EL SALVADOR: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN DECLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000200220001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington,D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
December 1988
El Salvador: Christian Democratic Party in Decline
Summary
El Salvador's ruling centrist Christian Democratic
Party faces an uphill battle against the rightist ARENA
party to win the presidential election next March.
Over the past three years, the Christian Democrats have
seen much of their popular support dissipate in the
face of charges of corruption and administrative
mismanagement. Their perceived inability to resolve
the key issues facing the country--especially the nine-
year old insurgency and economic problems--has provided
an opening for ARENA to win over a significant portion
of the Christian Democrats' electoral base. Growing
popular disenchantment with the Christian Democrats and
serious party infighting contributed to their defeat by
ARENA in the legislative election last March, and led
to a major split in the party in September.
This typescript was prepared by Middle America-
Cuba Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
with a contribution from Office of Leadership
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Middle America-Cuba Division, ALA,
-?rcitEs_
ALA M 88-20096
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The Christian Democrats are not likely to make a
strong showing in the March 1989 election unless they
unify and energize their campaign effort, reclaim their
electoral base in the rural areas, and stem the loss of
support to the left and the right. Loss of the
presidency probably would further fragment the party
and signal the weakening of the political center in El
Salvador. Unless the Christian Democrats can overcome
internal divisions and rebuild their electoral base
after the election, the party may cease to be a major
political force.
The Setting
The Christian Democratic Party, which had never held power
until 1984, has been largely unsuccessful in making the
transition from government critic to efficient executor of
policy. Although the party enjoyed a majority in the Legislative
Assembly prior to the election last March, it was unable to build
a consensus on such crucial issues as economic policy and how to
end the war against the insurgents. Polls taken since 1985 show
that the failure to address these issues effectively--especially
in the midst of rising unemployment and inflation--helped erode
support for President Duarte and his party, and contributed to
their loss of the legislature in the March 1988 election. The
Christian Democrats also were uncompromising in their attempts to
force through their own agenda--often on contentious issues such
as land reform. Partly as a result of these heavy-handed
tactics, previous legislative sessions were often marred by
walk-outs, high absenteeism, and boycotts by the opposition.
Other factors have contributed to the slow but steady
decline in the party's popular standing. Its failure over the
last three years to live up to campaign promises to provide jobs
and end the war has hurt its popularity with its key supporters--
peasants and workers. Many Salvadorans believe the Christian
Democrats have neglected them and have not done enough to improve
the security situation in the capital or the countryside,
according to US Embassy reporting. The majority of Salvadorans,
according to a recent poll, want a new party in the executive
branch.
The party generally has suffered from poor organization and
lack of leadership, in our view.
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The inability of the
party hierarchy to function smoothly during periods when Duarte
is incapacitated and the lack of a clear successor as party
leader have fueled growing internal discord and factionalism.
The Christian Democrats, who have no clear ideology, also
have failed to articulate a political platform with which they
can attract support. When the party was voted into office in
1984, Duarte had a mandate for populist economic, political, and
social reforms which he never was able to fulfill. Presidential
candidate Chavez Mena, however, has hinted publicly that he may
be willing to abandon some of Duarte's reformist agenda, probably
hoping to attract some business support, but he has failed thus
far to address the security situation--cited by some 43-percent
of voters as the second most serious problem facing the country.
Fissures in the Party
Duarte's failure to impose discipline on the party
intensified personal and factional disputes in 1985, when many
Christian Democratic leaders began to position themselves for the
next presidential contest. After two years of maneuvering, two
major factions emerged; one headed by Julio Rey Prendes, former
Minister of Culture and Communications, and the other by Fidel
Chavez Mena, the former Minister of Planning. This open
bickering between Rey Prendes and Chavez Mena contributed to the
party's defeat by ARENA in the March legislative election.
The Christian Democrats' defeat heightened the rancor
between the two groups because each blamed the other for the
loss. Each faction held a separate convention and nominated its
own presidential candidate. After the Salvadoran Central
Election Council ruled that Chavez Mena was the legitimate
candidate of the Christian Democrats, Rey Prendes followed
through on his earlier threat to leave the party. He announced
in September that, in alliance with a small, center-right party,
he has formed the Authentic Christian Movement.
Rey Prendes' departure may be a net gain for the Christian
Democrats, many of whom reportedly resent the intimidation and
coercion he had used to influence party members. His credibility
among party leaders was severely damaged by the Christian
Democrats' loss to ARENA last March; the US Embassy reports that
Rey Prendes hand-picked 58 of the party's 60 candidates.
According to US Embassy reporting, even some of Rey Prendes's
close followers see their political fortunes as tied to the
Christian Democratic Party and may be reluctant to join his new
party. Allegations that Rey Prendes has tolerated the corrupt
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activities of his inner circle hurt his image with the Salvadoran
public, and democratic labor leaders have said they would not
support a Christian Democratic ticket headed by Rey Prendes.
Chavez Mena apparently believes he has a good chance to win
without the support of the Rey Prendes faction. He probably
calculates that strong endorsements from democratic labor and
support from the party's rank and file will offset Rey Prendes's
attempts to undermine the Christian Democratic ticket. Chavez
Mena's confidence was boosted, according to the US Embassy, when
Duarte--who until recently had been reluctant to endorse him
because of past personal differences--indicated he is now willing
to campaign for him. Chavez Mena, also
may believe that past US support for Duarte and the party will
lackluster
benefit him in the election and compensate for his
style.
Chores Ahead
By selecting a prominent businessman, Dr. Francisco
Barrientos, as his running mate, Chavez Mena probably hopes he
can revitalize the campaign, overcome voter disenchantment with
the Christian Democrats' endless feuding, and recapture support
lost to ARENA--particularly from the business community.
Relations between business leaders and the Duarte government have
been strained, however, because businessmen believe that the
Christian Democrats have ignored their needs by pursuing populist
policies that have stalled economic recovery. As a result, most
businessmen remain more willing to back ARENA's campaign
financially, according to US Embassy reporting. Barrientos is
not a member of the Christian Democratic Party and is virtually a
political unknown, but his reputation for honesty and his
respectability within the business community may help Chavez Mena
to attract some support from the private sector.
Chavez Mena also must work to overcome the perception that
he is too close to the United States. US Embassy reporting
indicates that ARENA has been successful in portraying the
Christian Democrats and their candidate as tools of the United
States by playing up the close ties between the government and
Washington. Moreover, Chavez Mena has made only feeble efforts
to refute public allegations by ARENA and others that his
campaign is being funded secretly by the United States.
Until the most recent election, the Christian Democrats had
been able to take the center and the moderate left for granted,
but ARENA has made inroads with these voters. Specifically,
ARENA spent the last four years organizing on the local level and
using party resources to provide a wide range of services to
lower income voters in the countryside, thus eroding the
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Christian Democrats' base. ARENA's high profile programs have
paid dividends, in our view, contributing to its ability to win
control of 179 of El Salvador's 262 municipalities, many of them
former Christian Democratic strongholds. The ruling party's
failure to match ARENA's spending, especially in rural areas, has
allowed its opponent to retain momentum.
The Christian Democrats also face some competition from the
leftist Democratic Convergence, although it poses less of a
threat than the right. Convergence leaders are seeking support
largely from students, leftist labor, and peasants by promising
to end the war, although it is hindered by organizational and
funding problems. As long as the Democratic Convergence refuses
to renounce its ties to the insurgents, however, most traditional
Christian Democratic supporters probably will be reluctant to
back the leftist ticket.
Prospects
We expect a relatively smooth election process, although
given the volatile nature of Salvadoran politics and past
patterns of political extremism, there is a chance for violence
by the left or the right. Current polling data suggest that
ARENA now is best positioned to win in free and fair balloting,
and, in our judgment, is not likely to sanction violence in the
preelection period. Nevertheless, individual extremists could
resort to such methods if they perceive the Democratic
Convergence is gaining political ground. As in the elections
last March, however, delays or disputes in the balloting, and the
usual minor polling irregularities probably will spark charges of
fraud and possible violence. Moreover, any delay in the final
count after the first round of voting may lead to attempts by one
or more of the parties to "steal" the election by tampering with
the ballots. The insurgents, in turn, would be quick to cite
such tampering as public justification for any attempts on their
part to boycott or disrupt the balloting in a second round.
The failure of one candidate to win a majority in March
could produce a situation that favors a compromise between Chavez
Mena and Rey Prendes. If Chavez Mena comes in second behind
ARENA, he and other party leaders may be more willing to make
concessions to Rey Prendes in return for his c9operation on the
second ballot, which would take place in April-i-. Nonetheless,
1 In accordance with the Salvadoran constitution, if no
candidate receives an absolute majority--50-percent or higher--
the two leading vote getters will face each other in a run-off,
which must be held within 30-days of the first round. The
Christian Democrats defeated ARENA in a run-off in the 1984
election.
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the highly personalistic nature of Salvadoran politics and the
unwillingness so far to compromise for the good of the party
would make an arrangement between Rey Prendes and Chavez Mena
difficult to broker. Even with the Christian Democrats reunited,
however, we believe they would have problems winning on a second
ballot. Most of the small moderate and rightist parties in our
judgment, would be more likely to cast their lot with ARENA
presidential candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, whose victory would
give ARENA more patronage through its control of the executive,
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Unless the Christian Democrats can overcome serious internal
divisions and rebuild their popular base after the election, the
pro-US party could lose its standing as a major political force.
A decisive defeat at the polls most likely would precipitate even
more factionalism and hasten the total fragmentation of the
party. Compounding these difficulties is the imminent passing of
Duarte from the political scene. He has been the Christian
Democrats' major spokesperson for moderation and has gained
international prestige and support for El Salvador's budding
democratic process. If the party makes a reasonably strong
showing in the election, however, party leaders in the post-
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Longer Term Implications
For his part, Rey Prendes probably is overestimating the
electoral strength of his new party. Personally, however, he
will be in a strong political position whether the Christian
Democrats win or lose. Failing a deal with Chavez Mena on his
terms, Rey Prendes could, as Vice President of the Legislative
Assembly, be the political spoiler by blocking Christian
Democratic legislation, giving the majority ARENA party even
tighter control of the 60-member body. Moreover, if his
Authentic Christian Movement places third in the election--ahead
of the leftist Democratic Convergence--it would win a seat on the
powerful three-member Central Elections Commission. Although he
is not popular and is not likely to develop a strong political
following, Rey Prendes probably believes that his position in the
Assembly will ultimately give him greater influence and position
him well for future elections.
A Christian Democratic defeat at the polls probably would
signal some loss of US influence in El Salvador because ARENA has
adopted a more nationalistic stand, in part to exploit popular
discontent with the perceived slow progress of the US-backed
counterinsurgency program. Moreover, the reduction of the
centrist Christian Democratic role to that of a divided
opposition party, could, over the longer term, encourage
political extremism on both the left and the right.
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