AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 16, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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.14. ) Intelligence 25X1
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C/TFD/SOVA
Afghanistan Situation Report
16 November 1982
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
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INSURGENTS SHORT OF WEAPONS IN NORTH
A majority of the weapons were captured, but some of the most
important--such as antitank rockets--were acquired in Pakistan. 25X1
LUXEMBOURG GRANTS AFGHANS LANDING RIGHTS
Ariana will be able to use Luxembourg when its landing rights end in
France, West Germany, and the UK.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
WILL BREZHNEV'S DEATH AFFECT THE USSR'S AFGHAN POLICY? 3
Our initial judgment is that there will be little change in Soviet policy
in the near term. 25X1
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia and the
Office of Soviet Analysis
Publication Note
Unless major developments warrant
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report will appear on 30 November.
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INSURGENTS SHORT OF WEAPONS IN NORTH
Jamiat-i-Islami
insurgent
commanders in Takhar Province claim,
that weapons captured from Soviet and 25X1
important than supplies from Peshawar.
Afghan forces continue to be more
Equipment lists on each of the 19 JI groups in the province show that
although insurgents captured or bought most of their weapons--including
over two thirds of their AK-47s--all the mines, anti-tank rockets, and
heavy machineguns came from Pakistan.
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ammunition is allocated to more numerous groups in the south with the
remainder given to northern groups. Shortages of ammunition reportedly
limit the guerrillas to a few small actions each month.
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Comment: The insurgents appear to be able to acquire enough weapons
in Afghanistan to continue resistance without outside support. Without
the mines, rockets and machineguns from Pakistan, however, they would be
much less effective.
Long supply lines from the Pakistani border to Takhar probably are the
main reason groups in the north receive a smaller amount of equipment
from Peshawar. They are probably better off to steal or buy local small
arms and ammunition, however, and use the supply caravans to bring in
heavier weapons and mines without which the insurgents would be less able
, to attack convoys or defend themselves against air attack. Insurgent
acquisition of more automatic weapons, like the A1K-47, ironically worsens
the ammunition situation because such weapons tend to be used to fire
bursts rather than carefully aimed single shots.
LUXEMBOURG GRANTS AFGHANS LANDING RIGHTS
According to the US Embassy in Luxembourg, Ariana--the Afghan
airline--has been granted landing rights in Luxembourg. There will be
two flights a week from Kabul with stops at Zurich and Moscow. The Swiss
have told the British that they have not given permission for the stop in
Zurich. The US and several Western European countries plan strong
demarches to try to change Luxembourg's decision.
Comment: A year ago, the UK, France and West Germany informed Kabul
that Ariana would lose its landing rights in the three countries on 1
December, 1982. In July 1981, the Ottawa economic summit meeting had
called for the suspension of flights to and from Afghanistan because of
Kabul's "flagrant breach of its international obligations" during and
after the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner in March 1981. Ariana tried
to obtain landing rights elsewhere in Western Europe, but its requests
were rejected by the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and apparently by
Austria and Switzerland. Until the Luxembourgers granted landing rights,
it had appeared that Ariana would have to give up its profitable Western
.European runs--used by many Indians and Pakistanis--and fly no further
than Prague where passengers would have to transfer to other carriers.
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IN BRIEF
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--The Afghan Defense Ministry has ordered the construction of 10 new
airfields, most of
which will be at provincial capitals
. The government presumably is trying to increase
air support to convoys and isolated garrisons by
airfields. There are now only dirt strips at some of
its ability to give
upgrading existing
these towns.
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PERSPECTIVE
Will Brezhnev's Death Affect the USSR's Afghan Policy?
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As head of the KGB, General Secretary Andropov has been deeply involved on
all aspects of the Soviet Union's Afghan policy. We have no evidence he opposed
the move or favors a radically different policy than the one now being pursued.
Andropov said little about Afghanistan publicly prior to the invasion;
afterward, however, he appeared among the more militant defenders of the move.
Given his role in the decision to invade, we believe that Andropov does not
share the view
that the Soviet Union has
become too entrenched in Afghanistan.
The decision, in our
view, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had
failed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently
had to take some of the blame for underestimating the problells the Soviets would
face after the invasion.
Some changes--probably unrelated to the succession--may become apparent in
the way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically
over the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has
traditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy.
For example, this time a year ago the Soviets were beginning the process of
modestly augmenting Soviet forces there, in hopes of reversing a stalemated
military situation. The military situation remains stalemated and in the coming
months Afghanistan is going to be thrust back into the international limelight
by the Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi. The Soviets almost certainly will be
coming up with some new position on a political settlement in order to minimize
NAM criticism of their policies. Andropov may have surfaced some new ideas when
he met with Presidents Babrak and Zia on Monday.
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Debate over Afghanistan, in our view, will be intertwined with maneuvering
for political advantge in the post-Brezhnev period. In these circumstance, it
is unlikely that any contender would argue for abandoning the effort to
transform Afghanistan into a full-fledged Marxist State. Moreover, as
Brezhnev's successors cope with Afghanistan, they will face the same set of
policy tradeoffs and resource constraints he did. 25X1
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