THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502510020-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE WORLD SITUATION
I. History of mankind is full of conflicts between rival camps,
with empires, cultures, or continents as the prize.
A. When tiny band of Greeks stood shoulder to shoulder
against hordes of Persia in the narrow pass of Thermopylae some 2,500
years ago, they were well aware that civilization as they knew it
hung in balance. They died at the Fiery Gate -- not merely to defend
the sunburned hills of Greece from an invader -- but to preserve
a way of life. When victory came later on broad plains of Marathon
and last Persian was driven from the soil of Greece, survivors
must have faced the future with relief, "for surely" -- they must
have thought -- "the last great world war has now become history."
B. But it.was not true then, nor was it true later when Charles
Martel halted the advance of the Moslems in the West at Tours in 732,
nor when Don John of Austria won at Lepanto in 1571, nor when the Turks
were turned back from the gates of Vienna in 1683. For it is message
of history that conflict and struggle are as inevitable as life and
death itself. Mankind has continued to witness rise of new world
powers, only to see each collapse in turn before a younger rival
or coalition of powers.
C. Students of history like philosopher Hegel or historian
Spengler have concluded that struggle is one inescapable reality in
history.
D. It would be our undoing, however, if in our present situation,
we were to see in Soviet challenge nothing but one more empire struggling
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for its place in the sun. This so-called "cold war" is not cast in
familiar pattern -- conflict of the British Empire with Spanish
Empire in days of the first Queen Elizabeth or rivalry of German
and English commercial empires in our own century. We face something
new, and something more far-reaching in its consequences than anything
that history has yet recorded.
II. Struggle before us differs from great contests of history
in both scope and kind.
A. In the first place, we are not engaged merely in a struggle
over land. If this were all that was at stake, solution to our
problem would be simple: match military power of Soviets with
certainty of massive and overwhelming retaliation.
B. Neither are we confronted merely with a rise of nationalistic
fervor as in the past. Civilized world has learned how to deal with
Pan-Germanism, and although the Soviet Union plays upon national
aspirations of any group to gain its own ends -- witness its promotion
of Pan Arab nationalists -- sole battlefield of current struggle does
not lie here.
C. Nor can issues of struggle be reduced to simple economic
terms. Classical Bolshevist economic concepts have given way to
financial and industrial techniques that would be incomprehensible to
orthodox Marxian of a generation ago. This is not a struggle in which
industrial capacity or wealth of natural resources alone will
determine the victor. We cannot buy or build our way out of this one.
D. If issues of the cold war cannot be expressed solely in
military, political, or economic terms, how then are we to define them?
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We must begin by recognizing the fact that the Soviet challenge
is total. It involves every phase of Western civilization from
religion and philosophy to science and education. We are faced
by a new kind of enemy. All Western civilization has in common concepts
of what is right and wrong, true and false, free and slave. When we
communicate with one another, we make progress because we have common
foundations on which to build.
E. In Soviet Union, we are faced with an aggressive rival
who has rejected not only our political and economic systems but also
very definitions of truth, justice, and morality which have been held
by all civilized peoples.
As a result, it is almost impossible to communicate -- say
nothing about negotiate or conclude anything -- with a Communist.
How can one reason in a spirit of good will and mutual compromise with
one to who calls reconquest of Hungary "liberation?"
Make no mistake about it -- Soviet challenge is total. Our
antagonist is on fire with a messianic missionary zeal. He is out
to control the world -- not only our cities and lands, but our minds
as well. Time and time again he has promised that when he is victorious,
he will remake us in his own image.
III. 1957 Added New Dimensions to Historical Perspective.
A. Soviet first in Satellite-ICBM tests which, though followed
shortly by our own, had great psychological impact. Shook image of
US superiority and created fears we no longer as able defend our
allies. Some consider nuclear stalemate now reached because for first
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time can see Soviet Union able to launch critical blow at US
Bastion. Pr$blems for NATO -- some members want looser ties to
prevent their embroilment at US initiative. Some want tighter ties
to prevent US slipping out of local situations.
B. Khrushchev's consolidation of his leadership and embarkation
on further domestic innovations (industrial reorganizations, abolition
of MIS) designed to strengthen Soviet state. While are problems --
in the raw materials field, resistance to Khrushchev inovations on
part of some -- the domestic Soviet situation seem improved and holds
prospects for additional improvement.
C. Soviet achievement of degree of stabilization in E. Europe
(contrast to end of 1956), though underlying ferment still apparent
(e.g. E. Germany) and now Soviet-Yugoslav relations seem to have
taken sharp downturn.
D. Continued Soviet wooing of uncommitted and less developed
areas -- with particular success in Middle East. Is putting severe
strain on western oriented states -- example Lebanon -- which are
apparently losing out on considerable material aid for their orientation.
Events in 1957 tended to strengthen the growing concept in some of
these areas that the Soviet Union is the new political champion
and example of material progress.
E. New crises in Afro-Asian world -- Indonesia, Algeria -- (which
Commies are exploiting). Here as well as in Equitorial Africa, the
Soviet Union strengthened the impression that the US stands for the
existing order while the Soviet Union espouses and aids the nationalist
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aspirations of the native population.
F. Dramatic Soviet initiatives in fields disarmament (test
ban) and in seeking Summit talks, designed to capitalize on above
developments and further weaken position of West. Some indications
Soviets now feel they have overestimated their ability to appeal to
western public opinion, but so far these straws in the winds.
G. US recession gives Soviet Union an "unearned run."
Free World is worried enough about it without considering cold war
and Soviet leaders and propagandists don't let any one forget it.
Constantly quoting statements of US business and labor leaders,
news media and government officials re status of US economy. General
theme: it is not necessary to stick with sinking ship when rescue
vessel is at hand.
IV. At present, mood of Soviet leaders one of confidence. They
think they well on road to realizing Khrushchev's boast that "we will
bury you."
A. In secret speeches at 40th Anniversary celebration in Moscow,
both Mao and Khrushchev took line that if peace could be preserved
for 10-15 years Bloc could overtake and outstrip the West and position
Socialist camp would be unassailable.
B. Some basis for this confidence -- not only in scientific
and political successes I have mentioned but in striking growth of
Soviet economy. Equally important, in perceptible shift in world
attitudes as to respective strengths of US and USSR.
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C. Is crucial for our own policy that we recognize true nature
of this threat -- it does not, so long as mutual deterrence is
maintained, arise primarily from general war or even local aggression
but from the politico-economic subversive techniques employed by
Moscow since the Revolution, and with especial skill and flexibility
since Stalin's death.
D. Along with growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities are signs
of growing realization that technological revolution in modern
warfare makes general war far too dangerous. Breakthrough on anti ICBM
system could be next target. Effect of such success on international
affairs will equal US monopoly nuclear weapons.
E. While USSR determined to maintain strong military posture
against any eventuality, nuclear stalements well understood in Moscow.
Many indications of this. In last weeks Soviet leaders publicly admit
nuclear war leads to possible world devastation -- Malenkov was
chastised for such a statement in 1953.
F. New generation of Soviet leaders probably argue why
jeopardize 40 years of Socialist construction when we are well on way
to overtaking outworn capitalist system and when current politico-
economic tactics promise such success.
As Mikoyan said "last two world wars cost us three five-year
plans."
These leaders also seem to recognize how Stalin's foreign
policies were counterproductive (e.g. Berlin and Korea) and at any
rate too risky in nuclear age.
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V. From this reasoning has sprung the "peaceful co-existence policy,"
aimed at:
A. Buying time for continued forced draft growth of Soviet
economy. In 1958 Soviet investment in industry will-equal that
of US, growth running at double US rate.
B. Creating new opportunities for diplomatic maneuver and
politico-economic penetration aimed at undermining position of the
West and in long-run building international Communism. (Mr. Dillion
will discuss this with you.)
C. Playing down image of an aggressive USSR as an aid to these
maneuvers.
VI. Soviets laying particular stress on underdeveloped and uncommitted
areas ("Achilles' heel" of West) through both:
A. An expanding trade and aid campaign which, though still
small by US standards, now totals some $2 billion in credits and
grants, over $560 million of these since mid-1957.
B. Accelerated efforts to develop diplomatic and cultural
relations, exploit anti-colonial and neutralist sentiments, and lay
groundwork for subversive penetration. Indonesia a good case in
point.
VII. Simultaneously, a major diplomatic and propaganda offensive--keyed
to pressures for a Summit Conference and nuclear disarmament -- aimed at:
A. Creating a climate of detente without actual agreements,
which would hamstring Western use of nuclear weapons and undermine
rationale for US overseas bases.
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B. Growing Soviet emphasis on disarmament measures not
solely an offensive move, but also reflects concern over reducing
risks of nuclear war.
VIII. Though I have stressed so-called peaceful means, Soviets
won't neglect threats, intimidation, perhaps even blackmail where
gains seem to outweigh risks.
A. Can expect them to be firm, even bellicose in crisis
situation. They may even regard West as less willing stand up in
a crisis as result of growing Soviet nuclear strength.
B. Soviets reluctant to run risks of miscalculation inherent
in overt local aggression. Also would seriously compromise "peaceful
coexistence" posture they have done so much to develop.
C. While US must have adequate capability meet Bloc local
aggression so as to insure it won't happen, we far more likely to be
faced with situations like coup d'etat, civil wars as in Indonesia,
or third party squabbles (e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict) which Bloc has
either fomented or can exploit without open intervention.
Interesting that in last two crises (Suez and Syria) Moscow
must have looked upon West as resorting or about to resort to local
military action to offset "peaceful" Soviet gains.
IX. Bloc too has its vulnerable areas where it fears Western
pressures.
A. Soviets appear highly nervous about underlying instability
their position in Eastern Europe.
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1. This partly accounts for their seeking implicit
Western recognition "status quo" this area, their rigidity
on German reunification, the Rapacki Plan to deny Bonn nuclear
weapons, etc.
2. Much we can do to encourage ferment in EE, but no
easy or quick solution. Moreover, don't want prematurely trigger
Soviet reaction and nip promising developments in bud.
B. Also Moscow probably nervous over growing strength and
prestige Communist China in Asia.
1. Any basic US security policy must give growing weight
to this factor, and so must Soviets.
2. Chinese Revolution still young. Back where USSR
was 25 years ago.
3. But it profiting from Soviet aid and experience and
trying to avoid Soviet mistakes.
4. Will be long time before CC strength approaches USSR's.
China has smaller resources base and acute population problem
(about 640 million now and rate of increase has accelerated from
1.5 per cent in 1952 to about 2.4 per cent today if their own
statistics to be believed).
5. Mao's target only to catch up with UK production in
next 15 years. But unwise to underestimate CC long term
potential as Stalin reported to have done.
C. Most acute immediate problem facing Khrushchev is
meeting demands of Soviet people.
1. Mass education is stimulating yearning for a fuller
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life. Trend of giving more to Soviet consumer has already
started.
2. Soviet leadership is already wrestling with problem
of reconciling a greater measure of freedom for the people with
stern line of Communist doctrine and discipline.
D. Evolutionary change in Soviet society is inevitable.
Impossible to predict into precisely what pattern it will evolve.
1. Revolutionary zeal may the out. Totalitarian
philosophy itself may be rejected by succeeding generations
of Russians.
2. _ Long-run possibilities of this happening, however, no
reason for present complacency on our part. Communism has not
lost its aggressiveness, or given up its basic objective-of
world domination.
X. How do these developments and policies affect Free World.
A. Europe
Quite seriously
1. Nuclear stalemate - basically want capacity for more
independent action - own Nuclear and rocket weapons system.
Has caused revaluation of NATO, more threat than protection?
2. Disarmament propaganda - had considerable effect on
Socialist parties, persons afraid of fallout, those concerned
with proportion of gross national product going to military
instead of consumption.
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3. Afro-Asian Crisis - produced virulent nationalism
especially in France to lesser extent in UK (but socialists
generally oppose) Spain, low countries - strains NATO. Equally
important, European economy dependence on middle eastern oil.
4. US recession - Eu wants to recover level of trade,
Soviet trade made more attractive.
B. Latin America
Basically concerned with continuing social-economic revolution.
Traditional ruling group -aristocracy and military - under attacks
from new urban-industrial classes. Consequently:
1. US recession has effect on current political situation
o.f. Venezula and Chile.
2. This makes Soviet Econ offensive more attractive.
3. Growing picture of SU as model and political champion
of progress becomes more serious.
4. Communist are threat basically become of discipline
and organization. Can take advantage of opportunities.
C. Asia-Africa - Mr. Dillion will be speaking of these
areas more extensively. However net effect of recent activities
is that probable choice for most of the new nations concerned with
economic development is between Pro-Communist and neutralist attitude.
1. In Middle East events in 57 make US regarded with
great suspicion.
a. Israel-Suez-Turkish Syrian crisis.
b. Prime adjective is nationalistic.
c. West not SU seen as imperalistic.
2. Africa
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a. Nationalism of new and emerging states could
cause problems similar to those in Middle East. Depends
inpart on how European metropoles handle formation of
the state.
b. Concerns are detribalization, transportation.
market economics, urbanization, industrialization and
freedom of action.
c. Communism not considered menace locally.
d. Will be dependent on-foreign economic assistance
and will turn to any available source.
e. Will have complex problems in which, small but
diciplined local Communist Party could often be important
factor.
f. Have received continuing moral support for USSR
and Egypt for more extreme positions.
3. Asia
a. Communist China is display. New countries closely
watch progress of CCUS India in economic development.
CC is leading. Problems and ambitions much same as Africa.
b. US is perhaps better position in much of Asia o new
states sometimes remember US essential to gaining of freedom
and establishment of state.
c. Some have Communist parties which have engendered'
organized Communist activities.
d. Unresolved problem of Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam
continuing source of irritants.
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e. "Atomic stalemate" not yet a serious problem
here except in Japan.
XI. In sum, we are in a race with the USSR the nature and full
magnitude of which we only now appreciate.
It is a race in which we can no longer afford comfortable
illusion of our vastly superior power potential.
It is a race under awesome umbrella of hydrogen weapons and
advanced delivery systems, which so long as mutual deterrence is
maintained, makes the risk of general and perhaps even local war seem
too high to either side.
As a result it is a contest in which diplomatic maneuver,
trade and aid, propaganda, subversive operations are primary modes
of conflict, against backdrop of military threat.
New generation of Soviet leaders have shown skill and flexibility
in this arena of so-called "peaceful competition." They are confident
that forces of history are on their side and they will win in time.
It would be foolish to deny they have some reason for their confidence,
as I have sought to demonstrate today. We shall probably have more
losses in next few years. At the same time their own system is
evolving in ways they may eventually be unable to control. While
we face a prolonged cold war, we and our allies have vast resources.
Whether we mobilize and use these resources properly will rest with
you gentlemen here today not only on government. To total challenge
must in turn be total response.
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