TALKING POINTS FOR DCI ON REYKJAVIK GOALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401920001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 6, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401920001-8
-)t. T NIO/USSR
6 Oct 86
Talking Points for DCI on Reykjavik Goals
Beyond INF and setting a summit date, the big issues at Reykjavik are:
* On arms control: Space arms and their connection to START deductions
* On regional issues: Afghanistan
The minimum goal of the President should be to assert and defend his
positions on these key issues.
* His framework on space as presented in his 25 July letter, (superseding
or "novating" the ABM Treaty) versus Gorbachev's framework ("strengthening"
.the ABM Treaty).
* On Afghanistan, the need for the USSR to withdraw and give upon
imposing a Communist regime there (and elsewhere). The maximum reasonable
goal the President could strive for is to get Gorbachev to agree to talk
seriously and negotiate about:
* The President's space framework
* The possibility of a non-Communist regime in Afghanistan.
Even if Gorbachev gave no more than a promise to talk seriously about these
points--which he has studiously avoided--the President would get a big boost
of SDI and the Soviet position in Afghanistan would be weakened. Yet both
things are reasonable to ask for and,-if refusal caused the meeting to fail,
,the President would have the hig I h ground, not Gorbachev.
SE6RET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401920001-8