WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: September 9, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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NIO/W
9 September 1987
WESTERN EUROPE
GREECE/TURKEY: New Problems in the Aegean
A new crisis may be brewing. Greece
will move -a division from northern Greece to the Turkish border
oecause f fears that Turkey may attack in October. Athens also has taken
unusual security measures to prevent NATO from learning details of a large
exercise planned for the island of Limnos 12-14 October. The exercise would
violate a longstanding agreement with Turkey to demilitarize the island.
Each side apparently believes the US will prevent war--an attitude that may
encourage recklessness and trigger a sudden confrontation.
MALTA/LIBYA: Warming Relations
The Maltese government--which wrested control from the pro-Libyan
opposition party in May--may be debating the price for accepting Libyan
economic inducements.
The pro-Western Maltese
government will have to weigh Libyan promises to alleviate unemployment
against the price of Libyan involvement on the island.
EAST ASIA
SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA: Rocky Road to December
Agreement by the major parties on a new draft constitution sets the stage
for a presidential election late this year, but hardliners on both sides
continue to oppose the pact. The radicals are likely to call for street
demonstrations. Additional, perhaps greater, unrest could result from labor
strife. There appears to be general popular belief that a major breakdown in
order could occur before December. A collapse of public order could yet
result in the imposition of martial law. Disorder would encourage North
Korea to consider mounting destabilization operations and fomenting
anti-government riots and sabotage.
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PHILIPPINES: Coup Ramifications
President Aquino is weakened--perhaps mortally. Unless one of her
supporters can reunite the military, she will be unable to reestablish her
own political prestige and leadership. Rebel leader Colonel Honasan remains
at large with several hundred troops. The military is now split between
supporters of Honasan, Defense Minister Ramos, and former President Marcos;
each group could turn on the Aquino government. Because much of the military
and populace is sympathetic to Honasan's grievances and blames Mrs. Aquino,
another military uprising or coup attempt is likely.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Soviet Pressure
Soviet diplomatic initiatives and violations of Pakistani ground and
airspace are maintaining pressure on Zia to stop providing aid to the Afghan
resistance and to reach an accommodation with Moscow. Virtually daily cross
border attacks on Afghans in Pakistan continue. In an effort that would
boost pressure further, Moscow evidently will propose a timetable for Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan during current talks in Geneva.
EGYPT: Prospects for Instability
In the face of economic deterioration and continued activity by religious
activists, President Mubarak will be hard-pressed to maintain control during
implementation of the IMF program. If Mubarak fails to adequately address
Egypt's growing economic crisis, extensive protests and labor strife could
erupt, undermining Mubarak's hold on the presidency.
INDIA/CHINA: Risk of Confrontation
Chinese initiatives since mid-July to defuse the border issue--and New
Delhi's conciliatory actions--have helped ease tensions along the Sino-Indian
border, but there is little evidence of major troop withdrawals from the
border. Moreover, the Indian Army Chief of Staff seems to be spoiling for a
fight. Should Gandhi not compromise with the Chinese, the leve' of tension
could increase. A breakdown in the talks could result in new confrontations.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
Islamabad probably already has the capability to produce
a nuclear device within a few days to a few weeks of a decision to do so.
The Pakistani nuclear program enjoys widespread domestic support, and
external pressures against the nuclear program are not likely to dissuade
Pakistan from maintenance of the nuclear option. This has triggered Indian
reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions
in the subcontinent. NIO/Warning notes that we should be prepared for the
eventuality of a weapons test in the subcontinent.
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INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Invasion?
India has committed most of an infantry division to northern and eastern
Sri Lanka in recent weeks to help enforce the peace agreement concerning the
Tamil insurgency and has put another 15,000 troops and a corps headquarters
on alert for deployment. In addition to introducing a force that could
dominate the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians have obtained Colombo's
agreement to a virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka,
including access to external military assistance, internal security in the
north and east, and foreign ship visits. It is not yet clear how far Prime
Minister Gandhi intends to go in seizing power over Sri Lanka, but his
overall military commitment continues to grow and he is sending a commando
battalion to Colombo, where there are no organized Tamil insurgent units.
Should President Jiyewardene be deposed or an assassination attempt succeed,
Gandhi almost certainly would move in force on Colombo. US interests in the
country may be in jeopardy. NIO/NESA recognizes India's aspiration for a
dominant role in South Asia, but believes Gandhi would prefer to play that
role without the use of military force. NIO/NESA sees the peace accord as a
gamble by India that a short-term commitment of military force will help it
achieve its broader strategic goal.
IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
The likelihood has increased that Tehran will raise the stakes now that
the Saudis have called its bluff. Iranian military preparations and Tehran's
specific inclusion of Bahrain and an emirate in its list of direct enemies of
Iran may be a harbinger of further actions against the US or Saudi Arabia or,
in the short run, an attempt to seize new territory from other Gulf Arabs.
Additionally, there would be serious repercussions in the region should Iran
carry out its contingency plans to occupy Kuwait's Bubiyan Island. The
probability of a US combatant being involved in hostilities in the region is
higher than ever before.
IRAN/IRAQ: Internal Developments
Political stakes in the war are high. The potential for sudden collapse
of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military
results. Domestic military and civilian opposition to Husayn continues.
Meanwhile, in Iran, Khomeini's death could lead to major instability within
the post-Khomeini government.
IRAN/LEBANON/MEDITERRANEAN: Revolutionary Guard Naval Threat
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon apparently are
increasing and soon may present a new kind of threat to US and allied
maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea. Israeli targets probably have
highest priority, but the Iranians might choose to retaliate for US or allied
actions in the Persian Gulf with attacks or mine laying in the eastern
Mediterranean.
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KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is increasing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to border conflict. In May, Iran conducted a raid inside
Turkey following two Turkish raids against Kurdish targets in Iran. Turkish
intelligence has identified six Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that
94 Iranian irregulars recently captured while infiltrating intended to attack
Iraq's pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is
seriously straining Turkish-Iranian relations.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time. In the
absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with an
ever-deteriorating economic situation, the chances of a sudden change of
government continue.
TUNISIA: Increasing Instability
Bourguiba's campaign to suppress all political opposition is escalating
with harsher crackdowns on Islamic fundamentalists as demonstrations and
bombings become more frequent. The army is tightening security on the eve of
trials of fundamentalists and the government has released 2,500 thugs from
prison to form a special police battalion designed to keep fundamentalists
under control. Far from ensuring smooth succession, however, the regime's
efforts are drastically increasing discontent and ensuring chaos,
uncertainty, and confusion when the succession crisis comes. The Libyan
threat almost certainly will increase in the post-Bourguiba period, and
Algeria too seems poised to influence the succession struggle.
LATIN AMERICA
Brazil: Military Plotting
Partly as a result of proposed provisions in the new constitution
reinstating leftist officers expelled after the last coup,
The next few months will be critical as
Congress debates the constitution. Increasing economic problems could lead
to broad based protests, providing a pretext for military intervention.
CHILE: Intransigence
Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain in power
beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major reshuffle of the
army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet now seems
determined to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's actions to
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maintain control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over his
leadership within the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class, fueling
momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Descent Into Anarchy
The situation continues to deteriorate rapidly. Street violence and acts
of anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the safety of US citizens.
Radical Catholic priests and communists are increasingly involved in
anti-government activities. In addition, former President Duvalier continues
to plot a military coup. Economic problems--plus harsh military
reactions--increase the likelihood of a governmental crisis before the
presidential elections scheduled to be held in November. Even General Namphy
seems to yearn for a return to strongman rule.
NICARAGUA/HONDURAS: Continuation of Hostilities
Nicaragua continues to maintain a limited presence inside Honduran border
regions, thereby keeping pressure on the Honduran government to restrict
rebel activities. Honduras is likely to seek concessions and further
reassurances of support from the US, as Managua steps up activities in border
regions. NIO/Warning notes that the potential for Sandinista forces inside
Honduras to fire on US military personnel continues.
PANAMA: Stalemate
Anti-government protests are tapering off, but the opposition could yet
unify and force Noriega's resignation. Noriega under siege will continue his
demagogic campaign against the US, crack down roughly on the opposition and,
if necessary, install a military junta. The strife has contributed to the
flight of some 10 percent of the banking system's assets, increasing already
considerable strains on the economy and leading foreign bankers.to reassess
their positions in Panama; at least two have already decided to leave. As
the crisis evolves, there will be an ever increasing risk that Noriega will
target more sensitive US interests in Panama for subversion.
COLOMBIA/VENEZUELA: Border Dispute
Colombia and Venezuela again are squabbling over control of the oil rich
Golfo de Venezuela. Although the situation is stabilizing and a military
clash appears unlikely, both Colombian President Barco and Venezuelan
President Lusinchi have asked the US to speed delivery of missile shipments.
The dispute is complicating cooperation in counterinsurgency and
antinarcotics operations.
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ANGOLA: Prospects for Clash with South Africa
The risk of direct South African-Cuban clashes clearly is growing, as the
Angolan government accelerates its measured two-front offensive against UNITA
positions in southeast Angola. Satellite photography shows Angolan forces
converging toward UNITA-held Mavinga, which South Africa intervened to
protect in 1985. Pretoria is deploying more aircraft to northern Namibia and
Luanda has moved more fighters to forward bases; either side could strike
without further warning. Should the South Africans attack Cuban strongholds,
Cuban contingency plans--as reported by defector General del Pino--call for
retaliatory airstrikes against South African air bases in Namibia, thus
increasing the chances for escalation.
SOUTH AFRICA/FRONTLINE STATES: Confrontation
Conservative electoral gains and deep divisions within the Afrikanner
community have revealed increased domestic polarization that has further
undermined the influence of moderate blacks and whites who seek compromise.
Pretoria's gambit to co-opt South African blacks with a new constitution that
allows for urban black participation in government--but which does not
recognize the concept of one man, one vote--will not provide meaningful
political power to blacks, nor satisfy their demands for full political
representation. In extending the emergency decree to a quasi-permanent
condition and stifling legitimate dissent the government has demonstrated
that its authority can be perpetuated only by force. Externally, until
Pretoria's increasingly coercive measures against the Frontline States
subside, there will be greater opportunities for both the West and the East
to capitalize on the Frontline States' heightened sense of vulnerability.
President Botha may be seeking a relaxation in tensions to facilitate his
reform program as well as gain favorable publicity in the West.
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures:
Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling
effects on the aging East European leaderships. Prospective
succession dilemmas, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are
adding to the potential for instability. In Hungary, strikes and
demonstrations may grow as the impact of recent economic austerity
measures are felt this fall.
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Pressures are especially great in Romania, where continuing debt
problems and economic mismanagement have exacerbated already abject
living conditions. Poor nutrition and worsening sanitary conditions
are contributing to new outbreaks this summer of diseases like
cholera. Popular discontent may rea0 its neak in late winter, when
consumer goods supplies are lowest. I
Should they decide to move against the
ailing Ceausescu, we may have little additional warning. Moscow
would seek to draw Bucharest back to the fold.
USSR: Massive Need for Hard Currency
The Soviets face substantial reductions in hard currency earning from oil
this year at a time of increasing need for imports for modernization. Moscow
increasingly will: -rely on Western credit markets; squeeze oil supplied to
Eastern Europe to try to barter it on the international market; sell more
gold; and try to promote new exports--arms, vehicles, metals, and shipping
services--at bargain prices to gain needed hard currency.
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