WRAP-UP OF VISIT OF CODEL SOLARZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: January 30, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030047-9
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SUBL'E_CT: WRAP-UP OF V?SiT CF CODE: SC'LAPZ
PAGE 001
TOP: 3005062 JAN 84
2. SUMMARY: DURING THEIR VISIT TO MANAGUA JANUAR 23 AND 24,
CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ AND STAFF ASSISTANT RICHARD BUSH
MET WITH A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT
AND THE CIVIC OPPSOSITION. MORNING MEETINGS WERE HELD WITH THE
EMBASSY COUNTRY TEAM,CO-DIRECTOR OF LA PRENSA PDRO JOAQUIN
CHAMORRO, AND ARCHBISHOP MIGUEL OBANDO Y BRAVO. AFTER A LUNCH
AT THE RESIDENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF COSEP AND THE
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, THE DELEGATION PROCEEDED TO THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY FOR A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER D'ESCOTO. THE CODEL THEN
MET WITH COMANDANTE CARLOS NUNEZ, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF
STATE, AND HAD A MILITARY BRIEFING BY THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
OF THE SANDINISTA ARMY. IN THE EVENING,THE DELEGATION ATTENDED
A DINNER HOSTED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR SAUL ARANA, ATTENDED BY OFFICIALS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE FSLN.
DESPITE THEIR SHORT STAY, THE CODEL MEMBERS WERE ABLE
TO HEAR A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN
NICARAGUA. MOST OF THE DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE
CONTADORA PROCESS, PARTICULARLY THE SECURITY AND DEMO-
CRACY PROVISIONS. REGIME OPPONENTS EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM
THATTHE GRN WOULD AGREE TO HOLD GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS.
WHILE THE GRN OFFICIALS STRESSED THEIR RESONABLENESS
AND DESIRE TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
OF CENTRAL AMERICA.(END SUMMARY)
3. THE FIRST MEETING FOR CODEL SOLARZ UPON ARRIVAL
JANUARY 23 WAS WITH PEDRO JOAQUIN CHAMORRO (PJC) AT THE
OFFICES OF LA PRENSA. PJC SAID THAT CENSORSHIP HAD BEEN
RELAXED IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, BUT HAD NOT ENDED.
WHILE THERE WAS MUCH MORE FREEDOM TO PRINT POLITICAL
ARTICLES, CENSORSHIP OF OTHER ITEMS (FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTS
OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FIREARMS) CONTINUED. CONGRESSMAN
SOLARZ ASKED PJC WHETHER, AFTER THE GRN SIGNED THE
CONTADORA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN PANAMA, TRUE
DEMOCRACY COULD BE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP. PJC SAID THA
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"DEMOCRACY" TO THE SANDINISTAS DID NOT MEAN THE SAME
THING THAT IT DID TO US, AND THAT NECESSARY PPECONOTTIONS
FOR TRULY FREE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE MET. THE GRN, HE
SAID, WOULD NEVER PERMIT THE SEPARATION OF THE NICARAGUAN
ARMY FROM THE FSLN PARTY, AND WOULD NOT STOP USING ITS
DOMINATION OF THE STATE FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL ENDS. PJC
MENTIONED AS EXAMPLES THE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TELEVISION
NETWORKS, AND THE USE OF OFFICIAL VEHICLES TO TRANSPORT
PEOPLE TO FSLN POLITICAL RALLIES. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE
RETURN OF EXILED OPPOSITION LEADERS SUCH AS ROBELO AND
RASTORA WOULD NEVER BE PERMITTED, BUT WITHOUT THESE
LEADERS THE ELECTION COULD NOT BE FREE. THE SANDINISTAS
WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VERIFIABLE
ELECTION PROCEDURES, AND WOULD NOT ALLOW OUTSIDERS TO
SERVE AS GUARANTORS.
4. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A TRULY FREE ELECTION,
INCLUDING THE EXILED OPPOSITION, WERE TO BE HELD.PJC SAID
THE SANDINISTAS WOULD LOSE, AND WOULD GET ONLY ABOUT 25
PERCENT OF THE VOTE.HE HAD A FRIEND IN THE FSLN WHO
TOLD HIM THE GRN ESTIMATE OF ITS OWN POPULARITY RANGED
FROM 40 TO 60 PERCENT. THIS INDICATED, HE SAID, THAT THE
TRUE FIGURE MUST BE ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE POPULATION.
SOLARZ MENTIONED A NEW DECREE WHICH HAD BEEN PASSED WHICH
ONLY ALLOWED PARTIES NOT OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTION TO
DART.ICIPATE INELECTIONS. OJC SAID THAT THE DECREE
REQUIRED THE PARTIES TO "ACCEPT"THE REVOLUTION, AND THAT
IT COULD BE USED TO STOP ANY OPPOSING PARTY WHICH BECAME
TOO POPULAR.
5. SOLARZ ASKED PJC WHETHER THE SANCINISTAS WERE
PREPARED TO MAKE AGREEMENTS UNDER CONTADORA REGARDING
FOREIGN ADVISORS, BASES, AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN OTHER
COUNTRIES. CHAMORRO REPLIED THAT CUBAN ADVISORS COULD
EASILY BE HIDDEN IN NICARAGUA WITHOUT DETECTION. EVEN
IF WORKABLE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WERE SET UP, THERE
WOULD NOT BE PEACE BECAUSE THERE WERE 00,000 EXILED
NICARAGUANS WILLING TO GIVE THEIR LIVES TO STOP THE
SANDINISTAS. FDN AND ARDE WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTNG AND
WOULD EVENTUALLY ACHIEVE THE OVERTHROW CF THE SANDINISTAS.
ASKED ABOUT PCPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONTRAS, PJC
SAID THE PEOPLE WERE UNHAPPY OVER ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
AND POLITICAL CONTROLS, BUT WERE NOT YET READY TO REVOLT.
THE FDN WAS TO SOME EXTENT TAINTED BY THE SOMOZA LABEL,
BECAUSE IT HAD A FEW FORMER SOMOZA MILITARY WITH SAD
REPUTATIONS AMONG ITS MEMBERS. DJC THOUGHT A MOVE WAS
UNDERWAY WITHIN THE FON TO GET RID OF THESE PEOPLE.
THE FCN LEADERSHP ITSELF WAS NOT SOMOCISTA. PASTORA
WAS POPULAR IN THE COUNTRY BUT HIS FORCES WERE NOT
HAVING MUCH EFFECT BECAUSE THEY WERE OPERATING IN AN
UNPOPULATED ZONE.REFERRING TO THE DEBATE IN THE U.S.
OVER THE CONTRAS, SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER THE CONTRAS ALLOWED
THE SANDINISTAS TO JUSTIFY THEIR INTERANL REPRESSION.
PJC SAID THAT WAS TRUE TO SOME EXTENT, BUT THE REPRESSION
AND ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC HAD BEGUN WELL BEFORE CONTRA
ACTIVITY. THE PRESENCE OF THE CONTRA GAVE THE NICARAGUAN
P"": - SOME HOPE THAT THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE EVENTUALLY
CVERTHRU'VN, AND ALSO MADE THE GRN MORE FLEXIBLE IN ITS
NEGOTIAT_ IN CONTADORA. THE GRENADA ACTION AND THE
FLEET EXEC.1115 HAD AN EVEN BIGGER EFFECT ON THE GRN,
AND WERE THE ~CURCE OF THE CURRENT INTERNAL RELAXATION.
6. THE CODEL THEN PROCEEDED TO THE EMBASSY WHERE THEY
DISCUSSED CONTADORA AND THE. INTERNAL.. POLITICAL SITUATION
dfTl+ COUNTRY TEAM MF'MBC;RS. THEN`THFY WENT TO' A MEETING
WITH ARCHBISHOP' MIGUEL OBANDU Y FIRAWC, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED
BY HIS OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN FATHER BISMARCK CARBALLO.
CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ASKED THE ARCHBISHOP TO COMPARE THE
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PRESSURE ON THE CHURCH WITH ITS LEVEL OF A YEAR AGO.
OBANDO SAID THAT TENSION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND STGTE
HAD INCREASED DURING THE YEAR, REACHING A PEAK IN OCTOBER
WHEN SANDINISTA MOBS("TURBAS") ATTACKED 21 CHURCHES
THROUGHOUT MANAGUA. SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAD BEEN
SOME EASING OF TENSION. MEETINGS HAD BEEN HELD WITH
THE GOVERNMENT, BUT NO REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. THERE
WAS NO RELAXATION OF PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF RAID CATOLICA,
AND SANDINISTA PRESSURE ON THE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS CONTINUED.
ASKED TO COMPARE THE SITUATION OF THE CHURCH COMPARED TC
THE DAYS OF SOMOZA, THE ARCHBISHOP RESPONDED THAT HE HAD
BEEN A STRONG OPPONENT OF THE SOMOZA DICTATORSHIP, BUT
THAT THE CHURCH UNDER SOMOZA DID NOT SUFFER DIRECT PERSE-
CUTION AS IT BEGAN TO AFTER THE REVOLUTON. OBANDO
SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE FREE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD
UNDER THE SANDINISTAS.THE !'SLN WAS NOT TERRIBLY POPULAR
BJT IT DID ENJOY TREMENDOUS ORGANIZATIONAL ADVANTAGES.
THE CONTRAS ENJOYED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF POPULAR SUPPORT
AMONG THE PEOPLE. BUT THESE PEOPLE WERE AFRAID OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF EXPRESSING THIS SUPPORT. REGARDLESS OF
THE OUTCOME OF CONTADORA, HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE AN
END TO THE FIGHTING COULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL THERE WAS A
"CLIMATE OF TRUST AND PEACE" WITHIN NICARAGUA.
7. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ASKED THE ARCHBISHOP WHAT THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD DO ABOUT THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA.
OBANDO RESPONDED THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM THE UNITED
STATES, WHERE HE HAD SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS IN NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON. HIS NORMAL VIEW WAS THAT EACH COUNTRY
SHOULD BE MASTER OF ITS OWN DESTINY, BUT IN NICARAGUA
TODAY` THERE WERE MANY "INTERNATIONALISTAS" FROM CUBA,
THE PLO, THE TUPAMAROS, ETC., AND OTHER OUTSIDERS
HELPING TO GUIDE THIS DESTINY. HE SAID THE U.S. SHOULD
SHAPE ITSPOLICY WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE
(UNDERLINED) OF NICARAGUA FOREMOST IN MIND. THE
CONGRESSMAN ASKED THE ARCHBISHOP ABOUT THE QUESTION
OF CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS. OBANDO REPLIED
THAT IT WAS ANALOGOUS TO THE DISARMAMENT QUESTION BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND THE USSR. OBVOUSLY IT WAS PREFER-
ABLE TO GET RID OF THE WEAPONS, BUT NOT FAIR FOR ONLY ONE SIDE
TO BE ASKED TO DISARM.
8. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE ARCHBISHOP, THE CODEL
ATTENDED A LUNCH AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE WITH RAMIRO GURDIAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE PRIVATE AGRICULTURALISTS ASSOCIATION
UPANIC, AND EMILIO ALVAREZ OF THE CONSERVATIVE PART'',.
THE LUNCH WAS DOMINATED BY GURDIAN. WHO WENT OVER.
WITH THE CODEL THE DETAILS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
000RDINADORA'S ELECTORAL PROPOSALS. SOLARZ FRANKLY TOLD
GURDIAN THAT SOME OF THE DEMANDS (SUCH AS FREEDOM OF RELI-
GION AND AN END TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES) WERE VALUABLE IN
AND OF THEMSELVES, BUT PROBABLY SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO
SPECIFIC CONDITIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS FREE.
DR. ALVAREZ SAID HE THOUGHT THE SANDINISTAS WERE SEEKING
A KIND OF MEXICAN SYSTEM IN WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE PERMANENT
CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN HIS VIEW, ONLY CONTINUED
PRESSURE WOULD MOVE THE FSLN TOWARDS A MORE DEMOCRATIC
SYSTEM.
9. AFTER LUNCH, THE CODEL WENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
FOR A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MIGUEL D'ESCOTO, WHO WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR SAUL ARANA. SOLARZ
TOLD D'ESCOTO THAT HE WAS TRAVELLING THROUGH THE REGION
TO LEARN ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND WAS PARTICULARLY
INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTADORA
AGREEMENT SIGNED IN PANAMA TWO WEEKS AGO. D'ESCOTO SAID
THE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT WAS QUITE SIGNIFICANT, BUT
THE GRN WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE SEVERAL
THINGS DESIRED BY THE CONTADORA FOUR. AN IMMEDIATE
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MORATORIUM ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REGION WAS OPPOSED
BY HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR. THE DOCUMENT DID NOT PROVIDE
FOR AN END TO MILITARY MANEUVERS IN THE REGION, AND ALSO
PROVIDED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GRADUAL RATHER THAN
IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISORS. D'ESCOTO
SAID THE SUCCESS OF THE CONTADORA FPROCESS DEPENDEDON THE
POLITICA WILL OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE
NEGOTIATIONS A TRUE CHANCE. THE REASON ADMINISTRATION
HAD EXPECTED THE GRN TO "ACT LIKE HOTHEADS" IN THE
CONTADORA TALKS, AND IN THAT RESPECT HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.
AN ENCOURAGING SIGN FOR CONTADORA WAS THAT HONDURAS HAD
ALREADY APPOINTED THE MEMBERS FOR THE VARIOUS CONTADORA
COMMISSIONS. HE UNDERSTOOD EL SALVADOR WASHAVNG TROUBLE
FILLING ITS COMMISSION MEMBERS, BUT SAID IF THE NEXT
MEETING IN FACT TAKES PLACE IT WOULD BE ENCOURAGING.
10. SOLARZ TOLD D'ESCOTO THAT A COMMON VIEW IN THE
REGION WAS THAT WHILE THE PANAMA MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE.
SO MUCH REMAINED TO DO ON PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION THAT
THERE WAS LITTLE ROOM FOR OPTIMISM. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT
THE PANAMA MEETING DID MOVE A BIT CLOSER TO THE IMPLE-
MENTATION STAGE, BUT THAT SUCCESS WAS NOT IMMINENT. THE
REAL OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT WAS THE RELUCTANCE OF THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO ACCEPT THE FACT OF THE "SANDINISTA
POPULAR REVOLUTON," AND ITS DESIRE TO REVERSE
THAT REVOLUTION. IT STRATEGY IN CENTRAL
AMRICA WAS TO "DIVIDE AND CONQUER," USING THE SPECTER
OF THE SOVIET EMNACE TO LINE UP THE OTHER COUNTRIES AGAINST
THE GRN. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE REGION GAVE THE
U.S. LEVERAGE TO CARRY OUT THIS STRATEGY. THE CONTADORA
PROCESS DID NOT ADDRESS THE "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM" OF
HOW TO GET THE U.S. TO LAY OUT CLEARLY ITS SECURITY
AGENDA. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THROUGH CONTADORA THE
GRN COULD ADDRESS U.S. FEARS IN THAT REGARD.
11. SOLARZ THEN SAID HE WANTED TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC
ISSUES AT DISPUTE. HE NOTED THAT THE GRN PROPOSALS
TABLED IN THE FALL CALLED FOR AN END TO ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS
TO EL SALVADOR. AND ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT U.S. MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR WOULD BE PROHIBITED. D'ESCOTO
SAID THAT YES. UNDER THE NICARAGUAN PROPOSALS THIS
ASSISTANCE WOULD BE PROHIBITED. SOLARZ ASKED IF THE
PROPOSALS ALSO CALLED FOR AN END TO ARMS SHIPMENTS TO
NICARAGUA, AND D'ESCOTO SAID NO. SOLARZ THEN ASKED HOW
THE U.S. COULD BE EXPECTED TO STOP SENDING ARMS TO A
SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT IN EL SALVADOR WHILE NICARAGUA
WOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THEM. D'ESCOTO SAID THE
DIFFERENCE WAS THAT EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA WERE NOT
AT WAR, AND THE NICARAGUAN GOAL WAS TO STOP THE CIVIL
WAR IN EL SALVADOR, WHICH HAD SECURITY CONSEQUENCES FOR
THE ENTIRE REGION. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA,HE
SAID, WERE TO BE NEGOTIATED AS PART OF AN OVERALL
"EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES" IN THE REGION, WHICH WOULD
CONTAIN VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. SOLARZ THEN POINTED
OUT THAT NICARAGUA HAD SINGED THE CONTADORA PROPOSALS
IN PANAMA, WHICH WERE DIFFERENT FROM THE NICARAGUAN
PROPOSALS. HE ASKED IF, IN THE GRN VIEW, THE PANAMA
AGREEMENT WOULD PROHIBIT U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE
GOES AS LONG AS THOSE ARMS WERE WITHIN LIMITS SET FORTH
BY THE BALANCE OF FORECES AGREEMENT. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT
UNDER THE CONTADORA AGREEMENT SUCH ARMS SHIPMENTS COULD
CONTINUE, WHILE NICARGUAN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE FMLN
WOULD BE PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, THE GRN VIEW WAS THAT
THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR EVERYONE TO "KEEP THEIR HANDS OFF"
EL SALVADOR.
12. SOLARZ THEN ASKED D'ESCOTO FOR HIS V:EW OF :THAT
WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES IN CENTRAL
AMERICA. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT NICARAGUA WOULD HAVE TO HAVE
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ENOUGH FORCE TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST A COALITION OF ITS
THREE NORTHERN NEIGHBORS. THE CONGRESSMAN THEN POINTED
OUT THAT IN THAT CASE HONDURAS MIGHT SAY ITS PRIMARY
PROBLEM WAS NICARGUA, AND THAT SUCH FORCE LEVELS WOULD
BE UNACCEPTABLE TO IT. THIS WAS A GENUINE DILEMMA.
D'ESCOTO SAID THIS IDEA TO RESOLVE THIS WAS TO ACHIEVE
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH PRECLUDED MILITARY PACTS NOT
INCLUDING ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THAT
WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOP THE GPN TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE
QUESTION OF BALANCE OF FORCES. ASKED ABOUT THE CONTADORA
AGREEMENTS ON MILITARi' ADVISORS ANC THE REGIONAL ARMS
RACE, D'ESCOTO SAID THAT THE GRN FAVORED AN IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL OF ADVISORS. BUT THE AGREEMENT SPECIFIED A
GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THE NICARGJAN PROPOSAL
FOR A MORATORIUM ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REGION WAS NO-'
ACCEPTED. MILITAR' MANEUVERS, ALTHOUGH NT DIRECTLY
ADDRESSED."VIOLATED THE SPIRIT` OFTHE CONTADORA
AGREEMENT. SOLARZ THEN ASKED WHETHER ALL SANDINISTA
SUPPORT, INCLUDING POLITICAL STATEMENTS, FOR THE FMLN
WOU!.C BE PROHIETTED UNDER THE PANAMA DOCUMENT. C'ESCOTO
SAID THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE EXACT LANGLA.GE EVENTUI.L_,
WORKED OUTN BUT SAID THE NICARGUAN PROPOSALS HAD PRDHTFTTEE
SUPPORT " OF ANY KIND."
13. SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER THE GRN VIEWED AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA AS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE
TO A CONTADORA AGREEMENT. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT WHILE
CHARACGERIZING SUCH A BILATERAL ACCORD AS A SINA QUA NON
FOR CONTADORA SUCCESS WOULD OVERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH
OF THE GRN POSITION. THE GP.N BELIEVED SUCCESS IN CONITADORA
WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT WITHOUT IT. WITHOUT L S.
ASSURANCES, THE GRN WOULD DEMAND FORCES SUFFICIENT TO
DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST A U.S. ATTACK. BECAUSE SUCH FORCE
LEVELS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES, AN
AGREEMENT WITH THE I S. WAS NECESSARY IN PRACTICE. SOLARZ
SAID HE BELIEVED THAT IF THERE WERE A FINAL CONTADORA
AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE EASY TO OBTAIN A U.S.PLEDGE OF
NON-AGGRESSION AGAINST NICARAGUA. (HE MADE CLEAR HE WAS NOT
SPEAKING FOR THE USG ON THIS.) D'ESCOTO SAID IT
WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE PLEDGE TO COME FIRST, AND THEN
SOLARZ SUGGESTED THE PLEDGE COULD COME SIMULTANEOUSLY, TO
WHICH D'ESCOTO AGREED.
14. THE CONVERSTION THEN TURNED TO THE DEOMOCRACY
PROVISIONS OF CONADORA, AND C'ESCCTC SAID THE GRN
UNDERSTOOD IT HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO TAKING STEPS TO
ENHANCE POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND ACCELERATE DEMOCRATI-
ZATION. SOLARZ, REFERRING TO STATEMENTS IN THE PAST BY
SANDINISTA LEADERS THAT ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA WOULD NOT BE
LIKE THOSEIN COSTA RICA, THE.U.S., OR VENEZUELA, ASKED
HOW THE NICARAGUAN ELECTION WOULD DIFFER FROM THOSE
COUNTRIES. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT THE GRN DID NOT LOOK ON
THOSE COUNTRIES AS ELECTORAL MODELS. WHAT THE GRN
WANTED, HE SAID, WAS TO MAXIMIZE PARTICIPATION. WITH
VOTING BY 100 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE AS THE GOAL.
HE SAID IN THE LAST U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ONLY
HALF OF THE ELIGIBLE PARTICIPANTS HAD CAST VOTES, AND
NICARAGUA WANTED TO AVOID THIS. SOLARZ POINTED OUT THAT
IN THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, VOTING RATES nVER 90
PERCENT WERE NOT UNCOMMON, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THEY WERE
NOT TRULY DEMOCRATIC. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT THE GRN HAD
NOT EVEN EXAMINED THE SOVIET PRACTICE AS A GUIDE TO
THEIR OWN ELECTION, AND THAT OPPOISTION PARTIES (OTHER
THAN SOMOZA PARTIES) WOULD BE FREE TO PARTICIPATE, AND
WOULD BE GRANTED ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. FDN AND ARDE
LEADERS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO PARTICIPATE,
AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM WOULD NOT BE HELD.THIS WAS
BECAUSE THE GRN VIEWED THEM AS LITTLE MORE THAN MERCENARIES
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15. SOLARZ THEN AKSED FOR D'ESCOTO'S VIEWS ON POSSIBLE
"SYMMETRY" AMENDMENT, WHEREBY
THE U.S. WOULD CUT OFF AID TO THE CONTRAS ONCE IT WAS CLEAR
THAT NICARAGUA HAD CUT OFF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE FMLN. D'ESCOTO
SAID THAT WHILE PASSAGE OF SUCH AN AMENDMENT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE,
IF THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, THESE
WERE ALREADY CONTEMPLATED UNDER CONTADORA. SOLARZ ASKED
IF THE SYMMETRY PROVISIONS SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AS A PRAGMATIC
WAY OF GETTING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BOLAND AMENDMENT PASSED.
D'ESCOTO SAID THAT POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY PERHAPS WOULD
INDICATE THAT THEY SHOULD BE, ALTHOUGH THE MORAL ARGUMENT
WAS AGAINST IT. WHATEVER ACTIONS THE GRN MAY BE COMMITTING,
HE SAID, THE U.S. DI NOT HAVE THE RIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO SEND ARMED GROUPS INTO NICARGUA. THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR
SHOULD MAKE ITS OWN CASE AGAINST NICARAGUA, IF THERE WAS ONE. SOLARZ
REPLIED THAT HE AHD ARGUED THE SAME POSITION HIMSELF, BUT
THE BOLAND AMENDMENT HAD NOT PASSED. IN HIS FINAL
QUESTION, SOLARZ ASKED WHETHER THE GRN WAS WORRIED THAT
CONDECA WOULD CO TO NICARAGUA WHAT THE OECS HAD CONE TO
GRENADA. D'ESCOTO SAID THAT THE GRN WAS "VERY CONCERNED,"
BUT NOT AS CONCERNED AS A FEW MONTHS BACK. THIS WAS
BECAUSE OF THE DECISION OF GUATEMALA TO STAND OFF FROM
THE CONDECA REVIVAL. BUT THE GRN COULD NOT TRUST GUATEMALA
TO CONTINUE ALON G THAT LINE.D'ESCOTC HAD HEARD TALK OF
THE POSSIBLILITY OF ANOTHER COUP IN GUATEMALA.PERHAPS
INSPIRED BY THE UNITED STATES.
16. AFTER THE MEETING WITH D'ESCOTO, CODEL WENT TO THE
COUNCIL OF STATE FOR AN INTERVEIW WITH CCMANDANTE CARLOS
NUNEZ. DETAILS OF THIS CONVERSATION ARE BEING REPORTED
SEPTEL. AFTER THE NUNEZ MEETING, THE CODEL RECEIVED A
MILITARY BRIEFING BY SUB-COMANDANTE ROBERTO SANCHEZ. THE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR FOR THE SANDINISTA ARMY. SOLARZ
REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED SANCHEZ ABOUT WHETHER UNDER
CONTADORA, NICARAGUA WOULD NEED ENOUGH MILITARY FORCES
TO WITHSTAND A COMBINED ATTACK BY HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR,
AND GUATEMALA. SANCHEZ NEVER ANSWERED TIS QUESTION
DIRECTLY, BUT INSTEAD DESCRIBED THE PROBLEM OF THE
CONTRAS AND THE COMPLICITY OF THE U.S. AND HONDURAS.
CALLING THE CONTRAS VERY COSTLY TO THE ECONOMY, HE SAID
TWO SANDINISTA SOLDIERS HAD TO BE SENT NORTH FOR EVER
CONTRA THAT ENTERED NICARGUA. IF THE U.S. WERE TO
STOP AIDING THEM, IF HONDURAS WOULD STOP ALLOWING THEM
TO USE ITS TERRITORY, AND IF THE HONDURAN ARMY STOPPED
HELPING THEM, THEN NICARGUA WOULD BEGIN TO DEMOBILIZE
AND DISARM. THE SIZE OF THE GRN MILITARY WAS DETERMINED
BY THE SHORT-TERM CONTRA THREAT. NOT LONG-TERM POSSIBIL-TIES,
HE SAID.
17 THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED SANCHEZ WHETHER THE BIGGEST
THREAT TO NICARAGUA WAS THE CONTRA ACTIVITY, OR THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK BY THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
TO THE NORTH. SANCHEZ RESPONDED THAT THE BIGGEST THREAT
WAS THE UNITED STATES. AND THAT THE CONTRAS DID NOT
PRESENT ANY DANGER UNTIL THE U.S. BEGAN SUPPORTING THEM.
SANCHEZ COMPLAINED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO START MEANINGFUL
TALKS WITH THE U.S. BECAUSE EACH TIME THE U.S. RAISED THE
ANTE. SOLARZ SAID HE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA. AND HE HAD
BEEN URGING THAT COURSE FOR OVER A YEAR. REFERRING TO
THE LACK OF TRUST IN THE REGION,SOLARZ ASKED WHAT PRECISE
VERIFICATION METHODS THE GRN ENVISIONED FOR THE SECURITY
ASPECTS OF CONTADORA, SANCHEZ REPLIED THAPT THE CIA KNEW
THE-,'RN WAS NOT SENEUNG, ARMS: TO THE FM N, AND` THAT 1T
:OULD NOT" DO SQ EVEN IF IT WASTED TO. THERE WERE'
SOPHISTICATED CONTROL SYSTEMS IN PLACE IN THE GULF OF
FONSECA AND HONDURAS TO DETECT ANY SUCH MOVEMENT. THE
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030047-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 007 NC 3229953
TOR! 300506Z JAN 84
PROMARY SOURCE OF ARMS TO THE FMLN, HE SAID, WAS THE
SALVADORAN ARM,.SCLARZ RESPONDED THAT THE PEOPLE HE
TAMED TC IN WASHINGTON WHO WERE DESPONDIBLE FOR
ASSESSING CENTRAL AMERICA WERE CONVINCED THAT NICARAGUA
WAS IN FACT DEEPL`' INVOLVED IN THESE ARMS SHIPMENTS.
THE ASSESSMENTS MIGHT BE WRONG, BUT SOLARZ DID NOT DOUBT
THE SINCERITY OF THESE ANALYSTS. THIS RAISED AGAIN THE
ISSUE OF VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. SANCHEZ THEN SAID THAT
CONTROLS WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED WHICH APPLED
EQUALLY TO EVEYONE, AND WHICH WERE EFFECTIVE. 5#3
DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN NEGOTIATIONS, BUT AS
LONG AS CONGRESS CONTINUED AID TO THE CONTRAS. THERE
WAS LITTLE POINT TO SUCH DISCUSSIONS. SANCHEZ ENDED
BY SAYING THE GRN WOULD AGREE TO RECIPROCAL CONTROLS
OVER AID TC THE FM-N AND A:L- TO THE CONTRAS.
18 AFTER THE MILITARY BRIEEFING, CODEL MEMBERS ATTENDED
A DINNER AT A LOCAL RESTUARANT HOSTED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY
NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR SAUL ARANA. ALSO
PRESENT WERE BARRICADA EDITOR CARLOS FERNANDO CHAMORRO;
THE JESUIT DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL STUDIES. FATHER XABIER GOROSTIAGA, AND RAMON MENESES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT O THE FSLN.
19.
COMMENT: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ' INITIAL FOCUS WAS
ON
THE
CONTADORA PROCESS AND ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS.
HOWEVER,
AS
THE DAY ADVANCED, HE INCREASNGLY DISCUSSED THE
PROSPECTS
OF
GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. NOTWITHSTANDING
THE
SKEPTICISM OF LA PRENSA AND THE OPPOSITION, HE WAS
IMPRESSED
BY GRN PRESENTATIONS AND LEFT WITH A SOMEWHAT HOPEFUL VIEW
ABOUT THE FUTURE.
OUAINTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030047-9