THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MILITARY SECURITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA THROUGH 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004400060001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MILITARY SECURITY
AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF LAOS AND
CAMBODIA THROUGH 1954
IE 63-2-54
Appro a 4~~JuFM-5 4
Published 9 June 1954
LQQ
1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1.
XDECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DAT - ~J REVIEWER:-32,2_A
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 1 June 1954. The AEC and FBI abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
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WARNING
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within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS ON
THE MILITARY SECURITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY
OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA THROUGH 1954
THE PROBLEM
To examine the present military security and political stability of Laos and Cam-
bodia and to estimate-the effect which certain possible developments might have upon
their. security and stability through 1954.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Viet Minh forces are operating in Laos
and Cambodia, but do not currently pre-
sent an imminent threat to the existence
of the native governments. However,
this is so only because the security of
Laos and Cambodia is supported by
French regular forces and extensive
French assistance to the native forces.
2. Communism has thus far made little
progress in either Laos or Cambodia.
Nevertheless, both countries are vulner-
able to Communist pressures because of
their military weakness and uncertain
political stability.
3. Substantial Communist military suc-.
cesses in Vietnam would probably lead
to an early collapse or disintegration, of
authority in Laos and Cambodia unless
outside assistance or security guarantees
assured their protection.
4. If a negotiated settlement placed the
Communists in a position which would
enable them eventually, -but not imme-
1 The various contingencies considered herein
were supplied to the intelligence community as a
basis for this estimate.
diately, to dominate Vietnam, the imme-
diate danger to Laos and Cambodia would
be less and the Laotian and Cambodian
Governments could probably maintain
control for some time.
5. If, as a result of a negotiated agree-
ment with the Communists covering all
of Indochina, French and Viet Minh reg-
ular units were actually withdrawn from
Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet Minh
irregular forces still operating in those
countries), native forces could probably
preserve for some time approximately the
present' degree of security and stability
in Cambodia and a certain minimum se-
curity and stability in Laos, - provided
French cadres and the present scale and
nature of French material aid remained
available to the native armies. However,
such an agreement with the Communists
would be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to implement and police, and in
these circumstances the native armies
could probably not for long successfully
resist the Viet Minh without increased
outside support.
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6. If outside support took the form of a
security system involving multinational
guarantees for the security of Laos and
Cambodia and could be implemented in
time, that would probably permit Laos
and Cambodia to maintain their security.
We believe that the requirements of such
a security system would be: (a) adequate
MDAP-type aid; (b) effective protective
forces appropriately located in the area;
and (c) assurance of assistance in the
event of internal subversion as well as
external attack. The success of the above
measures, in the long run, would also re-
quire the maintenance and development
of a political and psychological atmos-
phere which would motivate the indige-
nous peoples against Communism.
-7. If Laos and Cambodia were parti-
tioned,. the will of the non-Communist
remnants to maintain their independence
would greatly decrease, and their ability
to do so would be weakened because of
the new establishment in those countries
of strong and legalized Communist posi-
tions. Under such circumstances proba-
bly nothing but. military occupation of
those countries would assure their con-
tinued freedom from Communist control.
DISCUSSION
9. Viet Minh regular troops in Laos are or-
ganic to regular .Viet Minh divisions and are
Vietnamese invaders, not Laotians. Viet Minh
regional forces, scattered throughout Laos, are
predominantly Vietnamese, but include Lao-
tians as well. These regional troops have
effectively conducted guerrilla-type operations
at company level and are considered equal in
effectiveness to companies of the Laotian Na-
tional Army. They could be easily organized
into larger units, with a consequent increase
1. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LAOS
AND CAMBODIA
Military Security
8. Viet Minh forces are operating in Laos and
Cambodia, but do not currently present an
imminent threat to the existence of the native
governments. However, this is so only be-
cause the security of Laos and Cambodia is
supported by French regular forces and ex-
tensive French assistance to the native forces.
Viet Minh
10,300 Regulars
Attached Militia
National Army
Regionals
National Guards and Other
Semimilitary
A. French Expeditionary Corps (includ-
ing integrated Laotian troops)
18,000 (of whom at least 5,000 are
known to be Laotian)
2,000 (all Laotian)
B. Laotian National Forces
14,500
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in their capabilities. There are no known
armed non-Communist dissident forces in
Laos.
10. The defense of Laos has depended pri-
marily on French Expeditionary forces. For
military reasons, the French may at any time
reduce or increase the present strength of reg-
ular units in that country. If such strength
is reduced substantially below 10,000, Laos
would be seriously exposed to Viet Minh at-
tack or subversion.
11. The Laotian National Army, numbering
14,500, is organized into six infantry bat-
talions, seven light infantry, battalions, and
one parachute battalion. The combat effec-
tiveness of the Army as a whole is only fair.
It is inadequately trained and lacks. experi-
enced native officers and NCO's. The Lao-
tian National Guard is poorly trained and
equipped.
12. The Laotian military, establishment de-
pends almost entirely on outside support.
France (and, indirectly, the US) furnishes all
equipment and almost all the necessary funds.
The French train, advise, and tactically direct
the Laotian forces. All French Expeditionary
and Laotian National Army troops in the
country are under French operational com-
mand.. Approximately 300 French officers
and NCO's serve in the Laotian National
Army, and French officers occupy most field
grade positions.
A. French Expeditionary Corps (includ-
ing integrated Cambodian troops)
5,000 (3,000 infantry;
2,000 service. Virtually
all Cambodians)
1,000 (All Cambodians)
6,000
B. Cambodian Royal Forces
Royal Army
14,000
Regional and Militia
National Guard
4,000
Semimilitary
15,000
8,700
Grand Totals Cambodia
13. Two Viet Minh regular battalions, organic
to a Viet Minh division, are now in northeast
Cambodia. These troops are Vietnamese in-
vaders. who entered Cambodia in March 1954.
In addition, small units of Viet Minh regulars,
regional troops, and militia are scattered
throughout Cambodia. The combat effective-
ness of these regional and militia forces is
generally only fair, but those east of the
Mekong River will probably be raised to a
higher standard of organization and training
before the end of 1954.
14. There are also in Cambodia several hun-
dred armed non-Communist dissidents, who-
are followers of. the nationalist leader, Son
Ngoc Thanh.
15. The Cambodian Royal Army, numbering
14,000, is organized into ten regular infantry,
one parachute, and three light infantry bat-
talions. Cambodian armed forces are heavily
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dependent on the French for finance, equip-
ment, training, and advice, though less so
than is the case in Laos. However, the Cam-
bodian Government exercises much greater
command responsibilities than does the Lao-
tian Government. French officers and NCO's,
who formerly served in the Royal Army, are
at present in the process of being withdrawn.
The Cambodian King has full administrative
control over all Royal forces, and operational
command west of the Mekong River.
16. The Cambodian Royal Army is reasonably
well equipped and trained, but has a number
of deficiencies, chief among which are a lack
of adequate numbers of trained officers and
NCO's, a low standard of discipline and re-
sponsibility in the officer corps, and an almost
paralytic defensive-mindedness. In time, the
effectiveness of the Royal Army may be in-
creased as a result of the efforts of General
Nhiek Tioulong, recently appointed by the
King as Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, and
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Political Stability
17. The political situation in both Laos and
Cambodia is uncertain, but at present is rela-
tively quiet. In Cambodia, the royal institu-
tion is held in high regard by the people, who
have traditionally accepted monarchial au-
thority, and the King is personally popular.
Moreover, Cambodia enjoys a high degree of
cultural, ethnic, and religious homogeneity.
In Laos, the population is largely apolitical.
In neither country is there any appreciable
economic or social unrest. In both countries,
a tradition of a governing elite subordinate to
the throne attracts most educated Laotians
and Cambodians to government service.
18. Communism has thus far made little
progress in either Laos or Cambodia. The
Viet Minh is unpopular in both countries be-
cause its members are Vietnamese, who are
heartily disliked by both the Laotians and
the Cambodians. Communist-sponsored "free
governments" and "independence forces" in
Laos and Cambodia are viewed as parts of the
Viet Minh and thus have evoked little support
in those countries. Communist political in-
fluence is believed to be minimal outside those
areas firmly occupied by Viet Minh forces.
The "nationalist" appeal of the Communists,
which has been relatively successful in Viet-
nam, has been blunted in Laos by the general
political inertness of the country, and in Cam-
bodia by the vigorous nationalist efforts of the
King.
19. The Cambodian Government derives con-
siderable domestic support from the fact that
it is anti-French. The Laotian Government,
on the other hand, is outwardly pro-French,
but this policy does not adversely affect the
government's domestic strength.
20. However, both Laos and Cambodia are vul-
nerable to Communist pressures, chiefly be-
cause of their military weakness. Moreover,
in times of crisis their political leadership is
often unpredictable, especially in Cambodia.
There has been a widespread tendency in both
countries to regard the war against the Viet
Minh as being "someone else's business." In
addition, the Communists may be able at any
time to take advantage of the fact that in
Laos, and especially in Cambodia, there are
rival cliques presently contending for political
power.
21. A source of weakness in Cambodia is the
existence of non-Communist dissidence. The
principal dissident is Son Ngoc Thanh, who is
believed to be essentially an independent na-
tionalist. A premier of Cambodia under the
Japanese during World War II, Thanh is be-
lieved to have a latent political following
throughout the country, particularly among
students, intellectual groups, and younger
army officers who see in him the embodiment
of Cambodian independence aspirations.
Thanh's political influence has been sapped in
recent months by the nationalist efforts of
the King, but is still far greater than the
small size of his present armed following
would suggest. Cambodia's political stability
would be greatly enhanced if he should rally
to the government, but his future behavior
cannot be predicted and it is conceivable that
he might join forces with the Viet Minh. In
addition to Thanh, there are a number of for-
mer dissident leaders who have rallied to the
King, but who continue to enjoy warlord-like
"autonomous" powers in certain regions of
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5
Cambodia. These people are essentially op-
portunists, whose future loyalty cannot be as-
sured.
22. There are no significant non-Communist
dissident groups in Laos. However, Prince
Petsarath, now resident in Thailand, is a pre-
tender to the Laotian throne and has at times
been reported to be planning a coup d'etat.
II. THE EFFECT OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SECURITY
AND STABILITY OF LAOS AND
CAMBODIA 2
23. The future security and stability of Laos
and Cambodia will almost certainly be deter-
mined by outside developments. The fate of
these kingdoms will be largely fixed, not by
their own efforts, but by a number of inter-
acting factors, chief among which are proba-
bly: (a) the trend of developments in Viet-
nam; - (b) the scale and nature of outside
assistance given the governments of Laos and
Cambodia; and (c) the nature and strength
of Viet Minh military and political pressures
against those countries.
24. Developments in Vietnam will have an im-
mediate effect on Laos and Cambodia. A
strong non-Communist position in Vietnam
would tend to assure military security and
political stability. However, if key areas of
Vietnam fell to the Communists, pressure on
Laos and Cambodia would be greatly in-
creased. The military capabilities of these
countries are so slight that they would almost
certainly request outside aid to defend them-
selves. If such aid were not immediately sup-
plied, Laos would be quickly overrun, or its
government would seek accommodation with
the Communists. Cambodia might hold out
longer, but in the end it too would be forced
to surrender or accommodate. If a negoti-
ated settlement placed the Communists in a
position which would enable them eventually,
but not immediately, to dominate Vietnam,
the immediate danger to Laos and Cambodia
2 The various contingencies considered herein were
supplied to the intelligence community as a basis
for this estimate.
would be less and the Laotian and Cambodian
Governments could probably maintain control
for some time.
25. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement
with the Communists covering all of Indo-
china, French and Viet Minh regular units
were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cam-
bodia (leaving Viet Minh irregular forces still
operating in those countries), native forces
could probably preserve for some time approxi-
mately the present degree of security and sta-
bility in Cambodia and a certain minimum
security and stability in Laos, provided French
cadres and the present scale and nature of
French material aid remained available to the
native armies. However, such an agreement
with the Communists would be extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to implement and
police, and in these circumstances the native
armies could probably not for long success-
fully resist the Viet Minh without increased
outside support.
26. Under the adverse alternatives discussed
in the two preceding paragraphs, outside sup-
port on a scale larger than the French could
provide would be required to assure a satis-
factory level of security and stability in those
countries. If such additional support were
not quickly forthcoming, the resistance of
Laos and Cambodia to Communism would
collapse.
27. If outside support took the form of a
security system involving multinational guar-
antees for the security of Laos and Cambodia
and could be implemented in time, that would
probably permit Laos and Cambodia to main-
tain their security, despite rising pressures
from the Communists in Vietnam and a prob-
able growing degree of internal Communist
unrest in both countries. We believe that the
requirements of such a security system would
be: (a) adequate MDAP-type aid; (b) effective
protective forces appropriately located in the
area; and (c) assurance of assistance in the
event of internal subversion as well as external
attack. The success of the above measures,
in the long run, would also require the main-
tenance and development of a political and
psychological atmosphere which would moti-
vate the indigenous peoples against Commu-
nism.
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-28. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, in those countries of -strong and legalized
the will of the non-Communist remnants to Communist positions. Under such circum-
maintain their independence would greatly stances probably nothing but military occu-
decrease, and their ability to do so would be pation of those countries would assure their
weakened because of the new establishment continued freedom from Communist control.
S I
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