PROBABLE FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO VARIOUS US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CHIN-MENS AND MATSUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030022-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 2, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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2 September 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Probable Free World Reactions to Various US Military
Courses of Action with Respect to the Cbin m.ns and
the Matsu*
1. The attached memorandum is a somewhat shortened revision
of the Staff draft of 31 August, iecorporating suggestions offered by
yourself. the Board, and OC3.
2. In paragraph U of the attached memorandum it will be noted
that the Boardhas retained the original wording "...the adverse
consequences for the US nd&ht be irreparable, " rather than your
suggested change. "would be serious, " the former being the language
of SNIE 100-7.38 (paragraph 36).
3. Knight McMahan of OCI suggested that the memorandum
might discuss reactions in the event the US brought the question of
Chinese Comm nist aggression against the offshore islands to the
UN. He noted that, while Undersecretary of State Herter was
pessimistic about the utility of a US appeal to the UN (State cable
to London 2314), it still might offer a possible way out. We have
not treated this problem, believing it to be outside the scope of the
memorandum. You may, however, wish to raise such a question
in the discussion at the OCB.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
DOCUMENT NO.
KO CHAUGE III CLASS. ^
CLASS. C:l!"M TO: TS S C
t.EXT R?. VI L?.?E:
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DATE J- 19 `J REVIEWER: 018645
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M. FREE WORLD RXACT1ONS TO US NUCLEAR INTZRVZNTION
8. No generaal. distinction has as yet been made in world opinion
between various types of nuclear weapons. Thur, whatever the
type of weapon and target. the predominant immediate Free World
reaction to the US use of nuclear weapons in defense of the offshore
islands would be highly adverse.
9. Most of our sues. Including those in NATO, would probably
shun any responsibility for, or connection with, US use of nuclear
weapon4. Adverse reactions would be particularly strong through-
out most of Asia, where US use of nuclear weapons would tend to
be looked upon as callous, white indifference to the lives of Asians.
Only a few Asian countries, notably the CRC and the ROX, would
be encouraged by the vigor of the US action.
10. These initially adverse reactions would toad to be modified
in time if all of the following conditions aiaaEppiieds (a) the US action
had been taken against an actual Chinese Communist invasion of
the major offshore islands; (b) the US bad restricted its actions
to attacks with low-yield wnea n. on military targets in the
immediate vicinity of the offshore islands; and (c) the actions
had brought the hostilities to an early and succosoful end without
- g -
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heavy ciVWhu cases. 'Under these conditions, ?t a
s world probably tome to have greater Cound-efte,
ability
Asian
4ef*nd them against communist agg7easion.
U. osvessaly, if the conflict
made nuclear strlke$ on targets beyond the ixoxnedsu viol
the ofishors isund*, *" .epeei
Indicted on C U"00
sone+equ ences:
adght be irreparable, particularly in ASIA. We ghG be
forced to thdtaw fxrom our bales in Jan, and J se pressure
for our , drawal Isom CWU&W4 would Ica'
in
an gover
about * p"in
pe fears of general Audoxv war and popular
would almost certa attempt vigorouitly to b7
ides.
dear weapons
* limited a Bent the Gu sts in turn
s: but +e i WoUld stiiineurr the odium
.
IV. FR E W i X" TINS TO NON-INT
er .Asian + o t s would be serloody -,
i. The dondsant Vise World reaction would probably be one
W96-se$Is eases tiel ad
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of relief that a serious source of friction between Communist China
and the US had finally been liquidated and that the US had apparently
accepted the view that the offshore islands were not worth serious
risk of war. This reaction would be tampered, nonetheless, by loss
for the Ut, some cis
Far East over f oa mti t
Ulna's growing strength, deep distress in the GEC, and a widespread
belief that there would not have been a crisis in the first place had it
not been for previous polic.i1ss.
14. We do not believe that the adverse effects of
defend the offshore is Cds would be critical in the case of most of
Middle East and Mien countries which now look to the Ug for
for the
aggression. It would be necessary
these countries its continuing readiness
demo
end Taiwan as well as its treaty
Obligations to therm, .ape aUy if Communist China followed up its
takeover of the
ands with increased military and psycho-
logical pressures against Taiwan itself. There would be -considerable
sympathy in the Free world for a renewed US commitment to defend
Taiwan. Even
offshore islands,
i n an Inc re*tsod linking of the
defense of Taiwan, it would be generally
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believed in the Pro* World that US interests and prestige were
far mine deeply committed in the case, of Taiwan than in that of
offshore islands.
15. The most serious consequence of the lose the offshore
islands would be the resulting effect on Nationalist morale. This
effect would be severe, whatever the circumstances of the lose of
the +Chinurneens. a7t9d, Matsu*. The impact of such * loss would be of
the greatest severity if the withheld Its
Nationalist troops stationed on the islands were defeated by^
Chinese Communist assault. The impact of the loss would be of lose
severity if the troops were ev cuated with US atesistence and these
important Chinese Nationalist resources w
preserved. In any
case, the Nationalist governxraeat, if it is to survive, would require
and convincing demonstrations that the US was still deteraacaed
to protect Taiwan end to preserve the GRC *s International position.
Given such deeanstrations, we believe that the Nationalists would
not fold up.
FAR THE BOA" OF NATIONAL T'l T :
.etastistaat Director
National Zst ates
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f--
ANNEX
1UMMAaRY OF REACTIONS TO DATE
1. Official and editorial reactions throughout the world to grow-
ing tension in the Taiwsa straits area so far has been limited, except
in the 1TK, Japan, India, and Egypt. Probably few comments have been
shade because the situation has not yet reached a climax. Also it is
possible that some loaders and, Journalists, while content to point out
the coersequessreos of further Us involvement in the area are still
reluctant to believe that either the US or the Chinese Com-sswntsts is
likely to push matters to the point of "on hostilities. While the Frees
World comment that is available tends to regard Chinese Coe mumist
Bering as a rather unsubtle attempt to assert Communist
strength, and perhaps to force entrance into the UN, there is little
public sympathy expressed for what is generally viewed as an over-
extended UI comssatitsanont. Comment elsewhere in the world fellows
predictable lines.
2. The strongest reaction has come from the UK, where over-
whelami> editorial opinion tends to look askance at Us policy as being
too deeply involved in areas where defensive positions could aluichly
become untenable. The ,government's position has, not been formally
determi ad, but a high foreign office official told the Us #'ambassy on
29 August that it was still sticking to its p y as enunciated in 1435
that Quemoy and Matsu were regarded as part of the territory of the
Chinese People's Republic. Probably the boot the US could expect from
the MacMillan Government if it became militarily istv*lved, would be
a statement condemning the use of force by the Chinese Communists.
3. Ths Japanese press is covering development* with thoroughness
& *A expresses deep concern that the conflict may spread to Japan. The
possible use of 05 bases in Upon is support of any active intervention
has alarmed soma political figurers Sad wen pro-Aaaericsa newspapers
who fear retalls .an against Japan. The Socialist Party and the Labor
Confederation harve already called for an immediate cane to both US
"Intervention" and Chisam military action.
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4. The Cairo press and radio have concentrated on factual
coverage of the events to date, with editorial comment that blamer
the US for encouraging the ambitions of Chiang by supplying arms
to the Chinese Nationalists. The official Indian reaction tends to
be non-committal. although the press generally favors the Chinese
Communists.
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