SOVIET INTEREST IN INVOLVING THE US IN EFFORTS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000500140009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 1, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP89G01321R000500140009-4
SOVIET INTEREST IN INVOLVING THE U.S. IN EFFORTS TO FIND A
POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviets, both directly to our Embassy in Moscow and via
U.N. officials talking with Armacost, have sought to involve the
U.S. in efforts to forge a political solution in Afghapistan that
would ease the Soviets' withdrawal. Embassy Moscow has urged
"careful consideration" of such a proposal. We see no reason to
involve the U.S. in such an effort. The Geneva Accords were
supposed to be a "fig leaf" to cover the Soviets' withdrawal. We
associated ourselves with the Accords, at substantial political
and operational cost and despite strong evidence that the Soviets
would leave Afghanistan with or without the accords. Further
American involvement is unnecessary. Such U.S. involvement would
be particularly costly to us were it seen to be part of an effort
to bring about a Kabul government which was, in the words of
Embassy Moscow, a representation of "the will of the International
Community." The Mujahedin are particularly sensitive to any
suggestion that outsiders will dictate the form of government in
post-war Afghanistan. They could be counted upon to resist the
"will of the International Community" with as much vigor as they
have resisted the Soviets.
U.S. PRESENCE IN KABUL
State's Near East Bureau, Diplomatic Security Service and
admin officers are strongly inclined to close Embassy Kabul. At
their request, we provided them with an assessment that the
security situation and, especially, the likelihood that the
Mission could provide for essentials such as fuel and food will
deteriorate in the coming weeks. We noted that the Mission's
means of egress (commercial air traffic through Kabul Airport)
would be cut off either prior to or in conjunction with serious
security problems. We and others have also noted the political
benefits that would be derived from signalling our total lack of
confidence in the puppet regime by closing our Mission.
State's Soviet Desk is pushing to keep the Mission open on
the grounds that the Soviets would interpret our departure as a
hostile granting of a "green light" to the Resistance to fire
"indiscriminately" on the city. The State Soviet specialists are
concerned that such a Soviet reaction would impact negatively on
the overall U.S./Soviet relationship. (DDI/SOVA does not share
this view.)
SE RET
L.. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP89G01321R000500140009-4
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP89G01321R000500140009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP89G01321R000500140009-4