WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300110009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held on
23 October 1986. Next month's warning meeting will be held on
20 November 1986 at 1015 hours in Room 7E62 CIA Head uarters. Please
have your clearances passed and call with names
of the attendees by Noon, 19 November 1986.
STAT
STAT
STAT
Attachment:
As stated
NIC 05024-86/1
3 November 1986
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SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 05024-86
3 November 1986
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
The NESA warning meeting for October considered two topics, the
Iran/Iraq war and the degree of Libyan support for and-involvement in
international terrorism.
1. The Iran/Ira War: Will There be an Offensive? CIA opened the
meeting y stating t at evidence suggests that ran is still planning to
launch an offensive this year. In spite of indications of an internal
debate on the subject, preparations continue and do not indicate a decision
to cancel the plan. Iraq's air campaign-has hastened the pace of Iranian
economic deterioration, which is probably causing Iranian hardliners to
argue for launching the offensive before they are too weak to attack. We
have not, however, seen the kinds of last minute preparations we would
expect if the offensive were imminent. If the Iranians decide to cancel, we
would expect a series of smaller attacks which the Iranians could hawk as
the promised offensive.
Iraq's military pcsture has improved and there are indications that more
authority and tactical flexibility may have been given to local commanders.
CIA notes that in spite of these improvements, Iran has consistently been
able to surprise Iraqi frontline units and that the Iraqi Air Force is still
not being used to counter Iranian preparations near the front.
DIA generally agreed with CIA's analysis-that Iranian preparations were
ongoing but made several observations:
-- While the Iranians are keeping the option to launch, the economy
could also cause it to be later rat e~i r tTian sooner. DIA does not
believe there will be a large offensive but a limited one, such as
this year's attack on Al Faw.
STAT
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-- Although the Iranians usually attack in February or March, they may
have decided to attack Burin the rains, instead of after, to use
weather to their advantage rains begin in early November).
The Marine representative raised the issue of Iran's ability to exploit
an offensive breakthrough. All analysts agreed that Iran has done little to
improve logistic deficiencies in away that would enable them to support any
sort of "breakout" operation. The intelligence question noar seems to be:
how much territory can they take and hold?
-The community believes that Saddam Hussein has every reason to continue
to press the air campaign, even if Iran backs away from an offensive. The
number of Iranian SCUDS is low, the threat of Iranian commando raids is not
compelling and the aircraft loss rate is acceptable. Iraqi efforts in the
air war have been halfhearted in the past, however, and we will watch
closely for a backing away by -Iraq. We may also see pauses in the Iraqi
campaign to gauge Iranian intentions.
Iran's economic situation has deteriorated so significantly that the
prospects for serious instability in Iran is an increasing possibility. For
example, there is currently about a 250,000 BPD shortfall in oil needed for
Iranian domestic consumption. The regime has talked a great deal about
"winning the war" this year and instead the Iranian population will spend a
very cold winter, possibly no Iranian victory to console them or, even
worse, another inconclusive bloodbath.
Warning Notes
Iran is desperate to find ways to pressure Iraq and states supporting
Iraq. Although they have long threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, the
Iranians were previously constrained by a desire to keep their own oil
moving and the absence of the military capability. Recently, however, Iran
has taken steps to improve its ability to hit tankers in the Strait (e.g.
deployed helicopters and Chinese antiship cruise missiles to the vicinity .
This improved capability and a radically decreased Iranian export capacity,
significantly raises the chance that Iran will try to impair oil flowing
through the Strait.
2. Libya: Qadhafi's Policy on Terrorism.
Summary: Qadhafi is determined to persevere in pursuing his radical
agenda and is picking up the threads of his pre-April policies. A variety
of evidence indicates that terrorism will remain a large element of
Qadhafi's strategy. .The community representatives were unanimous in their
judgment that Libya was involved in the PanAm 73 hijacking in Karachi.
A CIA briefer presented evidence to support his argument that Qadhafi
has returned, with vigor, to his pre-bombing agenda, albeit with tactical
adjustments. Evidence indicates that Qadhafi reenergized his various policy
tools no later than mid-July. He seems to be following a three-tiered
strategy.
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The first level of Qadhafi's strategy is diplomatic. At this level, we
have seen Qadhafi trying to decrease his isolation with a variety of foreign
initiatives, including an attempt to mediate between North and South Yemen,
attempts to improve relations with Sudan and Algeria, increased flexibility
with Tunisia, restraint in responding to King Hassan's talks with Israeli PM
Peres and approaches to the Europeans, especially Italy.
In the second level, Qadhafi increased the intensity of his effort to
woo a grabbag of "anti-imperialist" groups including legal parties such as
the Greens, Soviet front organizations, and various subversive groups. His
principal tool at this level has been sponsoring seminars supporting removal
of US bases and seminars redefining terrorism to exclude acts taken to
achieve national liberation, but to include actions such as the US airstrike.
The final level, and the most significant from a warning perspective, is
a reinvigoration of contact with terrorist groups from around the world.
There seems to be a special emphasis on finding groups which can "produce"
instead of supporting any group asking for assistance. There is a
noticeable Emphasis on Africa and Latin America and emerging evidence of a
link with Abu Nidhal that is much stronger than previously suspected. Some
details of Libyan involvement in the Karachi hijacking exceed the
classification of this document (see notes from Terrorism Warning Meeting),
but all communit re resentatives indicated stron a reement with the
conc union t at, a t oug_ ~t was an u i a operation, i ya was involved
in the incident.
Warning Notes
Qadhafi is still in the terrorism game and we are uncertain as to how
far he will go. The Karachi incident indicates that he: 1) doesn't believe
the US will react; 2) is prepared to suffer the consequences; or 3) capable
of gross miscalculations about his ability to hide his hand.
STAT
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The following components attended the NIO/NESA October Warning Meeting:
External
Navy/ONI
USMC/INTP
NSA/G6
NSA/G93
NSA/G6095
NSA/G642
DIA/DB-8
DIA/DE-4
Treasury
Army/ITAC
OSD/ISA/NESA
JCS/J-5 MEAF
Internal
CTC
0/NIO/CT
FBIS/DRD
FBIS/PROD
FBIS/NEAD/AAP
FBIS/AG
NPIC
NPIC/PEG
NPIC/IEG/PGB
NPIC/IEG/NESAD
OIR
OIR/DB
OIR/PSD/DB
OGI/GID/NEA
OGI/GD
CRES/SEG
CRES/IRC
NE/IRAN/R
NE/ARN
NESA/PG/I
NESA/AI/M
DO/NE
OIA
SOVA/TWASD
SOVA/TWAD/ME
DO/NE
LDA/PPD
LDA/NENA
CTC/TAB
DO/EPS
STAT
STAT
STAT
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