EL SALVADOR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GUERRILLA ATTACK AT EL PARAISO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000100250001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence AgFncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 May 1987
E1 Salvador: Implications of the Guerrilla Attack at El Paraiso
Summary
The successful attack by Salvadoran insurgents at E1 Paraiso
accomplished an important guerrilla objective by focusing
international. attention on an insurgency that has seen its
fortunes wane in recent years, but the Army retains the upper
hand and-the battlefield initiative. As in previous spectacular
successes--which have occurred at about nine-month intervals
since 1985--the rebel assault demonstrated glaring deficiencies
in the military's security, intelligence and leadership
capabilities. We believe the insurgents will score similar
successes from time to time, in part because the High C~aand has
done little to improve security at key installations or to
discipline senior officers guilty of negligence. We judge,
however, that the guerrillas are unlikely to stage a sustained
campaign of large-scale attacks because of the need for extensive
planning and preparation as well as the high risk to their elite
commando units. So long as reversals like El Paraiso occur
infrequently the course of the war is not likely to shift in
favor of the insurgents.
This memorandum was prepared by (Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome
and should be addressed to Chief, Middle American-Caribbean
Division, ALA
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Like earlier guerrilla attacks on the military training
center at La Union in November 1985 and 3rd Brigade headquarters
at San Miguel in June 1986, the assault on 4th Brigade
headquarte aiso on 30 March was well planned and
executed. the rebels had
precise intelligence prove e y in i trators on key buildings
inside the compound. The assault was spearheaded by a small
number of guerrilla sappers--out of an attacking force of some
150 men--who were able to penetrate carefully prepared perimeter
defenses, including mines and barbed wire, without casualties.
The US Embassy believes the guerrillas' sophisticated and
coordinated use of mortar and rocket fire--tactics not employed
in the attacks at La Union. and San Miguel--suggests the assault
force may have had Nicaraguan or Cuban training.
Poor security practices, weak leadership, and questionable
tactics by government troops also played a major role in the
guerrillas' success. The garrison at El Paraiso was caught off
guard when it failed to deploy adequate reconnaissance patrols,
and some guards were
asleep when the insurgents struck. Brigade officers failed to
check on sentries during the night, and guards who remained alert
were. either killed quickly or had no means of direct
communication with their superiors. In the earlier attacks at La
Union and San Miguel, the insurgents took advantage of poorly
maintained base perimeters to breach the defenses. Inadequate
counterintelligence procedures are believed to have enabled the
insurgents to infiltrate agents posing as government troops well
in advance of all three attacks.
Temporary Propaganda Payoffs
The guerrillas' primary rationale in launching these
spectacular operations, in our opinion, is to create the
impression for propaganda purposes that the are a otent
militar force.
~y staging
large-scale attacks periodically--one successful attack about
every nine months since 1985--the rebels divert attention from
the more substantive government advances in counterinsurgency
operations. Moreover, the guerrillas probably hope such assaults
eventually will spark urban anti-government dissatisfaction with
a seemingly endless war and force the government into
powersharing negotiations.
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The advantages gained by the guerrillas in overrunning
military garrisons have tended to dissipate quickly. US Embassy
reporting indicates that the attacks have not resulted in
increased popular or international support for the rebels, and
international press coverage of the insurgency has quickly
subsided. Lacking the ability to sustain military pressure, the
guerrillas invariably have reverted to low-level ambushes and
economic sabotage, thereby losing their propaganda advantage.
More Spectaculars Likely
We believe several factors, however, will prevent the
insurgents from sustaining pressure on the Armed Forces through
large-scale attacks.
problems 'that have led to guerrilla success.
We believe the guerrillas will be able to repeat such
spectacular actions from time to time, largely because of Army
deficiencies. Despite the formation of several military
commissions to investigate and redress shortcomings at key
installations, few substantive procedural changes have resulted.
The three major attacks since 1985 have demonstrated that certain
Army commanders have been slow to learn from their colleagues'
mistakes and that the guerrillas are quick to exploit weaknesses.
In our judgment, the unwillingness of the High Command to
discipline or replace mediocre field commanders contributes
significantly to the complaisant attitude and attendant morale
needed or p anning an training.
preparations for a planned
attack against the lightly defended international airport
late last year--cancelled after the Army found out and
took precautions--lasted for at least two months and
included intensive map studies, mockups, and field
rehearsals by specialized troops.
-- Guerrilla concerns about Army intelligence and tightened
security complicate planning and probably cause them to
delay or abort some operations.
-- The guerrillas cannot easily replace losses to the highly
trained and motivated elite units that conduct the
assaults. estimated that as many as
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half of the elite sappers who attacked San Miguel and La
Union were killed. The eight to ten guerrillas killed at
El Paraiso probably represent one third of the estimated
number of special forces that penetrated the perimeter.
Net Assessment
On balance, periodic reversals such as E1 Paraiso will not
change the course of the war, in our opinion. The armed forces
retain the battlefield initiative, and the guerrillas remain on
the defensive, relying largely on economic sabotage and terrorism
to prolong the war. Lacking the resources to follow up with
significant amd sustained military pressure, we doubt the
guerrillas can accomplish their key strategic objectives--driving
the armed forces into a garrison-bound, defensive posture and
forcing the government into powersharing negotiations. Previous
attacks have demonstrated the Army can replace its losses and
resume aggressive counterinsurgency operations quickly.
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SUBJECT: E1 Salvador: Implications of the Guerrilla Attack at
E1 Paraiso
Orig-- Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning
Coordination/ARA, Room 6913A, State
1 -- Mr. William B. Wood, Special Assistant to the Under
Secretary for Political Affairs/ARA, Room 7240, State
1 -- Mr. David Smith, Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division/INR, Room 7367, State
1 -- ADCI - 7D60
1 -- SA/DCI/IA - 7E12
1 -- Executive Secretary - 7E12 -
1 -- Executive Registry - 7E12
1 -- Mr. Daniel Childs, Comptroller - 7C21
1 -- Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, 7D43
1 -- Office of Congressional Affairs
1 -- NIO/LA - 7E62
1 -- NIC/AG - 7E47
1 -- DDI - 7E44
1 -- O/DDI - 7E44
1 -- C/PES/DDI - 7F24
1 -- D/CPAS/DDI - 7F16
1 -- PDB Staff - 7F30
1 -- SCIO/CPAS/DDI - 7F27
5 -- CPAS/IMC/CB/DDI - 7G07
1 -- CPAS/ISS/DDI - 7G50
1 -- C/LDA/LA/DDI - 1H39
1 -- D/ALA/DDI - 3F45
1 -- DD/ALA/DDI - 3F45
2 -- ALA/PS/DDI - 4F21
1 -- C/ALA/MCD - 4F29
1 -- DC/ALA/MCD - 4F29
1 -- C/ALA/MCD/Nicaragua Branch - 4F29
1 -- C/ALA/MCD/Central America Branch (Files)
1 -- C/ALA/MCD/Mexico - 4F39
1 -- C/ALA/MCD/Cuba - 4F39
1 -- C/ALA/MCD/Caribbean - 4F21
1 -- ALA/MCD/Central America ~ - 4F39
5 -- MCD Division Files
DDI/ALA/MCD/C~
(13May87)
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