WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400140025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: October 18, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400140025-6
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-03194-88
18 October 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Intelligence Community representatives at the monthly warning
meeting on 17 October reached consensus on the following issues.
2. Warning Notes.
-- There is little likelihood of renewed fighting between Chad and
Libya in the Aozou region during the next 90 days, but an increase
in Chadian military readiness by late December may increase slightly
the chances that Chad would initiate fighting. Habre does not
appear to face any significant domestic opposition or insurmountable
discontent within the military. (paragraph 4)
-- The security situation in northern Uganda remains problematic.
Although rebels have the upper hand in much of the countryside, they
do not threaten the Museveni regime which appears committed to a
military rather than political solution. (paragraph 5)
-- Progress in US-mediated talks among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa
has slowed following the session on 6-8 October in New York, but all
sides remain committed to a 1 November target date for an agreement
and further negotiation is likely. FAPLA operations against UNITA
in central Angola may become larger and will not necessarily:be
inhibited by the onset of the rainy season. Dos Santos' intentions
regarding national reconciliation.remain unclear and progress is
likely to depend on reaching agreement in the regional talks.
(paragraph 6)
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV FROM MULTIPLE
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4. Chad: Developments at Home and Abroad. Introduced by CIA/ALA.
-- Habre manages the military closely and is able to anticipate and
forestall serious ethnic problems. He is likely to rein in his
Toubou kinsmen to prevent Zaghawa discontent from building. Habre's
worst problems with troop discontent in the north probably have
ended with the rains, which had made resupply difficult. The pace
of ground resupply has picked up but some shortages will persist.
Delivery of a new C-130H in December will boost air resupply
capability. A large number of Iraqi IL-76 flights recently have
arrived in Chad with military materiel and other bulk supplies.
-- Renewed fighting in the Aozou is unlikely. Habre does not want to
be branded the aggressor in breaking the cease fire. Chad remains
suspicious of Libya, but Habre is willing to continue political and
diplomatic maneuvering with openings provided by Qadhafi and is
under pressure from regional leaders and the French to test Libyan
intentions. Habre would like a face-to.-face meeting with
Qadhafi--which other regional leaders may try to promote--but
prospects are dim for significant change in the stalemated Aozou
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400140025-6
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territorial dispute. DIA noted that the C-130, the Iraqi supplies,
will improve
Chadian military capability by late December an may
increase--albeit only slightly--the chances of new fighting in the
north.
Chadian dissidents who arrived in Sudan from Libya are unlikely to
be repatriated soon because of Habre's distrust. The way could be
cleared for the dissidents' return if rebel leader Acheik agreed to
reconcile with Habre, but personal animosities make this unlikely.
Meanwhile, a party congress next month--open to all elements who
reconcile to the Habre regime--and a revision of the constitution
will shape the future political landscape in Chad and are providing
an incentive for disparate Chadian factions to consider
participating.
5. Uganda: Regime Prospects. Discussion led by DIA.
-- Security remains problematic in northern Uganda, where government
forces control the towns but rebels of three insurgent groups have
the upper hand in the countryside. The rebels do not pose a threat
to the regime, however, and recently have had to operate in smaller
units to counter government pressure that has included effective use
of its limited air inventory. Rains are causing a lull in fighting
that may allow UPDA rebels to regroup after losing some support to a
government peace initiative a few months ago. The peace agreement
was not as successful as the Museveni regime had hoped, and the
government is now committed to a military solution rather than
political talks. There is no significant opposition to new laws
that will be applied in areas troubled by the insurgents.
6. Angola/Namibia/South Africa: Status of Talks. The A/NIO/AF opened
a discussion of developments in and implications o the US-mediated talks.
-- State/INR commented that guarded optimism continues to characterize
prospects for continued negotiation. All sides have remained
committed to a 1 November target date. An agreement but not
significant implementation is still possible by then. The South
Africans have indicated support for the US-offered compromise
proposal presented at New York, based on a 24 month withdrawal
calendar for Cuban troops, but may be reluctant to conclude,-.an
agreement before their municipal elections on 26 October. The
Cubans are sending mixed signals, publicly and privately.
-- The African-led initiative for national reconciliation between the
MPLA and UNITA is unlikely to go forward until a regional agreement
is concluded or a date for signing one. is set.. Dos Santos'
intentions remain unclear, and he may prefer a bilateral rather than
group approach in dealing with regional leaders about UNITA.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400140025-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400140025-6
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Savimbi may be having more trouble maintaining internal cohesion
because of uncertainty over the regional talks and prospects for
reconciliation. There have been no major defections to the
government, however, and UNITA hardliners remain skeptical of any
political deal with the MPLA.
Meanwhile, Luanda has continued military action against UNITA in the
central region around Munhango. The operation could become larger
and would not necessarily be inhibited by the imminent onset of
rains. There still are no signs of a buildup at Cuito Cuanavale
that would precede an offensive against Mavinga. There appears to
be internal debate in the South African Government over
Cuban/Angolan intentions toward UNITA in the near term, but a
consensus that an offensive against UNITA will occur in the next dry
season. Cuban tactical groups recently were observed departing
positions near the Cunene River in the southwest but their new
positions are undetermined. They may be moving to higher ground in
anticipation of the rains. There are fragmentary indications of
FAPLA action against UNITA south of Caiundo in the central border
region.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400140025-6