PANAMA: PROSPECTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN MEDIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000100670001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
m6hingtmDcmsos,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 June 1988
Panama: Prospects for Latin American Mediation
Summary
The mediation efforts in Panama of various
influential Latin American statesmen have stalled.
Former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez, whose
initiative is broadly supported by democratic leaders
in the region, is beginning to back off from
involvement because he believes Defense Forces Chief
Noriega has grown too strong and is not bargaining in
good faith. Guatemalan President Cerezo is trying to
gain the support of the Central and South American
democratic leaders to pressure Noriega to engage his
domestic opposition in direct negotiations, but Noriega
scorns the opposition as impotent and so far has
ignored Cerezo's entreaties. Some members of the Group
of Eight may use the group's meetings in Mexico
beginning on 25 June to call for the Group to act as
interlocutor between Noriega and the United States.
The Group may sound out Washington and Panama City
about such an effort, although we judge that divisions
within the organization itself will probably
circumscribe the extent of its involvement in the
Panama situation.
On balance, we believe prospects for any of the
Latin American mediation efforts are slim given
This typescript was prepared by South America
Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, South America Division, ALA,
ALA M $8-20054
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Noriega's strengthened position, the failure of the
Latins to combine their efforts, and the sentiment of
many regional leaders to avoid involvement in what they
see as a no-win situation. A broad-based initiative
led by Perez and supported by South and Central
American democratic leaders probably would have the
best chance of persuading Noriega to leave power, but
we believe that even such a unified Latin effort could
not succeed without support from the United States--
including a willingness by Washington to permit Latin
interlocutors to offer US concessions.
There have been three serious, albeit tentative and
cautious, offers by influential Latin American statesmen to try
to mediate a resolution of the Panama crisis since Defense Forces
Chief Noriega ousted President Delvalle in late February. The
first and the most sustained effort--which actually began in late
1987--has been that of former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres
Perez and two other Latin ex-presidents, Daniel Oduber of Costa
Rica and Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Colombia. More recently,
Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo sent envoys to Panama to
offer his good offices to facilitate talks between Noriega and
his domestic opponents. In addition, of late leaders of some of
the Latin American Group of Eight countries have become
increasingly disposed toward direct involvement in Panama.
Foreign ministers from the Group are likely to discuss a possible
mediation role at their meeting that begins 25 June in Mexico.
This paper analyzes the current status and the outlook of these
independent initiatives, and assesses their implications for the
United States.
The Ex-President's Initiative
Former Venezuelan President Perez has been the driving force
behind the most serious effort to induce Noriega to step down
from power and to effect a smooth transition to democratic rule.
Perez, Oduber and Lopez Michelsen have met with Noriega three
times since November 1987. According to Perez, Noriega had
agreed at their meeting in February--a few days before President
Delvalle's attempt to oust him--to the three ex-presidents'
proposal calling for:
Noriega to retire as Commander in August 1988 and leave
for Spain;
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Designation of a new, politically anodyne Defense Forces
Commander and strengthening of civilian control over the
military;
-- Reform of Panama's electoral- laws and the holding of free
elections in 1989; and
-- Respect for the principle of nonintervention by the
United States and Panama and mutual pledges to uphold the
Canal Treaties.
Perez remains convinced that the Defense Forces Chief would
have quit had Delvalle not tried to move against him, even though
a Perez associate familiar with the substance of the Noriega
talks says Perez did not obtain a specific timetable from Noriega
for his retirement. Embassy reporting indicates that Perez
alleges that Washington undercut his efforts by goading Delvalle
to move against Noriega.
In late March, Perez and Oduber met in Costa Rica with
President Arias and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, whereupon
they jointly decided to press Archbishop McGrath of Panama to
offer his services as mediator. Perez undoubtedly hoped the
addition of Arias and Gonzalez--two statesmen of international
stature who share his general political orientation--would
increase the pressure on Noriega to accept the Church as an
interlocutor. Although the Solis Palma regime agreed to accept
McGrath's offer of mediation to gain propaganda points with the
public, Noriega never responded to McGrath, whom he considers to
represent the opposition and to sympathize with US efforts to
oust him. By publicly backing McGrath as mediator, Perez and the
others probably damaged their own credibility with Noriega as
impartial interlocutors.
Perez renewed his efforts after the sudden collapse of the
US-Noriega negotiations in May, but he was discouraged by the
tenor of his last meeting with Noriega on 31 May. He and others
present at the meeting describe Noriega as fit, confident,
puffed up"--and not prepared to seriously discuss giving up
power. Instead, Noriega reportedly insisted that Washington must
reduce the US troop presence in Panama, recognize Solis Palma as
President, and drop the economic sanctions and indictments. The
military strongman reportedly told his associates after the May
meeting that Perez seemed to be acting on Washington's behalf and
would not be returning.
US Embassy reporting indicates
Perez has virtually given up hope on Panama, and will concentrate
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for the time being on his presidential election campaign at home.
We believe Perez, whose efforts have had the strongest Latin
American support, would be willing to give mediation in Panama
another shot only if he had assurances that his efforts would
have Washington's blessing. Indeed, he probably calculates--and
we concur--that any chance for success would depend on US
agreement to allow him to broker a US-Noriega deal. Perez
probably would want to reschedule talks with Secretary Shultz to
probe whether the US would let him act as a go-between with
Noriega and, if so, what US concessions he might be able to
deliver to Noriega to entice the strongman to step down. Perez
agrees with the US that any acceptable solution requires an
ironclad commitment from Noriega to retire, but Perez probably
would accept a November or December timeframe and conditions
allowing Noriega to remain in Panama. Moreover, Perez probably
would agree with Noriega that in exchange, the US must drop the
economic sanctions and indictments, and reduce its military
presence in Panama. Perez, like most Latin American leaders,
accords little legitimacy to -either Solis Palma or Delvalle and
probably believes that leadership of a transition government
should be negotiable. Given his belief that Washington
undermined his earlier "agreement" with Noriega, Perez also would
be likely to seek guarantees that the US would forswear new
policy initiatives before he undertakes renewed efforts.
Even with all the above conditions and concessions, Perez's
ability to negotiate a settlement to include Noriega's retirement
still assumes that Noriega is willing to relinquish power--a
highly problematic assumption in our view. Although Noriega
would have difficulty portraying Perez as a US stalking horse, he
could continue to stall until the US withdraws its offer or Perez
quits to return to his presidential campaign. Getting a majority
of Latin American countries behind Perez' efforts from the start
could make such delay tactics more difficult, or at least more
costly politically, for Noriega. Perhaps as difficult to
overcome is the outright rejection of Perez as mediator by
opposition leaders, who believe that he is close to Noriega and
the ruling party. Despite their claims to the contrary, most
opposition leaders know that their parties are in no position--
organizationally or financially--to contest elections in 1989.
Cerezo's Central American Initiative
Guatemalan President Cerezo has made recent soundings about
Noriega's receptivity to a possible effort by the leaders of the
Central American democracies--led by him--to mediate between the
regime and its domestic opposition. Cerezo's emissaries met in
late May and early June with Noriega, the newly formed military
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council, and ruling party leaders to present the Guatemalan
leader's ideas for resolving the crisis. Noriega--under little
pressure--apparently is temporizing and has not yet responded.
For their part, the Central American leaders have been tied up
recently with developments in the region affecting the Central
America peace accords.
Cerezo's proposed mediation track is substantially different
from that of Perez, although their goals--Noriega's departure and
fair elections--are the same. Unlike Perez, whose best ties are
to groups and individuals linked to the regime--Cerezo's closest
Panamanian connections are with members of the opposition. Thus,
while Perez apparently would aim first to settle Noriega-US
issues, a Panamanian opposition figure says Cerezo's proposal
focuses on getting Noriega to negotiate directly with the
domestic opposition, leaving aside temporarily the question of
Noriega's timetable for relinquishing power. Cerezo apparently
believes that once Noriega has acquiesced to direct talks with
domestic opponents, they can put his resignation on the table for
negotiation, as well as the composition of a transition
government. On the latter issue, Cerezo probably would be more
inclined than Perez to try to preserve a role for President
Delvalle. In addition to his direct overtures to Noriega, the
Guatemalan leader is working behind the scenes with the
Panamanian opposition to get the leaders of the Central and South
American democracies, Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, and the
Papal Nuncio in Panama to help him pressure Noriega into direct
talks with the opposition, according to US Embassy reporting.
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In our view, Cerezo's independent mediation offer has even
less chance of success than that of Perez. Noriega reportedly
has little respect for the Central American presidents and views
Costa Rican President Arias with contempt. Cerezo's close ties
to Panamanian opposition party leaders, particularly the
Christian Democrats' Arias Calderon, undoubtedly disqualifies the
Guatemalan president as an acceptable arbiter in Noriega's eyes.
Noriega might eventually give some encouragement to Cerezo,
however, to keep largely illusory mediation hopes alive. He
would only "favor" Cerezo's plan, however, because -he probably
views it as the easier to discredit. Cerezo's proposal to
recognize and support Delvalle publicly probably would prompt
Noriega to halt any role for foreign mediators, while putting
only minimal pressure on him to talk to the domestic opposition.
In the unlikely event that Cerezo could arrange for a majority of
Latin American leaders to receive Delvalle, however, Noriega
would suffer a significant setback to his effort to reintegrate
Panama into the Latin fold.
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Possible Group of Eight Involvement
While Noriega appears to be stalling Perez and Cerezo as
potential Latin interlocutors, Panamanian officials are actively
courting leaders of the Group of Eight countries in an attempt to
end Panama's political isolation in the region. The Uruguayan
foreign minister recently told US officials that Mexico and Peru
appeared to be readying an attempt to persuade the Group to
reinstate Panama.
Panamanian diplomats have been working
with representatives from Mexico and Peru at the United Nations
to develop a plan for the Group to mediate between Panama and the
United States and to draft a statement for the 25 June meetings
to the effect that the US should facilitate a settlement by
ending economic sanctions and recognizing the Solis Palma
government. The Uruguayan foreign minister has confirmed that
the Group intends to present its ideas to the Panamanian foreign
minister when he arrives in Mexico on 27 June for discussions on
Central America by the Contadora Group--to which Panama still
belongs. The Group of Eight reportedly will propose to Noriega
that he quit his command and agree not to interfere further in
Panamanian politics. In exchange, they will ask the US to uphold
its obligations under the Canal Treaties, guarantee that there
will be no military intervention in Panama, lift the financial
sanctions, and engage in a dialogue with the Solis Palma regime
on preparations for elections--in effect providing recognition to
the Noriega-imposed president.
Several countries are likely to oppose readmitting Panama or
approving collective Group action on Panama, however. Calling
the Panama situation a "minefield," for example, Argentine
Foreign Minister Caputo says his government prefers to maintain a
low profile on Panama. According to US Embassy officials,
Venezuelan leaders believe Noriega is in complete control and
under no pressure to make concessions, and Caracas is not
inclined to undertake or support any new initiative. Brazil has
consistently opposed direct involvement in the Panama situation.
These countries probably would insist on receiving assurances of
cooperation from both the US and Panama before taking any public
steps. Those in favor of some gesture on Panama may be able to
get the foreign ministers to decry foreign intervention in
Panamanian affairs and to call for a Panamanian solution that
leads to a democratically-elected civilian government.
Outlook
Current Latin American efforts to broker a political
compromise in Panama are likely to fail given Noriega's
obstinancy, the failure of Perez and Cerezo to combine their
efforts, and the decision of many regional leaders to disengage
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from what they see as a no-win situation. Panamanian officials
have admitted to Latin leaders, moreover, that Noriega--believing
he can stand up to US pressures--will not pursue the Latin
mediation offers seriously unless the economic strains on
Panamanians mount and popular opinion turns aggressively against
him.
In our view, a unified Latin American effort led by Perez
and supported by South and Central American democratic leaders
would stand a better chance of persuading Noriega to leave power.
Under any circumstances, however, we do not believe their efforts
could succeed without being supported by the United States,
including a willingness by Washington to permit them to bargain
with Noriega using US concessions. Without this leverage, we
doubt Latin mediation efforts can do much more than expose
Noriega's intransigence and personal ambition. Moreover, Noriega
would try to shift the focus of the Latin mediators toward the
absence of US concessions to try to boost his legitimacy at home
and abroad.
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