison-
ers convicted by these tribunals.
11. Mejia also has interviewed citizens personally
on several occasions to help find missing persons or
hear complaints of human rights abuses by military
officials in the countryside. In response to growing
pressure from a domestic human rights group, Mejia
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formed an official commission in December 1984 to
investigate the politically motivated disappearances.
The commission has failed to solve any of the cases
brought before it, however, and will be replaced by an
independent human rights commission when the new
Constitution comes into effect in January 1986.
12. These actions have won the cautious approval of
some domestic groups traditionally critical of or hostile
toward the government. The Catholic Church, for
example, has taken an increasingly outspoken stand on
many issues, and, although it continues to oppose some
aspects of the government's counterinsurgency pro-
gram, religious leaders in general have been encour-
aged by Meiia's political reforms. Antigovernment
views appear now in the Guatemalan press and the
publishing of communiques by guerrillas or human
rights groups indicates the military has ceased prohibi-
tion of their publications. Labor union activities-
brutually repressed during the Lucas years-have
increased dramatically and, under the new Constitu-
tion, government workers for the first time are permit-
ted to strike. The government also has improved its
handling of public demonstrations as evidenced by the
security forces' restrained response to rioting over a
bus fare hike in September 1985.
13. Political reforms also have undercut the destabi-
lizing influence of traditionally prominent rightist
parties, often closely tied to human rights abuses.
Fourteen political parties-representing the left to the
extreme right-participated in the November 1985
election. In our judgment, voters decisively rejected
the extreme right by giving it less than 15 percent of
the vote in the first round and by electing Vinicio
Cerezo, the candidate of the center-leftist Christian
Democratic Party, a party subject to intimidation and
violence under the military dictatorships of the 1970s.
In addition, centrist parties won 84 of 100 congression-
al seats.
Human Rights Groups
14. In our judgment, human rights groups' report-
ing on Guatemala has tended to stress continuing
abuses at the expense of substantial reforms. Although
the political opening afforded by the government's
reforms and the sensitivity of the military to its
international image have created new opportunities
for domestic human rights groups, their activities in
general have continued to work to the benefit of the
government's critics and, in some cases, the leftist
insurgency. The most active of these is the Group of
Mutual Support (GAM) organized in mid-1984 to
represent the relatives of disappeared persons. Since its
formation, the GAM has engaged in an array of
antigovernment activities-such as protest marches
and demonstrations-that would not have been toler-
ated by earlier military governments.
15. Because the improving political climate has
undercut popular support for domestic human rights
groups, radicals within the GAM increasingly have
steered it toward a confrontational posture. It has
attempted to use demonstrations and protest
marches-including exploiting public dissatisfaction
with the deteriorating economy-to provoke a harsh
response from the military and thereby win support.
The GAM also uses political action, propaganda, and
disinformation to foment opposition to the govern-
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Guatemalan human rights groups frequently fabricate
stories of Army massacres in the countryside and that
the GAM often inflates its numbers of missing persons.
Group leaders claim, for example, that 38,000 Guate-
malans are missing, although indi- 25X1
cate that less than 1,100 cases of politically related
disappearances have occurred since 1982.
16. Both the Mexico-based Guatemala Human
Rights Commission (CDHG) and the GAM reportedly
maintain ties to the country's four leftist insurgent
groups. The CDHG-which reportedly receives sup-
port from several international Marxist and national
liberation organizations-is a propaganda front for the
guerrillas and specializes in disseminating disinforma-
tion about government human rights violations. Al-
though we do not know the extent to which the
insurgents have penetrated the GAM, reporting indi-
cates that some GAM members are spouses of guerril-
las. Other sources report that many of those listed by
GAM as missing actually are insurgents and that
guerrilla groups provide political and material support
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to the GAM and often take part in its marches and 25X1
demonstrations. Reporting indicates that the GAM has
received support from various international groups,
including the Canadian- and American-based affiliates
of the left-leaning Peace Brigades International
17. Nonetheless, in spite of the apparent willingness
of the government to tolerate GAM activites, Guate-
malan human rights activists have been victimized.
Three individuals associated with the GAM were
murdered during 1985, and other members of the
group claim they have received death threats. Al-
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government security forces were responsible for the
murders
18. Internationally, recent reform efforts by the
military only partially have reversed Guatemala's
repressive image. On the plus side, the Special Rappor-
teur of the United Nations Special Commission on
Human Rights-during the last two years-consistent-
ly has praised the Guatemalan Government's progress
in restoring civilian rule and noted continued im-
provements in the human rights record. He found no
evidence to support charges by several international
groups that the government runs secret detention
centers. Mejia even allowed Amnesty International
and members of the foreign press to inspect two
locations suspected of housing secret prisons. US Offi-
cials in Guatemala also report that there is no evidence
that the government maintains extralegal long-term
detention centers.
19. Nevertheless, many international observers con-
tinue to be highly critical and unbalanced in their
assessments of the performance of the Guatemalan
military. Groups such as Amnesty International,
Americas Watch, and the Washington Office on Latin
America, as well as many other foreign observers,
frequently base their criticisms on disinformation. For
example, these groups often charge that the govern-
security forces and rightwing extremist groups, some
Guatemalan police officers probably continue to be
involved in rightist political violence. Most likely
adding to the problem is poor pay and rampant
corruption in the police force
21. The lack of an effective judicial system will
continue to hamper efforts to improve the human
rights situation. Judges historically have been vulnera-
ble to threats from leftwing and rightwing extremists
and governments-as under Rios Montt-often have
set up secret tribunals to try subversives and oppo-
nents. In addition, the lack of judicial independence
tends to make judges subject to the interests of high-
level members of the government and military. As a
consequence, official corruption and malfeasance of-
ten go unprosecuted.
22. Even more difficult to resolve is the continued
operation of the military outside legal constraints.
Although the Mejia regime has shown a willingness to
dismiss or jail members of the security services for
abuses, the officer corps largely remains immune to
prosecution. In one case, a series of killings and
disappearances in a western province linked to the
local military commander resulted only in his transfer.
Moreover, the central command often has little ability
to monitor or control human rights violations by local
commanders in isolated rural areas. Reporting also
shows that many villagers essentially are forced to join
the local Civil Defense Force and that some members
have abused suspected subversives while others have
program generally has been popular among Guatema-
lan Indians. Critics also tend to blame the security
services for all incidents of human rights violations,
regardless of evidence.
Continuing Problems
20. Guatemala remains a violent society plagued by
an inordinately high number of politically related
deaths, beatings, kidnapings, and disappearances. Giv-
en the violent methods of leftist guerrillas, rightwing
vigilante groups, and common criminals, it often is
impossible to determine the responsibility for many of
the deaths and disappearances. Many kidnapings ap-
pear to be the work of criminals, and the guerrillas
sometimes use the same weapons, tactics, and uni-
forms as the Army in an effort to place blame on
government forces. In 1985 insurgent activities result-
ed in the deaths of about 30 civilian noncombatants,
including the Norwegian Honorary Consul and three
others killed when their plane landed on a mined
airstrip. On the other hand, although there is no
formal liaison mechanism between elements of the
used their position for personal vendettas.
23. Although the government officially denies that
it is holding any political prisoners, reporting indicates
that an undetermined number of individuals suspected
of being insurgents or sympathizers probably remain
in illegal detention. The Mejia government has re-
sponded to writs of habeas corpus filed by domestic
human rights groups but thus far has failed to locate
any of the missing persons identified by those groups.
In addition, the Army and security services frequently
violate citizens' legal rights by failing to get warrants
before searching houses suspected of harboring guer-
rillas and arms caches
Outlook
24. We believe the new civilian government of
President Cerezo is committed to improve the human
rights situation and will be able to make some prog-
ress. The Guatemalan military recognizes that in-
creased economic assistance from the West and the
resumption of US military aid is in part tied to
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continued progress in curbing human rights violations.
The new Constitution guarantees citizens' legal rights,
prohibits illegal detentions, and creates a constitutional
court and official human rights commission. In addi-
tion, we would anticipate some improvements in the
countryside, particularly if civilians succeed in gradu-
ally taking local government administration out of the
hands of the military zone commanders and giving it
to appointed civilian officials
25. Progress, however, will be gradual and the
political climate is likely to be marked by continuing
disappearances and murders. Leftwing or rightwing
extremists may attempt to take advantage of worsen-
ing economic conditions to promote increased vio-
lence. Moreover, despite his impressive electoral man-
date, President Cerezo is likely to move cautiously in
tackling the human rights issue. He clearly recognizes
that the military will be watching his performance
closely, particularly for signs that he is encroaching on
matters it considers to be in its domain. Although the
new Constitution strengthens the judicial system, it
contains no provision for civilian judicial authority
over the armed forces. Moreover, it says that the
military will be governed by its own code of legal
conduct. Military leaders reportedly have indicated to
Cerezo that they would not permit him to prosecute
officers for past human rights abuses, and that the
Army would strongly resist any attempt to diminish
military control over the conduct of its counterinsur-
gency campaign.
26. President Cerezo has said that he will not
pursue a policy of retribution against the military for
past abuses, but has indicated that he would support
prosecution of any future violations by the security
forces. Military leaders may tolerate efforts by the
President to prosecute members of the police or
intelligence services for abuses, while transferring
officers or forcing the resignations of those suspected
of wrongdoing. As such, abuses in the field will remain
difficult to control.
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