TALKING POINTS FOR SUMMIT BRIEFINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R001104490007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5 u
T
TALKING POINTS FOR SUMMIT BRIEFINGS
-- THE PRESIDENT HAD TWO DAYS OF CANDID,
COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV ON THE FULL RANGE OF EAST-WEST ISSUES, HE
USED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSCORE HIS INTEREST IN
BUILDING THE BASIS FOR A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION.
--- AS THE U.S. HAD BOUGHT, THE TWO LEADERS HAD THE
CHANCE FOR FULL AND LENGTHY EXCHANGES ON EACH ITEM OF
OUR BASIC FOUR-PART AGENDA: ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL
ISSUES, BILATERAL QUESTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THEIR
MEETINGS INCLUDED SEVERAL LENGTHY-ONE-ON-ONE EXCHANGES.
-- THE MEETINGS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY A GREAT DEAL
OF SPONTANEITY AND SPIRITED GIVE-AND-TARE. THE
ATMOSPHERE WAS NON-CONFRONTATIONAL AND BUSINESSLIKE.
GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY IN CHARGE ON THE SOVIET SIDE,
READILY DEFERRED TO AND ACTING WITH VISIBLE
DECISIVENESS AND ENERGY. BE FREQUENTLY SPOKE WITHOUT A
SCRIPT, AND SOMETIMES WITH ANIMATION. AT-TIMES, HE -
TOOK PAINS TO TAKE A POSITIVE TONS-WITH-THE PRESIDENT,
EVEN WHEN LAYING.OUT FAMILIAR SOVIET DI"ERENCEB WITH
THE U.S.
-- THOSE GENERALLY PARTICIPATING ON THE SOVIET
SIDE, IN ADDITION TO GORBACHEV AND BHEVARDNADZE, WERE
DOBRYNIN, KORNIYENKO, YAKOVLEV, ZAMYATIN AND ?
TARASENKO. THOSE ON THE US BIDE, IN ADDITION TO THE
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, WERE MCFARLANE, REGAN-,
IIARTMANr RIDGWAY, NITZE, MATLOCK AND PALMER/PARRIS.
THE ENERAL SECRET LLENGTHYPRESEXCHANGESIDENT INANPRBOURIVATE ONR
BOTH DAYS.
NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS CONTROL
-- THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO
SECURING DEEP AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC
AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IN REVIEWING
OUR NOVEMBER 'ST NST PROPOSAL, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE
U.S. SEEKING N PROGRESS TOWARDS
FAC~ILITATED.
A MUTUALLY A ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT MIGHT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
.--..., . _ . "' .. .. .
S_
SECRET
_ 2
-- HE NOTED THAT IN START, THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL
BUILDS UPON THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION CONCEPT
CONTAINED IN THE EARLIER SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL AND
INCORPORATES REDUCTIONS TO 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE
WARHEADS AND LIMIT OF 400 ALCMS, WITH AN OVERALL SUM
OF 6900 (A FIGURE THE SOVIETS BAD PROPOSED EARLIER).
-- THE PRESIDENT REITERATED OUR INSISTENCE THAT
SUCH REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER, MUST BE APPLIED TO THE PROPER
CATEGORIES OF SYSTEMS. WE CANNOT AGREE TO THE SOVIET
PROPOSED DEFINITION OF 'STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS' OR
ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE WITHIN A COMMON LIMIT A CATEGORY
OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS-FOR THE U.S. SIDE WHILE EXCLUDING
IT ON THE SOVIET SIDE.
-- HE NOTED THAT THE AGGREGATE RESULT OF TEE
REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS THE U.S. WAS PROPOSING FOR
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE A MORS STABLE WORLD
IN WHICH THE NUMBER OF THESE ARMS WOULD BE RADICALLY
REDUCED TO COMPARABLE LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES. THE THREAT
TO RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF EACH SIDE WOULD BE
SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED-, AND THE PROSPECTS OF
VERIFICATION WOULD BE ENHANCED.
IN THE AREA OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS,
THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CAP U.S.
LRINF MISSILE LAUNCHERS IN EUROPE AT THE LEVEL DEPLOYED
AS OF DECEMBER 30, ?985, IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT
TO REDUCE SOVIET LRINF MISSILE LAUNCHERS WITHIN RANGE
OF NATO EUROPE TO THE SAME LAUNCHER NUMBER. FURTHER,
WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS THE
EXACT MIX OF THESE SYSTEMS.
HE NOTED THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE
REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET OS-20 LAUNCHERS
LOCATED IN ASIA AND OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF NATO EUROPE.
THE END RESULT WOULD BE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE
LIMITED TO AN EQUAL GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBER.
-~ AT THE SAME TIME, HE OUTLINED HIS GOAL OF MOVING
DETERRENCE TOWARD A G1iEATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE AND
AWAY FROM THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION. HE
STRESSED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT SEER SUPERIORITY OVER
THE SOVIET UNION. THE PURPOSE OF SDI RESEARCH WAS TO
DETERMINE WHETHER STRATEGIC DEFENSES WERE POSSIBLE --
DEFENSES WHICH'COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
ALL NATIONS.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
SECRET
W. 3 S.
-- TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS, THE PRESIDENT
UNDERSCORED HIS READINESS TO SHARE WITH THE SOVIET
UNION INFORMATION ON PROGRESS IN OUR LABORATORIES
('OPEN LABORATORIES'), INTER ALIA TO ASSURE THEM THAT
WE WERE NOT SEEKING A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY. WE WERE
ALSO PREPARED TO SHARE POSSIBLE FUTURE RESULTS FROM
SUCH 'RESEARCH.
-- AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE MADE CLEAR THAT
THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO'RESTRICT RESEARCH THAT WAS
LEGAL UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND THAT COULD EVENTUALLY
LEAD TO A MORE CIVILIZED FORM OF DETERRENCE,
PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN ACTIVE
RESEARCH PROGRAM IN-THE SAME AREA (WHICH GORBACHEV
DECLINED TO DISCUSS). THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED U.S.
INTEREST IN SEEKING A COOPERATIVE AND MANAGED APPROACH
TO THE QUESTION OF FUTURE DEFENSES.
-- FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET
UNION SHARES OUR GOAL OF DEEP CUTS IN OFFENSIVE
SYSTEMS, BUT DID NOT REALLY ADDRESS THE SPECIFICS OF
OUR PROPOSALS, OR INDEED, OF INDIVIDUAL START AND IMF
PROBLEMS AT ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
-- RATHER, HE CHOSE TO MAKE MORE GENERALIZED
COMMENTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD
RESPOND TO OUR PROPOSAL IN A MANNER -- USING HIS WORDS
-- SIMILAR TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. HAD.HANDLED THE
EARLIER SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL, THAT IS, WELCOMING IT
WHILE NOT DRAMATIZING THOSE ELEMENTS WITH WHICH THEY
DIFFER.
-- HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, SPECIFY IN ANY WAY THOSE
ELEMENTS IN THE NEW U.S. NST PROPOSAL FOR START AND INF
THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT OR WOULD REJECT. AT
CERTAIN POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION, HE INDICATED THAT THE
TWO PROPOSALS, U.S. AND SOVIET, NOW ON THE TABLE AT THE
GENEVA NST COULD CONSTITUTE 'THE BASIS FOR PROGRESS"
TOWARDS DEEP OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, OR SPOKE IN QUITE
GENERAL TERMS OF.'SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE' BETWEEN THE
TWO PROPOSALS.
-- GORBACHEV USED SUCH COMMENTS, HOWEVER, PRIMARILY
AS A STAGE PROM WHICH TO PRESS -- AT LENGTH AND AT
TIMES WITH SOME ANIMATION -- THE FAMILIAR SOVIET CASE
AGAINST SDI RESEARCH, THE CONTINUATION OF ,WHICH, HE
ASSERTED, REPRESENTED A STEP BACK FROM THE TERMS Of THE
JANUARY 8TH SHULTZ-GROMYKO AGREEMENT ON THE RESUMPTION
OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
7
SECRET
4
EE TOOK A FIRM LINE LINKING PROGRESS TOWARDS
OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TO AGREEMENT ON A BAN ON SPACE
WEAPONS. HIS BASIC POSITION WAS TO PUT OFF ANY
AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, EVEN IF POSSIBLE IN
THE NEAR FUTURE, WHILE CALLING FOR A BAN ON RESEARCH,
ALREADY PERMITTED UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND SEVERAL
YEARS AWAY FROM RESULTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE STATED
HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF
'OPEN LABRATORIES' IF 801 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WERE
INVOLVED.
DURING THE COURSE OF HIS CRITICISM OF SDI,
GORBACHEV ASCRIBED A NUMBER OF MOTIVES TO THE U.S.
INTEREST IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE [PRESSURE FROM 'THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX,' TEMPTATIONS TO OUTRACE
SOVIET TECHNOLOGY OR TO SEEK SUPERIORITY] WHICH THE
PRESIDENT STRONGLY REFUTED. IN WARNING OF THE SOVIET
UNION'
S READINESS TO COMPETE WITH SDI IF NECESSARY,
GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS SEEMED TO INDICATE CONSIDERABLE
PERSONAL CONCERN OVER THE WEST'S POTENTIAL
TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE.
-- IT 10 IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT COABACHEV G
9Tw
I
NDICATION AT ALL OF AN! NEW NUANCE IN HIS BASIC DEMAND
FOR "A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS,'-NOR DID HE FOLLOW UP ON
HIS EARLIER TIME MAGAZINE STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT AT,LEAST BORE FORMS OF
MORE BASIC SDI-RELATED RESEARCH.
THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED TO GORBACHEV'S CONCERNS
BY STRESSING HIS OWN COAL OF SEEKING TO MOVE DETERRENCE
TOWARDS A GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE AND AWAY FROM THE
THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION WHILE REITERATING THAT
SDI RESEARCH IS CLEARLY PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY.
IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS
READINESS NOT ONLY TO OPEN AMERICAN LABORATORIES, ON A
RECIPROCAL BASIS, FOR VERIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH
BEING CONDUCTED THERE BUT ALSO TO SHARE THE POSSIBLE
FRUITS OF THAT RESEARCH WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
-- AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MADE
CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO RESTRICT
RESEARCH THAT WAS LEGAL UNDER THE ABM TREATY AND THAT
COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A MORE CIVILIZED, LESS
THREATENING FORM OF DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT
OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN ACTIVE RESEARCH 'PROGRAM IN
THIS AREA.THE PRESIDENT ALSO REAFFIRMED U.S. INTEREST
IN SEEKING A COOPERATIVE AND MANAGED APPROACH TO THE
QUESTION OF FUTURE DEVENSPS&C
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
7
ECRRT
0. S_
HUMAN RIGHTS
-- THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE HOUR TETE-A-TETE. HE TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THAT RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND
THE RULE OF LAW IS AS FUNDAMENTAL TO PEACE AND SECURITY
AS IS ARMS CONTROL. HE ALSO PRESSED'FOR SOVIET
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL. AGREEMENTS., INCLUDING THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
-- IN RAISING SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL CASES, THE
PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS COULD
HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.
HE NOTED THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE PRACTICAL
RESOLUTION OF THESE CASES, NOT IN TAKING PUBLIC CREDIT
FOR IT.
REGIONAL ISSUES
-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT IN ADDITION TO
SEEKING A SAFER AND MORE STABLE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT,
THE U.B. AND SOVIET UNION. NEED TO WORK TOGETHER TO END
TRAGIC REGIONAL CONFLICTS.
-- IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT AMONG
THE CAUSES FOR LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND SOVIET UNION IS THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUING
INTERVENTION, BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH PROXIES, IN
SUCH REGIONS OF THE WORLD AS AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL
AMERICA AND CAMBODIA.
-~ THE TWO LEADERS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THEIR
DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE CAUSES OF REGIONAL
TENSIONS. THE PRESIDENT URGED AN INTENSIFIED
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON LOCAL CONFLICTS.
-- IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS,
GORBACHEV CLAIMED THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO SELFISH
INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND NO INTENTION TO
IMPOSE ITS VIEWS OR EXPORT REVOLUTION.
ADDRESSING AFGHANISTAN, GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE
SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS 'THE SOLUTION EMERGING AROUND THE
UN.' IT IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE ON A PACKAGE
INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND WITHDRAWAL OF
ALL FOREIGN TROOPS. THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, HE STATED,
'HAS PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS % EFFECT.'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
9
SECRET
-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE
AFGHAN PROBLEM 18 A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OP ALL OUTSIDE
FORCES. A GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE
SHOULD THEN BE INSTALLED.
-.0 THEY AGREED TO REGULARIZE PERIODIC DISCUSSIONS
BY UPS. AND SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERTS AND THAT REGIONAL
ISSUES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH AT THE
FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.
BILATERAL RELATIONS
-- THE TWO LEADERS AGREED TO THE SIGNING OF A
CULTURAL AGREEMENT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING
AHEAD ON AN EXCHANGES INITIATIVE TO FACILITATE GREATER
CONTACT BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES.
THEY ALSO AGREED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS INTO ENERGY
BASED ON FUSION.
WHILE THEY-DID NOT FIGURE EXTENSIVELY IN THE
TALKS, THEY ALSO-REVIEWED P1(OGRESS IN A NUMBER OF OTHER
AREAS, INCLUDING CIVIL AVIATION, NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR
SAFETY, AND OPENING CONSULATES IN NEW YORK AND KIEV.
-- WE CONSIDER THESE MODEST STEP FORWARD, BUT
NECESSARY AND USEFUL ONES WHICH HELP TO LAY THE
FOUNDATION FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIP.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STEPS
-- THE TWO DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS ALLOWED BOTH LEADERS
TO EXPLAIN THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND THERE WERE OBVIOUS
ONES RANGING FROM POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88GO1 1 17RO01 104490007-5
SECRET
-7-
-- AT THE SAME TIME, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE MEETINGS, THESE TALKS PROVIDED AN
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE COMMON CONCERNS AS WELL IN ALL
FOUR AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WHERE THERE ARE
DIFFERENCES, THEY ARE BETTER UNDERSTOOD; WHERE SHARED
CONCERNS EXIST, THERE 18 NOW A MORE SOLID FOUNDATION
FOR DEALING WITH THEM.
?- AS A RESULT'OF THESE TALKS, BOTH LEADERS AGREED
TO CONTINUE THIS PROCESS, WITH A VISIT BY GORBACHEV TO
THE UNITED STATES IN 0986 AND A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 0987.
(0044Y)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/09: CIA-RDP88G01117RO01104490007-5