LETTER TO GREGORY TREVERTON FROM JOHN BROSS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000700900003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 2, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

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December 2, 1987
Mr. Gregory F. Treverton
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Dear Greg:
You were very kind to send me a copy of Covert Action which I
have read with great interest. It is certainly a comprehensive
and well informed analysis of very complex issues. it is an
impressive effort for which you deserve congratulations. You
certainly have mine.
if I may venture a comment on your treatment of the role ap-
propriate for Congress in the oversight function Congress appears
as pretty much of a monolith. In assessing the possible con-
sequences of expanding congressional intrusion into the conduct
of day to day intelligence activity it seems to me important to
remember the obvious: Congress is not monolithic and the harm
done by maverick members of'Congress -- Senator Helms for ex-
ample. So far the Congressional committees have held the line
commendably. The possibility for harmful politically motivated
intervention nevertheless remains a problem.
The ultimate question, however, is whether Congressional involve-
ment, as it has developed recently, in the intelligence process
has added much to the over-all coherence and continuity of
American foreign policy. The record to date at least suggests
that it has not.
where you and I basically differ, I think, is with the purpose for
which covert action operations were mounted in the past and should
be at least considered in the future. Before trying to explain
what I mean by this I will comment briefly on a couple of state-
ments in the book which seem to me to cast CIA in a needlessly
or excessively pejorative light.
A minor but to me important point is that wisner was never Bissell's
boss. People forget that Bissell had already achieved a towering
reputation in the Maritime Commission but more importantly in the
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administration of the Marshall Plan before he arrived in CIA. He
came in as an advisor to the DCI and was then charged with the
organization that created the U-2 and was responsible for overhead
reconnaissance. He went from there to replace Wisner as DD/P.
There were, it seems to me, a number of factors other than CIA's
enthusiasm for the operation that contributed to the Bay of Pia.s
fiasco. I am no expert on this affair, but I don't believe
Arthur Schlessinger is either.
The principal reason for failure was the spongy nature of the
decision making process through which it developed.
Kennedy inherited the Brigade from his predecessor. In deciding to
go ahead he appears to have been strongly influenced by reluctance
to face the political consequences of having all those angry Cubans
around if the Brigade were disbanded.
It is my impression that Allen Dulles was content to go along with
it because he was satisfied that Eisenhower would never have per-
mitted it to fail and assumed that Kennedy wouldn't either. I
can't prove this but I believe that there is an unpublished article
of Allen's kicking around somewhere that states this as his view.
There were, of course, carrier elements of the navy lying off Cuba
at the time of the landing that would have been only too happy to
intervene. Thus, from CIA's point of view, there may well have
been reasons for optimism about the chances of success other than
illusions about the strength of the opposition to Castro inside
Cuba. The point here is not what Eisenhower would or would not
have done -- simply that there was plenty of room for illusions.
Whatever chances of success there may have been were seriously
eroded. by the decision to change the landing place from the
Escombray Mountains to the Bay of Pigs. This was done at Kennedy's
insistence and probably would have been a good time for those in-
volved, CIA and the military, to strongly urge cancellation of the
operation.
Then there was the cancellation of the second air strike, at
Adlai Stevenson's initiative, but for which the Brigade might have
had a fair chance of establishing a tenable lodgement area.
The Day of Pigs therefore does not seem to me to serve as a
particularly relevant example of "Overwhelming the message" --
though I see your point. What it really is is a good example of
the inability of the U.S. Government to make up its mind.
I am reminded of a remark of Bukovsky's in response to a question
as to what the Soviets think about the5Americans "A superpower
given to high moral rhetoric but unable to see which side its
bread is buttered! I sometimes feel that the USA is either too
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virtuous or too infantile to deal with the affairs of this sinful
world. The two may even be connected."
The estimate on terrorism is something which I personally know a
good deal about. what actually happened was that the first draft
of the estimate, prepared by CIA I believe, was so bland that
even Bob Inman, no cold warrior, described it as reading like a
brief for the defense. Other elements of the Intelligence Community
were violently opposed and were.promoting the extreme right wing
position represented by Claire Stirling. Casey then appointed
Lincoln Gordon (Harvard '33, Summa Cum Laude, Ambassador to Brazil
in the Kennedy Administration, former President of Johns Hopkins),
who was then working as part of a small group in CIA on estimates,
to take over personal responsibility for negotiating an acceptable
estimate on this issue. I think the final estimate was a success-
ful resolution of a complicated problem based on available evidence.
As far as I know Claire Stirling's sources for her article and book
were largely officials of European security services and not stories
invented by CIA covert propaganda. I say all this because to me the
manipulation of intelligence estimates for political purposes is
the ultimate sin against the Holy Ghost. The only areas where
there seems to be some evidence that Casey's personal views may
have been imposed on analytical judgements involved statements
which he has been alleged to have made about the capabilities of
the Contras. In those cases, of course, one has the question of
whether intelligence judgements, or something involving an ob-
jective judgement of capabilities, should be made by the Agency or
individuals responsible for an operation.
Now as to my argument concerning the basic purpose of covert
operations at least as it was understood by many of us in the
Agency. Many of us had served in OSS promoting and supporting the
efforts of European resistance groups to liberate their countries
from German occupation. I might say parenthetically that none of
us ever believed that this liberation was going to take place without
military intervention. Resistance groups could make life difficult
for the Germans but their ultimate mission was to support a con-
ventional military assault.
Most of us therefore were dejected, but not I might say surprised,
to wake up in 1948 and find that the Soviets were occupying about
as much territory as Hitler had ever conquered and were conducting
aggressively hostile political probes into western Europe and the
Middle East .
The objective of American covert action operations from Iran to
Nicaragua, was I think to meet a (possibly inaccurately or ex-
cessively) perceived threat of Soviet expansion. The objective
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of the Bay of Pigs operation was not to promote democracy or collect
just debts, it was to prevent Cuba from becoming a sanctuary into
which the Soviets could introduce brigades or missiles or which could
be used as a submarine base.
As one looks around the world today there continues to be, mut____atis
mutandis, the same widespread and potentially menacing Soviet
presence. The Soviets continue to sit uneasily on a huge empire in
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. In your book I think you
suggest that their own covert actiofn programs haven't worked so well.
However, not always initially on their own initiative, they have
moved into areas and established relations with regimes to whom they
are giving substantial military support in places likes Yemen,
Eth:.opia, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and their presence is
notable in many other places of strategic interest to the United
States.
The purpose of covert action operations therefore, as far as I am
concerned at least, has been to counter the intrigues and en-
croachments of a powerful hostile regime.
Now assuming the truth of all this, as I do, what are we to do
about it? Before even attempting to answer this question let me
introduce a number of caveats.
One is that in fact you are quite right in asserting that these
operations were not always designed to meet a clearly defined Soviet
threat. Great pressure was brought by Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson on the Agency to support the non-communist left in South
America -- hence the successful support of Frei's candidacy in
Chile. Moreover Dickey Bissell had somewhat of a penchant for
Social engineering -- promoting social and economic development for
its own sake -- a perfectly legitimate objective of American policy
but perhaps somewhat ultra vires for an intelligence agency.
I am not trying to say that confrontation with Soviet Russia will
necessarily be the primary cause or justification for military or
covert action in the future.
Quite obviously current developments in Russia have to be factored
into an assessment of the Soviet threat and could possibly result
in a fundamental change in our relations.
The emergence of national centers of expansion and/or aggression
with formidable military capabilities, other than Soviet Russia,
is of course a possibility that could dramatically affect the
direction and dimension of American foreign policy.
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I am inclined to agree with most of your criteria concerning the
prerequisits for success in any large scale covert action inter-
vention. Certainly success is unlikely to attend intervention
based solely or primarily on support for a notional opposition to
a regime that we wish to overthrow or neutralize (the Brigade or
possibly the Contras). There will always be dilemmas surrounding
issues comparable to the question of whether support for the Contras
was a good idea. I have no basis for a judgement about the Contras
or whether they represent a politically viable force. I was im-
pressed by an article in the London Economist not long ago which
said of three possible choicest do nothing,mmilitary intervention
or support for the Contras they would support the Contras. This
I understood to be because of the writers concern about the
massive military build-up which the Sandinistas have undertaken
based on money and equipment provided by the Soviets supported
by Soviet, Cuban and such like advisors.
One can not entirely exclude the possibility of a future require-
ment for some kind of large scale covert or quasi covert para-
!,That is inevitable, however, is that the next decade will be filled
with threats and incidents involving terrorist action against the
United States and its allies. Countering these threats will
certainly involve, and probably stretch to their limits, the full
range of our intelligence resources.
As to my recommendations:
(1) I would devote every possible effort to developing some
national concensus abol*. the objectives of American
policy, and the real threats thereto. This means doing
everything possible to improve intelligence analytical
capabilities including reassociating academia with the
process.
(2) A strong capability to undertake covert action where it
is.decided that such action is needed and can receive
appropriate support and security should be retained in
CIA.
(3) I would take stern action to remove from the lexicon of
discussion of covert action all references to morality.
I am not quite sure at what point in history American
moral abhorrence of the idea of interfering in the affairs
of other countries is supposed to have developed.
STAT
STAT
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President Polk invaded Mexico and appropriated Arizona,
etc., etc. without occasioning much moral furor (pace
Abraham Lincoln). We pursued Aguinaldo, exterminated
the indians, acquired Panamanian territory and re-
invaded Mexico with perfect equanimity.
wilsonian democracy is all very well but this is an
untidy world in which difficult decisions with serious
strategic implications and enormous potentialities for
human suffering must be resolved on a rational basis.
Covert action, like military intervention, is an option
to be resorted to only after serious assessment of these
consequencies.
Americans should not be overburdened by a feeling that
they have a monopoly on virtue and morality. There
exists what amounts to an American genius for tolerance,
compassion and ultimate common sense. It is the in-
stitutional framework which makes the exericse of these
qualities possible that we are trying to preserve and
protect@ it is important to remember, however, that
America is a nation capable of great emotional swings --
from the patriotism of World War II to MacArthur to
Vietnam.
The essential tasks of intelligence analysts and decision
makers is to evaluate as accurately as possible the
reality of the dangers and opportunities in international
development which may threaten or enhance the durability
of the American community.
(4) I would leave CIA alone, support it as it is and not
fiddle around with its organization or charter both of
which have developed after much careful thought and review.
Judge Webster is very highly qualified by character,
temperament and experience to run the Agency and co-
ordinate the Community. Bob Gates is an extremely able
and intelligent officer with years of experience with
intelligence and foreign affairs. They make a competent,
indeed impressive, team and I hope they will be there
long after a new president assumes office.
Bob incidentally has an article in the coming issue of Foriian
Affairs which should be interesting reading.
Forgive a long dissertation but these days everybody has to make
some comment on covert action. I do not think that you and I
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are far apart in our approach to the problem.
Many thanks again for sending me your book.
With warm regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
P.s. For many years there has been much talk about the
desirability of a quasi public foundation to promote
friendly organizations with a capacity for influencing
public odnion abroad as recommended by the Katzenbach
Committe
Getting Congressional
support for such an idea is something else. NED was
finally established, after much hard work by a number of
people, early in this Administration but is probably
destined to sail on politically stormy seas (given the
ease with which any one project of real political or
social significance can be swamped in the appropriations
process. The German foundations function in a sort of
political equilibrium -- the SPD supports their programs
and the CDU theirs.
STAT
STAT
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