ACTION IT IS, BUT COVERT IT ISN'T

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707310013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 19, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 :CIA-RDP90-005528000707310013-1
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ON PAGE~~
VvA~HTNGTCN POST
19 1\fAY 1983
Philip Geyelin
Action ~t ~s
But covert
ej . -...~ _ - ....
~t Isn.t -
You can't follow the debate over'the?Reagan
administration's Central America policy, and
still less can you appreciate its ultimatesbsurd-
iry, without a dictionary. The operative word is
"invert." Webster's .New World Dictionary is
downright adamant about :its meaning:."Con-
cealed,hidden, disguised, or surreptitious."
'That's the point of "covert?operatwns". the
L'.S. hand is supposed to be hidden from the
American public and other interested .parties;
American involvement is supposed to be con-
vincingly deniable in case somebody takes of-
fence; that way, you avoid the awkwardness of
being seen violating treaties or breaking domes.
tic and/or international law-,end the embar?
rassment if the operation fails.,
I go through this slo~}y because it all sounds
so plausible ("Congress Debates Secret War in
Nicaragua") that it takes time for the inanity of
it w sink in. Once it does, the futility of inn-
structive discussion begins to sink in. And
that's what's happening now in the argument in
Congress over Ronald Reagan's plan to ease the
heat on El Salvador by lending "covert" sup-
port to anti-government forces in Nicaragua.
By reason of its "covert" nature, the idea is
being talked to death. The process is worth ex-
amining, step by inexorable step..:, . .
Leave aside whether "covert" activitS~rof any
kind. to destabilize unfrienQly~. governments is
consistent with American values-oi workable.
You could make.some case for the administra-
tion scheme .on its terms a' year ago; the idea
was that support for opposition elements in
Nicaragua would help interdict. Nicaraguan
support for the rebels in El Salvador, either di-
rectly or indirectly by making rthe Sandinista
government pay a price.
Congressional intelligence oversight commits
tees had given secret concurrence, with the pro-
viso that the purpose not be to overthrow the
government in Managua. But last fall, the effort
suddenly ceased to be "concealed, hidden, dis-
guised." It was all over the press, unpersua- .
sively denied by the U.S: government, con-
firmed by the Nicaraguan opposition forces.
So total was the
Congress made the secret proviso public in the
form of the so-called Boland amendzneat. Re-
cently Ronald Reagan himself gave away the
plot and his real purpose:
If Congress wants "to tell us that we can give
money and do the same things we've been doing
..providing subsistence and so forth ro these
people directly and making it overt.instead of
covert, that's all right with me," he told a small
group of reporters in his office. But not, .he
added, if the administration "would have to en-
force restrictions on the )Nicaraguan) .freedom
fighters as to what tactics they .would vse." ~ In
other words, no nice distinctions about the op-
position's Purposes between "interdiction" of
supply lines to El Salvador and overthrowing
tbe Sandinista junta.
Congress isn't going to be foolish.erwugh to li-
censethe administration to jump in openly on the
side of a Nicaraguan insurrection. So the question
is whether the administxation can persuade Con.
grass not to note a total ban on continued "inv-
ert". U.S. activity in Nicaragua. That's wheee~e the
whole debate goes off the rails
An outright hart would have a preoedeun the
Clark amendment forbidding covert U.S. activity .
in Angola in 1975. But complications set in if
Cor~rress actually votes to reject a ban. That be-
Domes a go,ahead, publicly, to conduct a "covert"
operation. As tine congressional critic puts` it, "By
not saying no, we're sa-ving yes." .
For just this reason, there is growing demand
among younger members of the House, in
particular, to go on -record to cut off any "cov-
ert" intervention in Nicaragua. The leadership
until recently has taken the traditional line that
any such interference with the president's for-
eign policy prerogatives could be turned into a
"Who Lost. China?" campaign talking-point if
El Salvador is lost.
But support-for the commander in chief is
one thing; open approval, even .indirectly, of
"dirty tricks" is Quite a different political issue,
post-Vietnam..It is reliably reported that. so .in-
fluentiel .a figure as Majority Leader ,~
Wri?ht, who spoke up eloquently in support. of
the president after his address to a joint session,
was even more eloquent in 8.recentcloeed-door
meeting of the House Foreign Affairs ~amrt-
tee in favor of shutting down "ooverC' opera.
lions in Nicaragua
The cost of such a compromise for those in
Congress who like nothing about the adminis-
tration's Central America policy will probably
be e vote for most of the military aid money for
El Salvador-,and extra funds for overt efforts
to shut off the Nicaraguan supply lines through
Honduras. That may not be enough to meet '
Ronald Reagn's purposes. But it. might Delp us
all think more clearly about the implications, in
the conduct of U.S. policy, of the word "covert."
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 :CIA-RDP90-005528000707310013-1