CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005300020002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 28, 1955
• Content Type: SNIE

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CONnnrn1Tihs
TO
SNIE 11-9-55
28 June 1955
032514
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-9-55
CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 28 June 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Intel-
ligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative
to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, dissents from the conclusion of this estimate,
and has been joined in part by the Director of Naval Intel-
. ligence. (See FBI and ONI footnotes to paragraph 7.) .
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COPY NO. 142
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
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CLASS. CHANCED T
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41, 22
Ki REVIEWER:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Foreign Operations Administration
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
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CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the likelihood of a Soviet attempt to introduce nuclear weapons or
their components into the US clandestinely under diplomatic immunity before an
all-out attack on the US:1
ASSUMPTION
That the USSR decides to launch an all-out attack on the US.
THE ESTIMATE
1. The. USSR is capable of producing nuclear
weapons which could be introduced into the
US either as complete assemblies or as com-
ponent parts or subassemblies. Such weapons
could range from one kiloton to one megaton
in yield, and in the present state of the art
could be designed `to break down into com-
ponents weighing from a few pounds up to
approximately 25 pounds in the case of small-
yield weapons and up to approximately 200
pounds in the case of large-yield weapons.
1 This estimate is in response to a specific request
which confines itself to the narrow limits of clan-,
destine introduction of nuclear weapons under
diplomatic immunity. For a more extensive dis-
cussion of Soviet capabilities for clandestine in-
troduction by any means, see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet
Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key
Overseas Installations and Forces through 1 July
1958."
"Diplomatic immunity" as used herein refers to
an accompanied shipment not limited in size or
weight, which is covered by a diplomatic seal.
2. If the USSR intended to launch an all-out
attack on the US, the major Soviet objectives
would be (a) to destroy or neutralize as quick-
ly as possible US capabilities for nuclear
attack, and (b) to inflict such physical and
psychological damage on the US as would pre-
vent, or at least hinder, the mobilizatio50X1
US war potential. Accordingly, the initia-
viet attack would have to be planned not only
to achieve surprise but also to be of sufficient
weight to accomplish those objectives. Inso-
far as the USSR considered the clandestine
introduction of nuclear weapons into the US,
it would plan to use these weapons either
(a) as the principal means of inflicting maxi-
mum damage on the US or (b) as an auxiliary
means of inflicting damage, the main effort
of its all-out attack being made by other
methods of delivery (aircraft, guided missiles,
etc.).
CLANDESTINE ATTACK AS THE PRINCIPAL
MEANS OF INFLICTING DAMAGE
3. Soviet military planners are unlikely to
consider that nuclear weapons could be clan-
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destinely introduced and put into position on
a scale large enough to obviate the need for
an all-out attack by other means. The suc-
cess of a clandestine nuclear attack on such
a scale would depend not only .upon the initial
introduction of substantial numbers of nu-
clear weapons, but also upon subsequent oper-
ations which would be much more difficult
to organize and keep secret. To achieve its
objectives, the USSR would have to organize
a complex clandestine operation involving the
storage of weapons components, transporta-
tion of assembled weapons or component parts
over considerable distances, emplacement of
weapons, and accurate timing and coordina-
tion of attacks at the target sites. A clandes-
tine operation of this magnitude would in-
volve grave risks of premature disclosure be-
cause of: (a) the large numbers of targets to
be attacked; (b) the distances of such targets
from Soviet installations having diplomatic
immunity; (c) the amount of time the devices
would have to be held secretly prior to use;
and (d) the numbers of persons involved in
the operation.
4. We believe, therefore, that in order to ob-
tain the optimum -combination of weight and
surprise, the USSR would probably place chief
reliance on nuclear attack by aircraft, at least
until the aircraft delivery system is replaced
by intercontinental missiles. It would prob-
ably consider clandestine employment only as
an auxiliary method to attack certain selected
targets.
which (a) is sufficiently important to warrant
incurring the risks involved, (b) could be
accomplished by clandestine means more
easily or more certainly than by other means,
and (c) could be accomplished with minimum
CLANDESTINE ATTACK AS AN
AUXILIARY MEANS
5. In estimating the advisability of using clan-
destine delivery as an auxiliary method of
attack, the USSR would have to balance the
probable results to be obtained against the
risks of detection with consequent loss of sur-
prise and possible US counteraction. While
the justification for its employment would in-
crease in proportion to the contemplated scale
of clandestine attack, the risks of detection
would also increase substantially. Conse-
quently, we believe that, in considering such
an attack, the USSR would limit its operations
to those targets the destruction or damage of
risks of premature disclosure.
6. The USSR could minimize the risk of pre-
mature disclosure by limiting the clandestine
operation to placement of nuclear weapons at
Soviet diplomatic establishments in Washing-
ton and New York. In this way it could vir-
tually insure successful attack on two major
targets without using a large number of per-
sonnel and without incurring the risks in-
volved in transporting nuclear weapons to
areas which do not enjoy diplomatic immuni-
ties. On the other hand, the USSR could
attack New York and Washington by air and
therefore would not have to rely on clandes-
tine attack. In addition, even a very limited
clandestine effort would still not entirely elim-
inate the possibility of disclosure as a result
of unpredictable events.
7. Although the possibility of limited Soviet
use of this method of clandestine attack can
by no means be excluded, we believe that, since
the adverse consequences of premature dis-
closure would remain and since the chances of
detection could not be entirely eliminated, the
chances are now slightly better than even
that the USSR would not undertake even this
more restricted operation.3
The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, believes that this paragraph
should read as follows:
"It is impossible to predict whether the USSR
would or would not attempt to utilize the dip-
lomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nu-
clear weapons into the US. However, since the
USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons
for introduction by this method, a risk will
continue to exist 50X1
50X1
The Director of Naval Intelligence concurs in
general with the views of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and would stress that the danger
would rise in direct proportion to the ease with
which nuclear weapons could be introduced into
the US without risk of detection.
nnpir'ir PLITIAI
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