MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR SEPTEMBER 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300110013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for September 1986
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
Iran/Iraq
An Iranian offensive may involve a series of smaller attacks, not a single
large push. In the north, attacks probably would be diversionary, with Tehran
hoping Iraq would spread its forces thinly enough that Iran could make a
successful larger push in the south. CIA believes an Iranian move in the south
has slightly less than an even chance of success, with worse prospects if Iraq
does not fall for the diversions in the north. On the Iraqi side, recent
military successes against vital Iranian economic targets have boosted morale,
but Iraq has failed to harass directly Iranian offensive preparations. The
domestic impact in Iran of a failed offensive, coupled with substantial
economic deterioration, will have serious repercussions. Public expectations
for a decisive victory in 1986 are high, and NIO/Warning notes that serious
unrest probably would erupt if Iranians were to believe they had suffered a big
defeat. If worsening economic conditions result in demonstrations, they could
widen the split among hardline and conservative elements within the Tehran
regime.
Sierra Leone
Facing serious economic and political challenges, President Momoh may be
ousted by the army within 6 months, notes NIO/Africa. Momoh lacks leadership
skills and does not have a firm grip on his government. The economy remains in
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shambles, and Momoh's alienation of the country's Muslims, who comprise 50
percent of the population, increases the prospects of a military coup in the
near-term.
Sudan
Prime Minister Sadiq, facing immense economic and political problems, has
made little serious effort to address them to date. His ability to garner new
weapons for the military, to keep adequate food supplies in Khartoum, and to
avoid a military fiasco in the south will determine whether he remains in
office over the next year. At present, the southern insurgents' siege warfare
of government garrisons is creating major problems for the Sudanese armed
forces. Coup-plotting is likely to increase, aided by pro-Libyan factions
dissatisfied with the government's military and economic policies.
NI0/Latin America]
(concludes Cuba decided within the past year to
make a major commitment to the effort to destabilize Chile, and Havana likely
obtained Moscow's approval. NIO/Warning notes the military has rallied around
Pinochet but
this probably is only a-temporary development. Pinochet's determination to use
the new state-of-siege to stifle dissent, over time, is likely to stimulate
greater cohesion among the moderate opposition. If continued demonstrations of
broad-based opposition convince a majority of senior military officers that
Pinochet's policies are creating an irreversible polarization in the country,
pressures for decisive change before 1989 will build.
Nicaragua: Terrorism
Managua is likely to respond to new US funding for. anti-Sandinista forces
by assessing the prospects for a successful terrorist campaign against US
interests--including steps such as contacting radical Honduran groups,
assessing their strengths and making contingency plans. Because the
Sandinistas know the US will hold them responsible for anti-US activity, target
selection will be made with caution. NI0/Counterterrorism notes that the most
likely targets will be those involved in supporting US anti-Sandinista efforts
and rebels, particularly in Honduras, and only as a last resort will US assets
be targeted directly. While NIO/Counterterrorism does not see an immediate
Sandinista threat against US forces, action by some radical group seeking to
attract attention from a potential sponsor is possible at any time.
Suriname
Ronnie Brunswijk's small rebel force in eastern Suriname poses no direct
threat to the Bouterse government at present, but if Brunswijk sustains his
operations and presence in the country, the possibility of a coup from within
the military will increase. If Bouterse sees his support eroding and remains
unable to get military support from the West, he may turn to Libya for
assistance.
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2. Trend Commentary:
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USSR/Middle East
Soviet diplomatic activity in the Middle East has increased this year in,
for example, trying to promote Palestinian unity; dealing with the problems of
radical allies such as South Yemen; and in responding to Iranian overtures for
better ties. However, none of these initiatives holds much promise of moving
things in the direction the Soviets would like to go, and some--like promoting
Palestinian unity under Arafat's leadership--exacerbate frictions with key
allies like Syria. The Soviet approach to Israel appears likely to founder on
Moscow's unwillingness to incur Arab wrath. Israel will pocket any Soviet
concessions on emigration while continuing to protect its own interests toward
Soviet Arab clients.
Western Europe/US
New frictions among NATO's southern flank are likely as the result of
projected substantial cuts in US FY1987 foreign military assistance to Turkey,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal but probably will not lead to further base closures
beyond those already expected. In Turkey, the government seems inclined to let
DECA talks drag into 1987 rather than force the issue of increased aid in
return for a new agreement. In Greece, Papandreou--evidently ready to renew
most US basing rights--has been counting on increased US assistance to justify
his turnabout to the left. In Spain, the military--a reserve for support of US
bases--may loose clout if Spain incurs heavy financial costs. In Portugal,
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva will react strongly to the perceived US i3iminution
of recognition of Lisbon's contribution to NATO defenses. NATO's main concern
will be setbacks to force modernization in the southern flank and to their
potential reinforcement role. The EC will fear new demands from the southern
flank countries to compensate for losses in US assistance.
West Germany
Buoyed by a strong economy, Chancellor Kohl's electoral prospects are
bright. He needs a successful visit to Washington, notes NIO/Europe, to cement
his standing before the electorate, demonstrate his statesmanship and ability
to defend German interests, and defuse widespread antinuclear sentiment. F___1
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Japan/USSR
Though Gorbachev's Asian initiative aims at asserting Moscow's role as an
Asian and Pacific power, it contains no flexibility on issues key to Japan such
as the Northern Territories or reduction of SS-20s in Asia. While there may be
improvements in economic relations between the two sides, substantial political
improvements will be scarce, especially as the Soviets continue to place
paramount emphasis on trying to create problems for US-Japanese cooperation.
Nakasone is skillfully using the new Soviet style to create ever stronger
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public support for his approach to defense. Soviet troop cuts along the border
with China are unlikely to lead to greater domestic pressure in Japan for the
government to reduce its commitment to a military buildup and erode defense
cooperation with the US.
Liberia
Doe faces profound economic problems, including a local currency suffering
rapid devaluation, late pay, and hard currency shortages. Although the
political opposition now is generally moribund, NI0/Africa notes that the
likelihood of strikes and an opposition renaissance in 1987 will increase Doe's
vulnerability. NI0/Warning observes that Doe remains chronically vulnerable to
assassination or removal, because he has bankrupted the economy, exacerbated
tribal tensions, and alienated the military that has brought him to power.
Paraguay: Narcotics Threat
Narcotics trafficking and marijuana cultivation in Paraguay are rising, and.
Paraguay will remain a key spillover country for the cocaine trade. The.
country is fertile ground for expanding trafficking networks or relief from='.
intensified antinarcotics efforts in neighboring countries because of: the
existence of a tacitly accepted smuggling infrastructure, economic
deterioration, and high-level official corruption. These conditions have
facilitated the dispersal of Colombian and Bolivian narcotics operations to
Paraguay to realize greater profits and to escape interdiction.
3. NIO/Warning notes these additional Areas of Continuing Warning Concern:
Haiti--civil unrest is intensifying, and more extensive illegal migration is
likely as unemployment reaches 50 percent; government remains in danger of
collapse.
Jamaica--political tensions remain high, and economic woes will deepen, even
with new IMF agreement; Manley's chances to win national elections growing.
Israel/Syria--broad Israeli military action remains likely because Syria's
quest for dominance in Lebanon and its expanding coverage of Israeli airspace
is on major collision course with Tel Aviv's interests.
Persian Gulf Shipping/US--successful Iraqi attacks on vital economic targets
seriously hurting ran; Tehran has raised ante in Gulf, interdicting more
shipping of major powers and threatening to halt all oil exports of Persian
Gulf countries; US may be drawn into more direct role as friendly governments
in area seek protection.
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South Yemen/North Yemen/USSR--outbreak of overt fighting by Hasani guerrillas
will trigger vigorous Soviet defense of Aden regime, including efforts to
subvert the Sanaa government.
Greece/Turkey--risk of unintended escalation to violence by either side
continues amid hostile rhetoric and provocations against "national honor and
dignity."
South Africa/Frontline States--new South African attacks on ANC targets in
neighboring countries imminent, and further actions by Pretoria in Angola,
Mozambique, and other frontline states will spawn ever more intractable
situation which affords new opportunities for Soviet exploitation.
Romania--vulnerablity to Soviet pressure continues in face of dismal economic
prospects, more incidents of worker unrest, and debt/liquidity crises; in the
event of a succession crisis, Soviets will meddle to influence outcome.
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