EL SALVADOR: INCREASE IN POLITICAL KILLINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000200070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Central intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 September 1988
El Salvador: Increase in Political Killings
Summary
The number of politically-inspired murders and
civilian killings in El Salvador has increased slightly
during the past year, though the overall level of
deaths remains far below that of the early 1980s. Most
of the attributable political killings have been
committed by the Marxist guerrillas in an effort to
intimidate the population and quash progovernment
sentiment. At the same time, circumstances surrounding
some of the suspicious killings bear similarities to
those perpetrated by right-wing death squads in the
past, although there is insufficient evidence to
attribute these deaths to any particular person or
group.
We believe that neither the rightist ARENA party,
which is trying to promote a moderate image to win next
year's presidential election, nor the armed forces,
which fears a cutoff of US aid, has ordered or
sanctioned political killings. Nevertheless, right-
wing extremists and individual soldiers or policemen--
disturbed by increased leftist political activity and
discouraged by the lack of significant progress in the
This typescript was prepared byl (Middle America- 25X1
Cuba Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the 25X1
Chief, Middle America-Cuba Division, ALA,
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war--probably are involved. Increased political
tensions related to the scheduled presidential election
next year and the continuing insurgency will likely
result in a relatively high rate of political violence
in coming months. We believe the guerrillas, who are
frustrated by their dim prospects for a political or
military victory, probably will continue to account for
the majority of political killings.
Positive Trend Stalls
Political and suspicious killings of civilians in El
Salvador--which had been declining sharply until last year--have
increased slightly in the last 18 months. According to
information available to the US Embassy in San Salvador, 280
civilians died in 1987 in incidents of political violence, a
small increase over the previous year.1 (See Fig. 1)
Nevertheless, the overall level of deaths remains far below that
of the early 1980s. Dwarfing the small increase in political
killings last year was a doubling of "suspicious" murders, in
which there are no clearly established political or criminal
motives. (See Fig. 2). In the first seven months of 1988, the
rate of killings with confirmed political motives was about the
same as last. year, while the number of suspicious killings has
fluctuated wildly but generally remained higher than in 1987.
As during the early 1980s, the increase in civilian killings
has coincided with greater political and military activity by the
Marxist insurgents. The guerrillas' political allies are
preparing to participate in the March 1989 presidential
elections, while rebel front groups continue trying to stage
violent anti-government demonstrations in the capital. At the
same time, guerrilla military actions--most notably economic
sabotage and terrorist attacks--also have increased during the
past year (see Fig. 3). Many Salvadorans--civilian and
military--probably view these rebel activities as an attempt to
exploit the country's more open political environment while
simultaneously continuing the war. Although government
Statistical data used in this typescript was obtained by the US
Embassy in San Salvador fromlocal press accounts and other public
sources. While the figures probably are not precise, we believe
they reflect trends in political violence.
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operations since 1987 have disrupted some guerrilla activity,
they have failed to make deep, permanent reductions in the
insurgency.
The Guerrillas' Record
The US Embassy reports that the Marxist insurgents, no doubt
frustrated by their inability to make dramatic military gains or
attract significant popular support, are responsible for the
majority of confirmed political killings. Guerrillas have killed
civilians for--among other reasons--aiding the government,
registering to vote, having relatives in the armed forces, or
defying the rebels' frequent campaigns to blockade
transportation. The rebels' indiscriminate use of landmines--a
weapon adopted to compensate for tactical weakness--also has
contributed to increased civilian casualties. Finally, the
insurgents have kidnaped and murdered mayors, judges, local
officials, political candidates, and civilians suspected of being
government informers. For example, a guerrilla commander in
Usulutan Department recently killed two civilians suspected of
collaborating with the Army and put their bodies on display to
warn others in the area to avoid involvement with the military.
A major element of the insurgents' overall strategy is to
foment unrest and violence in the cities. This includes using
terrorist attacks to "bleed" government forces. Although we do
not believe the guerrillas are deliberately and indiscriminately
targeting civilians, their urban terrorist campaign has resulted
in some civilian casualties
Right-wing Extremists
Circumstantial similarities to death squad murders committed
during the early 1980s suggest that right-wing extremists are
responsible for at least some of the recent suspicious killings,
although no one has claimed credit for them. According to the
Embassy, some characteristics of death squad activity--the use of
torture, execution-style murders, assassination by groups of
armed assailants, and bodies being dumped some distance from the
scene of the crime--increased last year. If rightists are indeed
involved, we believe they have been acting primarily out of
frustration with the slow rate of progress against the insurgents'
on the battlefield and out of fear that the insurgents are
participating in the political process solely to expand their
urban support networks for terrorism and subversion.
Despite its past association with death squad activity, we
believe that the right-wing ARENA party currently does not
sanction human rights abuses. Such actions would wreck the
party's recent efforts to present a more moderate public image
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and seriously jeopardize its prospects for winning the presidency
next March. Indeed, we believe that, for the time being at
least, even many ARENA extremists probably are cooperating with
party moderates in an effort to strengthen their position and
expand the party's popular appeal. Most ARENA leaders probably
also are unwilling to risk the reduction or curtailment of US
economic and military assistance that might result from unchecked
violence.
Nonetheless, some party hardliners may be involved in the
crimes, although we lack definitive proof. 25X1
Roberto D'Aubuisson, RE s oun er 25X1
and honorary president, continues to maintain close ties with Dr.
Hector Antonio Regalado, the former chief of a notorious death
squad active in the early 1980s, though the two avoid appearing
together in public. ARENA's recent electoral triumph and
resulting control of the legislature may have inspired
lower-ranking party members or independent rightists to act
without the official knowledge or sanction of the party.
The Armed Forces
The Embassy's statistics indicate that the number of
politically-motivated killings committed by Salvadoran soldiers
is on the rise. The armed forces have committed 12 of the 106
confirmed political killings so far this year--or 11.3 percent--
compared to only about two percent in 1987. While we do not
believe the killings are officially sanctioned, they may be the
result of concern within the military about increased political
activities by insurgent front groups. However, many of those
soldiers and policemen most provoked by leftist activity probably
are biding their time, calculating that an ARENA victory in the
March 1989 presidential election could result in a sterner stance
against the guerrillas and their supporters.
Members of the Salvadoran armed forces, moreover, probably
have carried out at least a few of the suspicious killings. The
US Embassy believes that frustration over the end of "state of
exception" legislation in January 1987 has prompted some soldiers
to kill suspected leftists. Without the special legislation--
which suspended some civil liberties for suspected guerrillas--
the Constitution permits the authorities to detain suspected
guerrillas for only 72 hours before being turned over to the
civilian courts. Most Salvadoran officers believe 72 hours is
insufficient time to conduct a thorough intelligence
interrogation and they are frustrated by the courts, which
generally release suspected guerrillas for lack of evidence.
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Outlook
The Salvadoran government probably will respond to the
increase in political killings by quietly pressing the military
to be more vigilant in preventing and policing abuses. We expect
the publicity-conscious Armed Forces High Command, in particular,
will move to head off any sentiment or tendency among officers
and troops to deal with the left through illegal means. Despite
the frustrations arising from the many constitutional and
judicial restraints imposed on the armed forces--at a time when
they perceive the left as exploiting the hard-won democratic
reforms guaranteed by the very government they seek to subvert--
we believe most officers will want to avoid actions that would
alienate the populace or place vital foreign assistance at risk.
Similarly, politically astute moderates within ARENA
probably will exhort their extremist colleagues and
constituencies to avoid any actions that threaten the party's
political credibility and electoral prospects. Although the
Christian Democrats may attempt to use the death squad issue to
discredit ARENA during the months leading up to the March 1989
election, a similar effort by President Duarte prior to last
March's legislative elections failed to have much impact at the
polls. We believe a strategy of persuasion would be effective to
some degree in reducing political killings as the impending
presidential election invites greater international scrutiny.
Nonetheless, given El Salvador's long legacy of political
violence, extremist attitudes on the left and the right, and
frustrations on both sides over the slow rate of progress in the
war, we believe political killings will continue. Tensions
related to next year's presidential elections, particularly the
increasing boldness of the left, may provoke further violence, in
our view. The guerrillas--whose prospects for political or
military victory are remote--probably will continue to commit
most of the political killings
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Appendix: The Armed Forces and Human Rights
The Salvadoran armed forces--once responsible for the
greatest number of human rights abuses--have since the early
1980s significantly improved their conduct. US aid and influence
have facilitated the professionalization of the Army, permitting
it to wage a "cleaner" war. Today, all members of the security
services receive human rights training from the International Red
Cross, the Catholic Church, and the government's human rights
commission. Soldiers and police who commit crimes are routinely
brought to trial before civilian courts, according to the US
Embassy, and many have been dismissed.from the service for
various offenses. In addition,
that concern about civilian casualties has driven the military to
adopt stricter rules of engagement. Rigorous restrictions have
been placed on.the use of air and artillery support near
populated areas, and infantry seldom employ "reconnaissance by
fire"--firing blindly into an area to determine whether the enemy
is present. Moreover, despite the likelihood that most prisoners
will be released within 72 hours--under guidelines in effect
since January 1987--government troops still capture more
guerrillas than they kill, according to the attache.
The prospect of US military assistance being curtailed, fear
of negative publicity, and, in many cases, a growing realization
that expanding popular support is critical to their
counterinsurgency mission, have compelled officers to develop a
keener appreciation for human rights. Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce,
for example, an influential brigade commander who probably will
become the next Chief of Staff, is working in his sector to
promote greater public confidence in the Army, and he concedes
that human rights abuses by government troops contribute to pro-
guerrilla sentiment, The US 25X1
Embassy reports that Colonel Mauricio Staben--often linked to
past abuses--last year requested additional human riahts lectures,
for his troops and drafted a human rights manual. 25X1
.Despite the armed forces' improved performance and greater
awareness of the importance of human rights, abuses still occur
occasionally--albeit with far less frequency than during the
early 1980s--and institutional factors tend to impede corrective
action. Because the military has never created any formal
mechanism for investigating human rights abuses, such probes are
conducted on an ad hoc basis and the results usually are kept
private, according to the US Embassy. Civilian institutions
empowered to investigate the armed forces--such as the Attorney
General or the US-funded Special Investigations Unit--often are
reluctant to pry too deeply into the "internal affairs" of the
military, El Salvador's most powerful and cohesive institution.
Others, like the government's human rights commission, have no
legal authority. In addition, the Salvadoran court system relies
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more on confessions or eyewitness testimony than forensic
evidence for convictions, and few witnesses are willing to
testify in a human rights case--particularly one involvina a
military officer--out of fear of retribution.
The insular, highly cohesive nature of the Salvadoran
officer corps also hampers investigations of alleged abuses.
Officers generally tolerate misconduct--whether human rights
abuses, corruption, moral turpitude, or incompetence on the
battlefield--on the part of their colleagues, and few have been
subjected to strict disciplinary action. The officer corps tends
to enact what the US Embassy characterizes as a "code of silence"
when one of their own is accused of wrongdoing. This collective
protectiveness is, we believe, fueled by a desire to spare the
military--and, by connection, themselves--any embarrassment.
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EL SALVADOR: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION
no. 1: CONFIRMED POUTICAL KILLINGS (MONTHLY AVERAGE)
0 --,--
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Jul
1 ` ~o >,o~' X0010 ~- o c be 3 > >?~
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El Salvador: Confirmed Political Killings
1987--280
Does not Include 3$ ctviUan deaths from guerrilla landmInes.
JAN-JUL 1988--106
Does not Include 37 civilian deaths from guerrilla landmInes.
Killed In combat by both sides.
Legend
IC By Guerrillas
CI By Armed Forces
IC By Right
a By Unknown Assailant
E:3 Civilians KIA*
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SUBJECT: El Salvador: Increase in Political Killings
13 September 1988
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central America, Chris Arcos,
State, Rm. 6263
Ms. Jackie Tillman, NSC, OEOB, Rm. 391
The Honorable Morris Busby, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, Rm. 6263, State
Mr. Leonard, Director, Nicaragua Coordination Office Rm. 4908,
State
Mr. Joseph Sullivan, Director, Office of Central American
and Panamanian Affairs, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. Richard Wyrough, Deputy Director, Office of Central
American and Panamanian Affairs, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. Gregory Lagana, Deputy Director, Office of Central
American and Panamanian Affairs, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. Luigi Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning
Coordination/ARA, Rm. 6913A, State
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Mr. Harry Ponting, IAA, INR, Rm. 6510, State
Mr. David Smith, Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division/INR, Rm. 7637, State
Mr. Ashley C. Hewitt, Policy Planning Staff, Rm. 7417, State
Mr. Robert Witajewski, ARA/CEN, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. David Randolph, ARA/CEN, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. William Wood, Undersecretary for Political Affairs
Staff, Rm. 7240, State
Col. James Seith, JCS-J5, 2D959, Pentagon
Mr. Richard Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter
-American Affairs, DoD, Rm. 4C800, Pentagon
Mr. Vincent Cannistraro, DUSD(P)/SAS, DoD, Rm. 1E814,
Pentagon
VADM Jonathan T. Howe, USN, Assistant to the Chairman, JCS,
Rm. 2E868, Pentagon
COL James V. Coniglio, USA, DIO/DIA, Rm. 2A520, Pentagon
DIA/CAJIT/CJ4-C, NMIC, Pentagon
Mr. Dan Landers, USA, JSI4B, Rm. MB932, Pentagon
Mr. Ramon da Pena, HQ, SOUTHCOM, J2
SOUTHCOM, J5
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