MIDDLE AMERICAN CARIBBEAN DIVISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000700340002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 6, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 PANAMA: NORIEGA'S POTENTIAL
SUCCESSOR AND HIS ROLE
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6 May 1988
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 May 1988
PANAMA: NORIEGA'S POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR AND HIS ROLE
Summary
We believe Noriega's successor would be less powerful, but
nevertheless would be the dominant actor--in the tradition of
Panamanian politics--even in a government of national
reconciliation:
Even a military commander who wished to lower somewhat
the military's political profile most likely would remain
the chief actor in Panamanian politics because of the
military's broad base of support and resources.
The Defense Chief's dominating role in politics probably
would be further assured by disunity within the
opposition, which even now is divided over the issue of
the appropriate role of the military in politics and
which would have great difficulty maintaining a united
front in a new government.
Noriega will want his successor to be an officer who will
defend the military's dominant political position. He also would
favor an officer loyal enough to protect him from opposition
retaliation and to allow him to exert influence behind the
scenes.
Noriega plans for Chief of
Staff Justine to succeed him on an interim basis with Deputy
Chief of Staff Castillo eventually assuming command. If in the
course of negotiations for a reconciliation government, the
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This typescript was prepared by the Office of 25X1
African and Latin American Analysis, with a contribution from
Office of Leadership Analysis. Comments and 25X1
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle
American-Caribbean Division 25X1
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military agrees to mandatory retirement after 25 years, Noriega
would be forced to choose a more junior officer on the General
Staff--such as Chief of Intelligence Wong or his relative
Lieutenant Colonel Sieiro. The prospects of a purged officer,
such as Lieutenant Colonel Herrera Hassan, being selected as
Defense Chief are extremely remote
This paper discusses the degree of political power a new
Defense Chief and the military would retain following Noriega's
resignation and identifies possible successors to Noriega as
Defense Chief. The assumption underlying our analysis is that
Noriega will step down as Defense Chief and that a government of
national reconciliation divided between present regime supporters
and the opposition will be formed as part of a negotiated
solution to the crisis.
The Roots of the Military's Supreme Position
The strongman tradition of the Military Commander in Panama
dates to the 1940s when Police Chief General Jose Remon dominated
politics and removed presidents at will. The current military-
dominated political system in Panama was created by General Omar
Torrijos, who fostered broad grassroots support for the military
through coopting interest groups across the political spectrum
and extensive civil action programs. The military's predominance
in all facets of Panamanian political life has reinforced public
perceptions that it is the only institution capable of running
the country and has perpetuated weak civilian institutions.
Panama's military commanders have demonstrated a willingness to
use their power to ensure that political developments do not
threaten the military's preeminent position in Panama; Noriega
and his predecessor--General Ruben Paredes--removed three
Panamanian presidents in the last six years and rigged the last
presidential election to assure that the military's preferred
candidate won.
A New Defense Chief's Power
Whomever the new Defense Chief is, we believe he will be
less powerful than Noriega. He probably will need to devote time
and energy to heal wounds in the officer corps stemming from the
prolonged crisis. He may also concede some latitude in
decisionmaking to the national reconciliation government as a
result of a negotiated settlement. The military, however, is
likely to strongly resist sacrificing any control of government
institutions for fear of losing financial benefits and patronage
positions.
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We believe the new Defense Chief will remain the key
political actor in Panama. The extent to which the new Defense
Chief dominates a reconciliation government will partly depend on
his abilities and inclination to rule, but even a commander
willing to reduce the Defense Forces' role in politics would
likely remain a principal actor in Panamanian politics because of
tradition as well as the military's broad support base and
resources. The President almost certainly would remain in a weak
position and the major parties of the ruling coalition--assuming
that the Defense Forces' will retain considerable patronage
power--probably would remain allied with the military. Moreover,
some elements of the military's support base--notably labor
groups--would remain loyal because they are strongly opposed to
many of the opposition's political objectives. Finally, any
Commander who sought to disengage himself and the military from
politics would confront the monumental task of restructuring the
role of the Defense Forces, meeting significant resistance from
many military officers and their political allies.
Impediments to Opposition Influence
The Defense Chief's dominating role in politics most likely
would be further insulated by the difficulty the opposition would
have in presenting a united front in a reconciliation government.
Present critical weaknesses such as distrust between the Civil
Crusade and opposition political parties and factionalism within
both groups would be magnified in a reconciliation government as
opposition leaders jockeyed among themselves for dominance.
Likewise, the opposition's inexperience in governing and narrow
bases of support--with the exception of the Authentic Panamenista
Party--will hinder opposition efforts to wean power from the
military.
The most critical impediment to opposition progress in
exerting power in a reconciliation government, however, would
most likely be differing views over the role the military should
play in a new government. The opposition's present narrow focus
on ousting Noriega has dampened debate on this issue to date but
it probably would quickly become a source of contention that the
Defense Chief could exploit to divide and weaken his opponents.
The new Defense Chief might agree to some limited restrictions on
the military's political role to appear receptive to opposition
demands for reforms in hopes of coopting his more moderate
opponents. that some opposition
groups are already maneuvering to cut a deal with the military to
guarantee participation in a transitional government, and we
believe the temptation to ally with the military will increase as
opposition members in the government collide over objectives and
ambitions. Indeed, even a reform-minded Defense Chief could find
himself remaining the final political arbiter in Panama due to
the inability of opposition forces to unite on the mechanisms and
goals of powersharing.
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Candidates for the Next Defense Chief
Noriega will want his successor as Defense Chief to be
professionally competent and able to protect the military's
dominant role in politics. In addition, Noriega will want
assurances that the new military commander would protect him and
other officers from opposition retaliation. Ideally, Noriega
would want an officer whose loyalty to him is certain and through
whom he could try to remain influential behind the scenes.
Noriega probably would name a successor in accordance with
the military's traditional chain of command and respect for
seniority, thus assuring General Staff approval. According to
tradition, Chief of Staff Colonel Marcos Justine is next in line;
Noriega and all of his predecessors became Defense Chief after
occupying the Chief of Staff position.
however, that Noriega plans tor Justine to act as
an interim replacement for only a few months. Although Justine
is five years past the military's informal retirement date (25
years) and has long stated his desire to retire when Noriega
does, we believe he would accept Noriega's offer. Noriega may
hope that installing Justine--a dedicated career officer and his
point man--would allow him to continue exerting power behind the
scenes during the critical transitional period, particularly
since Justine reportedly is not a forceful commander.
Deputy Chiefs of Staff Colonel Alberto Purcell and Colonel
Elias Castillo are second and third in line for command and both
have been mentioned as possible successors to Noriega.
Purcell, who heads the Air Force, is
a longtime crony of Noriega's, notoriously corrupt, and highly
nationalistic. While Castillo, who heads the Ground Forces, is
not known as a staunch Noriega supporter, his reputation as a
more professional and apolitical officer probably would make him
more acceptable to the opposition members of any government of
reconciliation as well as to the General Staff.
reports Noriega plans for Castillo to become
Defense Chief--after a short interim period of leadership by
Justine--because of his strong support within the officer corps.
Noriega's reported suspicion that Justine and Purcell were aware
of coup plotting last March probably also improves Castillo's
chances for advancement.
The odds of a dark horse candidate being selected as the
next Defense Chief would increase substantially if a negotiated
resolution to the crisis includes a stipulation for mandatory
retirement of all officers with 25 years of service. All of the
full colonels have at least 25 years, as do many of the
lieutenant colonels on the General Staff. Of those remaining,
Noriega may favor Lieutenant Colonel Aquilino Sieiro to succeed
him. Noriega's brother-in-law and a staunch loyalist, Sieiro has
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21 years of military service and was promoted to lieutenant
colonel following the March coup attempt.
Noriega is grooming Sieiro for a leadership
position and has made repeated comments to members of the General
Staff that he is a well-rounded officer who would be acceptable
to the US as a military leader. Noriega, however, probably would
find the General Staff more amenable to naming Lieutenant Colonel
Guillermo Wong the next Commander because of his seniority and
reputation. Although not regarded as a long-time Noriega
loyalist, Wong's recent elevation to Chief of Intelligence--a
traditionally important position Noriega himself held for a
number of years--indicates Noriega trusts him and has confidence
in his abilities.
We believe that the prospects for a successor to Noriega
emerging from below the General Staff or among purged officers
are remote. Although many middle-level officers are Noriega
loyalists and owe their careers to him, concern about leaving the
Defense Forces in inexperienced hands and fear of creating
internal strains in the military probably would cause Noriega to
refrain from advancing an officer without seniority. Neither
Noriega nor most of the General Staff would consider naming any
officer dismissed from the Defense Forces--such as Lieutenant
Colonel Herrera Hassan--as a possible successor. Noriega has
long regarded Herrera in particular as a potential threat to his
power, and now believes
that he has joined the opposition. The Defense Chief views
Herrera as a traitor, and undoubtedly fears that Herrera's
reformist tendencies would erode the military's political power
and threaten Noriega's interests--perhaps to the point of
endangering his life.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Officers of the Panamanian Defense Forces General Staff
(Number in parenthesis indicates years of service.)
Colonels
Marcos Justines (30)
Alberto Purcell (25)
Elias Castillo (25)
Angel Mina (29)
Rogelio Alba* (27)
Julio Ow Young* (25)
Eros Cal* (25)
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff/Aviation
Deputy Chief of Staff/Ground
Chief, Economic Services
Chief, Joint Committee on Canal
Defense and Security
Chief, Panama National Police
Commander. Fort Esoinar
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Lieutenant Colonels
Ricardo Garibaldo (30)
Eugenio Corro (27)
Eric Aguilera (25)
Eduardo Herrera (23)
Alfredo Remon (23)
Roberto Armijo (22)
Guillermo Wong (23)
Teodoro Alexander (25)
Gerardo Garcia* (23)
Nivaldo Madrinan* (19)
Moises Correa* (22)
Aquilino Sieiro* (21)
Virgilio Mirones* (21)
Aristides Hassan* (26)
Carlos Velarde* (14)
Carlos Garcia* (24)
*Promoted in March 1988
Chief, Administration and Personnel
Chief, War Materiel Services
Chief, Penitentiary System
Ambassador to Israel
Chief, Protocol
Commander, Navy
Chief, Intelligence
Chief, Adjutant General Staff
Chief, Logistics
Chief, National Department of
Investigation
Chief, Operations
Chief, Combined Board
Chief, Civic Action
Inspector General
Chaplain General
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Senior Medical Officer
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