AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 2, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
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Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
2 November 1982
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Top ?eeret
NESA-M 82-1058ICX
SOVA-M 82-10I72CX
2 November 1982
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Copy 71
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
HARD WINTER AHEAD FOR THE PANJSHERIS
1
This year's campaigns have seriously damaged local crops and villages.
INSURGENT ATTACKS SHUT DOWN POL PIPELINE
1
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Continuing insurgent attacks to keep the pipeline closed would help the
resistance greatly this winter 177 reducing critical fuel supplies for
Soviet air and ground operations. 25X1
INSURGENT DEFECTIONS
2
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Several bands--most belonging to Gulbuddin's organization--have gone over
to the government. 25X1
IN BRIEF
3
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia and the
Office of Soviet Analysis.
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2 November 1982 25X1
NESA M 82-10581CX
SOVA M 82-10172CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
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Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily out oritatiye.
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2 November 1982
NESA M 82-10581CX
SOVA M 82-10172CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
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HARD WINTER AHEAD FOR PANJSHERIS
year's Soviet/Afghan campaigns in the Panjsher Valley
local crops and villages. The 80,000 inhabitants, many
returning from the mountains, are being forced to buy
inflated prices or rely on outside supplies.
insurgent commander Masood said the situation even as early as June 1982
was already as bad as it was last winter and local people will face even
more serious problems this winter. The Soviet seizure last August of the
Koranomunjan area, at the north end of the Valley, cut off a vital supply
route. The Panjsheris must now rely on a longer Hezbi-Islami-controlled
route to the south, which Masood's caravans must pay to
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this 25X1
seriously damaged
of whom are now
scarce food at
use.
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Comment: The Soviet seizure of a key supply route may be the first
move in an effort to cut off insurgent supplies and let the winter do
what Soviet arms cannot. Because they cannot occupy all areas or depend
on their Afghan allies to secure them, the Soviets may try to destroy the
food supply and to eliminate civilian support in other
holds this winter to
Panjsher could become
vation there spreads
their support of the
resistance strong-
weaken insurgent groups. The destruction in the
even more valuable to the Soviets if word of star-
and causes civilians in other areas to withdraw
resistance lest they suffer the same fate.
INSURGENT ATTACKS SHUT DOWN POL PIPELINE
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2bAl
Soviet engineers at Bagram had given uP25X1
hope of operating the new POL pipeline, which was recently extended from
Pol-e Khomri and has been the target of frequent guerrilla attacks.
-25X1 Soviet advisers concluded that unidentified "major changes" would be
needed to protect the pipeline.
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Kabul is considered to be 75 percent
segment in question is 65 kilometers
and Afghan unitsstationed every two
1
the highway leading north from
under government control. The road
long and is guarded by small Soviet
kilometers. 25X1
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2 November 198225X1
NESA M 82-10581CX
SOVA M 82-10172CX
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6,1
Comment: Continuing insurgent attacks to keep the pipeline closed
would help the resistance greatly this winter by reducing critical fuel
supplies for Soviet air and ground operations. With no operating pipe-
line, the Soviets would have to again rely on truck tankers, which are
highly vulnerable to ambush on the main road to Kabul. The claim of 75
percent control of the road appears exaggerated and would still leave the
insurgents in control of many kilometers along a highway where the guer-
rillas have perfected the art of convoy ambush.
INSURGENT DEFECTIONS
Harakat-i-Islami surrendered
insurgents surrendered on 1
17 insurgents belonging to the
in Kabul Province on 29 August. . Forty other
September. Both bands were converted into
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
2 November 1982
NESA M 82-10581CX
SOVA M 82-10172CX
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6,1
village defense groups. in early
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October, several hundred of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar s followers near the
Panjsher Valley transferred their allegiance to the Jamiat-i-Islami.
Around 20 October, two of Gulbuddin's
bands in Baghlan Province defected to the government. The leaders were
made district chiefs, and the men were inducted into the Army and other
security organizations. Three of Gulbuddin's bands in northern Afghani-
stan have also gone over to the government,
Many Army officers suspect these groups
infiltrate the defense forces.
surrendered in an effort
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Comment: Some of these defections may well be fraudulent. In late
September, two of Gulbuddin's bands in Nangarhar Province offered to sur-
render, but ambushed the force sent to bring them in. Moreover, even if
the bands now support the government, those that remain responsible for
the defense of their villages could easily turn against the government if
it tries to interfere in local affairs. We have, however, never before
seen so many reports of defections in a short period of time, presumably
an indication that a growing-- if still small--number of insurgents are
thinking seriously about making a deal with the government. Followers of
Gulbuddin, whose policies have resulted in many clashes among insurgents,
appear to be the most disillusioned. Defections so far have not had a
noticeable effect on the level of fighting, but for several years the
,Soviets have been counting on insurgent war weariness and disillusion
eventually to end the war. 25X1
IN BRIEF
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NESA M 82-10581CX
SOVA M 82-10172CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
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--Two non-American employees of the US Embassy in Kabul have been ques-
tioned separately by the Soviet-controlled Afghan political police, KHAD,
about the embassy's internal security procedures and communications
arrangements. As a result, the embassy is heightening its vigilance.
--Wounded Soviet soldiers get priority over wounded Afghan soldiers in
receiving blood transfusions at hospitals in Kabul,
Afghans sometimes died
less-seriously wounded Soviets to be treated.
treatment and in
while waiting for
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Libya has dissuaded Al-Zulfikar leaders 25X1
from moving their headquarters from Kabul to Damascus and is training
members of the Pakistani terrorist group, presumably in terrorist tac-
tics. We believe Libyans have trained Al-Zulfikar members in the past.
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NESA M 82-10581CX
SOVA M 82-10172CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330002-6