WARNING AND FORCAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300050007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 24, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01306-87/1
24 March 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)
A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on
17 March 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated. with meeting
participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their
views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional
concerns, I'll report further to you.
Frederick L. Wettering-
Attachment:
NIC #01306-87
RET
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple
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NIC #01306-87
17 March 1987
1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following
topics at our monthly warning meeting on 17 March.
2. Brief Items:
(1) Madagascar - Riots: The A/NI0/Africa led the discussion of riots
and looting in Madagascar. There was consensus that:
-- Unhappy Malagasy students have been demonstrating off and on since
December, but calm was restored once again last week. The students
have been protesting government interference with the university
system, arrests of student protesters, and food shortages. The
Comite Unique des Etudiants (KIM) student group plans to continue
until its demands are met, and the teachers are sympathetic. KIM is
composed heavily of dissatisfied southeasterners; the government
must deal cautiously with KIM because southeasterners also are
heavily represented in the armed forces.
-- Possibly inspired by the student demonstrations, looters recently
have been attacking homes and shops owned by Indians and Pakistanis
in the provinces. The anti-Indian riots have affected five towns
and perhaps six villages, but they appear to have burned themselves
out for the moment.
-- Three political parties reportedly support the students, and a loose
cooperation among the parties has been established. President
Ratsiraka alleges that Libya and the opposition parties are
responsible for the violence. Several anonymous pamphlets in
support of the protests have been printed and distributed, and their
source is unknown.
The government's strategy has been to try to keep the various
unhappy elements separated, and the security forces have exercised
restraint. The troops are thinly spread, however, and poor roads
hinder redeployments. On the positive side, rice supplies are ample
again, although some distribution problems persist. The Malagasy
Foreign Minister recently said that he thinks "the corner has been
turned."
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Warning Note: The situation has been the greatest challenge to
President Ratsiraka since he took power in 1975. We do not expect more
riots soon, but a resurgence certainly is possible. Whether violence flares
again or not, Ratsiraka probably will take action. He may attempt to make a
scapegoat of the Vonjy party while leaving MONIMA-K and MFM alone, and it is
possible that one or two student leaders may soon disappear.
(2) Liberia - Coup Plotting: INR led the discussion and suggested that
Liberia is entering a new phase in which economics--not politics--will drive
events and policies there. There was consensus that:
-- Reports of coup plotting probably will continue, but President Doe
seems secure over the next 30-90 days. Beyond that time frame,
however, Doe has much to fear from the worsening economy. US
efforts to influence economic policies in Liberia are a source of
friction. For example, Doe has made a shambles of the economy, and
the US has said so. Moreover, the 17 operational experts that the
US is sending will not be enough to turn things around.
-- NI0/Africa noted that there is a generational split emerging in
Liberia, and he urged monitoring the spread of radicalism in
Liberia. The old guard is becoming irrelevant, and there is a
danger of a coalition forming among dissatisfied students and young
radicals. In this atmosphere, there is a somewhat greater potential
that Doe might turn to new external sources for support.
-- INR suggested that Doe probably will try to extort funds from the
foreign mining companies in Liberia before turning to more desperate
measures such as seeking Bloc aid. Analysts judged that Doe is
unlikely to reestablish relations with the USSR over the near term,
although he may try the "Mobutu model" of juggling a variety of
advisers and aid from East and West.
-- DIA noted that some military officers are unhappy with the recently
delivered Romanian vehicles and advisers. Thus the army might not
go along with a decision by Doe to court Soviet Bloc potential
suppliers.
Warning Note: The 17 US operational experts due to arrive soon in
Liberia probably will be a further source of friction in US-Liberian
relations. Doe is unlikely to turn to the East for new aid over the near
term, but might do so at some point in the future.
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(3) Mozambique - Foreign Intervention: The A/NI0/Africa led the
discussion of international aid to Maputo and the RENAMO insurgents, which
concluded that:
Soviet Bloc and Cuban military assistance probably will remain at
modest levels for the near term. Soviet military deliveries dropped
nearly 50 percent last year, probably because of the Mozambican
armed forces' limited ability to absorb new equipment and because
the Soviets want to avoid new costs in Mozambique. Mozambican
pilots reportedly are training in the USSR on Sukhoi aircraft, but
introduction of new Soviet aircraft in Mozambique is unlikely soon
because such training usually takes years to complete. Meanwhile,
Soviet roles in Mozambique may be changing somewhat. Soviet
personnel may be providing more communications and intelligence
support, and they are training elite or specialized Mozambican
counterinsurgency units.
African support for Maputo is increasing, but Tanzania and Malawi
will find it difficult to maintain their commitments over the longer
term. Zimbabwe recently carried out some limited offensives in the
Zambezi River valley, but we expect its forces to resume a defensive
posture nearer the Beira and Tete transportation routes soon.
Tanzania has delivered 1200 or 1500 troops to Quelimane--more than
most analysts expected--and a third battalion may be sent soon. A
number of states have helped to transport the Tanzanian troops or
promised to support them, but the deployment is diverting Tanzanian
funds and thus iponardi7ina Dar Ps Sal agreement. Malawi
o protect a portion
of the Nacala Railroad, but Lilongwe is wishful that RENAMO won't
attack them.
-- The United Kingdom is doubling its training of Mozambican Army
officers, but the West remains unwilling to provide substantial
military aid.
-- Insurgent operations and South African aid probably have been
disrupted, but the guerrillas have successfully evaded the
Zimbabwean and government attacks and are likely to bounce back over
the coming months. CIA noted that the security situation has
improved somewhat, but that the government's gains probably are
short-term.
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(4) Angola/Cuba - Cuban Troop Withdrawal: The NI0/Africa began the
discussion by suggesting that Angola is considering a
partial Cuban troops withdrawal are main y a disinformation effort by
Luanda. The discussion produced consensus that:
-- Several factors suggest that the MPLA government
wants a reduction of Cuban forces in Angola are an Angolan
disinformation effort. Most stem from Luanda,
Moreover, the MPLA's
iast arty uongress reportedly decided to try to project a more
reasonable image in order to undercut international support for
UNITA. Finally, Luanda has not notified the US Government that it
desires to dispatch some Cubans; it presumably would do so if its
motive were to spur negotiations.
-- On the other hand, INR suggested) (might only
indicate that Luanda and Hava er the price Angola
must pay for the Cuban troops the Cuban troop
ctronoth in A- la appears to nave r a e gradually by about
bver the last 15 months.
(5) Angola/South Africa --Military Developments: DIA presented the
discussion of Angolan airstrikes on South African or
Namibian units, o an Angolan air incursion into Namibia, and of Angolan
fighters scrambling against indications of a South African air penetration.
There was consensus that:
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Warning Note: Whether) )indicate new Angolan/Cuban
aggressiveness or just South African posturing, the potential for new
fighting, especially air related, has increased. South Africa's airpower
advantage has been eroding over recent years, and it probably will do
something in coming months to reassert it's superiority.
3. Main Item: Chad - Turning Point Ahead. CIA led the discussion of
Libyan, Chadian, and French preparations for increased fighting. There was
consensus that:
-- Libya continues to reinforce its forces in northern Chad, to carry
out airstrikes and ground operations, and to prepare for an attempt
to retake Fada. President Habre has sent more Chadian troops north
and deployed them widely; the Chadians also are developing their own
aerial resupply capability. France has reinforced its contingent in
Chad and deployed its forces farther forward. Meanwhile, diplomatic
initiatives by Sudan, Algeria, and Nigeria have been unsuccessful in
getting peace talks started, but all three efforts are continuing.
-- Analysts were no longer confident that Libya probably could win the
expected fight for Fada. The Libyan forces have advantages in
equipment and numbers of personnel, and they probably could take
Fada under optimum conditions, but Habre's forces may adopt an
aggressive defense and exploit Libyan errors to defeat them.
Moreover, Libyan units are reluctant to fight, some are not obeying
Qadhafi's orders, and the quality of Libyan manpower is poor. The
US Army representative thought that a Libyan attack on Fada might
fail, and the Air Force representative noted that Libyan aircraft
have been ineffective in bombing Fada for three weeks.
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-- Libyan movements toward Fada may indicate that the campaign has
begun, and Chadian units have deployed to ambush Libyan convoys.
However, we see no evidence that the Libyans have stockpiled
ammunition at Ouadi Doum as we would expect, and Libyan forces in
Sudan appear to have relaxed. France, meanwhile, has deployed
helicopters with antiarmor missiles near the Chad-Sudan border in
position to counter a Libyan incursion from Sudanese territory.
Warning Note: Habre's costs are likely to increase soon. Intensified
fighting around Fada, Faya-Largeau, and/or Ouadi Doum is likely soon.
Meanwhile, Libyan forces in the Tibesti area have been gaining experience at
fighting the guerrillas and have begun to improve their tactics.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300050007-7
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa
warning meeting:
EXTERNAL:
DIA/DI0/Africa
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Air Force
Marines
State/INR
NSA
DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/CRES
DDI/OGI
DDI/LDA
DDI/OIA
NPIC
DDO/AF
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300050007-7