AFGHAN REQUEST FOR FURTHER HELMAND AID RAISES PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130010-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 27, 1959
• Content Type: MISC

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AFGHAN REQUEST FOR FURTHER Although the irrigation and land-
HELMAND AID RAISES 'PROBLEMS development projects in the upper
Helmand River valley in Afghanis-
tan are not completed, Afghanistan has made a formal request
for additional US assistance in the construction of a flood-
control diversion dam in the Chakhansur Basin area of the lower
Helmand Valley. In asking US aid for development of this de-
solate, sparsely populated, southwest corner of Afghanistan,
the Afghans have reopened and placed the US in the middle of
the long-standing, unresolved Afghan-Iranian dispute over the
diversion of the Helmand waters. Our Embassy in Kabul has
Intimated that if the US does not build the dam the Soviets
might be asked to construct the dam in this potentially strate-
gic area. The Department is currently considering the various
factors raised by this request.
Helmand Valley Project The Helmand Valley watershed
consists of the Helmand River and its tributaries, chief of
which is the Arghandab River, occupying the southwest half of
Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush range (see map). Extensive
ruins in the valley evidence extensive cultivation 2,000 years
ago or more; however, depredations over the centuries destroyed
most of the major irrigation canals and not until the late 1930's
were the modern works for irrigation begun in the upper valley
by the Afghan Government..
Following the interruption of the project by World War II,
the Afghan Government resumed work and in 1946 launched a large-
scale project to develop the million acres of land in the valley
for population resettlement. An American construction company,
Morrison-Knudsen (MK), was hired to begin construction of dams,
canals, roads, drainage ditches and associated structures. After
three years of work and $24 million of its own resources including
about $10 million in foreign exchange, the Afghan Government re-
alized that it could not complete the project without financial
assistance. An application to the Export-Import Bank resulted
in a loan of $21 million in 1950 and a second Eximbank loan of
$18.5 million in 1954.
The US Government became more actively associated with the
Helmand project in 1953 when technicians of the forerunner agency
to ICA helped to draw up a plan for the establishment of a "Hel-
mand Valley Authority" (HVA) to direct the development of lands.
Since then ICA has carried on the work of providing technical
assistance to help solve the various problems of land settlement,
water storage and distribution, agriculture, and to train a
corps of Afghan technical and administrative personnel.
MAP
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HELMAND VALLEY
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STATUTE MILES
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When expenditures had reached $60 million, in 1955, the
Government of Afghanistan became concerned that tho, cost of the
project appeared to be in excess of any economic benefit the
country would eventually dreive,from the program. The US was
also concerned since in Afghanistan the project was identified
with other US economic and technical assistance programs. The
US therefore sent a survey mission to the Helmand in August 1956
to study the progress, problems and prospects of the valley pro-
ject. This report, known as the Tudor Report, has since pro-
vided the guidelines for US action in the valley. Especially
pertinent in the report was the mission's finding that the pro-
gram had already produced an estimated average additional gross
income in the upper Helmand Valley of nearly $10 million annually.
The report further estimated that with some revisions the program
would result in increasing by 1962-64 the total value of pro-
duction in the valley by about $14 million annually above the
present level.
As a result of the recommendations of the survey mission, the
US furnished financial assistance, mainly grants, of around $9
million dollars during 1957-1959 for needed additional develop-
ment of the first phase of the project. The division of the pro-
ject into two stages and the spelling out of those projects of
each stage was the major recommendation of the Tudor Report and
was largely adopted by the US Government. According to the re-
port, it would be more economic to rephase the work so as to
narrow the gap in time between the completion of the main irriga-
tion and drainage ditches by MK and the land development work
of a sub-unit of the HVA.
Only $3 million of the US grants have been utilized, how-
ever, as MK and the Afghan Government for the past year and a
half have been unable to agree on a construction contract for
the remaining $6 million of work. When this is done and when
the three projects under this contract are completed -- power
generators at the Arghandab dam, a canal in the Tarnak area, and
further work by the development unit of the HVA -- stage one will
be considered finished. Following the completion' of stage one,
the US anticipates a period when only nominal technical assist-
ance will be required for such items as soil analysis and surveys,
a livestock farm, village development, forestry, hydrology, health
and sanitation, and maintenance. After the efforts of stage one
are consolidated, the US anticipates requests for further aid for
more large-scale capital projects"; probably for further power
generation equipment.
At the
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At the present, however, the two major dams have been
completed--Kajakai and Arghandab 300 and 145 feet high and
887 and 1740 feet along the.Crest respeetively--and diversion
dams to lead the water into the irrigation canals have been
finished at Arghandab, Boghra, and Darweshan. Bridges, roads
and a network of lesser irrigation ditches have also been built.
Afghan-Iranian Division of Waters Dispute The Helmand
River rises in the Hindu Kush about 50 miles west of Kabul and
flows for nearly all of its 650 miles through Afghanistan, dis-
charging into the marshy Seistan Delta on the Iran-Afghanistan
border. The river provides waters for irrigation, cattle, and
domestic uses in both countries, but relations between the
countries have suffered because of the water controversy since
1872 when a definition was made of the Afghan-Iranian boundary
in this area. When Afghanistan began its Helmand Valley pro-
ject, Iran protested claiming that the irrigation works on the
upper river would restrict the flow traditionally available to
Iran. On the other hand, Afghanistan ,claims Iran's construction
of a diversion dam close to the border in 1953 diverted more
than a normal flow of water into the Chakhansur Basin on the
Afghan side of the boundary causing flood damage. The Helmand
did take a new course down the Afghan side when the dam was
built, but such course changes have been common in the delta.
Also another outlet on the Iranian side had become blocked by
sand dunes. (Strong north-northwest "winds of 120 days" pre-
vail during the summer months and dunes moving eastward now
cover 280,000 acres of formerly inhabited area.)
On a number of occasions there have been attempts to come
to an agreement on a formula for the distribution of the water,
the most recent in 1950 when the Helmand River Delta Commission,
composed of three hydraulic and irrigation specialists selected
by Afghanistan and Iran, made a study of the area and published
their findings. This Commissiorrwas established through the
good offices of the US.
Both countries have mistakenly interpreted the Commission's
work as an arbitral award rather than the factual study that
it is. No recommendations as to the actual division of waters
are made; however, the traditional cultivated acreage and the
amount of water necessary for cultivation are discussed. Af-
ghanistan has interpolated these figures to mean that Iran's
share of the Helmand waters would be equal to an annual average
flow of 22 cubic meters per second. This figure is far lower
than the 57 cubic meters sought by Iran. As a result, the Afghans
insist that the Commission's report be the only negotiating docu-
ment while the Iranians are equally emphatic in their refusal to
negotiate solely upon the basis of the report.
Early
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Early this year, the Afghans offered to increase the flow
to 26 cubic meters, but when this figure was not accepted, the
offer was withdrawn. The Iranians have countered by saying they
would accept 35 cubic meters, a compromise figure between the
Afghan figure of 22 and a new 47 figure arrived at this year
by an engineering firm engaged by the Iranians to study Iran's
water needs in the Seistan. At the present time, the Afghans
and the Iranians do not appear to be any closer to a settle-
ment than before, although the fact that the Commission's re-
port is being utilized by both sides is considered encouraging.
US Views on the Afghan Request US policy and actions in
Afghanistan have been guided by its desire for the continuance
of a non-communist government willing and able to maintain Af-
ghanistan's traditional neutrality. However, the US believes
that Afghanistan has since 1955 permitted Soviet activities .to
increase to a dangerous degree. Soviet penetration has been
facilitated by the Afghan Government's determination to modern-
ize its economy utilizing aid from both East and West. Also,
the Soviets have been more than willing to take advantage of
Afghanistan's unwarranted but real fears of CENTO members
Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran. (Since 1954 the Soviets
have made what amounts to a pre-emptive bid for economic and
military penetration of the country by committing approximately
$300 million in aid which has been accompanied by a large number
of technicians and military advisers.) The importance which the
Soviets attach to the penetration of Afghanistan was shown most
recently when they made an $80 million grant for a road from the
Soviet border to Kandahar. Not only Is this the first grant
ever made by the USSR outside its satellites, but in building
the road from the border through Herat and Farah to Kandahar
the Soviets have successfully penetrated the Helmand Valley
and outflanked the Hindu Kush, traditionally the mountain barrier
between Russia and the Indian sub-continent.
When the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan was in Washington
in early October, the US made it clear that it was not prepared
to compete with the USSR in an economic war in Afghanistan on
a dollar-for-dollar basis. Within its means, Department officials
said, the US would continue to assist Afghanistan in order to
convince Afghan leaders that a reasonable alternative exists to
excessive dependence on the USSR. The US believes, however,
that Afghanistan cannot be a strong and independent member of
the free world so long as disputes with neighboring Pakistan
and Iran exist.
Within this
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Within this framework of US views, the Afghan request for
further assistance in the lower valley is being considered.
While the initial dam is estimated to only cost about $10
million, development of the area would require the building of
a communication network from this area of Afghanistan to the
upper valley, the rebuilding, or construction of drainage
canals and ditches, and the rest of the appurtenances of a
modern irrigation and redevelopment scheme. The total cost of
this project could probably exceed $100 million, and political
and economic results would hardly justify the investment. Ad-
ditionly, population in the area is estimated at only about
8,000 families; the land is not the-best available in Afghani-
stan; the unit cost per acre for such reclamation as can be
accomplished will be high; physical hazards such as lack of
roads, drainage, heat, and high winds must be overcome; and,
finally, Afghanistan has still to complete its upper valley
project.
Approximately 20% of Afghanistan's budget over the past
years has been spent for the Helmand Valley project. Despite
the near completion of the physical structures for the irri-
gation aspects of the valley, the Government still has a
great deal to do in the resettlement of nomads, construction
of towns, introduction of new farming methods, and the myriad
other problems involved in the project. Any diversion of
Afghanistan's limited resources into the lower valley at this
time would be unwise and would undoubtedly further delay the
upper valley project.
The Delta Commission report noted that any suitable Iranian-
Afghan compact must provide for such factors as average annual
water requirements and variation of deliveries in accordance
with irrigation needs. (The Iranian Seistan actually requires
its greatest water flow during the period when the upper valley
requirements are lowest.) Rather than trying to reach an im-
mediate agreement on the whole problem, the US believes that
many of the difficulties would be overcome if an initial accord
were reached followed later by a revaluation after flow and
use data has been gathered. As the Delta Commission report
stated, the annual water 'supply that has traditionally reached
the delta has always far exceeded the requirement for all
beneficial purposes.
MOROCCO
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