FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: PROBLEMS FOR DST AND SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000600800004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

STAT
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Exec~ati^ "c, istri
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Geneva, Switzerland
November 27, 1987
SEeRt SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
TO: Mr. William Webster, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
FROM: Ambassador Henry F. Cooper ~'F-
SUBJECT: Framework Agreement: Problems for DST and Suggested
Approach for Summit
I wish to add my voice to Ron Lehman's in expressing
concern that we avoid a Summit Communique that amounts to a
"framework agreement" -- whatever it may be called. And I wish
to suggest tactics we might pursue not only to frustrate the
Soviet agenda but to press our own in the DST negotiations.
The Problem: Soviet Press for Key Provisions
The longstanding Soviet objective of achieving a key
provision (characterizing a 10-year nonwithdrawal commitment as
a trade for key provisions of a START Treaty) for a framework
agreement is undiminished as has been apparent from the inten-
sity with which their negotiators have pursued it in Geneva over
recent weeks. It was also evident in this week's Ministerial in
Geneva; Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev both spoke of "instructions
to delegations" regarding "a" treaty on START and adherence to
the ABM Treaty. Akhromeyev dealt with specificity on some START
issues, but simply shrugged off DST differences (except for the
"7-10" years) and, consistent with recent Soviet tactics in
Geneva, sought to paper over them by making only general
statements linking continued adherence to the ABM Treaty to
generalized START objectives.
Ron has explained how such generalized statements do not
serve our interest in START. Neither do they serve our DST
objectives. If there is to be a serious DST negotiation in our
interest, it must focus on resolving substantive differences
rather than papering over them and it should be focused on a DST
agreement responsive to the concerns of both sdes on its own
merit -- it is not a trade for START. Moving in that direction
should be a goal of the Summit Communique. At the same time, it
is too much to seek to resolve all the differences at the
Summit. So we need a game plan to put first things first.
cFrRET/ENSITIVE
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Ron's recommendation that the Communique direct negotiators
to focus on the START Treat Joint Draft Text is on the mark.
Such bracketed text gives equal weight to areas of agreement
and disagreement which reflects the accumulation of the last 33
months of negotiations -- and it keeps the focus on completing
a START Treaty.
Unfortunately, I cannot recommend this same tactic for DST
because we have not tabled our position in Treaty format. We
can point to joint working papers from Rounds VII and VIII as
elaborating the agreements and differences between the sides.
But it does not make sense to direct negotiators to further
.elaborate those documents in Round IX, which should be our
final round.
Recommended Objective for DST: Separate New treaty
I strongly urge that we seek, as the top priority DST
objective, to have the Communique direct negotiators to
expedite the elaboration of DST differences in Joint Draft
Treaty format to enable the.resolution of such differences on a
time frame consistent with completing a START Treaty. We can
ligitimately argue that even though there is no U.S. Treaty now
on the table, this can be quickly rectified (even if some new
position emerges from the Summit) and, because of the Round VII
and VIII joint working papers, bracketed Joint Draft Treaty
Text can be quickly produced.
This directive would serve our interest in countering
Soviet linkage between a START Treaty and a general statement
regarding continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. It would help
support the logic of our position that the START Treaty should
stand on its own merits as equally benefiting both sides --
without further restraints on defensive arms. Similarly it
would strengthen the basis for our argument that additional
pledges to the ABM Treaty should also offer equal benefits to
both sides -- predictability in response to Soviet stated
concerns in exchange for our desire for an acknowledge right to
deploy after the nonwithdrawal period if research proves
advanced strategic defenses are feasible, preferably in the
content of a cooperative transition to a new strategic regime.
As a treaty separate from the ABM Treaty, it would help to
change the perception that stability depends on prohibiting
defenses (as per the ABM Treaty) to a perception that stability
is viewed in terms of the joint management of both offensive
and defensive arms.
We can expect the Soviets to resist our pursuit of this
objective because they want to preserve the argument that
stability depends upon continued adherence to the ABM Treaty --
meaning no effective ABM deployment. Nevertheless, in Geneva,
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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they have agreed (and recently reaffirmed) that a separate new
agreement (as exemplified by their July 29 Draft Agreement) was
appropriate. So it is reasonable to expect we could achieve
such an outcome. (Their July 29 Draft Agreement was a
comprehensive document, in every sense but name a treaty.)
Tactics: Maintain difference in nonwithdrawal period while
pressing for separate new Treaty
In considering negotiating tactics for drafting a Joint
Communique which achieves this objective without papering over
differences, I believe we should resist the Soviet tactic of
closing on the time period (6-10 years from 1988 when a Treaty
could enter into force). The Soviets are obviously interested
in settling this "final outstanding issue" for inclusion in
their proposed "instructions to delegations." Without it,
their attempt to get a framework agreement papering over
substantive differences will continue to be frustrated. Thus,
resisting closure on this issue will continue to constitute
important leverage to us in pressing our agenda to gain clarity
regarding the nature of the nonwithdrawal commitment and the
right to deploy after the nonwithdrawal period.
Therefore, I believe we should preserve this as an
unsettled issue after the Summit. Any offer we make involving
movement toward closure (e.g., 8 years from 1988 -- to 1996,
consistent with our Reykjavik offer) should include demands on
the Soviets that press the most important aspects of our
agenda. Our most important requirement would probably be the
unfettered right to deploy after the nonwithdrawal period --
and this would probably be the most difficult for Gorbachev to
accept. But if he did, then settling the time period might be
a fair trade -- even if we agreed to disagree on most other
issues.
At the same time, while we seek to frustrate the Soviet
tactics, we should press our own agenda to insist on a separate
new treaty. As a tactic for achieving this goal, I suggest we
undertake to settle the issue of which treaty comes first,
START or DST. The objective would be to conclude that there
should be two separate treaties (satisfying our agenda for
resisting linkage) entering into force at the same time
(satisfying the Soviet desire for the appearance of linkage).
This result could easily be converted into communique language
which leaves the nonwithdrawal period unsettled, thereby
maintaining our leverage for future negotiations.
Suggested DST Language for Joint Communique
Following Ron Lehman's model, I would suggest Communique
language such as the following:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 4 -
The President and the General Secretary also
discussed the status of the negotiations
relating to a nonwithdrawal commitment to the
ABM Treaty for a period of time. They agreed to
instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite
work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text incorporating
such a commitment in a new separate Treaty which
would enter into force at the same time as the
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also
agreed to instruct their negotiators first to
identify the areas of agreement and disagreement
in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to
accelerate work toward resolution of the areas
of disagreement.
Such language incorporates only the general agreement to
embody a nonwithdrawal commitment in a separate new Treaty to
enter into force at the same time as the START Treaty.
Avoiding the listing of more specific areas of agreement would
frustrate Soviet attempts to formulate key provisions of a
framework agreement that would imply specific U.S. commitments
regarding the SDI program. This will also encourage the
Soviets to drop their recent tactics of focusing only on
general statements of potential areas of agreement while
avoiding the hard problem of elaborating and resolving the
areas of disagreement.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Ambassador Henry F. Cooper
S/DEL - Department of State
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
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