BANGLADESH: ERSHAD'S PROSPECTS IMPROVE FOR 10 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700650001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/20: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700650001-0
DATF, 7
fILL
DOC NO I 1)1 k% 7-O I D
OIR 3
PAPD
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 November 1987
Bangladesh: Ershad's Prospects Improve for 10 November
Summary
President Ershad's use of force and concessions will probably enable him
to defeat opposition attempts to oust him on 10 November. The opposition
hopes to foment sufficient violence in Dhaka during demonstrations on that date
to provoke the military to intervene and overthrow Ershad. For now, however,
his political foes and Army critics have failed to agree on the composition of a
successor government, likely a fatal weakness in the opposition's strategy.
Without an agreement between the military and the opposition on a new
government, we do not expect the Army to act. Over the long term, Ershad's
staying power hinges on his efforts to divide his military challengers and build a
reliable political base by either coopting or splitting the Bangladesh Nationalist
This memorandum was prepared by Pakistan/Bangladesh Branch, 25X1
South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 5
November was used in its preparation. Comments and queries should be directed to Chief,
South Asia Division 25X1
NESA M#87-20106
25X1
25X1
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The Challenge to Ershad
Turbulence and violence have marked
Bangladeshi politics since independence in 1971 and
opposition plans to oust Ershad on 10 November
are no exception. Bangladesh President Ershad's
chief rivals, the Awami League and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP), seek his removal and
transfer of power to a civil-military coalition which
they would dominate. They hope to bring at least
500,000 people to demonstrate in Dhaka on 10
November in an attempt to shut down all
government institutions as a means to convince the
Army that the President can not govern without
their cooperation.
Ershad has confronted their challenge with a
mix of force and concessions which should enable
him to prevail. In a preemptive crackdown directed
at opposition political street organizers, the police
arrested over 4,500 activists in early November,
according to press reports.
= the President is contemplating instituting
emergency constitutional measures that will allow
him to restrict assemblies. It also is possible that
Ershad will close down the transport network before
10 November, making travel from the outlying parts
of the country to Dhaka for the demonstration
virtually impossible. We believe these preventive
measures will be sufficient to disrupt his opponents
and prevent them from achieving a turnout on 10
November great enough to shut down the
government.
Balancing his show of force, the President
has offered to dissolve parliament, bring the BNP --
which boycotted the 1986 parliamentary election --
into parliament, and expand the Awami League's
representation
Ershad also has offered to scrap a bill expanding the
military's role in local government that has provoked
a storm of outrage from the opposition and led in
July to violent street confrontations with Ershad's
Jatiyo Party supporters. The bill has been sent back
to parliament for reconsideration, but both
opposition parties are demanding that it be
permanently tabled.
Ironically, the military leadership is reluctant
to intervene in local government as called for in the
controversial bill. the
Army is split on the biff's contents, with the junior
officers favoring the visibility the bill would give
them, but united in displeasure over Ershad's crude
handling of the furor it has sparked. Although some
1-
junior officers would probably resent scraping of the
bill, we believe the generals could hold them in line.
For now, Ershad retains Army su ort, the
key element in Bangladeshi politics.
25X1
For their part,
the politicians rejected participation in a 'facade" 25X1
civilian government that they argue would be little
better than Ershad's. 25X1
Divided Opposition
Because the opposition-military talks broke
down, we believe the Army is unlikely to move
against Ershad. It is not cohesive and is held together 25X1
by a system of shifting, informal alliances dominated 25X1
by the personalities of senior generals. Unless
several of the most powerful generals have already
cut a deal with the opposition, we believe it unlikely
that any one general will move against Ershad.
Moreover, the generals undoubtedly fear that a coup
could unleash the ambitions of more junior officers
and soldiers, destroying discipline. The Army was 25X1
wracked by a series of enlisted mutinies in 1975 and
1977 and their lessons almost certainly remain seared
into the Army's psyche.
Although the two main opposition leaders
met publicly in late October and agreed to oppose
Ershad on 10 November, their political parties--the
Awami League and the BNP--remain divided. They
are torn by factionalism, internecine strife, personal 25X1
vendettas, and ideological bickering. If any of the
opposition parties gained power, the programs they
would pursue would differ radically. Begum Zia,
chief of the BNP and widow of slain President Ziaur
Rahman, favors a presidential system. Sheikh 25X1
I-lasina Wajcd, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, the murdered first ruler of Bangladesh, 25X1
favors a parliamentary style of government. The
only issue that unites them is Ershad's removal.F___1
25X1
Only the BNP enjoys any degree of Army /_)x1
support. The military has distrusted the pro-India
Awami League's policies since it languished under
Sheikh Mujib's post-independence rule in the early
1970's. For the Army, the memory of slain
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President Ziaur Rahman, and his pro-nationalist
policies make the BNP more appealing. In any
coalition, however, the Army would insist upon the
upper hand.
What is Likely to Happen on 10 November?
In our judgment, there is no likelihood that
either Ershad or his opponents will back down
before 10 November. Ershad will rely upon
interdicting as many demonstrators as possible by
cutting transportation links into Dhaka. He will
invoke the criminal code that prohibits congregations
of more than five people in a designated area. We
judge he will use paramilitary troops as his first line
of defense, gambling that they will be sufficient to
maintain order. We believe that he will consider any
recourse to the Army risky but will call it out if
lesser methods fail.
Opposition leaders have told US diplomats
that they intend to assemble at "several strategic
points," then march to government buildings such as
the Secretariat which they will encircle to prevent
normal activities. Both sides are anticipating violent
confrontations, the US Embassy reported in early
November. We believe that, although the
opposition leadership insists that it wishes to avoid
violence, violence is central to its strategy. It is the
only method likely to demonstrate to the generals
that the government cannot operate without military
intervention. We do not believe, however, that the
opposition has sufficient dedicated demonstrators to
force the issue to the point of provoking a military
coup.
After 10 November
Ershad's lack of political legitimacy and a
credible political organization are his most serious
long-term problems. His Jatiyo Party remains
largely a paper organization that can be counted on
to suppress street violence and little else. It has
almost no popular following and has suffered from
Ershad's neglect. Because the Army is jealous of its
role as the key player in domestic affairs, Ershad is
likely to try to strengthen his appeal in the Army.
Higher salaries, better living quarters, and increased
visibility, such as in the flood relief, will work to
ameliorate discontent
The President is likely to supplement these
perquisites by appealing to the more moderat
elements of the BNP
3
He apparently is not 25X1
concerned with BNP leader Zia Begum's hold on her
party because he considers her to be primarily a
figurehead whom party members retain out of
deference to her late husband, President Ziaur
Rahman. Moderate elements led by BNP Secretary
General Obaidur Rahman, however, appear to be
more favorably disposed to dealing with Ershad. We
judge that Ershad hopes to coopt this section of the
BNP and start building a political base with a pro-
Army constituency.
If Ershad is Removed
The Military will only tolerate a limited
amount of controlled lawlessness and will withdraw
its lukewarm support for Ershad, we believe, if it
views him unable to preserve basic law and order.
If Ershad is removed, his most likely successor 25X1
would be either Ninth Division Commander Major
General Noor Uddin Khan or Army Chief of
General Staff Abdul Wahed. Both are ambitious
but
neither appears willing to share real power with the
politicians. Both generals are suspicious of one
another and their would-be political partners. An
interim government headed by Chief of Army Staff
Major General Mohammad Atiqur Rahman also is a
possibility while the key principals sorted out their
respective positions. Any replacement government
almost certainly would continue Ershad's pro-West
policies.
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CHRONOLOGY OF ERSHAD'S RULE
1982
1983
1985
1986
24 March Lieutenant General Ershad stages a bloodless coup
against the BNP Government of Abdus Sattar.
December Lieutenant General Ershad declares himself President.
March National Referendum approving Ershad's leadership
passes with a huge majority.
7 May Parliamentary elections give Ershad 's /atiyo Party
a nearly two-thirds majority; massive vote
fraud occurs.
1987
31 August Ershad retires from the Army.
15 October Ershad wins Presidential election granting a 5-year
term; major opposition parties boycott the election.
10 November Parliament passes an indemnification act legalizing
all actions taken when martial law was in force;
martial law is formally lifted, and the 1972
Constitution is restored.
July
Assassination plot against Ershad by disgruntled
Army enlisted personnel foiled.
10 November Encirclement of Dhaka by civilian opposition.
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I I
SUBJECT: Bangladesh: Ershad's Prospects Improve for 10 November
NESA M#87-20106
DIST
RIBUTION:
External:
1 -
Robert Peck (State)
1 -
Robert Flaten (State)
1 -
Jeffrey Lunstead (State)
1 -
Ann McDonald (AID)
1 -
Sherin Tahir-Khali (NSC)
1 -
Rena Epstein
(State)
1 -
DCI/DDCI/Exec
Staff
1 -
DDI
1 -
ADDI
1 -
NIO/NESA
1 -
C/PES
1 -
CPAS/ILS
6 -
CPAS/IMD/CB
1 -
NID Staff
1 -
PDB Staff
1 -
D/NESA
1 -
DD/NESA
1 -
C/NESA/PPS
2 -
NESA/PPS
1 -
C/NESA/PG
1 -
C/NESA/IA
1 -
C/NESA/AI
1 -
C/NESA/SO
1 -
DC/NESA/SO
1 -
C/NESA/SO/A
1 -
C/NESA/SO/P
1 -
C/NESA/SO/S
DDI/NESA/SO/P
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