ANGOLA-CUBA-SOUTH AFRICA: NEGOTIATIONS AT A CRITICAL POINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000200030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
15 August 1988.
Angola-Cuba-South Africa: Negotiations at a Critical Point
Recent dramatic changes in the military situation have driven
the US-mediated negotiations between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa
to the point where there is general agreement on all issues except
the timing of the Cuban troop withdrawal. This issue will be
addressed in the next round of talks this month, under a deadline of
1 September, and serious concessions will be required from all sides
if the process is not to break don. A Soviet observer has been
present at each round of the talks and Moscow apparently believes
that prospects for a settlement are good. Although the Soviets
apparently are willing to assist efforts to reach a compromise,
Moscow supported Havana's military buildup and has equities with its
Angolan client that it will seek to protect.
Current Situation
Status of the Peace Talks. There has been substantial progress toward a
regional peace settlement. Tripartite meetings, with the US mediating, in
London, Cairo, New York, and Geneva have pushed the process along to where there
has been agreement on the general principles of a peace settlement incorporating
both a total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and independence for Namibia
This typescript was prepared by Central Africa Branch, Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with contributions from
Office of Soviet Analysis ALA. Comments and
questions may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
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under UN Resolution 435. The Geneva meeting set the sequence of events and key
dates that would lead tc a signing of peace accords on 10 September and
implementation of_ the UN plan for. Namibia. on 1 November.
In addition, the parties agreed to a temporary cessation of hostilities to
reduce the risks of an escalation during the coming weeks. South Africa promised
to pull its remaining troops out of Angola--primarily those in the southeast
arolin.d Cuito Cuanavale--while Cuba promised to hold its forces in place and make
no further moves to the south or southeast. The military disengagement and
cease-fine will be monitored by a joint military committee. UNITA, not a party
to the talks, has refused to abide by a cease-fire.
Nevertheless, the sticky issue of the timing for a Cuban troop withdrawal
remains unresolved and the two sides are far apart. Both sides tabled proposals
at the four-da.y Geneva meeting. South Africa publicly called for all the Cuban
troops to withdraw in under a year, or roughly simultaneous with the mandated
withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Cuba and Angola are on record
with a joint proposal for a four-year withdrawal, although during the first year
the Cubans would deploy northward away from the Namibian border. Cuba and Angola
have, however, hinted at a willingness to be flexible and may be satisfied with a
more accelerated withdrawal.
The next round of negotiations during the week of 22 August .will focus on
the timing of Cuban troop withdrawal, and compromises will be necessary from both
sides. With 1 September set as a deadline for an agreement, the parties have
little room to stall and are under the grin to make decisions.
Motivations of the Participants. The recent acceleration in the talks and
the apparent will.i.ngness of both sides to discuss the issues seriously is a
direct result of unprecedented changes in the military situation over the past
ten months. Cuban augmentation since late 1987 and force deployments into
southwestern Angola since March have fundamentally changed the balance of forces
in the region and challenged South African regional military hegemony.
Cuba's .decision to send reinforcements to Angola last fall--and abandon its
largely defensive role by moving south toward the Namibian border--probably was
motivated by Castro's desire to end longstanding South African intervention in
support of UNITA. Since November, Castro has sent approximately 10,000 regular
troops to Angola, raising his military strength there to an estimated 45,000 to
50,000 men. Since March, Castro has concentrated a 15,000-man, five tank brigade
strike force in southwestern Angola, protected by an extensive air defense
umbrella, and served by a newly constructed major airbase.
Cuba's strong military position has given Havana the upper hand on the
diplomatic front and, from Castro's perspective, the current .negotiations offer
him the best chance of withdrawing Cuban forces from Angola under "honorable"
conditions after 13 years of involvement. In Havana's view, Namibian.
independence would effectively end direct South African military intervention on
UNITA's behalf and cut material support ro the insurgents by isolating them from
their primary backer. implicit also is the recognition that Luanda is unlikely
to defeat UNITA as long as Pretoria's support continues.
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Havana's bottom ].i_ne condi_L-ions for. a settlement require the survival of
the MPLA regime, Namibian independence, and the withdrawal of South African
forces from Angola and even.tu.ally Namibia.- Castro apparently is under little
pressure--domestic or foreign--to accept an agreement not fully to his liking,
although he pr_obab].y is prepared to compromise on some issues, such as a
timetable for Cuban withdrawal.
Angola shares Havana.'s basic assumptions about the military situation and
the negotiations. Luanda actively sought Cuban augmentation last year and urged
the Cubans to take a more direct combat role to drive the South Africans out of
Angola. Various sources indicate, moreover, that the MPLA regime--with its own
survival at stake--is wary of a rapid Cuban troop withdrawal that might threaten
its own security. Some in the Angolan hierarchy argue against hasty concessions
in the belief that the US will be more supportive after the November elections.
On the other hand, Luanda is frustrated by its inability to fight both
South Africa and UNITA, and sees a regional settlement as the best way to remove
South Africa from the scene even if it loses its Cuban benefactors. Several
sources also report that Angolan leaders have grown weary of the prolonged a.nd
expensive Cuban presence and that they have had little say in Cuban military
decision-making. Despite reports of major differences between Luanda and Havana
over Cuban troop withdrawal, however, the Angolans probably have little choice
but to follow Cuba's lead.
South Africa probably is more concerned by what it could lose in the
negotiations than by what it could gai.n.. Pretoria apparently was surp.r_ised by
the speed of the Cuban military moves and the change in the military balance.
For Pretoria, the stakes in the negotiations are higher than ever, and its
primary objective is to secure withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Pretoria.
calculates that failure to agree on Cuban troop withdrawal would negate its
promises on Namibian independence. Unlike past negotiations, .however, Pretoria
probably believes that it might have to pay a stiff price if the talks break
down. In effect, Pretoria is being forced to choose between independence for
Namibia or a costly military escalation.
Some officials apparently believe that the time has come to end South
Africa's 73-year rule in Namibia. In addition to the increased military risks,
high financial costs of Namibian occupation and rising domestic pressure against
Angolan adventures have pushed South Africa into the negotiations. In the past,
President Botha and the military have opposed implementation of the UN plan
largely because of the security implications of having a hostile SWAPO-led
government in Namibia. Botha may have reconsidered his opposition to the UN plan
in return for consideration of an accelerated Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.
Security questions and the specter of a domestic right-wing backlash,
however, probably wi_I1 continue to drive Pretoria's negotiating position.
Demands for concessions to accommodate these concerns could intrude on the
negotiations. Pretoria has stipulated that approval of the settlement plan is
conditioned on assurances regarding funding for the settlement process and
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guarantees o.f. fina.nci.al support for. Nami.bi_a to replace South Afri_ca's annual
contribution of some $400-600 million--more t-ha.n one-third of the Namibian
budget. P.retori.a has also brought up the removal of African. National Congress
training camps .i.n Angola as a possi.b].e condition. fo.r a settlement.
Reconciliation and an End to the Civil War. Reconciliation between the
MPLA government and UNITA to end the civil war has been pushed off on a separate
track and is not pa.ri: of the current negotiations. Although all the parties
assert, in one form or_ another, that the civil war can only be ended by a
political settlement, substantial disagreement exists on how this is to be
accomplished. Luanda and Havana. have refused to negotiate a reconciliation with
UNITA, and~Pretoria has backed off. from its early demands that UNITA be included
in the talks.
UNITA has formulated several proposals over the years that call for direct
MPLA-UNITA talks leading to an interim government or a power-sharing arrangement
and popular elections. Savimbi recently tried to enlist support from several
friendly African countries to mediate a reconciliation agreement, and he has
obtained promises from, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Zaire, among others, to
intercede with Luanda.
Luanda firmly rejects reconciliation or any form of power sharing with
Savimbi or UNITA. Instead, Luanda offers a so called "harmonization" program
that is in effect clemency for UNITA rank and file, but not for Savimbi. On
occasion, MPLA members have met with UNITA representatives abroad, but the
meetings have not developed into more productive contacts and primarily are
intended to sow dissention within the insurgent leadershi by suggesting that a
solution is possible if Savimbi steps down.
Luanda. reacted sharply to the recent offers of African mediation and was
quick to reject initiatives from Zaire, Morocco, and Ivory Coast. The government
pressed the point that relations with UNITA are purely an internal matter and
that mediation offers represented unfriendly behavior. Luanda also has argued
that internal political discussions should be delayed until after a regional
political settlement, probably in the belief that it would be dealing with a
weakened UNITA.
Soviet Position
The Soviets apparently believe that prospects for a settlement are good and
have commented favorably on recent progress made at the negotiations. The
Soviets viewed South African acceptance in principle of UN Resolution 435 at the
New York talks as a positive step in the negotiations, but they appear to remain
skeptical of South Africa's intentions to implement the plan. Although the
Soviets are not a direct participant in the negotiations, they have had an
observer at all rounds of the talks to monitor the situation. Deputy Foreign
Minister Adamishin publicly asserted before the Geneva round that the USSR would
use "all the authority of its policy to help increase positive relations among
the sides participating in the talks" and that Moscow is seeking to ensure a
settlement is reached "as quickly as possible."
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Moscow and Havana appear t:o be generally in agreement on the advantages of
pursuing a negotiated solution backed by military force. In Moscow's view, the
Cuban augmentation served Soviet interests by forcing Pretoria. to rethink its
military commitment. The aixgmentati_on almost cer_tai_nly was made with Moscow's
full knowledge and approval. 'The Soviets have commented favorably on the
increased Cuban troop presence, facilitated some troop movements, and provided
additional military equipment to the Cubans.
While it does not appear that the Soviets have ha.d substantial problems
with the Cuban-Angolan negotiating positions, differences could emerge over the
timing of a Cuban troop withdrawal. In the event that the Cubans--in order to
avoid appearing to capitulate to South African pressure--hold out for a longer
withdrawal timetable than Moscow thinks would be necessary to preserve Angolan
security, the Soviets might press Havana to be more flexible to prevent a
breakdown of the talks.
The Soviets continue to contend that national reconciliation can only be
addressed after the current negotiations yield an agreement on Cuban troop
withdrawal and implementation of UN 435, according to the US Embassy in Moscow.
Soviet Africa Institute specialists also commented in late July that the current
negotiations have stretched Luanda's manpower and that a parallel set of
discussions on national reconciliation is beyond Luanda's diplomatic
capabilities.
The Soviets have stated publicly that they will continue to provide
military aid to the MPLA and that their aid is not an issue to be negotiated.
Soviet military deliveries to Angola probably will reach approximately $1.5
billion this year, about the same level of assistance as last year. Since
November, Soviet deliveries have included additional Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters,
air. defense equipment, tanks and other armored vehicles, military .trucks, and
nearly all of Angola's munitions. The Soviets also maintain a military advisory
contingent of roughly 1,200 men in Angola which provides vital staff and
technical support to the Angolan Army.
Vorontsov's Likely Stance
Vorontsov probably will reiterate the Soviet belief that Angola should not
be an issue for US-Soviet confrontation and that Washington and Moscow should
cooperate in seeking a regional settlement. He may urge the U5 to press South
Africa and UNITA to adhere to a cease-fire and encourage South Africa to be more
flexible on the issue of the Cuban troop withdrawal timetable.
Vorontsov probably will state that Moscow believes Luanda will seek an
internal political solution once all the "external" elements of the Angolan
problem are resolved. He likely will say, however, that the MPLA at present is
so edgy on the question of national reconciliation that it is not in the US or
Soviet interest to push it on the issue.
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Vorontsov may criticize continued US aid to UNITA-citing its
inappropriateness in light of the US role as a mediator--and US use of 7aire as a
conduit. Adamishi.n has done so in his talks with Assistant Secretary Crocker.
Vorontsov may argue that US aid to UNITA must be cut off before national
reconciliation can be addressed. While maintaining that Soviet aid to its ally
is a bilateral issue and therefore not negotiable, Vorontsov may suggest that
after a regional settlement is implemented, and if the US aQr.ees to reduce aid to
UNITA, the USSR would be able to reduce its ai_d to Luanda..
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SUBJECT: An og la_Cuba-South Africa: Ne~otiati_on_s_ at_ a Critical
Point
Distribution:
Ori.g
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DDI/ALA/AFD/C
Mr. Michael H. A.rmacost
DDI
ADDI
0/DDI
D/ALA
C/ALA/AFD
DCJALA/AFD
ALA/AFD Files
C/ALA/AFD/C
ALA/AFD/C
- ALA/AFD/C Files
- ALA/AFD/S
- ALA/MCD/C
D/BONA
SOVA
(15 Aug:. 88)
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