EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING - 17 JUNE 1987
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000300060020-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 19, 2013
Sequence Number:
20
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 26, 1987
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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CIA-RDP91B00776R000300060020-1.pdf | 139.7 KB |
Body:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, ix.20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #02692-87
26 June 1987
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting - 17 June 1987
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held on
22 April 1987. Please let me know if there are any significant amendments,
additions, or corrections.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held Wednesday,
22 July 1987 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Recommendations
for discussion/warning topics should be forwarded to this office by COB
13 July 1987.
3. It is essential that you telephone your attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by
your security ottice by NUUN, 21 July 1987. Attendees from outside agencies
are advised to arrive early to avoid parking problems created by
construction work. Please enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123
entrance.
Attachment
Carl W. ord, Jr.
17 June 1987 Warning Report
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
26 June 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM:
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: 17 June 1987 East Asia Warning and Forecast Report
1. Representatives from the Intelligence Community met on 17 June 1987 to
discuss unusual mobilization activity in North Korea resulting from the
issuance of Supreme Commander's Order 002. (North Korea has at least five
levels of Supreme Commander's Orders that deal with levels of preparation for
war. The higher the number, the closer North Korea is to a wartime footina.)
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April 1987, several steps resulting from Order 002 have been undertaken:
The Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF) has taken over
administrative control of at least three counties.
The MPAF has been given priority in the supply of foodstuffs, and there
has been a renewed emphasis on wartime grain stockpiles despite an
apparent nationwide food shortage.
Land previously farmed by the military has been turned over to civilian
farmers.
Fishing vessels have been transferred to the military.
2. Most analysts agreed that, to date, the main thrust of the
mobilization appears to be a militarization of the economy designed to spur
production--particularly in the agricultural area--and to eliminate
non-productive elements. No shift in emphasis in the industrial sector,
including defense industries has been noted.
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3. Although the analysts at the meeting agreed that these efforts are, by
themselves, not threatening, all agreed that a successful effort to improve
productivity and overall economic performance would enhance the North's
overall warmaking ability should they decide to make a military move against
the South. Over the past few years, the ground forces already have been
redeployed to facilities nearer to the DMZ; recently, the Air Force and Navy
have undergone reorganizations. A successful economic mobilization will add
another element to long-term war planning. Missing, however, are key
indicators of more hostile intent, such as an increase in military
training--especially out of cycle training--and a move to mobilize the
reserves.
4. Although not directly tied to the current instability in the
South--Order 002 was issued in April--an effective mobilization of the economy
will put the North in a better position to take advantage of any further
breakdown of order in the South. While the US' resolve to defend South Korea
acts as a significant deterrence against an invasion by the North, the current
political unrest, and its potential to continue through the run up to the 1988
Seoul Olympics, could tempt the North to take steps which lead to
hostilities. Analysts at the meeting believe that the period between now and
December--before a planned increased US presence in 1988--will be critical.
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