SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00766R000200140002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1989
• Content Type: NIE

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WHITE KEY JUDGMENTS /70
SPECIAL WHITE KEY JUDGMENTS
Distribution
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it
Sec Defense
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CJCS
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Nat'l Sec Advisor
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DCI
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DDCI
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ExDir
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DDO
leave with DDO/DO
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DDA
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DDS&T
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ADDI
VIA Morning Briefing Book
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VC/NIC
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D/CPAS
Helene L. Boatner
CPAS Registry
18
The Honorable Douglas P. Mulholland
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
19 Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 3E258, Pentagon
Mgnr-nrreitiftb-usg_oaa_
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ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
COPY if RECIPIENT
20 Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy
Director, National Security Agency
Room 9A197, Fort George G Meade, Maryland
21 Mr. James H. Geer
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4026, J.E. Hoover Building
22 Mr. Robert J Walsh
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
Room 4A014, Forrestal Bldg., Department of Energy
23 Michael Romey, Acting
Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security)
Room 2049, Main Treasury Building
24 The Honorable James F. McGovern
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Room 4E886, Pentagon
25 RADM Thomas A. Brooks, USN
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Room 5C600, Pentagon
26
Major Charles Eichelberger, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Room 2E464, Pentagon
27 Maj Gen C. Norman Wood, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
28
Major John A. Studds, USMC
Director of Intelligence, US Haring Corps
Headquarters, US Marine Corps
Room 2117, Navy Annex
Washington, D.C. 20480
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COPY # RECIPIENT
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29 Robert M. Gates
Deputy Assistant National Security Advisor
White House Situation Room
30 The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Deputy Secretary of State
Room 7220, New State Bldg.
31 Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
New State Bldg.
The Honorable Donald J. Atwood
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Room 3E944, The Pentagon
33 Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E830, The Pentagon
34 The Honorable Henry S. Rowen
Asst. Secretary of Defense for Internat'l Security Policy
Room 4E838, The Pentagon
35 Stephen J. Hadley
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internat'l Security Policy
Room 4E838, The Pentagon
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42-44
Mark Sullivan
Deputy Executive Secretary, NFIB
NIO (Action Officer)
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Soviet Policy Toward
the Middle East
National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11130-89
December 1989
Copy
53
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The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation* of these Key Judgments:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
The Intelligence Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs.
The full text of this Estimate is being published
separately with regular distribution.
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (NF)
Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC)
Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PR)
Caution?proprietary information involved
ORCON (OC)
Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
REL...
This information has been authorized for release to...
WN
WNINTEL?Intelligence sources or methods involved
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Soviet Policy Toward
the Middle East
? The USSR will press harder to broaden its influence in the
Middle East beyond its traditional Arab clients, but these clients
will remain important to the Soviet position for the next two years.
? The Soviets will be more willing than they have been in the past to
seek peaceful solutions to Middle Eastern conflicts?even if this
upsets key clients such as Syria?and will attempt to keep
frictions over the region from undermining the general improve-
ment in US-Soviet relations.
? Despite emphasis on the nonutility of force, the Soviets will
continue to provide advanced arms to traditional clients while
seeking new paying customers. Arms deliveries will remain Mos-
cow's key influence tool, as its weak economy will keep it a minor
player in the Middle East economically.
? The Soviets are now ready to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Israel. They would prefer that Tel Aviv first make a move they can
claim is a concession to the PLO, but probably would move
unconditionally if they perceived the A ab-Israeli peace process
were passing them by.
? Soviet relations with Iran probably will continue to improve but
within limits imposed by traditional mutual suspicions, economic
constraints on both sides, and Moscow's desire to minimize
damage to relations with Iraq and the Gulf Arab states.
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Key Judgments
The broadened political access General Secretary Gorbachev's policies
have won for the USSR in the Middle East ensures that the United States
will face a more diverse and demanding political challenge in the region
from the Soviets during the next two years. Having achieved recognition as
a major player in the region once again, Moscow is likely to stick with the
strategy of courting such key regional powers as Israel, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Irawhi1ea1tmpting to protect its equities with its tradition-
al Arab clients.
Gorbachev's policy toward the Middle East, as elsewhere, will continue to
be influenced by his desire for a stable international atmosphere conducive
to the restructuring of the Soviet political and economic system. As such,
he can be expected to display greater flexibility in the region, providing op-
portunities for US-Soviet cooperation. To that end, the Soviets will be more
willing than in the past to seek peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and
will seek to avoid confrontation with the United States. To enhance their
influence, they are likely to engage Washington in discussions where they
lack adequate entree, such as the Arab-Israeli peace process, and?barring
a crisis?shun discussions on areas where they hold an edge over the
United States, such as Iran.
The supply of arms remains Moscow's best means of influence in the region
despite Gorbachev's public rejection of military solutions to Middle
Eastern conflicts. Soviet arms transfers to the region have declined since
the peak year of 1983 but still account for a significant portion-10 to 15
percent?of Moscow's hard currency export earnings.
The USSR's weak economy and the increased competition it faces for
weapons sales in the region will probably limit increases in Soviet arms
deliveries to the Middle East over the next two years. The Soviets do not
want to continue supplying large volumes of sophisticated arms to clients
unlikely to pay. At the same time, in response to the stiffer competition,
they are likely to offer some of their most modern weaponry to preserve
their influence and market share. Moscow is increasingly concerned,
however, about the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region and
probably will be receptive to talks limiting their spread.
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The Kremlin has lessened its reliance on its traditional Arab clients, but
they will remain important to Soviet influence in the region over the next
two years. Soviet differences with Syria probably will grow and could pose
serious risks to the relationship if there is genuine movement in the Arab-
Israeli peace process. The PLO has become more important for Moscow
but is not likely to take Syria's place as the USSR's primary Arab client in
the next two years. The Soviets will continue urging PLO chief Arafat to
follow more moderate policies as long as they *ud e he will not make a sep-
arate deal with the United States and Israel.
Achieving a central role in the Arab-Israeli peace process is certain to
remain the top Soviet goal in the region. Gorbachev attaches increased
importance to a peaceful settlement and knows he can only achieve this in
cooperation with the United States. This will prompt the Kremlin to be in-
creasingly open to compromise:
? An international conference will continue to be Moscow's preferred
option, but, in order to get their foot in the door, the Soviets probably will
be more flexible on the mechanics and authority of such a conference.
? The Soviet leadership would support the idea of interim phases?such as
the Israeli election plan, and the subsequent Egyptian and US plans?as
long as they were confident that such steps would not become ends in
themselves, and the PLO's role would not be superseded; but even on
these issues they will be open to compromise.
? The Soviets are ready to resume relations with Israel. They would prefer
to wait until Tel Aviv makes a move that Moscow can claim is a
concession to the PLO. However, if the Soviets perceive that the peace
process is passing them by, they are likely to resume relations uncondi-
tionally.
Moscow's heightened interest in playing a major role in peaceful Arab-
Israeli settlement will make it more willing to risk the ire of its harder line
Arab clients. Thus, the Community now believes that, if an international
conference were held during the next two years?which is unlikely?and
Syria were the only major player to stay away, there would be a better-
than-even chance that Moscow would attend lest it be excluded from
the process. In this scenario, the Soviets would try to prevent a final Arab-
Israeli settlement from being reached until Syria's concerns were ad-
dressed.
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Soviet relations with Iran are likely to continue to improve but within
limits imposed by traditional mutual suspicion, Moscow's desire to avoid
damage to its relations with Iraq and the Gulf Arabs, and Tehran's efforts
to court Western economic assistance. Although economic ties will increase
gradually, arms sales will be the Kremlin's strongest card. The types and
quantities of weapons the Soviets sell Iran will depend on Moscow's
assessment of the stability of the Iranian leadership, the reaction of Iraq
and Saudi Arabia, and the military balance between Iran and Iraq. They
probably will sell ground and air defense equipment but not their most
advanced aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles.
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