SUMMARY OF NPIC'S ROLE IN CUBAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 30, 1966
• Content Type: MISC

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Summary of NPIC's Role in Cuban Crisis
1. The first U-2 reconnaissance mission over Cuba was flown on
27 October 1960. At the time, it was a clandestine operation for the
Purpose of acquiring intelligence data on the Cuban military buildup,
conductO with Soviet assistance, and to provide information of possible
use for clandestine operations. By 4 September 1962, when President
-
Kennedy issued a public statement pointing out that Soviet equipment in-
cluding surface-to-air missile (SAM's), patrol boats with missiles
(KOMARs), MIG fighters and 3500 Soviet technicians were known to be in
Cuba or on their way there, but that no offensive threat had yet been
observed, about 43 high-altitude U-2 missions had been flown and ex-
ploited by the National Photographic Interpretation Center. As soon
as these missions returned to the U. S. the film was removed from the
aircraft and rushed by waiting aircraft to the processing site. Here
the film was developed under the most rigid quality and security controls
around the clock by the best caliber personnel available. The film was
edited by NPIC personnel and then titled according to prescribed pro-
cedures. Duplicate positives were produced for immediate shipment to
NPIC where the film was exploited as soon as received. (It generally
was received during working hours at this time.) Constant contact was
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required by the Operations Officer with the collector and the processing
site in order that scheduling information was constantly available to
Center components so that exploitation terms could be formed to produce
the IPIR. They consisted of PIs, collateral support personnel, editors
and graphics personnel. PI teams consisting of Army, Navy, Air Force
and CIA PIs were organized. A coordinator for each mission was designated
who was responsible for the actual IPIR production. Since the PI readouts
were recorded on IBM cards it was possible, by means of the IBM EAM
equipment, to produce "Target Briefs", which chronologically recorded
the information from all previous coverage for use by the PIs. Target
packets were prepared, which contained the target briefs, maps and selected
intelligence from other sources. The flight track was plotted on maps
and a preliminary list of targets possibly covered were identified.
COMOR targets were exploited first, but then all of the film was scanned
in detail for any indication of offensive weapons. The PI's interpreta-
tion was recorded on target work sheets which were preprinted with the
COMOR target number, target location, name, and coordinates. After
editing they were turned over to the coordinator for approval. After
this, they were passed on to the punch operators who prepared IBM cards
and verified them. The IBM cards were then sorted in a predetermined
arrangement by subject categories such as missiles, airfields, naval
activity, etc. After all work sheets were completed a proof run was pro-
duced which was checked by the coordinator, editor and Operations Officer.
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After final approval, corrections were made as required on the applicable
IBM cards and the final version of the IPIR was run on the IBM tabulator
or multilith mats. These were printed, assembled and bound for dissemi-
nation early the next morning. The IBM cards were then processed through
a card to tape converter and a 5-channel teletype tape was produced which
could be run directly on the communications equipment without retyping.
(This avoided time-consuming punching of tape, proofing and errors.)
Cable headers had been prepared in advance so that the IPIR could be trans-
mitted to some 40-50 organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere with-
out delay.
Concurrent with the production of the IPIR, as significant informa-
tion was uncovered, graphics personnel would prepare detailed work orders
which were sent to the Photo Lab where enlargements were produced to be used
in the production of briefing boards as directed by the coordinator. In
addition to these, many prints were made for use by the PIs for study and
establishment of chronological evidence files. After the briefing boards
were prepared they were photographed and enlarged for simultaneous dissemination
to the Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA. (Later when DIA came into being two
original copies of all briefing boards were prepared and one was dissemi-
nated to the Director, DIA at the same time that one was being taken to
CIA Headquarters to brief the DCI. Photo copies were also provided the
Military Services but priority was given to the two originals. Vugraphs
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were also made of these briefing boards and about fifteen (15) copies
were disseminated. All materials (IPIRs, briefing boards, vugraphs,
etc.) had to be disseminated by about 0730 the morning after the film
was received by NPIC.
2. Now there were many reports of offensive missiles in Cuba from
a variety of sources available to the U. S. intelligence community. Most
....iwpiw@!grof these, of course, was the refugee report. The word had spread
among the Cuban refugees (just as it had years earlier in Europe among
the East German refugees) that information about missiles sold well.
Thousands of these were checked out, analyzed and evaluated and the majority
either were proven false (through various means) or were related to a
SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), publicly known to be in Cuba. In the
period just preceding the October 14 "hard evidence" photograph, many
of the reports of truck convoys and missile trailers were being given
higher and higher evaluations. But for the intelligence community to
be skeptical about a refugee's estimate of the length of a trailer (the
key in determining the type of missile) seen at night under difficult
and probably nerve-wracking circumstances, is not unreasonable particular-
ly against the background of a mass of reports that had been proved
false.
3. So despite the fact that unconfirmed intelligence reports and
weather-delayed U-2 flights precluded the U. S. government from having
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earlier "hard evidence," this Evidence in the form of an aerial photo-
graph was obtained on October lb.41962J1,xl,a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft
operated by the Strategic Air Command (SAC).
This flight, authorized by the President on the 9th of October,
but delayed by bad weather flew over the Western end of the island in
the Pinar Del Rio Province. When the photographic materials were re-
turned to Washington for processing and analysis by photo interpreters,
the beginning of a Soviet medium-range missile base was spotted in the
San Cristobal area.
Thus the first evidence was in hand and it confirmed the fact
that the Soviet Union had made a decision earlier in the year to install
an offensive nuclear missile capability on the island of Cuba.
4. Up until about 14 October 1962, all U-2 flights had been flown
clandestinely. Well justified missions, weather predictions and top
level approval were key factors in the frequency of missions. On 14
October 1962, SAC started to fly the U-2 missions but generally speaking
the same provisions prevailed. After the MRBM site at San Cristobal was
spotted the frequency of missions was increased.
5. ,The DDI was advised of the MRBM site at San Cristobal on the Even-
ing of 15 October 1962. A restricted dissemination memorandum was pre-
pared for the DCI and DIA. The Director, NPIC briefed senior CIA officials
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at 0730 on 16 October 1962 and immediately thereafter accompanied the
DDI to the White House where Mr. McGeorge Bundy and selected top
officials were briefed. Later the DDCI and the Director, NPIC briefed
the President and the EXCOM (selected cabinet members and others). It
was decided to put Cuba under virtually constant aerial surveillance.
A special security caveat on all information was imposed in order to
restrict the dissemination of information to only those that had a
strict need-to-know. Thereafter, the number of missions increased
dramatically and the workload imposed on the Center increased so that
there was around the clock activity. All ports were covered and a con-
stant search was conducted for cargos on ships including shipping
crates. This commenced an entirely new problem of attempting to
identifying the contents of those crates. With the imposition of the
quarantine on October 22nd of all offensive military equipment under
shipment to Cuba, Navy reconnaissance imagery of deck cargos on Soviet
ships was received by the Navy and copies provided to NPIC. In the
President's speech he indicated that a series of offensive missile sites
are now in preparation in Cuba.
"The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two
distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-
range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead
for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles."
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"Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed
for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling
more than twice as far--and thus capable of striking most of
the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north
as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In
addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are
now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary
air bases are being prepared."
All of this information was acquired from aerial reconnaissance.
6. The step up in surveillance (a continuation of high-level and
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commencement gs low-level) required that personnel be on duty 2)-i- hours a
day to process the constant flow of information. Daily production
scheduling meetings were held by the Operations Officer and a constant
shuttle of couriers between NPIC, Andrews Air Force Base and the alter-
nate processing site at the NRTSC was instituted. The pace increased
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considerably in that during the period 14 October to 19 November 1962,
73 high-altitude mis.sisms were flown and 152 low-level missions.
Overlapping PI and Support Teams were organized and functioned on a
shift basis. Two PI missile specialists devoted full-time, on a shift
basis, to the support of GMAIC. Nearly daily GMAIC reports were pro-
duced.
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7. At the same time briefing aids were prepared for the specific
purpose of clearly demonstrating that the President had evidence to back
his position at the United Naticns. Special projects were undertaken to
produce data and briefing aids to support the DCI and Director, DIA at
Congressional hearings. At the same time, many questionable reports of
new missile deployment had to be checked out to verify their validity.
8. Even after the Russians started to dismantle their offensive
weapons (missiles, IL-28s, etc.) on about 1 November 1962, continuing
aerial reconnaissance vigilance was maintained to ensure that all such
equipment had in fact been removed and to ascertain if the Soviet tech-
nicians were leaving Cuba. Facilities destruction and the movement of
equipment to ports was monitored so as to account for all offensive weapons
systems. Deck cargos were photographed and ships had to be identified.
Emphasis was also placed on trying to determine what equipment actually
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was put into the holds of ships. When the United Nations Observer Team
was established pecial books containing photographs _facilities
with offensive weapons, were pre ared for their use and sent to United
Nations Headquarters. A large number of photographs were prepared for
release to the press which were later published in LIFE, TIME, and various
newspapers. Such release photography had to conclusively prove that
these facilities were being dismantled. Considerable coordination was
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required to obtain approval via appropriate channels, e. g., the DDI
and Mr. Salinger in the White House.
9. After all offensive weapons were actually dismantled, removed
and accounted for on Soviet vessels from photography, surveillance was
continued at a high-level through November 1964.
Many reports were now received that missiles were being stored
in caves. A complete survey of all caves was conducted by NPIC and de-
tailed reports were prepared. In addition, NPIC commenCed preparing film
evaluation reports on all Cuban missions in order to report on camera
operations, malfunctions, processing adequacy, etc.
After November 1964, the requirement for reconnaissance was
reduced, but the USIB requires about 90% coverage of the island with
interpretable photography every 28 days. The COMOR reports monthly to the
USIB the level of coverage achieved. Currently about 100 U-2 missions
are flown annually to achieve such coverage.
To date, a total of 901 missions and i54grlevel
missions have been flown. There is no evidence that the current pace will
be relaxed by the USIB.
In essence, the photo interpreter discovered the offensive
weapons, continually monitored their operational status, and verified
dismantling and removal from Cuba. This has required many thousands of
hours of overtime in the continuous review of more than 6.3 million feet
of film since October 1960.
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