SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050010-4
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RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 31, 2012
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 8, 1961
Content Type:
SNIE
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A
N I E 1 1 - 7- 61
25 April 1961
AB APR Mai
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11--7-61
SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS
REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this. estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force. and the Joint Staff,
Concurred In by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 25 April 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of
the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, intelligence, USAF;
the Director for Intelligence, Joint Stag`; the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense, Special Operations. and the Director
of the National Security Agency. The Atomic energy Com-
mission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of investigation, abstained, the subject
being outside of their jurisdiction. Xtti1 SAW t. 6..'b1e,1,"1Li
~~} 16
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H ?.4i W.
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SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS REGARDING BERLIN
AND GERMANY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany over
the next six months or so.
CONCLUSIONS
1. We believe that in the relatively near
future the USSR will present a formal
demand for a renewal of negotiations on
the question of a peace treaty for "the two
Germanies" and a new status for Berlin.
Almost certainly, Khrushchev still pre-
fers to negotiate on this matter rather
than to provoke a crisis by unilateral
action, chiefly because he desires to avoid
the risks of a showdown in this dangerous
area of East-West confrontation. He ap-
parently still hopes that, if he keeps in
reserve the threat of a unilateral move,
Western fears of a showdown will induce
the Allies to make concessions at the bar-
gaining table. (Paras. 5, 9, 11)
2. In raising this issue once again the
USSR's chief concern will be to strength-
en the East German regime by eroding
and eventually eliminating the Western
position in Berlin, and by bringing the
West to recognize the permanence and
legitimacy of that regime. The Soviets
also hope that success in this will under-
mine West Germany's confidence in
its present policy of participation in
NATO's military effort, since it remains
a primary Soviet purpose to check the
buildup of significant military power in
the Federal Republic. (Paras. 6-8)
3. In any negotiations which take place in
the next few months, the Soviets would
almost certainly not hold fast to their
maximum demand for a peace treaty with
"the two Germanies" and the immediate
conversion of West Berlin into a "demili-
tarized free city." Instead they will con-
centrate on getting an "interim agree-
ment," of the 'ZIT -outlined at Geneva3 in
9, which would constitutea first step
toward eliminating Allied occu ation
rights West Berlin.-. The USSR might
in the course of negotiations reduce some
of its previous demands concerning such
an interim settlement if it could obtain
an agreement, which, at least by implica-
SECRET 1
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SECRET 2
tion, put a time limit on these occupation
rights. This outcome would be intended
to lay the groundwork for later advances
and would be, in the Soviet view, a major
gain. (Paras. 12-15)
4. If higher level negotiations do not take
place, or if they break down, the USSR
might agree to refer the problem to lower
level talks. More likely, however, it would
move to summon a Bloc-sponsored peace
conference and would eventually sign its
long-threatened separate peace treaty
with the GDR. Subsequently, the So-
viets could transfer to the GDR control
over Allied access and, sooner or later,
permit that regime gradually to apply a
policy of harassments. As another way
of exerting pressure, they might choose
to exploit the vulnerabilities of German
civilian access, a course which would not
directly threaten the Allied position but
could seriously undermine the integrity
of West Berlin. Under this or any other
policy, however, the USSR is likely to con-
tinue to offer negotiations, always hope-
ful that the Allies can be induced to ac-
cede peacefully to the eventual loss of
the Western position in Berlin. (Paras.
19-21)
DISCUSSION
Soviet Policy Considerations
5. Recent Soviet public and private statements
make it clear that the USSR intends to raise
the issue of Berlin and Germany again, and a
formal diplomatic initiative to this end will
probably be launched in the relatively near
future. Khrushchev has indicated an unwill-
ingness to wait for the West German elections
due in September, and he would probably like
to be able to point to some activity on this
question at the Party Congress in October.
His manner and timing in raising this is-
sue will depend on the movement of events
generally in East-West relations, which will
in turn be heavily conditioned by develop-
ments in such crisis areas as Laos and Cuba.
In general we believe that the Soviets would
consider the Berlin issue too sensitive to press
very hard if tensions were already high be-
cause of developments elsewhere. But an ap-
pearance of disunity or disarray in the West-
ern Alliance, such as may result from the
present internal crisis in France, might lead
the Soviets to believe that a favorable moment
had arisen to demand new negotiations. In
any case, we believe that the Soviets will try
to find a way, sometime during the next six
months or so, to revive this problem from its
present relatively dormant state.
6. The course of events in the last two years,
including the Soviet proposals at Geneva and
Paris, indicates that the Soviets, in returning
to this issue, will be raising it primarily for
the sake of certain objectives with respect to
Berlin and Germany themselves, rather than
because they wish to use it as a lever in dis-
cussing other questions. These objectives
have remained essentially unchanged since
Khrushchev precipitated the Berlin crisis in
the winter of 1958-1959. The USSR believes
that its puppet regime in East Germany can-
not be finally stabilized so long as West Berlin
continues to exist in the heart of the country
as a route of escape,' a center of anti-GDR
activities, and a reminder of Western refusal
to reconcile itself to the permanent division of
Germany. In addition, Moscow seeks to use
the advantages of its strong local position in
the Berlin area to extract greater international
recognition for the GDR, both in order to
' After a period of decline until the spring of 1960,
the refugee flow began to increase. In the first
quarter of 1961, about 34,000 persons escaped through
West Berlin, approximately 70 percent more than
during the corresponding period of 1960.
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strengthen that regime and to extinguish
latent German hopes for reunification on any
other than Soviet terms. Further, the Soviets
hope that, in the long run, legalizing the divi-
sion of Germany would reduce a potential
military threat to the GDR on the part of a
rearmed West Germany.
7. Moscow is also keenly aware of the psycho-
logical gains which would accrue from West-
ern concessions in this area. Even a partial
Western retreat would be exploited among
America's allies, in both parts of Germany,
and most of all among the West Berliners, as
proof that the "world relation of forces" was
shifting irrevocably in favor of the Bloc, that
the US was unwilling in this new phase to
maintain its commitments, and that further
Western retreats were inevitable. In particu-
lar, the Soviets would hope to undermine West
Germany's confidence in its present policy of
participation in NATO's military effort, since
it remains a primary Soviet purpose to check
the buildup of significant military power in
the Federal Republic.
8. In a certain sense Khrushchev is under
pressure to make progress in the near future
toward.these objectives. This is not because
he is being urged by a specific group of other
Soviet leaders to adopt a harder line. Nor
does our considerable evidence on the Sino-So-
viet dispute indicate that the Chinese Com-
munists exert an important influence here.
The commitment of Soviet prestige in the
Berlin situation does exert a kind of pressure
on Khrushchev to make good, although this
has probably become somewhat attenuated
with the passage of time and the postpone-
ment of several potential showdowns. But
the chief pressures are those arising from the
weaknesses inherent in the position of the
GDR, which has continued to encounter
serious problems in consolidating its rule and
developing its economy. East German boss
Ulbricht is the spokesman for these pressures,
and while Ulbricht himself may have little per-
sonal weight in Soviet councils, the USSR as
the party ultimately concerned to maintain
and extend Communist power in Central
Europe shares fully his desire to stabilize the
GDR by repairing these weaknesses.
9. Anxious as the Soviets are to achieve these
objectives, they nevertheless remain acutely
conscious that Berlin is potentially the most
dangerous point in the entire range of East-
West confrontations. Despite his evident cau-
tion, Khrushchev probably still doubts that
the Western Powers are actually willing to
run substantial risks of general war over the
question of East German administration of
their access to Berlin. Nevertheless, he recog-
nizes that the US is so deeply committed in
Berlin that it might react forcefully in re-
sponse to interference with its access to the
city. He would clearly prefer to seek conces-
sions via negotiation, at least until he has
further opportunity to gauge the temper of
the new American Administration. This atti-
tude is reinforced by his desire to preserve a
"peace-loving" pose and to demonstrate, be-
fore resorting to unilateral measures, that he
has offered the Allies every chance for a nego-
tiated solution.
10. Thus, while the USSR ultimately seeks
absorption of West Berlin and full recognition
for the GDR, Moscow has realized from the
outset that these goals must be approached
by stages. The "free city" is intended as such
a stage, while the subsequent proposals for
an "interim status" for West Berlin are de-
signed to prepare the way toward a "free city."
Similarly, Western agreement to the Soviet-
proposed all-German commission would be a
stage toward full recognition of the GDR, as
would agreement to negotiate a peace treaty
with the two German states. The Soviets ex-
pect their full program to require a number
of years; what they seek in 1961 is a start on
that program, not only to bring its realiza-
tion nearer, but also to establish the presump-
tion that further steps are to follow.
Probable Soviet Tactics
11. At some point in the course of its diplo-
matic explorations with the new US Adminis-
tration, the USSR will probably broach the
idea of negotiations on Berlin and Germany.
While the forum and time cannot be pre-
dicted, Moscow will probably seek to obtain
formal talks, perhaps at the highest level, and
to schedule them for some time during this
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year. Having achieved the participation of
the GDR in the Foreign Ministers' Conference
of 1959, the Soviets would probably press for
this again if the talks were held at that level.
A relatively correct approach seems to be the
preferred Soviet tactic at present, and the
USSR probably will not resort to strong pres-
sures unless it judges that negotiations can-
not be obtained in any other way. Neverthe-
less, an invitation to negotiate will probably
be accompanied by semiofficial, low-key re-
minders of the vulnerability of the Western
position in Berlin. The Soviets may also per-
mit sporadic harassments during this period
by the GDR against German access through
the Soviet Zone and across the sector border
within the city.
12. The maximum Soviet position calls for
concluding peace treaties with both German
states and, as an integral feature of this settle-
ment, the conversion of West Berlin into a
"demilitarized free city." Failing this, Mos-
cow has threatened to sign a separate treaty
with the GDR and thereafter to turn over to
that regime the control of Allied access routes
to the city. These demands may well be the
initial Soviet position in any new negotiations,
but the USSR showed itself ready, both at
Geneva in 1959 and at Paris in 1960, to bar-
gain for lesser immediate gains, and we be-
lieve it would probably prove willing to do
so again.
13. Recent restatements of the Bloc's position
indicate that the USSR continues to think
primarily in terms of an "interim agreement"
on West Berlin, valid only for a fixed period,
combined with provisions for a commission in
which the two German states would try to
work out the terms of a peace treaty. This
will probably be, if not the initial Soviet pro-
posal, a fallback position introduced fairly
early in any discussions. Its chief virtue from
the Soviet viewpoint is its "interim" nature;
by this means the USSR seeks to document a
Western commitment to further steps in the
same direction at a stipulated future date.
14. The main conditions for West Berlin dur-
ing this interim period would probably again
be red tt ons in Western troop levels, c nom, trols
on propaganda and subversive activities, and
4
the creation of a Bi Four' commission to
supervise a agreement. These provisions
are designed to injec h UUSSR into the affairs
of the city and to undercut the Allies' original
rights of occupation by means of a new agree-
ment, limited in duration, to which the USSR
is a party and with which the GDR is asso-
ciated. The formation of an all-German com-
mission would be intended to extract de facto
recognition of the GDR.
15. Proposals of this sort, however, may not
represent the Soviet minimum position. If
Khrushchev came to feel that the West was
willing to let negotiations founder at this
point, he might offer an interim agreement
on more moderate terms. The USSR might
agree, for example, to a ceiling on Western
troops in West Berlin rather than insist on
their reduction. Or it might drop its demands
for an all-German commission in connection
with an interim status for the city. Its main
effort would be to establish, at least by im-
plication, that the new agreement put a time
limit on Allied rights of occupation, and there-
by to lay the groundwork for further Com-
munist advances at a later date.
16. Our chief reason for raising the possibility
of such modifications in, the Soviet position is
the USSR's evident awareness of the risks of
proceeding unilaterally toward its objectives
in Berlin. Khrushchev's estimates of West-
ern, and particularly US, reactions will be
fully as important in determining Soviet policy
as his own objectives and his appraisals of
the USSR's bargaining advantages. The
record of successively deferred showdowns
since November 1958 suggests that Khru-
shchev may have come to feel that his original
expectations were founded upon an under-
estimate of the importance which the US at-
taches to its position in Berlin, or, put another
way, an overestimate of the ease with which
he could exploit the USSR's growing military
power at the bargaining table. Apart from
these considerations of military risk, Khru-
shchev is also aware that any major unilateral
action on his part would virtually foreclose for
a considerable period the possibility of han-
dling other issues with the West in any atmos-
phere except one of maximum hostility.
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17. While the severity of the USSR's minimum
demands will vary primarily according to its
estimate of American intentions and Western
unity, it is clear that Moscow sees no necessity
to sacrifice anything of value in the bargain-
ing on Berlin and Germany. We believe there
is v'rt o chance, for example, that the
U would seriously consider proposals in-
volvi g in ine the status of East Berlin
or the establishment of a._ground corridor
betw_e_en W-est_Berlin_ancl'West Germany over
which the GDR had no control.
18. There is also a close relationship between
the advantages which the USSR would re-
quire in any settlement this year, and the
length of time for which it would be prepared
to underwrite this settlement. We believe
that the Soviets will not accept any settle-
ment which requires them to be satisfied with
minor concessions unless it also offers them
an opportunity to raise the issue again in the
relatively near future. The USSR continues
to believe that, although dangers are involved,
its prospects for eventually absorbing West
Berlin and legitimizing the GDR are good.
And while the desire to avoid too sharp a
deterioration in relations with the West may
at various times put constraints upon its
Berlin policy, we estimate that the USSR will
not accept any long-term settlement which
denies it the opportunity to work toward these
goals.
19. Despite Soviet reluctance to move uni-
laterally, the USSR will take care to insure
that the threat of such action is kept alive in
the minds of its adversaries. And indeed, if
negotiations do not take place, or if they fail,
the USSR will have to consider whether to
resort to further steps on its own. One possi-
ble move at the end of deadlocked negotiations
would be to remand the problem to further
discussion at a lower level; Khrushchev might
acquiesce in this as a means of avoiding a
test of nerves and providing some appearance
of continuing movement on the question.
More likely, however, he would announce plans
to convene a peace conference and, if the West
still remained unwilling to make concessions,
would finally sign a separate treaty with the
GDR.
20. If events reached this point, the USSR
would still have several ways of proceeding.
It might transfer control over Allied access
to the East Germans, who could sooner or
later attempt, under Soviet guidance, to force
the West into dealing with them. Alterna-
tively, recent Soviet and East German state-
ments suggest that the chief means of pres-
sure following a separate peace treaty might
be harassment of German access. This policy
would be intended to force the West Berlin
Government to give up its ties with Bonn, to
clamp down on anti-GDR activities, and in
this fashion gradually to submit to East Ger-
man control. Such a course of action would
allow the USSR to avoid for a time the issue
of Allied rights, but it might be effective in
undermining the independence of the city and
the confidence of its population.
21. A policy of this sort, of course, need not
wait upon a peace treaty. But we believe that
the USSR will not permit its puppet regime
to go very far in this direction until Khru-
shchev has explored the possibilities of ex-
tracting concessions from the new US Ad-
ministration. In any event, Soviet policy
during and beyond the next six months is
likely to utilize a variety of such techniques
to heighten periodically the pressure on Ber-
lin, each time offering the possibility of new
negotiations.
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