EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING- 17 SEPTEMBER 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300110015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #04356-86/1
19 September 1986
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting - 17 September 1986
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 17 September
1986 to consider the Japanese reaction to the Gorbachev Asian initiative.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held Wednesday,
22 October 1986 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters.
Recommendations for discussion/warning topics should be forwarded to this
office by COB 13 October 1986.
3. It is essential that you telephone your attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by
your security office by NOON, 21 October 1986. Attendees from outside
agencies are advised to arrive early to avoid parking problems created by
construction work. Please enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123
entrance.
Attachment
17 September 1986 Warning Report
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #04356-86
19 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: 17 September 1986 East Asia Warning and Forecast Report
1. The September Warning Meeting focused on a single topic, The Japanese
reaction to the Gorbachev Asia initiative. Representatives from various
agencies presented their assessments, and there was general discussion from
the floor. This topic follows an exploration of the implications of the
Gorbachev initiative for China which was covered in last month's meeting.
2. of SOVA began the discussion by indicating that
Gorbachev's speec rea ly had no new major implications for Japan in and of
itself, but was part of Moscow's general trend of putting a better face on
Soviet policy toward Japan. The main theme of the speech was that the Soviet
Union is an Asian and a Pacific power. The Soviets clearly hope that their
political and economic influence will expand along with their military power.
If this is to happen, their relations with Japan will have to improve.
3. Yet Soviet initiatives show no flexibility on key issues such as the
Northern Territories. While Gorbachev was willing to discuss territorial
questions in his initiative toward China, no such gesture was made to Japan.
This was made perfectly clear by Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa's statement
to Japanese reporters that there would be no concessions on the Northern
Territories issue. The Soviets are willing to allow visits to graves, and
adopt a more "smiling diplomacy," but show no evidence of flexibility on this
key issue.
4. Soviet policy with respect to Japan has three goals: (1) drive a wedge
between the US and Japan to try to complicate or preclude military cooperation
between Washington and Tokyo; (2) seek Japanese involvement, where beneficial,
in the Soviet economy, and particularly development in the Soviet Far East;
and (3) promote the gradual advance of Soviet political influence in Japan and
the region.
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5. There was some discussion of the Northern Territories issue. The
principal reasons for Soviet intransigence on the issue apparently include:
-- Nationalistic pride causes the Soviets not to want to surrender
territory.
-- Strategic security; the Southern Kurile chain provides some protection
for Soviet ballistic submarines in the Sea of Okhatsk.
-- Feelings of racial superiority over the Japanese and historical memory
of Japanese humiliation of Russia in 1904-5.
-- The precedent would create demands by other countries for Soviet
concessions on occupied territories.
-- Perception that the Japanese would take the islands, but the Soviets
would get nothing of importance in return.
6. The question was also raised about whether the Soviets might offer to
reduce forces opposite Japan, in a manner similar to their offer to China.
Thus far, the Soviets have been continuing to build up forces and there is no
evidence yet that they might make this kind of gesture. The principal threat
to the Soviets is not Japanese forces in Hokkaido, but US forces in Northern
Honshu.
7.I IOEA, mentioned that the Japanese are pleased with the
new Soviet style, and look forward to improvements in atmospherics of their
relations. Nevertheless, the Japanese recognize Soviet goals and intentions
and continue to view Japan's relations with the US as the foundation of their
security. Moreover, Soviet failure to yield on the Northern Territories, and
the Soviet position against reducing SS-20s in Asia are a constant reminder of
Soviet attitudes. Japan rejects the Soviet assertion that the principal
threat to peace and stability is the US buildup in the region and the prospect
of a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul axis. Essentially, there is no illusion in Japan
where the main threat comes from.
8. There followed general discussion about whether Soviet "smiling
diplomacy," and troop cuts along the border with China might lead to greater
domestic pressure in Japan for the government to reduce its commitment to a
military buildup and erode defense cooperation with the US. The general
consensus was that this would not work since the Soviet threat will still be
strongly perceived in Japan. Furthermore, Nakasone is using the new Soviet
style to claim that his policies are working and to create even stronger
public support for his approach to defense. Also, it was pointed out that the
overwhelming repudiation of the Japanese Socialists--the Party which most
strongly advocated improved ties with the Soviets--in the July elections had
removed an important source of domestic pressure on the Liberal Democratic
Party on the Soviet issue. When Nakasone leaves office his successor may not
be as effective in man.ripulating public opinion as he, but his successor is
also not likely to be as active as he is. Also, the bureaucrats in the
Japanese Foreign Ministry, who are strongly suspicious of the Soviets, will
likely begin to reassert their influence under a less activist Prime Minister.
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9.1 TIOEA, discussed the economic factors involved in the Soviet
approach. Soviet overtures to Japan in the 1970s, particularly on oil and gas
in Siberia, occurred in an era of energy shortages. Now the situation is much
different. There have been discussions of a gas project in Sakhalin, but so
far the project is too expensive and Soviet allocation policies have not been
sufficiently flexible to encourage great Japanese interest. There are some
discussions of potential joint ventures between the two sides, and a project
in which the Japanese ship equipment and get lumber is ongoing. Nevertheless,
there is unlikely to be any upsurge in economic cooperation.
10. DIA, discussed the importance of mutual perceptions
arising from the Gorbachev speech, making the point that what Gorbachev said
was not really new, but his approach was refreshing to the Japanese. In the
context of other Soviet initiatives, the Soviet approach could result in an
upswing in Japanese-Soviet relations. The upswing will continue until the
prospective summit between Gorbachev and Nakasone, possibly next year.
11. However, after the summit, there will probably have been few concrete
gains for either side and a period of disillusionment might set in. Also, in
the past the Soviets have had a penchant for blundering, as in the case of the
KAL 007 shoot, down. It is possible that some Soviet hard line move could
disrupt the now more pleasant atmosphere.
12. Precisely how and when the summit will be held is uncertain. It has
not yet been decided whether Gorbachev will go to Tokyo first, or Nakasone to
Moscow. Nakasone has indicated he would like more progress on the Northern
Territories issue before a summit.
13. I NSA, agreed that there had not been much change in
the pose ion of the two sides. The cornerstone of Japanese security policy
remains the relationship with the United States and this is likely to
continue. While there could be some improvements in economic relations
between the two sides, there were likely not going to be substantial political
improvements. The Soviets will continue to place paramount emphasis on trying
to create problems for US-Japanese cooperation.
14. Several points were raised during the follow-on discussion:
-- The Soviets would probably be more concerned about an independent Japan
than one which relies on the US. A much more independent Japan might
develop its own capabilities which could be more threatening to the
USSR than the present situation.
-- If Japan became concerned that a new Soviet-US summit was resulting in
less US concern for Japanese interests, at worst, Japan would return to
the uni-directional diplomacy it once followed in years past.
-- One participant argued th : the Gorbachev speech may actually be
evidence that the Soviets now recognize that they can't do much about
the US-Japanese relationship. The Soviets are searching for areas of
vulnerability but not finding any. With respect to the US-Japan
relationship, the Gorbachev speech was a Soviet "blink."
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Warning Implications
16. While there are no signs that much has changed beyond the
atmospherics of the Soviet-Japanese relationship, it is important for us to
constantly review our assumptions and analysis to make sure that we are not
missing factors which could lead to significant change. The importance of the
US-Japan relationship makes it critical that we be able to see changes before
they have developed too far.
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
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