CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000100110001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/16: CIA-RDP90M00005R000100110001-3
Ret
88-160OX
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES o~~
PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
For your information.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/16: CIA-RDP90M00005R000100110001-3
lfarcr..E. 1.88 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Re)nurks E 961
:HENRY :HYDE'S SPEECH ON whether to trade information with U.S. in- out the early history of problems with un-
LE aKS AND CONGRESSIONAL telligence. what quality of information they authorized disclosures in Congress and gave
OVERSIGHT will provide and whether they will actively more recent examples of alleged coneres-
cooperate with us in other ways. In testify- sional leaks published in other sources. in-
HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL ing against proposals for mandatory and cluding use of the threat of disclosure by
more detailed prior notifications to Congress several individuals in order to block execu-
;r ILLINOIS sional Intelligence Committees. Secretary of tive branch actions of which they disap-
:N .HE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Defense Frank Carlucci. who formerly was a proved. That the majority report didn't con-
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence seder leaks a fundamental issue is in itself a
:7tursday. March 31. 1988 under President Carter and more recently real measure of the problem.
From the outset of the
f
Mr. MICHEL Mr. Speaker. on Wednesday, served as President Reagan's National Secu- Contra probe. there was a a steady y stream Iran-
Mr. of
Marcn .30. 1988. my distinguished Illinois cot- rity Adviser, stated that foreign govern- leaks. Interestingly. House Chairman Lee
ree
league and our good friend. HENRY HYDE. de- ments cooperating on special activities are Hamilton and his Senate counterpart.
iiverea a soeecn before a conference cospon- wary because they don't trust Congress to Daniel Inouye. followed their best instincts
sores by the American Bar Association Stand- keep secrets:' on how to keep secrets when it came time to
ing Ccmmirtee on Law and National Security, "'It is a matter of perceptions.' said Mr. depose admiral Poindexter. As the minority
the George Mason University School of Law. Carlucci. 'Other Governments are extraordi- report observes:
the Slucent gar Association, and the Intema- narily sensitive on this point ? ? ?.* " "The two Select Committees recognized
tional Law Society. I want to insert Mr. HYDE'S If our intelligence assets around the that the Admiral's testimony on the diver-
remarxs in the RECORD at this point because I world, particularly cooperating organi7a- sion of funds was the pivotal, and potential-
tions. perceive that the CIA is obliged to dis- ly most explosive political question of this
believe what he has to say aDOut "'teaks' gorge whatever the [Intelligence Commit- whole investigation. As a result, extraordi-
and Ccrigressional Cversignt" reflects his tees) may want, then it is very clear based nary steps were taken to protect the infor.
usual good judgment, common sense. and un- on my experience that our intelligence matlon. Specifically. only three staff attor-
common wisdom. assets would dry up." neys and no members of either committee
"LEAKS" AND CONGRESSIONAL OV?RSIGni' Carlucci said he knew of "numerous" oc- participated in the secret questioning. The
cessions when foreign goverments had said success of these procedures speaks volumes
r By Henry J. Hyde) on how to protect secrets." ?
The grave effects of unauthorized dfsclo- they would not share information if CIA Officially "proven" sourcing of leaks on
provided it to Congress.'
sures upon U.S. intelligence and our foreign Congressmen by nature have strong politt- the Hill or elsewhere. however. is extremely
policy is a problem we had better begun. cal views, cater to and depend on the press. ran' Only a handful of leaks ever have been
thinking about with some urgency. are not imbued wsecurity habits traced through investigation to the culpable
The seriousness and universality of and arre individual. so lack of proof hardly estab-
th the h they bats
lishes that Congress has a good record.
"leaks ' are obvious. Yet many continue to of f intelligence ce Professionals. with
maintain theres no "proof' that Congress urally fall under suspicion. Thus And , let's not A Senate intelligence committee study re-
leaks or that it leaks significantly. And, forget that congressional oversight in the leased to the press reportedly found that in
even when acknowledging problems in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate selected leaks of classified information.
executive branch or Congress. powerful leg- strained relations between Congress and the journalists referenced congressional sources
islative figures habitually object to virtually intelligence community almost to the break- only 8-9% of the time, but cited Reagan ad-
every initiative for investigating and punish- Ing point. Ex-CIA Director Colby recalls in ministration officials 66% of the time. This
ing these occurrences, while failing to offer his memoirs that every new covert action research methodology is suspect. since jour-
alternative solutions. MY proposal for a disclosed to Congress in 1975 was leaked, nalists are alleged frequently to protect
Joint Intelligence Committee, which would "And the 'covert' part of CIA's covert action their most vulnerable sources, and persons
replace the existing two House and Senate seemed almost gone." ? The notorious laxity on the intelligence oversight committees
committees and reduce the number of Mem- of the Church and Pike investigations taint- would in many cases be particularly exposed
ben and staff with access to intelligence in' ed the more rigorous Intelligence Commit- by virtue of being the only knowledgeable
formation, has been resisted sine 1984- tees which tool: their place. "congressional" sources. Let us take the
when I first introduced the idea Other sug- No less a journalistic authority on leaks Senate study at face value, however, and
gestions. e.g., increasing use of the poly- than Daniel Schorr noted In a Washington also generously assume that Congress has
gratin for investigative Purposes, strength- Post article ? "' ' ' that it has never been 2.500 people with clearances as opposed to
eeing strt nondisclosure agreements and suggested ta Mof Congress could 2 2" million it.. the executive branch and mlli-
than of Congress could tart'. Reliance on the Senate study forces us
legal action against discloser or the media. be disciplined that ha other Member
are branded as paranoia and violations of to conclude that Congress maintains just
first amendment rights. But the critics This is relevant because (f don't think that I over 0.1(,-. the number of executive branch
never offer a better solution, and most seem am baring any great journalistic secrets) the clearances. but is responsible for 8-9% of
content to arift with the trde-or. more ac- exposure of covert intelligence questions is the leaks on national security issues. Specif-
curately. the tidal wave. frequently a form of congressional whistle- ically. on average. a cleared person in Con-
IL the Irani Contra affair had one salutary blowing. A leak often occurs when a clandes- gress is 60 times more likely than his coun-
effect. it was to highlight poltcymaker' fear time plan runs into substantial opposition terparts elsewhere to engage in unauthor-
of leaks and distrust of congressional discre- during a briefing for congressional commit- ized disclosures.
tion. and to expose dramatically the de- tees." Schorr went on to cite a number of Evidence that news leaks quite commonly
structive effects this can have. Maximum specific examples involving reported con- originate on the Hill also was developed in a
compartmentalization within the executive gressional leaks of information on Angola. summer 1981 survey among the readership
branch and failure to notify Congress of the Chile. Nicaragua. El Salvador. and Libya. of the periodical. American Politics. The
Iran initiative invited judgmental errors and Recently. there have been several known journal. circulated almost entirely within
courted political disaster- These sups were and serious disclosures on each of the Over, the Washington area, asked its readership
taken out of determination to explore a sight Committees. Those who nonetheless to respond to a wide-ranging poll which In-
policy option considered potentially pr'Omi*' continue categorically to defend the com- cluded the question. "Have you ever leaked
ing only if. by avoiding normal Procedure& mittees' records apparently depend upon information to the news media?" over 900
It could be kept secret. An unanswered Ques' congressional courtesy to forestall a "name persons. considered to be a reliable cros-
Re-
tion is how many times the opposite hap- section of the readership, responded. Re-
names" rebuttal. In the congressional Select
pens-how visit' times are innovative ap? suits the leak question were considered
Preaches to difficult foreign policy Problems Committees' final report on the Iran-Contra so dram matic that they were published early
rejected or not even considered because affair. the minority report devoted a chap- and separately. in an August 1987 article en-
their success depends upon a secrecy which ter to the need to patch leaks.' It pointed titled "Leak City"' More than one in four
probably could not be maintained?
Regardless of claims that Congress must ' BiU Gertz...Carlucci: Cohen 13111 Will Plug CIA
be considered innocent until proven guilty Sources." Washington Times. Dec. 17. 1987. ' Ibid. D 579.
of security lapses. damage to the oversight . Bob Woodward and Walter Pineus. 'Carlucci ' Rerilts on the la ublished in
Ruben Garcti "]rak k t portion " us m are
American Pultttn.
process occurred as soon as a widespread Warru of Veto on Coven?Aetion Notice." Washing- August 1987. pp. 23-24. Metnoau)ogy is explained
perception
could eveloped that the legislative ton 'William Colby. Men" (1978). p. 423. in Roobert Gadditional arcia And pertinent
Other Results of the given rurst
branch anch conot be trusted. This Perc Der'ce9- t} tion has seriously affected executive branch ? Daniel .Schorr. "Cloak and Dagger Relcs." Annual 'Inside the Beltway' Readers Poll." Amen-
cooperation with intelligence oversight com- Washington Post. Nov. 14. 1985. A23. can Politics. Sept. 1987. pp. 14-17. Respondents on
mittees. A similar attitude is harbored by "'Report of the Congressional Committees hives. inc leak section included. inter aria. 16 pelluciana.
allied intelligence services who decide tismung the lran?Contra Affur" (Washington. DC: 193 Capitol Hill suffers. six memoers of the Diplo.
GPO. 1987), pp. 575-79. matte corps and 66 Federal emploxees.
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E 962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Rcmarks
persons-
v
o
er 28-concededt
o-- a some time
having shared a secret With the media. Cap.
itol Hill staffers. sporting a 31% rating. were
higher than average. But they were pikers
compared to the "politician" category, alone
at the pinnacle of the chart. in which 62%
of 16 respondents admitted to having leaked
information. This contrasted with 23% in
the "Federal employees" category. Media in.
formation sources tended to have higher
salary and educational levels. Contrary to
some recent accusations. conservatives were
found to leak less than liberals and moder-
ates. And, in delicious irony, leakers named
journalists as the group they trusted the
least (Among respondents as a whole. "poll-
ticians" had a slight edge over journalists in
competition for this award.)
The situation has been allowed to deterio.
rate so far that the task of changing this
permissive culture is now monumental. Suc-
cess will come very slowly indeed, and will
result only from a persistent and aggressive
attack across a broad front. in both Con-
gress and the executive branch.
One option is stricter security procedures
and increased compartmentalization. Cap-
itol Hill is very quick to claim this is the
preferred solution for the executive branch
problems, thereby avoiding the need to
grapple with difficult civil and press liber-
ties issues. But Congress is loathe to apply
this option to its own operations by consoli-
dating its oversight into one joint commit-
tee. However. consolidation and compart-
mentalization is a far more promising
option for the congressional Intelligence
Committees than for policy agencies. Effec-
tive congressional oversight doesn't require
Intelligence Committees with 32 (plus 4 ex-
officio) members and 55-plus staff. More-
over, additional staff, as well as 31 Senators
and Congressmen serving on the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittees in both
Houses of Congress, also have access to ex-
tremely sensitive intelligence. Altogether,
therefore. 67 Memoers of Congress are in
the "loop" for such information.
For the policy agencies. who already have
cut back on access to classified material. fur-
ther restrictions on the dissemination of in-
formation may be helpful in some cases. But
If compartmentalization is not carefully ap-
plied. the additional advantages could be
limited and the arawoacks serious. Already
there is concern that the most sensitive in-
telligence Roes only to top pollcymakers
who are too busy to read or act upon it. An-
alysts who are supposed to make sense of
collected intelligence cannot do their job if
Pertinent information is withheld from
them. Finished intelligence analyses, in
turn. are less useful if they are not distrib-
uted to those with an interest in the sub-
ject If policy action is considered or at-
tempted. the circle of knowledgeable parties
inevitably widens so that some people will
become involved who may disagree with the
proposed action or who for some other
reason will be inclined to leak: and there
will be too many people involved at this
stage to have much hope of finding the
leaker. Even the Ollie North Iran/Contra
operation. compartmentalized as it was,
eventually involved great numbers of people
within and outside the Government. In fact,
the Iran overture was indeed leaked rather
early in a little-noticed Jack Anderson
column, by some still unxnosn person.
Future use of establisned covert action and
policy deliberation procedures, insisted
upon by the Tower Review Board and in
congressional reports on the Iran/Contra
affair. will ensure that a sizable number of
People always are involved.
But rather than accept for itself the medi-
cine that it has sometimes proposed for the
'xecutive orancn. Congress is now propos.
rig that it expand the det:nition of its own
need to know. ' n what Secretary Carlucci
has aptly :aoeled a 'risguided effort to
close every conceivable loophole" despite
resulting damage to U.S. foreign policy, the
Intelligence Committees now are promoting
egislation reauir:ng that they almost imme-
atately receive information on every single
covert action undertaken. We should in-
stead be confident that the political fallout
from the IraniContra affair has provided
far greater assurance than ever before that
notification will not be withheld temporari-
ly unless there is very good reason. Indeed.
the executive branch doubtless in the
future will take pains to snare critical infor-
mation and attendant political nits with
Congress.
If the first thing Congress should do is to
vote down this mandatory early notification
legislation and the second is to form a com-
pact Joint Oversight Committee, the third
must be to study carefully our options for
action and legislation to prevent future
Government leaks and to investigate and
punish them when they occur.
The law on punishing those disclosing
classified information is frequently an effec-
tive barrier to successful prosecution. Spe-
cifically, it is extremely hard to prove in
leak cases, as the law generally requires.
that there was "intent or reason to believe
that the information is to be used to the
injury of the United States. or to the advan-
tage of any foreign nation." $
Government prosecutors are faced with a
similar hurdle when it comes to convicting
journalists who reveal the identities of un-
dercover intelligence personnel. The law
governing this kind of disclosure requires
the Government to prove that such an indi-
vidual engaged in "a pattern of activities in-
tended to Identify and expose covert agents
and with reason to believe that such activi-
ties would impair or impede the foreign in-
telligence activities of the United States".'
In short, although there are Inherent dif-
ficulties in apprehending a leaker. neither
Congress nor the executive branch can
claim that vigorous or competent attempts
to do so have been undertaken or that pun-
ishment is swift and sure.
Given the difficulty of identifying those
who have leaked classified material, we
should also fat= the question of whether.
under what circumstances, and how we
should take action against the known party
to the deed-the reporter and media outlet
in question. Although the media sometimes
have exercised restraint in these Issues, here
again the culture has become so permissive
that potential damage to II-S. intelligence
collection and foreign policy often receive
short shrift when authors and editors are
deciding whether or not to publish. More-
over. like the leakers themselves, Journalists
purporting to weigh carefully the national
security implications of such writings often
display notoriously poor judgment in this
regard. Yet they contend that they alone
should be the judge and, for instance, hold
in their hands agents' lives and the future
effectiveness of intelligence collection sys-
tems costing billions of dollars of taxpayer
money. I believe it is beyond dispute, more-
over, that the excuse of "the public's right
to know," used as a defense in these cases, is
a rationale that would be rejected by the
vast majority of the public itself.
Ideally, the press should agree among
themselves on some explicit or implicit code
'Chapter 37 (Espionage and Censorship) of Title
18. United States Code. section 793.
? National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 422).
Title Vt, section 602.
March ,11. :988
of conduct :o curtail 'nese anuses. .At
present. however. ':.is seems unukeiy. As
:he media appears more and more :ncuneo
:owara :ncesui write ' reporting and advo-
cacy lournausm. :::e demand for leaks ao-
pears to be using in tandem with to
supply. We can also expect a further escata-
,.:on of disputes over release of classifies
':ateriais as satellite pnotoitrapny of senst-
:tve events and installations becomes avail-
aole to the media.
in the 1970's. investigative reporter Sev-
-tour Hersh reportedly told a Navy ',Var
College seminar that as a reporter his job
.vas to break into the Pentagon if he could
and steal all the classified documents he
could, and that their lob was to stop him.i'
We have to ensure somehow that the Gov-
ernment and the media remain fundamen-
tally on the same side where national secun-
tY is concerned. But the media is becoming
more rather than less aggressive with
regard to acquisition or publication of classi-
fied information. And its enormous collec-
tive resources instantly are marshalled to
stigmatize as unconstitutional extremism
any suggestion that the press must be heid
legally accountable if it does not police
itself more effectively.
Unwilling to grapple with these intracta-
ble. messy, and politically volatile problems.
some people insist that the damage we have
suffered is overstated. and that no matter
how great it may be. it does not justify tam-
pering with press liberties or even congres-
sional perquisites. But if our Government
cannot keep a secret and Congress displays
no sense of urgency in solving this problem.
we will become ever more severely crippled
In a dangerous world where the margin for
error is fast disappearing.
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