BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. aC20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
NIC 05210-87
31 December 1987
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
2. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
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NIO/W
31 December 1987
LATIN AMERICA
PANAMA: Noriega Fighting Back
The Noriega regime, under pressure from a declining economy and unusually
strong allegations of corruption, appears to be preparing to curtail Panama's
military relationship with the US and challenge longstanding US base rights.
This strategy may lead to a unilateral abrogation of the 1977 Canal Treaties
and demands for immediate transfer of the canal to full Panamanian
sovereignty. The most striking indication of such intent was the 24 November
National Assembly resolution calling for the government to suspend visas for
US military personnel and begin negotiations for the removal of the US
Southern Command. The resolution followed a series of media provocations this
fall including forgery of a State Department letter purporting to assure a US
Senator that troops would remain in Panama after the year 2000 and allegations
that the US planned to overthrow the Panamanian government.
HAITI: Critical Mass?
The rescheduled 17 January election is unlikely to assure either order or
General Namphy's promised transition to genuinely democratic government by
February. The ruling council is adopting an increasingly threatening posture
toward centrist candidates and is criticizing the Catholic Church directly and
the US indirectly. Efforts by Namphy to manipulate the election have resulted
in an increasingly volatile situation that could erupt into violent upheaval
requiring the evacuation of several thousand American citizens. An ominous
alternative is that Duvalierist activists continue plotting for a coup in the
near future.
CHILE: Crawling toward Democracy
General Pinochet's determination to stay in power may precipitate a new
crisis this coming year. Although his popularity has risen sharply and a
recent poll indicated that 37 percent of the populace would vote in the 1988
plebiscite to keep him in power, he cannot count on winning a free election
despite the initial disarray of the soon-to-be-legalized opposition. To boost
his chances, Pinochet is pressing the reluctant junta to move the plebiscite
from September to July, when fewer, more supportive, voters are likely to be
registered. However, he could dangerously alienate the generals--Oarticularly
those opposed to him now who want a return to democracy--by pushing too hard
for an early election. A July vote also would threaten the legitimacy of the
plebiscite and increase political polarization, reinforcing the spiral of
extremist violence.
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EASTERN EUROPE
ROMANIA: Impending Crisis
President Ceausescu's personality cult, managerial incompetence,
repression, and yet more severe living conditions point to a crisis, possibly
by late winter when consumer supplies are lowest. The regime recently
stiffened austerity measures that in recent years have lead to thousands of
malnutrition and exposure-related deaths, and laid off still more workers
whose entire livelihoods--including housing and meals--are linked to their
jobs. The measures have sparked new unrest. In the worst incident, in Brasov
on 15 November, up to 10,000 workers and sympathizers sacked the local Party
headquarters and city hall, and called for Ceausescu's ouster. This time,
security forces' (Securitate) responses were muted and the crowd dispersed on
its own. The regime may be able to defuse individual troubles and get through
the winter, but major endemic problems and hatred of Ceausescu make more,
possibly violent unrest beyond control of the Securitate all but inevitable.
The threat of imminent upheaval also could galvanize disaffected government,
security, and party officials to overthrow the ailing, 69-year old Ceausescu.
Depending on the scale and type of crisis, Moscow may find opportunity or need
for military intervention.
EAST ASIA
PHILIPPINES: Stumbling Along...Dangerously
The Communist New People's Army
associated with nationwide local elections on 18 January
already is responsible for nearly 40 deaths. President Aquino's political
authority continues to be tenuous, despite her December approval to increase
military pay and the capture of coup leader, Colonel Honasan. Moreover, both
Communist and non-Communist politicians have criticized US policy and alleged
American violations of Philippine sovereignty. This, plus the October
killings of three US servicemen by Communists have serious implications for
the United States and the Aquino government. Continued guerrilla successes
amid other domestic turmoil will encourage various political and military
factions to force Aquino from office. It is difficult to exaggerate the
danger of Americans becoming targets of radical factions--there are some
120,000 Americans scattered throughout the Philippines.
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Freedom of Navigation
The recent upsurge in Iraqi airstrikes against Iranian shipping and
Iranian reprisals against foreign tankers will increase the chances of
incidents involving US naval vessels. Iran has increased its antishipping
attacks over the past year and now appears to be concentrating on
Saudi-associated shipping. This month, 13 out of 17 tankers attacked were
trading with Saudi Arabia. Iran's strategy evidently is aimed at driving a
wedge between the US and countries supporting the protection program.
Already, Saudi Arabia has called into question the value of the US and allied
combatants standing by while the Iranians attack neutral shipping. If the
United States were to extend naval protection to non-US flagged shipping,
Tehran probably would view such an action as additional US support for the
Iraqi war effort and consequently would confront the United States more
aggressively. In addition, the threat of an Iraqi accidental attack on US
combatants and merchant ships continues.
SYRIA/USSR: A Soviet Base?
Syria's possible agreement to allow construction of a Soviet-controlled
naval base at Tartus would give the Soviets their only actual base in the
Mediterranean, reducing the need to transit the Bosporus for repairs and
replenishment, and potentially increasing the Soviet challenge to NATO's
Turkish flank. Syria's decision, in return for $500 million in debt
forgiveness, a submarine, and coastal defense vessels, reflects the severity
of Damascus' economic woes and could be a harbinger of new Soviet bases in
Syria of greater military significance. The Syrians have resisted requests
for bases in the past, but are behind in payments for arms and may have felt
they have little choice now if they wish to continue to receive advanced
Soviet military hardware. Chronic Syrian economic troubles and the oil
price-related financial problems of their key Arab benefactors like Saudi
Arabia, and more adroit Soviet bargaining under Gorbachev, may give Moscow
still more leverage in the future.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
Islamabad probably has the capability to produce a nuclear device within a
few days to a few weeks of a decision to do so. The Pakistani nuclear program
enjoys widespread domestic support, and external pressures against the nuclear
program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from maintenance of the nuclear
option. This has triggered problems with US aid for Pakistan and could lead
the Pakistanis to a more independent course. It also has prompted Indian
reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that will further fueitensions in
the subcontinent.
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INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Imperialism?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's adoption
of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
an infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian) insurgency
before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi continues to
increase its troop strength, which is approaching 40,000. In addition to
introducing a force larger than the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians have
obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri Lankan state and to a
virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka. It is not yet
clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing dominance over Sri Lanka,
but active guerrilla warfare by Tamil fighters against the Indians and India's
1400 combat casualties will complicate plans to withdraw and make a long stay
more likely. The Indians themselves already are talking of a three-year
presence; this could presage an extended period of warfare and turmoil.
IRAN/IRAQ: Developments on the Ground
A high level of activity in Iranian rear areas, new mobilizations, and the
massing of troops and supplies suggest that Iran will launch a large-scale
offensive against Iraq soon. The Iraqi military recall of reservists born in
1945--and placing reservists born in 1943 and 1944 on standby status--indicate
Iraq is becoming increasingly hard-pressed to replace casualties. Extensive
Iranian use of chemical weapons would exacerbate Iraq's problem, particularly
if Iran achieves surprise with its conventional attack. No matter the
military outcome of a new offensive, the potential for sudden collapse of
either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military results.
Latent civilian and military opposition to Iraqi President Husayn, combined
with lack of success on the battlefield, popular weariness with heavy
casualties, and no end to the war in sight, could with the right catalyst
produce a sudden governmental change. Meanwhile, in Iran, the possibly
imminent death of the popular Ayatollah Khomeini could lead to major
instability within any successor government given massive, continuing battle
casualties and the deprivation of the populace.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya may recently have received
additional chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran.
We
should be prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile
in Libya against Chad.
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IRAN/IRAQ: Chemical/Biological Weapons
Iranian chemical warfare capabilities are growing, and Tehran recently has
demonstrated a willingness to use chemical munitions on the battlefield.
Prime Minister Musavi stated publicly on 27 December that an in-country
capability is being established for manufacturing various chemical weapons and
openly declared a willingness to use them if necessary. Although Iraq is the
most likely target, Iran may also decide to attack US interests ashore or
afloat. US Naval vessels would be hard to attack, but could quickly be
contaminated by CW agents traveling through ship ventilation systems.
This suggests that Iraq may be willing, for the
first time in the history of warfare, to use biological weapons on the
battlefield.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is continuing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to border conflict. In November Turkish authorities seized
Iranian irregulars who claimed they strayed into Turkey en route to northern
Iraq to assist Kurdish compatriots. Earlier, Iran conducted a raid during May
inside Turkey followina two Turkish raids against Kurdish targets in Iran.
identified Kurdish camps located in Iran, and this
summer the Turks captured ranian irregulars who were infiltrating to
attack Iraq's pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the
Kurds is seriously straining Turkish-Iranian relations. These developments,
plus a September Kurdish attack in Istanbul--the first in a major city since
1980--could boost pressures on Prime Minister Ozal to launch more preemptive
strikes against Kurdish camps in Iran.
WESTERN EUROPE
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: Continuing Tension
Another crisis may be brewing despite warm public comments that could
presage a Greek/Turkish summit to discuss differences. Allegedly with Greek
government encouragement, the Greek Cypriots have received 30 French AMX-30
tanks for their National Guard and may soon buy 30 more. The buildup in
offensive weapons could become a red flag goading the Turks to react. The
Greeks also appear to be reorienting military forces more to oppose Turkey
than to defend against a possible Warsaw Pact attack. The Nb/Warning
believes that, given the background of contentious issues between the Greek
and Turkish governments such as rights to the Aegean seabed and militarization
of the islands, direct confrontation is possible. Rumors of future joint
Greek-Bulgarian military exercises will heighten tensions further.
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AFRICA
ANGOLA/CUBA/SOUTH AFRICA: Cuban Reinforcement
Cuba is increasing the risk of clashes with South African forces in
southern Angola. Armor elements of a premier division deploying25xi
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NIGER: Government in Transition
New President All Saibou's position is insecure Wandhe may be a
transitional leader. The Nigerien armed forces are divided and many officers
believe that Saibou lacks ability; senior officers are jockeying for position
? while younger ones want someone from junior ranks. Popular support also
appears thin. Protracted instability could make the country especially
vulnerable to Libyan meddling and territorial predation.
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