AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000600180001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
Exec ti e ecretary
7 May '87
3637 (10-81)
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(
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No.NSDD 270
COPY #4 (CIA)
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
Notice
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� tkt:. EGRET�
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WA S HAWG rp N
1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESID
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ACTING DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
90204
SUBJECT: Afghanistan
The President has approve
Decision Directive on A
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
,ched National Security
(S)
Attachment:
TAB I NSDD on Afghanistan
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SECRET SECRET � SYSTEM II
90204
THEWHITEAbUSE
WAS HIToiN
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 270
ASSESSMENT
May 1, 1987
After seven years of mi 'tat' aleps e in Afghanistan, the
Soviet Union has engaged in a ,*0.re comprehensive approach to the
issue of its future involvement iflAfghanistan. It has embarked
on a sophisticated political strategy which has captured head-
lines and generated hopes for a settlement. However, Soviet
proposals have been accompanied by stepped-up military activity,
particularly along (and across) the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
We remain skeptical that Moscow has made the hard political
decisions necessary to a settlement. At the last Geneva round of
negotiations in February-March 1987, the Soviets reduced the
withdrawal timetable for their forges from Afghanistan to 18
months (from an initial offer of 'lir years). The Soviet move is
designed to persuade the world Moscow is serious in
searching for a solution in AA4han tan, yet clearly aimed to
allow Soviet military operatns ag1nst the resistance with
decreased external support
Attempts at appearing
have been coupled wit
sabotage, and terrori:,,
exacerbate relations 150
Pakistani hosts. Ethnid
worries the Pakistani leadersh
committed to a strong stand oriE
Pakistan must resist Soviet pressure, he faces growing domestic
pressures to adopt a less confrontational approach on
Afghanistan. Such pressures may have been responsible for
Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's too-hasty willingness to make a
seven-month withdrawal timetable counter-proposal at the recent
proximity talks in Geneva. (S)
taard a political settlement
-u � "let campaign of air raids,
lIcistan which has begun to
0,fghan refugees and their
ilthern Pakistan also
hile President Zia remains
nistan and believes that
Thus, we are entering a critical
strong pressure on the Soviets i
suitable negotiated settlement
encourage more active interna,
resistance and for Pakistan,
examine each Soviet propos
dismissive of Soviet mi
opportunities arising
regime which stem fro
courting of Pakistan,>
nervousness within thd
p_Tiod and need to maintain
e are to have a chance of a
must renew our efforts to
support for both the Afghan
same time, we must carefully
care not to appear routinely
e must also remain ready for
tensions within the Kabul
political moves. Soviet
tent, has greatly enhanced
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We should remain in close touch with the Pakistani leadership,
alert to the possibility of subtle shifts in the GOP position and
ready to raise concerns when we perceive them. At the same time,
in our larger interest,we should be mindful of -- and
sympathetic to -- the: ressUre.S'onPakistan as we proceed to
implement our enhanced political stratpgy. (S)
Pakistan remains the key to ouz ability to implement a policy of
opposition to Soviet aggressiokin7ilfghanistan. Critical to
Pakistan's ability and willingness-to play this role is
Islamabad's confidence in our support, as manifested in the
short-term by passage of the proposed follow-on program of
security and economic assistance. Any lessening in our com-
mitment could add to the pressures on Pakistan and cripple our
broader policy objectives regarding Afghanistan. While there is
strong bipartisan support for the Afghan struggle, there are many
in the Congress who appear to underestimate the relationship of
Pakistan to our Afghanistan policy, or who are so strongly
motivated by other issues that they are prepared to put
Afghanistan second. (S)
Given the importance of the
the Afghan strategy, we ha
Congressional support wh.
proliferation agenda wi-
the inter-relationshi.
capabilities, we ham&
-19,!87 assistance for Pakistan
een rking to sustain
forward on the non-
Additionally, recognizing
nand Pakistan nuclear
ng India on a nuclear
to
dialogue with Pakistai We must contInue to address the evolving
attitudes of key membe ogresoward the South Asian
nuclear dilemma in the face of developing Pakistani and Indian
nuclear programs, by setting ttge for a more rational,
effective, and long-term approach to obtaining greater restraint
by both Pakistan and India on nuclear matters. Such an approach
will also require the cooperation of other governments. (S)
U. S. OBJECTIVES
o Raise the military and poli
their occupation of Afghanistaii
into a comprehensive politica
prompt, complete, and irrevo a le
genuine Afghan self-determi��n
o Continue economic
specifically, ensure
will require effecti
inter alia, about the
al costs to the Soviets of
a means of pressuring them
lement that results in the
ithdrawal of Soviet troops and
(S)
assistance to Pakistan;
ollow-on program. This
ongressional concerns,
program. (S)
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o Continue support for thf
the lead. (C)
o Encourage a more e
ating track with Pakistan in
resiistance political front. (C)
o Provide humanitarlan.a.sItalLir
to free Afghans rc,patrit,rig
Encourage more active into):
the Afghan resistance. ('
o the Afghan refugees and
their own country. (C)
onal support for Pakistan and
o Increase international public awareness of the war and
support for a free Afghanistan. (U)
U. S. ACTIONS
Assistance
Develop a comprehen*
full funding of the
for Pakistan. (
Augment Pakistan
against blatant arid
sional strategy to ensure
llow-on assistance program
Consider increasing exist,
(cross-border) programs. (C)
.lity to defend itself
4at/DRA air violations. (S)
sources in humanitarian
Assess how support for the cross-border humanitarian
assistance program by other governments, international
organizations and PV0s could be increased in such areas as
food and agriculture, medicines and health care, education
and public administration; solicit such support. (U)
Produce plan for long-term a4xoaches to other concerned
governments to help meet tan's military and economic
needs. (S)
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Public Diplomacy
Set up an interagency Afghanistan Public Diplomacy Working
Group to provide .better ;1)�1.it4a, focus and consistency for
USG public diplomacy
Group shouldalso
develop plans for maximizing favorable to the
Resistance in foreign 'med4a outlets. (C)
Consider various possible Presidential initiatives that
would contribute to our public diplomacy efforts and
underscore U.S. commitment to Pakistan and the Afghan cause.
(C)
Review USIA global programming with a view to enhancing
Afghanistan profile and costs of Soviet actions inside
Afghanistan and cross-border bombings in Pakistan. (C)
Consider concentrating and increasing USIA public affairs
and cultural resources targetted on the Afghan resistance
and refugees both inside Afghanistan and abroad. (C)
Consider ways in whiq
enhancing support fq
toward a rapid an
determination f
minvolve other governments in
and pressuring the Soviets
tawal of troops and self-
4C)
Push forward with Afghan media project, including
development of contingency plans for achieving goals in the
absence of a GOP decision on h Afghan director. (C)
Political Strategy
Work to increase the political and diplomatic pressures on
the Soviets to negotiate a pt9mpt and complete withdrawal of
their troops, including pres'UOres upon the PDPA. (C)
Intensify Afghanistan-re)
governments with speci
strategy and enhancem
development. (C)
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consultations with friendly
cy focus on diplomatic
sistance alliance political
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Develop concept paper Afghan Alliance institutional
.
development to provide
, (E)n4pasis /or dialogue with the Alliance,
specific action recommendations to USG agencieis and action-
oriented consultationswi0 GOP, Saudis, and other
governments. (c
Develop a gameplOi�,for_encouragitig resistance peace
proposals and other political Ctivity to counter Soviet and
PDPA political efforts.
Examine possible new approaches to Congress, Pakistan, and
other concerned governments on Pakistani and regional
nuclear problems. (S)
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